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INTRODUCTION
The recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Horton v.
Commissioner,' which affirmed a tax court decision holding that punitive
damages recovered in personal injury tort actions are excludable from the
gross income of the recipient under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),2 conflicts with three
decisions in other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion.3 The cir-
cuit courts now stand deeply divided on the important and very basic question
of whether punitive damages are taxable.
This article examines the conflict between the federal courts over the
taxation of punitive damages recovered for personal injury. While this article
focuses on the tax treatment of punitive damages recovered for personal inju-
ries, it is necessary to touch upon the tax consequences of other elements of a
personal injury recovery. To put this discussion in context, consider the exam-
ple of Stella Liebeck. In 1992, Ms. Liebeck, a 79-year-old McDonald's cus-
tomer, suffered third-degree burns when hot coffee spilled on her legs after
she had removed the lid on her coffee cup and held the cup in her lap. Ms.
Liebeck sued McDonald's, and in August 1994, in an outcome widely reported
in the popular media,4 an Albuquerque jury awarded Liebeck $2.9 million in
damages.' On appeal, a state district court ordered the award reduced to
$480,000,6 and while further appeals were pending, the parties settled.7
The Liebeck litigation raises some timely and interesting questions con-
cerning the federal income tax treatment of Ms. Liebeck's original damage
award, had it stood. For example, assume that Ms. Liebeck's $2.9 million
award consisted of the following:
1. 33 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994), affg Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 101
(1993).
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988).
3. See Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994); Reese v. United
States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
4. See, e.g., Theresa Howard, Jury 'Burns' McD in $2.9M verdict: Scalded Customer's
Victory Puts Chains' Coffee Service in Hotseat, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 29,
1994, at 1.
5. Liebeck argued that McDonald's had sold a defective product (due to the coffee's
extreme temperature), had failed to wam customers of the coffee's temperature, and had
breached an implied warranty of merchantability because it had failed to ensure that the
coffee was fit for human consumption. Id.
6. See Theresa Howard, Judge Slashes McD Settlement to $480,000, NATION'S RES-
TAURANT NEWS, Sept. 26, 1994, at 1.
7. See Theresa Howard, McD Settles Coffee Suit in Out-of-Court Agreement, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Dec. 12, 1994, at i.
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Specific compensatory damages: hospital bills ............. $20,000
lost wages ................. $10,000
loss of future earnings ......... $25,000
General compensatory damages: pain and suffering ........ $170,000
Statutory prejudgment interest ........................ $75,000
Punitive damages ............................... $2,600,000
Had Ms. Liebeck consulted a tax advisor concerning the taxability of her
original award, she would have learned that the federal income tax conse-
quences of the first four components of the award were relatively well-settled:
all the amounts received for those components would have been excludable
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).8 However, she would also have learned that the tax
treatment of the punitive damage component of her award is very unsettled
and controversial, and may vary among federal districts.'
This article will examine the current state of the law regarding the taxa-
tion of punitive damages. The resolution of the controversy is hampered by the
historically inconsistent ruling and litigating position of the Internal Revenue
Service, the uncertain effect of a 1989 amendment to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),'0 the
inconclusive application of relevant theories of taxable income to punitive
damages, and the debatable impact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Burke."
The discussion begins by examining the history of the applicable provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code 2 governing personal injury damage re-
coveries.
I. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): OVERVIEW AND A SHORT HISTORY
Under § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer's gross income
means "all income from whatever source derived." This statutory definition of
8. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988) states that "lelxcept in the case of amounts attributable
to ... deductions allowed under section 213 . . . gross income does not include . . . the
amount of any damages received .. . on account of personal injuries or sickness." However,
had Mrs. Liebeck previously deducted her hospital bills and received a tax benefit under
I.R.C. § 213 (Supp. V 1993), any recovery for those bills would have been includable in
her income to that extent. For the income tax treatment of prejudgment interest, see discus-
sion infra note 499.
9. The Tenth Circuit, in which Mrs. Liebeck resides, has not yet addressed the issue.
At least one district court in the Tenth Circuit, however, has found punitive damages
excludable from gross income. O'Gilvie v. Commissioner, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,567 (D. Kan. 1992); see infra notes 438 and 504.
10. See discussion infra note 276 and accompanying text. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (Supp. V
1993) was amended as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, § 7641, 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(hereinafter RRA '891.
11. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
12. The Internal Revenue Code is sometimes referred to herein as "the Code."
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gross income is "admittedly somewhat tautological"' 3 and of limited assis-
tance, although I.R.C. § 61 does list fifteen types of enumerated receipts and
transactions which constitute gross income. In attempting to interpret and
apply I.R.C. § 61 over the years, the courts have never articulated a true defi-
nition of "income" for purposes of the Code. " However, it is clear that the
courts hold that § 61 is all-encompassing and "sweeps broadly."' 5 It is equal-
ly clear that a personal injury damage recovery falls within the scope of the
section and will be includable in gross income unless specifically excluded
under another section of the Code. 6 Such exclusions from income are con-
strued narrowly. 7
The exclusionary provision of the Code applicable to damage recoveries
for personal injury is I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), entitled "Compensation for injuries or
sickness." The section exempts from gross income "any damages received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic pay-
ments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." This provision raises
many difficult questions of statutory construction. For example, what is the
exact scope of the phrase "personal injuries"?" What is to be made of the
13. Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625, 629 (2d Cir. 1993).
14. It is generally recognized that the Supreme Court abandoned its effort to define
"income" in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (holding that the
taxpayer recognized taxable income from a retirement of its bonds at less than par value).
The Court ignored its own earlier description of "income" as a "'gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207
(1920) (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)). Writing for the
Court in Kirby Lumber Co., Justice Holmes conceded that there was "nothing to be gained
by the discussion of judicial definitions." Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. at 3; see also Stanley
S. Surrey & William C. Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute:
Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness, 66
HARV. L. REv. 761, 771 (1953) (noting that in Kirby Lumber Co. the Court "recognized the
futility of attempting to capture the concept of income and confine it within a phrase" and
"explicitly abandoned the search for a definition" of income). Subsequently, in Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme Court repudiated the Eisner defi-
nition of income, stating that while "[imn that context ... the definition served a useful
purpose," it was "not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions."
Id. at 431. The Court stated, "Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable
receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature." Id. at 429-30.
15. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1870 (1992). The courts recognize that in
I.R.C. § 61 Congress intended "to use the full measure of its taxing power." Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940). The Code describes income "in sweeping terms and
should be broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax income compre-
hensively." Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
16. I.R.C. § 61 (1988) states that it applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
subtitle." As noted by the Second Circuit, "the term gross income has been read expansively
to include all realized gains and forms of enrichment, that is, 'all gains except those specifi-
cally exempted."' Collins, 3 F.3d at 630 (quoting Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 430).
17. See, e.g., Jacobson, 336 U.S. at 49 (stating that "[t]he exemptions, on the other
hand, as compared to income, are specifically stated and should be construed with restraint
in the light of the same policy.").
18. The major issue that has arisen in this context is whether "personal injuries" means
only physical personal injuries, or whether the phrase also encompasses nonphysical personal
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phrase "any damages"--does it truly mean any and all damages arising out of
a personal injury, or are there some components of a damage recovery that
ought not qualify for the exclusion? Is the phrase "any damages" qualified in
some fashion by the phrase "received on account of personal injuries" which
follows? And is the entire provision in turn qualified by the title of the sec-
tion, which refers to "compensation" for injuries (that is, should damages
which do not demonstrably serve a compensatory purpose fall outside the
scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2))?
The applicable Treasury Regulations provide little assistance in answering
these questions. The Regulations are brief, and merely state that "[t]he terms
'damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' mean an amount received
(other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or
action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement
entered into in lieu of prosecution.9
The legislative history of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) is enlightening, although not
dispositive. The predecessor of § 104(a)(2), section 213(b)(6) ° of the Reve-
nue Act of 1918,2" excluded from income "[almounts received, through acci-
dent or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensa-
tion for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages re-
ceived whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sick-
ness."2 2 The legislative history accompanying the Revenue Act of 1918 re-
garding this provision is sparse,23 although the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee Report accompanying this provision stated, "Under the present law, it is
injuries as well (e.g., those arising from torts such as defamation, employment discrimination,
insurance bad faith, denial of first amendment rights, etc.).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
20. When the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was recodified and reorganized as the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 213(b)(6) became I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The legislative histo-
ry of 1.R.C. § 104(a)(2), however, gives no indication that its scope or purpose was intended
to be modified in any way.
21. The Revenue Act of 1918 came at a time when the federal income tax was only
five years old:
On February 3, 1913, the sixteenth amendment was ratified by the states and be-
came part of the Constitution. In March of that same year, Woodrow Wilson be-
came President and World War I was imminent. With the entry into the war by
the United States, Congress appropriated nineteen billion dollars toward the war
effort and enacted to raise income taxes and lower exemptions. The Revenue Act
of 1918 was still in the Senate Finance Committee when World War I ended in
November 1918. It eventually became law ....
Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain-No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their Tax
Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 407, 413 (1986-87) (footnotes omitted).
22. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919) (current
version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)) (emphasis added). The availability of punitive damages was
well established by 1918. This gives rise to the argument that, had Congress desired to
distinguish between compensatory damages and punitive damages when it enacted §
213(b)(6), it could have easily done so; that it did not is indicative of a congressional intent
to treat these two components of damages identically. See Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d
586 (4th Cir. 1990).
23. See Chapman, supra note 21, at 413-14 ("[On the actual expression of intent, the
silence of Congress is deafening.").
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
doubtful whether amounts received ... as compensation for personal injury or
sickness, and damages received on account of such injuries or sickness, are
required to be including gross income. The proposed bill provides that such
amounts shall not be included in gross income. 24
Section 213(b)(6) was enacted against the backdrop of three prior govern-
ment rulings. In early 1915, the Service ruled in Treasury Decision 21355
that insurance proceeds received on account of an accident, as well as recover-
ies for pain and suffering in a lawsuit, were includable in gross income. This
result conflicted with the treatment of life insurance proceeds under the origi-
nal Revenue Act of 1913, which were stated to be excludable.26 The Service
subsequently had misgivings, and in 1918 asked the United States Attorney
General for his views on the tax treatment of the proceeds of an accident
insurance policy. In Attorney General's Opinion 304,27 the Attorney General
replied by invoking what has come to be known as the "return of capital"
theory:
Without affirming that the human body is in a technical sense the
"capital" invested in an accident policy, in a broad, natural sense the
proceeds of the policy do but substitute, so far as they go, capital
which is the source of future periodical income. They merely take the
place of capital in human ability which was destroyed by the acci-
dent. They are therefore "capital" as distinguished from "income" re-
ceipts."
The opinion concluded that "the proceeds of an accident insurance policy
are not 'gains or profits and income' but are instead capital and therefore
nontaxable." On the heels of Attorney General's Opinion 304, the Service
issued Treasury Decision 2747, ruling that proceeds received by an individual
as the result of a suit or compromise for personal injury sustained are an acci-
dent is not income under the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917.30 While the
basis for the ruling was not stated, a later ruling by the Solicitor of Internal
Revenue, Solicitor's Opinion 1384,"' interpreted Treasury Decision 2747 as
"rest[ing] ... upon the theory of conversion of capital assets."32
Against the backdrop of the Service's inconsistent rulings in this area,
24. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918).
25. T.D. 2135, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39 (1915).
26. See Internal Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913) (providing that
all amounts received in respect of a life insurance policy, including those received at maturi-
ty or upon surrender of the policy, were excludable). This generous provision was said to
have been inserted at the urging of an article appearing in the Wall Street Journal. See
GEORGE F. TUCKER, THE INCOME TAX LAW OF 1913 EXPLAINED 18 (1913). Under the
current Code, amounts received under a life insurance contract are excludable only if paid by
reason of the death of the insured. I.R.C. § 101(a) (1988).
27. Income Tax-Proceeds of Accident Insurance Policy, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918).
28. Id. at 308.
29. Id.
30. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
31. Sol. Op. 1384, 2 C.B. 71 (1920).
32. Id. at 72.
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section 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 attempted to clarify the status of
the law and adopted the conclusions expressed in Treasury Decision 2747 and
Attorney General's Opinion 304. Because those rulings relied on the return of
capital theory, section 213(b)(6) may be viewed, to some extent, as congres-
sional approval of that rationale.
It is important to note that both Treasury Decision 2747 and Attorney
General's Opinion 304 involved a physical injury. After the enactment of
section 213(b)(6), the Solicitor of Internal Revenue held that the "[mioney
received as damages in libel proceedings is subject to income tax. 3 a In the
setting of a nonphysical injury, the government took the position that the sec-
tion 213(b)(6) exclusion did not apply. Thus, very early in the history of
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), a "physical-vs.-nonphysical" injury distinction was read
into the statute.
The following year, the physical-vs.-nonphysical distinction was again
invoked. In Solicitor's Memorandum 1384, damages received by a taxpayer on
account of the alienation of the affections of his wife were found to be
includable in gross income, and not within the scope of section 213(b)(6)'
While the ruling specifically acknowledged that the language of section
213(b)(6), which refers broadly to "injuries of sickness," might arguably be
construed to extend to personal injuries such as the one there involved," the
ruling concluded that "[nievertheless, it appears more probable from the lan-
guage of [the statute] taken as a whole, referring as it does, to accident and
health insurance and workmen's compensation Acts, that the term 'personal
injuries,' as used therein means physical injuries only."36
In distinguishing Attorney General's Opinion 3043" and Treasury Deci-
sion 2747,"s Solicitor's Memorandum 1384 stated that
[t]hese conclusions rest ... upon the theory of conversion of capital
assets. It would follow that personal injury not resulting in the de-
struction or diminution in the value of a capital asset would not be
within the exemption. From no ordinary conception of the term can a
wife's affections be regarded as constituting capital. 9
After Solicitor's Memorandum 1384, the Supreme Court in its 1920
Eisner v. Macomber decision, described income as the "'gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be understood to in-
clude profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets."' Based on
33. Sol. Op. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919).
34. See Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920).
35. Id. at 71.
36. Id.
37. See 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918).
38. See T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
39. Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 72 (1920) (emphasis added). This may be the earliest
articulation of the view that a personal injury recovery, such as punitive damages, which
does not compensate a loss in human capital, is taxable.
40. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.
Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918)). As discussed above, this definition was later abandoned by
the Supreme Court and is no longer held in repute. See supra note 14. For a description of
1995]
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Eisner, in 1922 the Solicitor of Internal Revenue held, in Solicitor's Opinion
132, that damages for alienation of affections, damages for slander or libel of
personal character, and money received by a parent in consideration of the
surrender of his right to the custody of his minor child, were all excludable
from gross income.4" Solicitor's Opinion 132 relied more on the absence of a
"gain or profit" as required by Eisner, and less on the return of capital theory
that formed the basis of the earlier rulings.42 Solicitor's Memorandum 957
was modified in accordance with this opinion, and Solicitor's Memorandum
1384 was revoked.43 Whatever its rationale, Solicitor's Opinion 132 clearly
represented a retreat from the physical-vs.-nonphysical distinction."4
The preceding rulings set the stage for two important issues that will be
discussed later in this article. First, these rulings suggest that the statutory
predecessor of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was arguably predicated, at least in part, on
the return of capital theory. More recently, the return of capital theory has
played a major role in the cases that have examined the tax treatment of pu-
nitive damages, and its analysis has spawned very different conclusions. This
theory and its weaknesses are discussed in Part 1II.
4
1
Second, these rulings left unresolved the question of whether damages
received for nonphysical injuries should be afforded exclusion under I.R.C. §
104(a)(2). In Hawkins v. Commissioner,46 decided soon after Eisner, the
Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor to the Tax Court) adopted the view that
Eisner as an "Old Stone Age tax case," see Robert J. Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and
Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REv. 701, 738 (1986).
41. Sol. Op. 132, 1-1 C.B. 92, 94 (1922).
42. The opinion stated:
In the light of ... [Strattons Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913)
and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)] it must be held that there is no
gain, and therefore no income, derived from the receipt of damages for alienation
of affections or defamation of personal character. In either case the right invaded is
a personal right and is in no way transferable. While a jury endeavors roughly to
compute the amount of damage inflicted, in the very nature of things there can be
no correct estimate of the money value of the invaded rights. The rights on the
one hand and the money on the other are incomparable things which can not be
placed on opposite sides of an equation. If an individual is possessed of a personal
right that is not assignable and not susceptible of any appraisal in relation to mar-
ket values, and thereafter receives either damages or payment in compromis6 for an
invasion of that right, it can not be held tha: he thereby derives any gain or prof-
it. It is clear, therefore, that the Government c:an not tax him on any portion of the
sum received.
Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
43. See Sol. Op. 957, I C.B. 65 (1919).
44. In Revenue Ruling 74-77, the Service stated, without analysis, that damages received
on account of alienation of affections or in consideration of the surrender of the custody of
a minor child were excludable as income. Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33. These represent-
ed two of the three issues discussed in Solicitor's Opinion 132, and the latter ruling was
declared superseded. Id. Interestingly, in both Solicitor's Opinion 132 and in Revenue Ruling
74-77, the Service failed to cite the applicable statute. Id. The rulings appear to have been
predicated on a conclusion that the recoveries were not even "income" under I.R.C. § 61
and its predecessor.
45. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
46. 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927).
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nonphysical injuries are "personal injuries" for purposes of the predecessor to
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). While Hawkins may have removed any doubt that non-
physical injuries can constitute "personal injuries" for purposes of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2), the Service and the courts have nevertheless historically afforded
damages for nonphysical injuries less favored treatment under the statute. The
details of this controversy have dominated litigation in the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
arena in recent years and ultimately culminated in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Burke,47 discussed in Part IV of this article.
II. THE NATURE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
4 a
Punitive damages49 have a long,"0 contentious, 51 and somewhat uncer-
tain history in American law:52 "sometimes used to punish, and sometimes
used to compensate a plaintiff for injuries to pride, dignity, or reputation that
would not otherwise be compensated through traditional tort awards intended
47. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
48. See generally Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1173 (1931) (discussing how punitive damages serve an admonitory function); Tom Riley,
Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195 (1977-78)
(examining the development of the law of punitive damages).
49. Punitive damages are also referred to as exemplary damages, vindictive damages,
and in years past, "smart money." See, e.g., WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 234 (1896) (Punitive damages are allowed "in view of the grossness of the wrong
done, rather than as a measure of compensation. They are 'smart money' added to proper
compensation."); FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF REMEDIES FOR TORTS 598 (1873) (stating
that "[plunitive, vindictive, and exemplary damages are, in legal contemplation, synonymous
terms").
50. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (recognizing both the
existence and propriety of punitive damages); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont.,
Inc. v. Kelso Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 274 (1989) (noting that the practice of awarding
punitive damages was known to the framers of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution). Punitive damages appear in reported cases at least as far back as 1791. See
Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 90, 91 (Super. Ct. 1791) (instructing the jury "not to estimate
the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for
example's sake, to prevent such offenses in the future" and to "mark [the jury's] disapproba-
tion and be an example to others"). See generally Melvin M. Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages:
Their History. Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society. 49 UMKC L. REV. 1
(1980); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957).
51. See HILLIARD, supra note 49, at 597 n.(a) (stating that "[nlo question relating to
damages has been so prolific of discussion, and still remains so unsettled, as the one, wheth-
er in any case, and if so in what cases, exemplary damages may be given"); cf. Fay v.
Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (The notion of punishing the defendant in such a way "is
a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of
the body of the law."). For Judge Friendly's more recent and oft-cited economics-based criti-
cism of punitive damages in the context of product liability cases, see Roginsky v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
52. English law has a long history of punitive or exemplary damages. See, e.g., Wilkes
v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B. 1763) (stating that "[dlamages are designed not
only as satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as punishment to the guilty, to deter
from any such proceeding for the future and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the
action itself"); see also Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 274 (tracing the roots of puni-
tive damages in England to the Thirteenth Century).
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to make a plaintiff whole." 3
Under the majority view, punitive or exemplary damages are wholly pe-
nal 4 in nature and are recoverable "where the wrong done to [the victim]
was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or
wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant."55 It is the "wanton,
reckless, malicious or oppressive"" conduct of the defendant, and not any
injury suffered by the victim, that is said to be the basis for an award of puni-
tive damages. "Unlike compensatory or actual damages, punitive or exemplary
damages are based upon an entirely different pubic policy consideration-that
of punishing the defendant for his evil behavior or to make an example of
him .... "" These criteria are often statutorily prescribed," and the under-
lying purposes of punitive damages are frequently reflected in jury instructions
describing such damages."
While the foregoing characterization of punitive damages holds true in the
53. Rein v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 928 F.2d 1267, 1272 (2d Cir. 1991).
54. Penal statutes have been contrasted with punitive damages statutes in that the former
create an entirely distinct and independent cause of action (while the latter do not) and re-
quire no proof of actual damages as a condition precedent to recovery (contrary to the gen-
eral rule for punitive damages). See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 214
(Colo. 1984).
55. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990).
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) (describing puni-
tive damages as "damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from
similar conduct in the future."). In light of the penal nature of punitive damages, an award
of punitive damages is justified only for conduct "that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others." Id. § 908(2).
While it is true that "facts [must] be established that, apart from punitive damages, are suffi-
cient to maintain a cause of action," punitive damages are not awarded to compensate for an
injury, they are designed to punish the tortfeasor and to deter him and others from similar
conduct in the future. Id. § 908 cmts. a,c,e; see also Palmer, 684 P.2d at 213-14.
58. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (authorizing the jury
to award exemplary damages in tort actions if "the injury complained of is attended by
circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton misconduct"). The acknowledged pur-
pose of exemplary damages in Colorado is to punish and penalize the wrongdoer and to
serve as a warning to other possible offenders. See Palmer, 684 P.2d at 213-14 (upholding a
landmark $6.2 million punitive damages award against manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield);
Beebe v. Pierce, 521 P.2d 1263, 1264 (Colo. 1974); Ark Valley Alfalfa Mills v. Day, 263
P.2d 815, 817 (Colo. 1953) (holding that exemplary or punitive damages are not compensa-
tory in nature but are for the purpose of punishing the wrongdoer as an example to others);
Barnes v. Lehman, 193 P.2d 273, 274 (Colo. 1948). But cf Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119,
122 (Colo. 1884) (rejecting punitive damages as not consistent with reason and justice).
59. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'g 79 T.C. 398
(1982), where the trial court stated:
If you find that the Plaintiff has suffered actual damages as a proximate result of
the acts of the Defendant on which you base your findings of liability, you may in
your sole discretion award additional damages against the Defendant known as
punitive or exemplary damages for sake of example and by way of punishing the
Defendant. If, and only if, you find by a preponderance of the evidence that said
Defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud and actual malice.
Roemer, 79 T.C. at 403.
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case of damages awarded in federal actions' and is accepted by a majority of
state courts, 61 some states do not view punitive damages as entirely penal in
nature. Punitive damages are sometimes said to rest "on the theory that the
injury is greater, and the actual damages are increased, by reason of the ag-
gravating circumstances" of the tort. Punitive damages are also sometimes
said to compensate the victim for elements of damage which are not otherwise
legally compensable, such as attorneys' fees and costs63 or wounded feel-
ings.' Thus, some states view punitive damages as at least partially com-
pensatory6" and therefore not entirely penal in nature." An examination of
state law is therefore often necessary to ascertain the nature of punitive dam-
ages in the particular jurisdiction.
60. The Supreme Court views punitive damages as penal in nature rather than compen-
satory. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelso Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
297 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing punitive
damages as private fines to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter repetition of the injuri-
ous act); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979)
(citing Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
61. Belli, supra note 50, at 6. For example, Wyoming courts are in accord with the
majority view of punitive damages. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Columbia Casualty Co.,
682 P.2d 975, 978 (Wyo. 1984) (holding that the purpose of punitive damages "is to public-
ly condemn some notorious action or inaction, to punish a defendant, and to serve as a
warning and a deterrent to others"); Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1984)
(finding that "lilt is not the purpose of punitive damages to compensate the plaintiff; instead
punitive damages are awarded as a punishment to the defendant and with the purpose of
deterring others from such conduct in the future"). In New Mexico, punitive damages are
awarded as punishment of the offender and as a warning to others. See, e.g., Fredenburgh v.
Allied Van Lines, Inc., 446 P.2d 868, 873 (N.M. 1968) (citing Bank of New Mexico v.
Rice, 429 P.2d 368 (N.M. 1967)).
62. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 735 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
63. See HILLIARD, supra note 49, at 600 ("[Tlhe jury are not limited, in assessing
damages, to mere compensation, but may give exemplary . . . or vindictive damages, in
view of the degree of malice or wantonness, and, as is sometimes held, may take into con-
sideration the plaintiffs expenses of the prosecution of his suit.") (footnote omitted).
64. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2,
at 9 (5th ed. 1984); Note, supra note 50, at 520-21.
65. Compare CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 78, at
279 (1935) (noting that in some states punitive damages are regarded not as punishment but
as "extra compensation" for injured feelings or sense of outrage, while in other states, al-
though allowed, punitives are limited to litigation costs) with THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREA-
TISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 347, at 502 (1891) ("It might be said, indeed, that
the malicious character of the defendant's intent does, in fact, increase the injury, and the
doctrine of exemplary damages might thus be reconciled with the strict notion of compen-
sation; but it will appear from the cases we now proceed to examine that the idea of com-
pensation is abandoned, and that of punishment introduced.").
66. Over the years, many justifications for punitive damages have been offered: (i) pun-
ishment of the defendant; (ii) specific deterrence, aimed at the defendant; (iii) general deter-
rence, to prevent others from committing similar acts; (iv) preservation of the peace; (v)
inducement for private law enforcement; (vi) compensation to victims for otherwise noncom-
pensable losses; and (vii) payment of the victim's litigation costs. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law, of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 3 (1982);
Stephan Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1, 7 (1990).
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Part V of this article examines in detail the four recent cases that have
created a split among the federal courts over the taxation of punitive damag-
es.6 One of the basic disagreements leading to the current uncertainty over
the taxation of punitive damages is whether (i) the nature and purpose of
punitive damages under state law is irrelevant, making punitive damages com-
pletely excludable as long as the underlying personal injury suffered by the
taxpayer is "tort-like" so as to implicate I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), or (ii) the purpose
of punitive damages controls, the theory being that the statute requires the
recovery to be "on account of" a personal injury. Under the latter view, puni-
tive damages may or may not be awarded "on account of' a personal injury,
depending upon whether such damages are considered under state law to com-
pensate the injury (in which case they are excludable from income) or to
merely punish the tortfeasor's outrageous conduct (in which case they awarded
"on account of" the tortfeasor's conduct, not the injury, and are not
excludable). The nature and purpose of punitive damages under state law
played a particularly key role in Commissioner v. Miller" and Horton v.
Commissioner," as will be explored in Part V.
III. THE THEORETICALLY CORRECT TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE
RECOVERIES
A. The Return of Capital Theory
Any discussion of the theoretically correct income-tax treatment of puni-
tive damage recoveries" must begin with the Haig-Simons" conception of
67. See Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994); Hawkins v. United
States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
68. See 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
69. See 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
70. See generally Joseph W. Blackburn, Taxation of Personal Injury Damages: Recom-
mendations for Reform, 56 TENN. L. REV. 661 (1989); Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Developing a
Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 759 (1988); J. Martin
Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards:
The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13 (1989); Chapman, supra note 21; Mark W.
Cochran, Should Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43
(1987-88); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143 (1992); Robert J.
Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23
Hous. L. REV. 701 (1986); Malcolm L. Morris, Taxing Economic Loss and Recoveries in
Personal Injury Actions: Towards a Capital Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 735 (1986); Edward
Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-tax Policy Considerations, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 701 (1977).
71. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) ("Serious thought about personal income tax policy has
come to be dominated by an ideal in which taxable income is set equal to total personal
gain or accretion, without distinctions as to source or use."); William D. Andrews, Personal
Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARv. L. REV. 309, 320 (1972) (recognizing that
the Simons model is "now the most widely accepted definition of personal income for tax
purposes"); Charles 0. Galvin, Tar Reform: What? Again? A Rose by any Other Name ...
1 39 Major Tax Planning 1201, at 12-3 (1987) (The Haig-Simons "classical definition has
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income. 2 In his classic treatise published in 1938," Henry Simons74 de-
fined income as:
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in con-
sumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption
during the period to "wealth" at the end of the period and then sub-
tracting "wealth" at the beginning.75
Stated in its short form, the Haig-Simons model equates taxable income to
the sum of a taxpayer's "consumption" and his or her "accumulation" during
the taxable period.76
The application of the Haig-Simons model to a personal injury recovery
should result in exclusion of the recovery from the recipient's taxable income
to the extent that the recovery merely compensates the recipient-taxpayer for a
loss in the "accumulation" component of the accretion equation as applied to
the taxpayer. Under this view, an injury suffered by a tort victim does indeed
negatively impact the accumulation component of the Simons equation, as-
suming the taxpayer's accumulation includes a monetary value assignable to
personal rights and well-being-that is, the taxpayer's "human capital." The
subsequent recovery, whether by award or by settlement, serves to compensate
this injury and merely restores the human capital impaired by reason of the
injury. The loss and recovery negate each other; thus, the recovery should be
excludable from gross income.
The Haig-Simons model of taxable income can be illustrated by compar-
ing two hypothetical taxpayers. Taxpayer A has suffered no injury. Taxpayer
B is identical in all respects to Taxpayer A, except that Taxpayer B has suf-
fered a personal injury inflicted by a third-party wrongdoer. Assume also that
Taxpayer B sues the wrongdoer and recovers an award in compensation of
that injury. As a result, Taxpayer B is now in the same economic position as
become the starting point for any in-depth analysis of the income tax system.").
72. It is recognized that while conceptual models such as the Haig-Simons formulation
"are helpful in indicating possible overall objectives of an income tax, they are neither ap-
propriate for statutory use nor intended to be." Surrey & Warren, supra note 14, at 770.
73. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938).
74. The income model formulated by Simons is often referred to as the Haig-Simons
model to reflect the contributions of Robert Haig to an earlier statement of the definition.
Professor Haig viewed income as "the money value of the net accretion to one's economic
power between two points in time," assuming one includes power exercised for consumption
purposes. Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX I. 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921). In deference to Haig's statement of
the definition, the Haig-Simons model is also sometimes referred to as the accretion model.
Simons thought the Haig definition to be interchangeable with his own. See Boris I. Bittker,
A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925,
932 (1967).
75. SIMONS, supra note 73, at 50.
76. Id. at 130 (The definition of taxable income can be restated "as the algebraic sum
of consumption and accumulation. .. (and] affords the best available basis for personal taxa-
tion.").
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Taxpayer A. Therefore, Taxpayer B should be entitled, as a matter of sound
tax policy, and as a legitimate extension of the Haig-Simons model, to exclude
his recovery from taxable income.77
The Haig-Simons conceptualization of taxable income has never been
widely accepted as a model for either the Code"8 or judicial interpretations of
the Code. As discussed in Part III, however, the Haig-Simons model does
have an analogy in the federal income tax law known as the "return of capi-
tal" theory. Under this theory, an injured taxpayer who recovers a compensato-
ry personal injury award should not be taxed on that award because he is
merely recovering human capital impaired as a result of the injury. In other
words, the recovery is a "capital" receipt rather than an "income" receipt.79
This theory has long been recognized by the courts.'
Under the return of capital approach, the $170,000 hypothetically awarded
to Ms. Liebeck as compensatory damages for her pain and suffering would be
viewed as the jury's best approximation8 of the loss in human capital suf-
fered by her as the result of her injury. The $170,000 merely compensates Ms.
Liebeck for a diminution of the value of her pre-injury well-being. Therefore,
the return of capital theory would dictate that the $170,000 be received by Ms.
Liebeck on a tax-free basis. Similar arguments can be fashioned for a wide
range of general compensatory damages, including damages for loss of person-
al reputation recovered in a libel action. 2
Conversely, the return of capital theory would indicate that a recovery of
punitive damages, assuming it is true that such a recovery serves no compen-
satory purpose, should be fully taxed. In that case, "there is no compelling
fairness argument for excluding" punitive damages from taxable income. 3 As
77. This result can also be defended on the additional argument that, given the relative
positions of these taxpayers, it is fair and equitable to exempt Taxpayer B's award from
taxation, or conversely, that it would work an injustice on Taxpayer B if he is taxed on the
award. See, e.g., Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAx L. REV. 45, 90-91
(1990).
78. For example, under the Haig-Simons model, individual property transactions are es-
sentially irrelevant and ignored. In applying the accumulation component of taxable income,
the model merely compares a taxpayer's net worth at the beginning of the measurement
period with his net worth at the end of the measuring period. Whether the taxpayer entered
into several property transactions during the period, or none at all, has no direct effect on
the computation. The Internal Revenue Code, on the other hand, does not adopt this "balance
sheet" approach to property transactions, but consistent with the realization principle, imposes
a tax upon the gain or loss incurred by the taxpayer on each individual transaction. See
Eisner v. Maconiber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920).
79. See, e.g., 31 Op. Att'y Gen 304, supra note 27, at 308.
80. See, e.g., Glenshaw Glass Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 426, 430 n.6. (1955).
81. It is of course arguable that the jury system is imperfect and will often fail in
accurately ascribing a value to a tort victim's loss and that the resulting award may over-
compensate the victim and thereby present him with a windfall. See Thuronyi, supra note
77, at 91.
82. Recoveries for loss of business reputation will also fall within the scope of §
104(a)(2), provided that the underlying theory of recovery involves a tort characterized under
state law as "personal." See, e.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
83. Thuronyi, supra note 77, at 91.
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the Supreme Court stated in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.' in a re-
lated context,
The long history of rulings holding personal injury recoveries nontax-
able on the theory that they roughly correspond to a return of capital
cannot support exemption of punitive damages .... Damages for
personal injury are by definition compensatory only. Punitive damag-
es, on the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capital for
taxation purposes."5
Under the return of capital theory, punitive damages are a windfall to the
recipient and as such should be taxed in full. Thus, Ms. Liebeck's hypothetical
$2.6 million punitive damage award should be taxable.
B. Deficiencies in the Return of Capital Theory
Despite its apparent appeal, the return of capital theory suffers from sever-
al deficiencies when applied to the tax treatment of damage recoveries for
personal injury.
1. Treatment of the Uncompensated Victim. First, the return of capital
theory does not adequately describe the Internal Revenue Code's treatment of
a hypothetical Taxpayer C, who is identical to Taxpayer B in all respects
except that Taxpayer C is not compensated for her injury. Here, Taxpayer C is
in a worse economic position than both Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B, and it
can be forcefully argued that Taxpayer C should be entitled to a deduction86
to place her in a relatively equal after-tax position compared to Taxpayers A
and B. The Code, however, does not afford Taxpayer C a deduction in recog-
nition of her reduced economic position. 7 In this respect, the return of capital
theory is an imperfect predictor of the results obtained under the Code and
does not accurately reflect the tax theory underlying the Code.8
84. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). In this landmark case, the taxpayers sued a competitor and
received punitive damages for fraud and treble damages for antitrust violations. Id. at 431.
The taxpayers argued that the punitive damages constituted punishment imposed on the
wrongdoer and a mere windfall, which under the definition of income stated in Eisner, could
not be treated as "income derived from capital, from labor, from both combined." Id. (citing
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920)). The Supreme Court repudiated the Eisner
definition and found damage awards to be taxable because "[hiere we have instances of
undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion. The mere fact that the payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punish-
ment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the recip-
ients." Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431.
85. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 432 n.8.
86. The deduction would be equal to the monetary value of Taxpayer C's reduced well-
being and loss of human capital. This amount would admittedly be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to determine. Such a deduction would presumably be characterized as a casualty loss
deduction, governed by I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1988). See Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.
124, 151 n.22 (1993) (Beghe, J. dissenting).
87. See Thuronyi, supra note 77, at 90-91.
88. The absence of a deduction for Taxpayer C can be explained in part by the Inter-
nal Revenue Code's strong bias against allowing a deduction for any expenditure bearing
more than an insubstantial element of personal consumption. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 262 (1988)
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2. Treatment of Recoveries for Lost Income. The return of capital theory
also fails to explain, and is in fact inconsistent with, the established position of
the Service and the courts concerning recoveries for lost wages suffered as the
result of a personal injury. If Ms. Liebeck were awarded $10,000 to compen-
sate her for lost income suffered during her hospital stay, the theoretically
correct treatment of that portion of the recovery would tax it in full. Had Ms.
Liebeck not been injured and continued to work and receive her regular wages
in the amount of $10,000, those wages would have been taxed. The $10,000
recovery received by her in lieu of lost wages should, likewise, be fully taxed,
because it represents not a return of capital but a wage substitute.89 Failing to
tax Ms. Liebeck's lost income recovery places her in a better after-tax eco-
nomic position than had she not been injured at all; this is an anomalous re-
sult.
Even though recoveries for lost income theoretically should be taxed in
full, both the Service' and the courts9  have held that such recoveries (for
both past and future earnings) fall within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) if
awarded or obtained in respect of a personal injury. They are therefore
excludable from income. The courts have extended this analysis to recoveries
for lost income due to nonphysical injuries as well as physical injuries. In so
doing, the courts have acknowledged that the victim is thereby placed in a bet-
ter after-tax economic position than had he never been injured in the first
place. This anomaly, however, has not led the courts to withhold the §
104(a)(2) exclusion from lost income recoveries.9"
(precluding the deduction of expenditures for personal, living, or family expenses).
89. As has been noted, this notion is so well established in the federal income tax that
the taxpayer in Glenshaw Glass Co. had included the compensatory one-third of its recovery
in income, representing lost revenues, and did not challenge its taxability. Brooks, supra note
70, at 764.
90. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50, in which the taxpayer was struck by a
bus and settled his multiple count claim prior to trial. The ruling concludes that the "entire
. . . settlement amount, including the amount allocable to the claim for lost wages, repre-
sents compensation for personal injuries" and is therefore excludable. Id. at 51; see also Rev.
Rul. 61-1, 1961-1 C.B. 14.
91. See, e.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1983); see also
Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1300 (1986), where this approach was:
graphically illustrated by considering the case of a young surgeon who los[t] a
finger because of the tortious conduct of another. . . . This injury will surely cause
the surgeon compensable general damages, such as physical and emotional pain and
suffering, but it will also undoubtedly cause special damages including loss of
future income. In order to prove the extent of the damages flowing from a clearly
personal injury, the surgeon will likely produce evidence of both his actual pain
and suffering and his loss of income. However, because it is easier to place a
present dollar value upon the loss of future income than upon an intangible such as
emotional pain, the surgeon will quite predictably place greater emphasis on lost
income as a measure of his damages and will perhaps, thereby, receive a greater
recovery. In such a case, the entire damage award or settlement amount received
will be excluded from income. The fact that the tortious conduct causing the sev-
ered digit manifested itself in the loss of future income to the surgeon raises no
troubling questions as to the exclusion of the award.
Id. at 1300.
92. In Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third Circuit
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In extending the scope of § 104(a)(2) to encompass recoveries for lost
income, the courts have implicitly failed to recognize the return of capital
theory in a context where its application is clearly indicated.93 Therefore, it is
again arguable that the return of capital theory does not adequately explain the
underlying rationale of the courts' application of the Internal Revenue Code to
recoveries for personal injuries.
3. Treatment of Punitive Damages for Physical Injury After RRA '89. As
will be discussed at greater length in Part IV of this article,94 Congress
amended I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as part of RRA '89 to provide that the statutory
exclusion will not be available for punitive damages that are not received on
account of a physical injury. While the meaning of this amendment, and the
intent of Congress in enacting it, are far from clear, a reasonable interpretation
of the amendment is that following RRA '89, the exclusion will be available
for punitive damages that are received on account of a physical injury." This
result remains contrary to the return of capital theory and once again fails to
explain accurately the Internal Revenue Code's intended treatment of personal
injury damage recoveries.
4. Treatment of Recoveries for Damages to Property. The consequences of
applying the return of capital theory to personal injury recoveries must be
compared to its application to recoveries for property damages. Assume, for
example, that Taxpayer Y owns Blackacre, a parcel of unimproved land. As-
sume also that Blackacre is rendered worthless and must be abandoned by
Taxpayer Y due to contamination from toxic waste introduced onto Blackacre
by Taxpayer Y's negligent neighbor. Any recovery by Taxpayer Y against his
neighbor to compensate Taxpayer Y for the loss of Blackacre will be consid-
ered a return of capital with respect to Blackacre. 9 This does not, however,
lead to the result that the entire recovery is necessarily nontaxable. To the
contrary, Taxpayer Y must compare the recovery to his basis in Blackacre,"
concluded that the taxpayer's recovery for lost wages in a successful age discrimination
lawsuit was fully excludable under § 104(a)(2). The court acknowledged:
tilt might be troubling to some that a successful plaintiff in an ADEA suit will
make out better, vis-a-vis federal income tax liability, than if the plaintiff had not
been discriminated against in the first place. Although this concern is understand-
able, we note that . . . the successful ADEA plaintiff is being treated no better (or
worse now) than the typical tort victim who suffers a physical injury. We see no
reason to treat one personal injury victim any differently than another.
Rickel, 900 F.2d at 664; see also Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145, 150 (6th Cir.
1990) (finding a back pay award in a successful age discrimination lawsuit to be excludable
and conceding that the taxpayer "will have less federal tax liability than if he had not suf-
fered age discrimination in the first place").
93. Professor Dodge has argued that there may be circumstances where the exclusion of
a recovery for lost income would be logical and correct, depending upon whether certain
factors (such as the amount of the award, the discount rate, or the projected amount of
future earnings) have been applied on an after-tax or before-tax basis. See JOSEPH M.
DODGE, THE LoGic OF TAX 109-14 (1989).
94. See infra text accompanying note 276.
95. See infra text accompanying note 283.
96. See infra text accompanying note 125. See generally Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (Ist Cir. 1944).
97. For the rules governing the determination of a taxpayer's basis in property, see
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and any difference between these two amounts is either a taxable gain or
loss.98 Thus, if Taxpayer Y's basis in Blackacre was $60,000, and he recov-
ered $100,000 (Blackacre's then-fair market value) to compensate him for the
loss of Blackacre, Taxpayer Y must report a taxable gain of $40,000.9
This result does not conform to the proposed operation of the return of
capital theory in the context of compensatory personal injury recoveries, which
are argued to be fully tax-exempt under that theory. Completely exempting the
personal injury recovery ignores the possibility that the recovery ought to be
tax-exempt only to the extent of the taxpayer's basis in the converted asset.
Yet in the context of personal injuries, this begs the question: what is the
converted asset? Perhaps the best answer that can be given is that the convert-
ed asset is "human capital," an admittedly nebulous concept that may be de-
scribed to include the sum total of the taxpayer's personal rights, health, and
welfare. Is it possible for a taxpayer to prove that she has a "basis" in such
human capital? This seems highly unlikely."° It appears that any recovery by
a tort victim to compensate her for the diminution in value of her personal
well-being should in fact be fully taxed because the victim has no basis in the
asset being converted and compensated."'
generally I.R.C. §§ 1011-1016 (1988). Generally, a taxpayer's basis in a particular asset will
be the taxpayer's cost to acquire the asset. I.R.C. § 1012 (1988).
98. See Telefilm, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 688, 695 (1954), nonacq. 1954-2 C.B.
6, rev'd on other grounds, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9,453 (9th Cir. 1955):
Surely, to the extent that damages for the destruction of property, whether
tangible or intangible, do not exceed the cost or other unrecovered basis of
such property, they are merely a return of capital and are not taxable at all.
But to the extent that such damages exceed the unrecovered basis of the prop-
erty the excess represents a profit which constitutes taxable income.
Id. at 695; see also Freeman v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 323, 327 (1959); Cullins v. Com-
missioner, 24 T.C. 322, 327 (1955). See generally ROBERT W. WOOD, TAX ASPECTS OF
SETTLEMENTS AND JUDGMENTS, Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 522, at A-3 (1993).
99. This result does not obtain under the Haig-Simons model of taxable income, under
which the concept of "basis" is unknown. See generally SIMONS, supra note 73 and accom-
panying text.
100. See, e.g., DODGE, supra note 93, at 108. Dodge argues:
[A] person has a basis equal to the sum of "human capital" expenditures, which
initially might seem to include such items as outlays for food, education, preventive
health care, vitamins, and the like. Unfortunately, nobody keeps track of these out-
lays, nor would it be feasible to do so.
Id.; see also United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1979). Garber was a crimi-
nal tax case in which the court relied upon a perceived uncertainty in proving the
defendant's basis in her blood plasma to remand her conviction for tax evasion for failing to
report the substantial income she generated from the sale of the plasma. The dissent argued
that Mrs. Garber had not persuasively shown that she "had anything but a zero basis in her
plasma." Id. at 103 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); see also Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d
693, 696 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Since there is no tax basis in a person's health and other
personal interests, money received as compensation for an injury to those interests might be
considered a realized accession to wealth. Nevertheless, Congress in its compassion has re-
tained the exclusion (now codified at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)."). See generally Dodge, supra note
70, at 152-53. For a light hearted look at this issue, see Note, Tax Consequences of Trans-
fers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 842 (1973).
101. There may be alternate theories of exclusion for personal injury recoveries in this
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Analogizing to the application of the return of capital theory to recoveries
for property damage, the theory would not result in a- tax-exempt personal
injury recovery. Again, the proper tax treatment of personal injury recoveries
under the return of capital theory is at best problematic, and the theory as
applied yields inconclusive results.
C. Summary
The Haig-Simons model of taxable income provides an excellent starting
point for evaluating the tax treatment of personal injury recoveries. Its corol-
lary in federal income tax law, the return of capital theory, has likewise prov-
en to be an attractive rationale for those courts concluding that punitive dam-
ages should not be excluded under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Indeed, if Congress and
the courts were writing on a clean slate, the return of capital theory would be
extremely persuasive, if not compelling, in resolving the question. The slate,
however, is hardly clean. The return of capital theory has severe limitations
given its uncertain application to other issues in this area." 2 Reliance on this
theory to explain or justify the tax treatment of punitive damage recoveries is
hazardous at best.
IV. OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION
OF I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
A. History of the IRS's Ruling Stance on Punitive Damages
A major factor contributing to the current uncertainty over the taxation of
punitive damages has been the Internal Revenue Service's own inconsistent
context. For example, exclusion may be defended on the argument that most of the expendi-
tures incurred by a taxpayer in creating "human capital," such as food, preventive health
costs, education, and the like, are nondeductible personal expenditures and are not capital
expenditures. See I.R.C. § 262 (1988). Therefore, it is arguably appropriate to mirror this
treatment by allowing a recovery compensating for a loss of human capital to be received
tax-free. See DODGE, supra note 93, at 108; see also Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income
Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1391-95 (1984).
The fact that the typical tort victim is being compensated for injuries inflicted in an
involuntary transaction may also provide an explanation for the exclusion of the recovery.
Under I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A) (1988), if a taxpayer's property is converted involuntarily such
as by destruction or condemnation, the taxpayer may nevertheless avoid gain on the conver-
sion by reinvesting the conversion proceeds (e.g., insurance proceeds, condemnation award)
into property which is "similar or related in service or use to the property so converted."
Any realized gain (i.e., the difference between the proceeds and the property's adjusted basis)
will not be recognized and will be deferred by means of adjustments to the basis of the
replacement property. See I.R.C. § 1033(b) (1988). Exemption of a compensatory recovery
for personal injuries may simply reflect that, in the case of human capital, there is simply
no ability to reinvest the proceeds of the recovery in a similar fashion and that in the inter-
est of fairness, the tort victim ought to enjoy exemption. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 42-43 (7th ed. 1994); DODGE, supra note 93, at 112-13; see also
Cochran, supra note 70, at 46-47 (criticizing this rationale and noting that I.R.C. § 1033
does not provide for exclusion, only deferral, of the realized gain).
102. See Burke & Friel, supra note 70, at 42.
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rulings and litigating positions. Over the years, the Service has struggled to
develop a coherent analytical approach to punitive damages; however, the
results have been confusing. The following rulings illustrate the unpredictable
course charted by the Service in this area.
Revenue Ruling 58-418'°3
In Revenue Ruling 58-418, the taxpayer received both compensatory and
punitive damages in settlement of a libel suit. Relying on Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co., ° the Service ruled that the punitive damages were tax-
able.
Revenue Ruling 75-4505
The Service subsequently reversed its position in Revenue Ruling 75-45,
ruling punitive damages to be within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
The taxpayer in this ruling was an estate. The decedent had been killed in an
airplane crash, and in return for a release of all wrongful death claims against
the airplane's owner, the executor accepted a check from the owner's insur-
ance company." The ruling conceded that under the law of the decedent's
state of residence, a series of court decisions had established that payments
made under the wrongful death act were strictly punitive in nature." In
holding these damages to be excludable, the ruling stated,
Section 104 of the Code is a specific statutory exclusion from gross
income within the "except as otherwise provided" clause of section
61(a). Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of
any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of
personal injuries or sickness" (emphasis added). Therefore, under
section 104(a)(2) any damages, whether compensatory or punitive,
received on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable
from gross income."
Under this analysis, the treatment of punitive damages mirrors the treat-
ment afforded to compensatory damages: if compensatory damages received
on account of a particular injury are excludable, then any punitive damages
arising out of the same injury would likewise be excludable; and if the com-
pensatory damages are taxable, then any punitive damages arising from the
same injury are also taxable.
Revenue Ruling 84-108"°
In Roemer v. Commissioner,"' the Service argued before the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals that a punitive damages award received by a successful
plaintiff in a libel and defamation action was taxable, despite the Tax Court's
103. 1958-2 C.B. 18.
104. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).




109. 1984-2 C.B. 32.
110. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
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previous holding that compensatory damages arising out of the same injury
were excludable. This litigating position was inconsistent with the Service's
own Revenue Ruling 75-45. To the Service's chagrin, the Ninth Circuit in
Roemer relied heavily on Revenue Ruling 75-45 in holding punitive damages
excludable, despite the court's strong doubt that the ruling was correct."'
That same year, in Church v. Commissioner,"' the Tax Court also relied on
Revenue Ruling 75-45 in concluding that a punitive damages award in a libel
action was excludable, having held that the compensatory damages portion of
the taxpayer's award was also excludable.
Saddled with a Revenue Ruling undercutting its current litigation position,
the Service reconsidered its liberal application of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) to punitive
damages set forth in that ruling. One year later, in Revenue Ruling 84-108, the
Service revoked Revenue Ruling 75-45.'
In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the Service revisited the facts of Revenue
Ruling 75-45 and assumed that the decedent was domiciled in, alternatively,
Virginia or Alabama. Under the wrongful death act of Virginia, the amount
recoverable was limited to the amount necessary to compensate the survivors
for their loss sustained because of the wrongful death. Punitive damages, how-
ever, were recoverable." 4 In Alabama, the applicable wrongful death act pro-
vided exclusively for the payment of punitive damages based on the degree of
fault of the liable party as opposed to the loss sustained by the survivors."'
Focusing on the fact that payments made under the wrongful death act of
Alabama were strictly punitive in nature, the ruling continued:
In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co ... the Supreme Court held
that punitive damages received in an antitrust case and punitive dam-
ages received in a fraud case are includable in gross income. In arriv-
ing at this decision, the Court examined the nature of these damages
and concluded that punitive damages are not a substitute for any
amounts lost by the plaintiff or a substitute for any injury to the
plaintiff or plaintiff's property, but are extracted from the wrongdoer
as punishment for unlawful conduct. The Court held that these dam-
ages represent accessions to wealth and are includable in gross in-
come....
An award of punitive damages ... does not compensate a tax-
payer for a loss but add to the taxpayer's wealth. Furthermore, puni-
tive damages are awarded not "on account of personal injury," as
required by section 104(a)(2), but are determined with reference to
the defendant's degree of fault." 6
The ruling concluded that payments made under the Virginia wrongful
11I. See infra text accompanying note 301.
112. 80 T.C. 1104 (1983).
113. See Mary J. Morrison, Getting a Rule Right and Writing a Rule Wrong: The IRS
Demands a Return On All Punitive Damages, 17 CONN. L. REV. 39 (1984).
114. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 33.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 33-34.
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death act were excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), but that payments made
under the Alabama act were taxable."7 Revenue Ruling 75-45 was re-
voked. "'
In Revenue Ruling 84-108, the Service articulated two arguments that
subsequently became the bases of its litigating position concerning punitive
damages. First, in its discussion of Glenshaw Glass, the Service concluded that
the return of capital theory is relevant to the interpretation of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) and requires punitive damages to be included in income. Second, the
phrase "on account of" personal injuries has an independent vitality and repre-
sents a separate test in applying I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The phrase requires puni-
tive damages to be included in gross income because punitive damages are
received not "on account of' a personal injury, but rather, on account of the
tortfeasor's egregious or malicious conduct.
The Service's inconsistent ruling history has contributed greatly to the
lack of consensus in the federal courts over the taxation of punitive damages.
B. United States v. Burke
A second factor tending to cloud rather than clarify the proper tax treat-
ment of punitive damages is the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Burke."9 The Burke controversy has its roots in the early government rulings
that left some doubt as to how the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) exclusion was intended
to apply to recoveries for nonphysical and physical injuries. 2 From this
fairly innocuous origin, the physical-vs.-nonphysical question mushroomed into
a full-fledged and well-chronicled 2' controversy that has yet to be resolved
and that has continuing implications for the taxation of punitive damages. To
117. Id. at 34. A federal district court, later addressing the tax treatment of damages
received under the very Alabama wrongful death statute at issue in Revenue Ruling 84-108,
concluded that the Ruling was erroneous and that the phrase "any damages" as used in
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) extended the exclusion to punitive damages as well. Burford v. United
States, 642 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1986).
118. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. at 34.
119. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
120. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
121. See generally Arthur W. Andrews, The Taxation of Title VII Victims After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 TAX LAW. 755, 766 (1993); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Taxation of
Awards and Settlements Under Employment Discrimination Statutes, C932 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 795
(1994); Mary L. Heen, An Alternative Approach to the Taxation of Employment Dis-
crimination Awards Under Federal Civil Rights Statutes: Income from Human Capital, Real-
ization, and Nonrecognition, 72 N.C. L. REV. 549 (1994); Richard T. Helleiod & Lucretia S.
W. Mattison, Has the Scope of the Personal Injury Erclusion Been Changed by the Supreme
Court?, 77 J. TAX'N 82 (1992); Margaret Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax Treat-
ment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAw. 783 (1992); David
G. Jaeger, Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards: The Continuing Controversy, 57 TAX
NOTES 109 (1992); Susan W. Matlow, Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages: Have the
Courts Gone Too Far?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 369 (1991); Patricia T. Morgan, Old Torts, New
Torts and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875
(1988); Robert W. Wood, Taxing Discrimination Recoveries: Bucking Burke, 56 TAX NOTES
363 (1992).
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gain an appreciation of the controversy that the Supreme Court encountered in
Burke, a review of the leading cases that culminated in Burke is appropriate.
1. Pre-Burke Case Law Developments
Roemer'22 and Threlkeld
23
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Roemer, it was well established that
all compensatory damages received because of a physical personal injury were
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), including those components of the recov-
ery that compensated for such distinctly nonpersonal elements as lost wages
and profits. Recoveries for items such as lost wages have been held non-tax-
able despite the fact that had the victim never been injured and had earned the
wages in the first instance, the wages would have been taxable. 24 Thus, in
the case of physical personal injury, the nature and character of the injury as a
personal injury was all-controlling, and the fact that some of the consequences
flowing from the injury were nonpersonal or business-related was irrelevant.
On the other hand, the Service had never conceded that the same rule
would control in the case of nonphysical injury. Until recently, the Service had
maintained instead that the proper analysis was to analyze the consequences of
the nonphysical injury to determine the tax treatment of the recovery."2 Un-
der this theory, the various components of an award would be taxed by refer-
ence to what the award is intended to replace. Thus, if one consequence of a
nonphysical injury-such as defamation-is lost wages, any subsequent recov-
ery for those lost wages would not be excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),
notwithstanding that the injury was decidedly personal in nature, because
wages are ordinarily taxable. The validity of this physical-vs.-nonphysical
distinction was the central issue in Roemer.
The taxpayer in Roemer, a casualty insurance salesman, claimed he was
injured by a defamatory credit report prepared by Retail Credit Co. Roemer
sued Retail Credit in 1965, claiming libel and defamation, and following trial
he was awarded $40,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive
122. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
123. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988).
124. See supra notes 90 and 91.
125. This approach would be consistent with the general rule applicable to damage re-
coveries. Under this general rule, the federal income tax treatment of a damage award de-
pends on the nature of the underlying claims asserted, not the nature of the injury. United
States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). The inquiry is in lieu of: what were the damages
awarded? See, e.g., Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982); Raytheon Prod. Corp. v.
Commissioner, I T.C. 952 (1943), affd, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 1944). Thus, if ABC
Corporation sues XYZ Corporation and recovers lost profits caused by XYZ's tortious act,
the recovery is taxable just as the profits would have been taxable if received in the first
place. § 104(a)(2) is an exception to this general rule, applicable only to cases of personal
injury that fall within its scope. Despite the fact that nonphysical injuries are acknowledged
to qualify for treatment under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), the Service has nevertheless historically
applied the "in lieu of what were the damages awarded" analysis to determine the tax conse-
quences of nonphysical injury recoveries.
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damages.126 Most of the evidence produced at trial related to Roemer's lost
business, damage to his business relationships, and his general reputation in
the insurance industry.27
After the Service determined that the entire award was includable, Roemer
argued before the Tax Court that the jury awarded him compensatory and
punitive damages based on personal injuries to his personal and professional
reputation, and thus the damages should be excluded from his gross income
under § 104(a)(2). 2' The Service argued that because the injury inflicted on
Roemer was nonphysical, it was appropriate to look not to the nature and
character of the injury suffered, but rather to the consequences of that injury
to determine if the damages received by Roemer were excludable because of
those consequences. 29 Here, the consequences were lost profits and income;
therefore, the Service argued that the damages received by Roemer in compen-
sation for those lost profits were includable in Roemer's gross income.
The Tax Court majority sided with the Service in Roemer, 30 thus vali-
dating the Service's physical-vs.-nonphysical distinction.13' In dissent, Judge
Wilbur noted that where a taxpayer is physically injured, as in an accident, the
entire award is nontaxable under § 104(a)(2), including components such as
lost income. In fact, lost income often represents the best measure of the dam-
ages suffered by the victim and may even constitute the entire award.
32
Judge Wilbur saw no reason to place lost wages and other business injury
recoveries outside the scope of § 104(a)(2) in cases where the injury was
nonphysical, as long as the injury was in fact a "personal" one.
33
126. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 403.
127. Id. at 401-02.
128. Id. at 404.
129. Id.
130. Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
131. Id. at 405-406. The next year, prior to the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court
in Roemer, the Tax Court again analyzed the tax consequences of a nonphysical personal
injury recovery in Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104 (1983). The taxpayer in Church
had been libeled by the Arizona Republic while serving as Attorney General for the State of
Arizona. After the Republic called Church a "communist" in print, Church's public life was
ruined, causing him embarrassment, humiliation, emotional distress, and other pain and suffer-
ing. After protracted litigation, Church was awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages and
$235,000 in punitive damages. Reiterating its analysis from Roemer, the Tax Court noted that
in defamation actions there is a distinction between damages received for personal reputation
(nontaxable) and damages received for loss of business and professional reputation affecting
income (taxable). In the instant case, however, unlike in Roemer, there was no evidence that
any of Church's recovery was in any way tied to lost income, nor had Church asserted any
claims for lost income. Rather, his compensatory damages related solely to the pain and
suffering of a ruined career. While Church lost his public career, he did not lose his career
as an attorney; he simply was limited to private practice. Thus, there was no evidence of
lost income. Holding his compensatory damages recovery excludable, the court noted that
"[iln our opinion, shattered dreams, ruined careers, and the mental anguish that follow are
just as personal as, for instance, loss of limb." Church, 80 T.C. at 1105-06, 1108-09.
132. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 413-14 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
133. In an example that was to echo through subsequent cases, Judge Wilbur noted:
A young surgeon who loses a finger will recover damages that for the most part
replace future earnings otherwise taxable, but the loss is not bifurcated into its
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's ruling." The
Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's analytical approach.35 and concluded
that its "analysis of this matter confuses a personal injury with its consequenc-
es and illogically distinguishes physical from nonphysical personal inju-
ries.""'36 The court continued:
The relevant distinction that should be made is between personal and
nonpersonal injuries, not between physical and nonphysical injuries.
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) states that damages received on account of person-
al injuries are excludable; it says nothing about physical injuries.
"[T]he words of statutes-including revenue acts-should be inter-
preted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses." ... The
ordinary meaning of a personal injury is not limited to a physical
one.
37
The Court of Appeals concluded that, for both physical and nonphysical
injuries, the proper inquiry is into the nature and character of the injury and
not the consequences that flow from that injury. Consistent with Judge
Wilbur's dissent,'38 the Ninth Circuit noted that although lost wages and oth-
er business-related damages often represent the best indicator of the extent of
the injury suffered by the tort victim, those consequences should not define the
injury. 39 Because this rule had long been recognized in the case of physical
damages, the Ninth Circuit did not feel that the nonphysical nature of an inju-
economic and personal components, thereby subjecting the former to taxation. Nei-
ther should damages for defamation of character, since defamation is by definition
personal to the plaintiff. In both cases, section 104 excludes the damages from in-
come-both the economic and personal components-from income.
Id. at 414; see also supra note 91.
134. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 694 (9th Cir. 1983), nonacq., 1985-2 C.B.
55.
135. The court stated:
When an individual recovers damages for a physical personal injury, the lump-sum
award is not allocated between the personal aspects of the injury and the economic
loss occasioned by the personal injury, nor is the taxpayer precluded from use of §
104(a)(2) when the predominant result of the injury is a loss of income. However,
when the injury is nonphysical, as is defamation, the majority of the tax court
would require the taxpayer to allocate an award between the excludable and the
otherwise taxable components of the damages.
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 697.
136. Id. at 696-97.
137. Id. at 697 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
139. The court noted:
Although there are different types of defamation actions (libel or slander) depending
on the form of the defamatory statements, all defamatory statements attack an
individual's good name. This injury to the person should not be confused with the
derivative consequences of the defamatory attack, i.e., the loss of reputation in the
community and any resulting loss of income. The nonpersonal consequences of a
personal injury, such as a loss of future income, are often the most persuasive
means of proving the extent of the injury that was suffered. The personal nature of
an injury should not be defined by its effect.
Roemer, 716 F.2d at 699 (footnote omitted).
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ry calls for the application of a different rule. 4 °
The question thus became whether the nature and character of the injury
compensated in a California tort action for defamation was such that damages
received in compensation of that injury were on account of a "personal" injury
for purposes of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Turning to state law,' 4' the Ninth Circuit
examined the nature of an action for defamation in California'42 and con-
cluded that, under the law of California, "defamation of an individual is a
personal injury."'43  Therefore, Roemer's compensatory damages were
excludable under § 104(a)(2) as were compensatory damages received because
of any personal injury."
In Threlkeld,'45 the Tax Court had the opportunity to reconsider its ana-
lytical approach in Roemer in light of the Ninth Circuit's reversal."4
Threlkeld had sued Williams for malicious prosecution and settled his claims
for $300,000. The settlement allocated the damages to Threlkeld's professional
reputation; his credit reputation; his personal indignity, humiliation, inconve-
nience, and pain and distress of mind; and the settlement of an outstanding
judgment that Threlkeld held against Williams.'47 Threlkeld did not report
any of the settlement. The Service, still clinging to its physical-vs.-nonphysical
injury distinction,'48 asserted that the damages received from injury to pro-
fessional reputation were taxable under the theory that the consequences of the
injury, not the nature of the injury itself, were dispositive of the settlement's
tax treatment. Under this theory, the damages received by Threlkeld for injury
140. See id. at 697.
141. Following the Erie Doctrine, the court concluded that "[s]ince there is no general
federal common law of torts nor controlling definitions in the tax code, we must look to
state law to analyze the nature of the claim litigated." Id.
142. Id. at 697-700.
143. Id. at 700.
144. Id.
145. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988).
146. In Threlkeld, the Tax Court summarized this approach:
If a taxpayer receives a damage award for a physical injury, which almost by defi-
nition is personal, the entire award is excluded from income even if all or a part
of the recovery is determined with reference to the income lost because of the
injury. Where, however, the damage award is received for a nonphysical injury, we
have previously mounted an inquiry to determine whether the components of the
injuries for which the award is made are personal or professional.
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1300.
The court compared this approach to that applied to the victim of a physical injury,
such as the surgeon who loses a finger in Judge Wilbur's hypothetical:
The fact that the tortious conduct causing the severed digit manifested itself in the
loss of future income to the surgeon raises no troubling questions as to the exclu-
sion of the award. Where, however, a taxpayer's injuries are nonphysical we have,
in the past, ignored the personal nature of the claim and delved into an inquiry
regarding the nature of the consequences of the injury.
Id. at 1300-01. For the origin of the hypothetical, see Roemer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C.
398, 414 (1982) (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
147. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1296.
148. The Service had entered a nonacquiescence to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Roemer. Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55.
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to business reputation were not on account of a "personal" injury for purposes
of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
The Tax Court abandoned the analysis it articulated in Roemer and de-
clared it incorrect. "'49 The court stated, "for purposes of section 104(a)(2),
there is no justification for continuing to draw a distinction, in tort actions,
between damages received for injury to personal reputation and damages re-
ceived for injury to professional reputation.' 50 Thus, the Tax Court conclud-
ed that it would no longer focus on the monetary consequences flowing from a
nonphysical injury to determine whether it was a "personal" injury for purpos-
es of § 104(a)(2); instead, it would consider the nature and character of the
injury itself. If that injury was of a personal nature, then damages paid there-
for were to be considered "personal injuries" for purposes of the exclu-
sion. '5 In so holding, the Tax Court articulated a test cited by virtually all
courts subsequently confronted with the question: "Section 104(a)(2) excludes
from income amounts received as damages on account of personal injuries.
Therefore, whether the damages received are paid on account of 'personal
injuries' should be the beginning and the end of the inquiry.'
' 52
This approach became Threlkeld's major contribution to the law develop-
ing around I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). It has also served as the central point of conten-
tion in the punitive damages area. Recent decisions grappling with the ques-
tion of the taxation of punitive damages.have disagreed sharply as to whether
the Threlkeld analysis is still viable after the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Burke. If so, the logical conclusion is that if an underlying
personal injury is "tort or tort-type" in nature, then all damages recovered
from the tortfeasor-including punitive damages-are excludable under I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2). On the other hand, if the Threlkeld analysis has not survived
Burke, perhaps it is appropriate to further examine the nature and purpose of
the recovery under state law to determine whether it is truly recovered "on
account of" personal injury or "on account of' something else. Part VI of this
149. The court stated:
We do not lightly decline to follow one of our prior decisions; no court bound by
the doctrine of stare decisis does. But where one of our decisions lacks a firm
foundation in the case law and an appellate court issues a well-reasoned reversal of
that decision, the weight of precedent must give way to a better approach. There-
fore, we will no longer distinguish between personal reputation and professional
reputation for the purpose of deciding whether a damage award received in a tort
action is excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2).
Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1304-05.
150. Id. at 1298.
151. The court stated:
To determine whether the injury complained of is personal, we must look to the
origin and character of the claim and not to the consequences that result from the
injury. No doubt a defamatory statement that injures a person's professional reputa-
tion will result in lost income. In such cases, the amount of income lost is an
accurate measure of the damages sustained because of the injury to reputation.
However, the extent to which income is decreased, even though this may be the
best measure of loss, in no way changes the nature of the claim.
Id. at 1299 (emphasis added).
152. Id. (emphasis added).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
article explores this issue in detail.
How is the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis from Threlkeld to be
undertaken? How is a "personal injury" to be identified? In Threlkeld, the
central question was whether Threlkeld's malicious prosecution claim was one
for "personal injury" under § 104(a)(2). If so, then the damages received by
Threlkeld were received "on account of personal injuries" and therefore
excludable. In this regard, the court concluded:
The determination of whether damages are received on account of a
personal injury properly depends on the nature of the claim. The
regulations under section 104(a)(2) narrow the scope of damages
received to those amounts received through prosecution of tort or
tort-type rights. Therefore, "the essential element of an exclusion
under section 104(a)(2) is that the income involved must derive from
some sort of tort claim against the payor." As a result, common law
tort law concepts are helpful in deciding whether a taxpayer is being
compensated for a "personal injury."'53
Under the Threlkeld analysis, the critical inquiry is whether the underlying
claim seeks to vindicate "tort or tort-type" rights, which in turn implicates
common law tort concepts. Because there is no federal common law of torts,
recourse to common law tort concepts necessarily requires examination of the
relevant tort law of the state in which the underlying action was brought."
In attempting to establish guidelines for identifying a tort or tort-type claim,
the court noted that "[e]xclusion under section 104 will be appropriate if com-
pensatory damages are received on account of any invasion of the rights that
an individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the
law."'
155
With this in mind, the Tax Court looked to Tennessee law for guidance as
to the nature and character of Threlkeld's claim.'56 Finding the tort of mali-
cious prosecution to be similar to the tort of defamation (found in Roemer to
be a tort for personal injury under California law), the court concluded based
on their analysis of Tennessee law that "an action for malicious prosecution
would be classified as an action for personal injuries."''  Any damages
Threlkeld received were received as compensation for the invasion of rights
granted to him "by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law."
Threlkeld's settlement was thus held within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
and therefore excludable from gross income. The Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
153. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1305 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
154. In this context, the court stated:
We find that the use of the terms "damages" and "personal injury" by Congress
necessarily implies that the exclusion under section 104(a)(2) depends, to some
degree, upon classifications under State law. This is confirmed by use of the term
"tort or tort type rights" in the regulations under section 104(a)(2).
Id. at 1306 n.6.
155. Id. at 1308 (emphasis added). Note that the cited passage refers to compensatory
damages.
156. Id. at 1307.
157. Id.
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peals' 8 subsequently affirmed." 9
Threlkeld established an analytical approach to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) that
might be termed a "one-step" approach."w The Tax Court abolished any dis-
tinction between physical injuries and nonphysical injuries in applying the
exclusion. All that mattered was whether the damages were received "on ac-
count of personal injuries." This represented the "beginning and end of the
inquiry."' 6 The Threlkeld inquiry requires an examination of the taxpayer's
underlying claim in light of relevant state tort law to determine if the claim is
a "legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type" rights as called for under
the Regulations, that is, whether the claim is one arising from the invasion of
rights granted to the taxpayer "by virtue of being a person in the sight of the
law." Put another way, so long as the taxpayer's claim is one that is advanced
in an action based upon tort or tort-type rights, nothing more needs to be said.
In such a case, any damages received from successfully prosecuting the claim
are received "on account of personal injuries" for purposes of the statute.
The principle developed by the Ninth Circuit in Roemer was followed in a
subsequent pro-taxpayer decision, Bent v. Commissioner.'62 The taxpayer in
158. The Sixth Circuit has been called upon in recent years to provide its views on vir-
tually all of the important questions litigated under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): the physical vs. non-
physical injury controversy (Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988)); the
long battle over the taxation of back pay awards that ultimately led to the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992) (Pistillo v. Commissioner, 912
F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990)); the Burke case itself (Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th
Cir. 1991)); and the taxation of punitive damages (Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625
(6th Cir. 1994)).
159. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). The Court of Appeals
concluded:
We agree with the Ninth and the Third Circuits [in Roemer and in the subse-
quently-decided case of Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1987)] that
the nonpersonal consequences of a personal injury, such as a loss of future income
are often the most persuasive means of proving the extent of the injury that was
suffered, and that the personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its
effect. Injury to a person's hand or arm is a personal injury. This is so even
though it may affect a person's professional pursuits. All income in compensation
of that injury is excludable under section 104(a)(2). Similarly, the injury to
taxpayer's reputation in this case was a personal injury. This is so even though it
affected his professional pursuits. All income in compensation of that injury is
excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Id. at 84.
160. Concededly, the analysis is not truly a "one step" test. The underlying action, in
addition to being tort or tort-type, must also be personal in nature. There are many torts,
such as trespass, that are not personal in nature, and recoveries for which would not qualify
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). See Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 112 (Whalen, J., dis-
senting), aff'd, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994); see also supra text accompanying note 212
(describing this approach as a two-step analysis); Every v. Internal Revenue Serv., 94-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,478 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (recovery of lost income by fishermen in
settlement of claims against Exxon for damages suffered as a result of Exxon Valdez oil
spill is taxable; while action sounded in tort, it was not in respect of a personal injury).
161. See Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1299 (1986), afftd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1988).
162. 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987).
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Bent, a Delaware teacher, had sued his school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
claiming he had been denied re-employment for reasons which abridged his
First Amendment rights.'63 Bent had been fired after making critical remarks
about the school, the staff, and the administration, and he had been denied a
re-employment hearing." The Court of Chancery agreed that Bent had been
denied re-employment "for reasons which, in part, abridged his First Amend-
ment right to express his views as to the public employer and school adminis-
trators for whom he worked-regardless of his obvious lack of tact in so
doing."'65 The state court denied certain of Bent's claims, including rein-
statement, leaving only his First Amendment claim." The Chancery Court
continued the case on the issue of the amount of money damages. Before any
hearing on damages was held, however, the parties settled the case by a pay-
ment by the school district's insurance carrier to Bent of $24,000, computed at
least in part by reference to lost wages. 6'
Bent did not report the $24,000 in his gross income, but the Service as-
serted that the portion of the settlement that constituted compensation for lost
wages should be taxable. The Tax Court sided with Bent, concluding that the
settlement payment was an amount received based upon "tort or tort-type
rights."'68 The government appealed, contending that the settlement "repre-
sented compensation for lost wages which was not excludable from gross
income under section 104(a)(2).""' 9
The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in a brief opinion. 70 Ac-
knowledging that an award of damages for the violation of a constitutional
right may be measured in whole or in part by the amount of lost wages,"'
the court approvingly cited the Ninth Circuit in Roemer for the proposition
that "[tihe personal nature of an injury should not be defined by its ef-
fect."' 2 Accordingly, the settlement was held excludable." 3
163. Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 240 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 19
164. id. at 237-39.
165. Id. at 240-41.
166. Id. at 241.
167. Id. at 242.
168. Id. at 249.
169. Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 70.
172. ld. (citing Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 699 (9th Cir. 1983)). The c
stated:
The Commissioner urges that since the settlement admittedly included a sum based
on the taxpayer's lost wages [rather than on pain and suffering], that sum represent-
ed compensation for lost wages which was not excludable from gross income under
section 104(a)(2). We do not agree. For an award of damages for the violation of




173. On petition for rehearing, the Service argued that no personal injury was present in
this case because the injury resulting from the tort was economic. Following this argument,
Bent's suit was merely for lost wages, not personal injury. Bent, 835 F.2d at 70. The court
rejected this position, stating that the denial of a civil right "involves a personal injury just
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2. The Federal Antidiscrimination Cases
In a series of controversial decisions, the principles of Roemer and
Threlkeld were applied with mixed results to particularly nettlesome areas:
back pay and liquidated damage awards, and settlements obtained by employ-
ees alleging violations of federal antidiscrimination statutes such as the Fair
Labor Standards Act,"' the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,"5 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act"' prior to its amendment in 1991.'" Al-
though the recovery scheme set forth in each statute varies slightly, the basic
underlying remedy is the recovery of back pay: the amount that the victim
should have been paid as compared to what the victim was in fact paid during
the victim's term of employment, or the amount the victim would have earned
absent an improper termination in violation of the applicable statute. In addi-
tion, under the ADEA and the FLSA (but not under pre-amendment Title VII),
the successful claimant may recover liquidated damages in an "additional
equal amount"; that is, an amount equal to the award of back pay."' Under
most statutes of this nature, a claimant may also seek equitable relief, such as
reinstatement and an order prohibiting further discriminatory practices. General
compensatory damages (such as for pain and suffering or mental anguish) and
punitive damages, however, are not available to a plaintiff under these statutes.
The limited recovery scheme reflected in the federal antidiscrimination
statutes immediately raises the question of whether a taxpayer's recovery
under these statutes is really in the nature of personal injury tort recoveries or
more analogous to breach of contract recoveries for earned but unpaid wages.
If the latter, the § 104(a)(2) exclusion would not apply.
as much as a physical assault." Id. at 70-71. The fact that the resulting damages were mea-
sured by reference to lost wages was of no significance.
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter FLSA]. Under the FLSA,
a successful claimant may be entitled to "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropri-
ate to effectuate the purposes of [the FLSA], including without limitation employment, rein-
statement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as
liquidated damages." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988).
175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter ADEA]. The remedial
scheme of the ADEA is taken directly from the FLSA and, in fact, is simply cross-refer-
enced in the ADEA rather than set out at length therein. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). Thus,
the FLSA scheme and the ADEA scheme are virtually identical, with one exception: liquidat-
ed damages are "payable only in cases of willful violations of" the ADEA. Id.
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (amended 1991) [hereinafter pre-amendment
Title VII.
177. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). As indicated in the text, prior to the enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, successful complainants were limited to equitable relief and an award of
back pay. The 1991 Act significantly expanded these remedies to include (i) compensatory
damages, such as for "future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, men-
tal anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses," and (ii) punitive dam-
ages, provided the complainant demonstrates that the respondent "engaged in a discriminatory
practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual." § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-1073 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. V 1993)).
178. See supra notes 174-75.
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In one of the first cases to address this question, Byrne v. Commission-
er,'79 the taxpayer claimed she was the victim of a retaliatory discharge in
violation of the FLSA. Byrne asserted that she was treated discriminatorily and
eventually terminated by her employer, Grammer, Dempsey & Hudson, Inc., a
steel firm, because she had cooperated with an EEOC investigation of wage
disparity at her workplace." Although Byrne initially sought reinstatement,
she eventually accepted $20,000 in a lump sum settlement of her case.''
Byrne did not report the $20,000 in income. The Tax Court, after concluding
that a plaintiff's claims in a retaliatory discharge lawsuit under the FLSA
exhibit equally demonstrable characteristics of both a personal injury tort
claim "'82 and a breach of contract claim," 3 held one-half of the $20,000 to
be includable, and one-half to be excludable." The Tax Court concluded
that the Roemer/Threlkeld principle did not apply in this case because the
claims settled were not solely claims of a tort-like nature.'
The Third Circuit reversed:'
Based upon our ruling in Bent, we reject the Commissioner's argu-
ment in this case that the settlement is taxable because it was intend-
ed, at least in part, to compensate Byrne for lost wages due to her
wrongful firing. The relevant inquiry, as the Tax Court noted, is
whether the settlement was received on account of personal or non-
personal injuries, not whether the damages compensate the taxpayer
for economic losses.
87
The court acknowledged, however, that "[riejecting this argument...
does not settle the issue of whether the settlement Byrne received was on
account of personal or nonpersonal injuries."'8 8 The court proceeded to ana-
lyze Byrne's FLSA claim'89 and her related New Jersey state law wrongful
discharge claim"9 and concluded that "both the FLSA and state law wrong-
179. 90 T.C. 1000 (1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989).
180. Bvne, 90 T.C. at 1001-02.
181. Id. at 1004.
182. Byrne analogized the nature of her FLSA claim to similar claims under New Jersey
state law, such as retaliatory or abusive discharge, which she characterized as being in the
nature of a personal injury tort claim. Id. at 1008.
183. After reviewing cases at the state level involving abusive, retaliatory, and unlawful
discharges, which occasionally characterized such claims as sounding in contract, the Tax
Court concluded that "the contract action [analogy] appears to apply equally well to the facts
here." Id. at 1009.
184. Id. at 1011.
185. Id. at 1011 n.10.
186. Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989).
187. Id. at 214. The court added, "[tlo the extent that the Commissioner argues that
because the settlement was intended to compensate Byrne for economic losses it is therefore
compensating her for non-personal injuries, we find this argument to have been explicitly
rejected in Bent, and we reject it again here." Id.
188. Id.
189. The court concluded that such a claim was "more tort-like than contract-like" be-
cause it sought redress for violation of a duty owed by the employer to the employee by
operation of law (the FLSA) and not pursuant to an express or implied employment contract.
Id. at 215.
190. Id. at 215-16. The Court of Appeals, more so than the Tax Court, viewed the set-
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ful discharge claims settled by Christine Byrne qualify for the section
104(a)(2) exclusion"'' because they were more analogous to tort claims than
contract claims. Accordingly, Byrne's recovery was held tax-exempt.
Despite its losses in Bent and Byrne, the Service continued to argue that
statutory recoveries for back wages were analogous to contract recoveries, and
the Tax Court still seemed receptive to the argument. The matter came to a
head in Rickel v. Commissioner.'92 The taxpayer in Rickel received $80,000
from his former employer in 1983 and $25,000 in 1984 pursuant to a settle-
ment of his ADEA lawsuit. 9 Rickel had been general sales manager of
Malsbary Manufacturing Company. Rickel was passed over for a promotion to
president because the company "wanted someone younger" and was subse-
quently terminated after the new president told Rickel he "wanted a younger
person as general sales manager."''" Rickel sued his former employer under
the ADEA, seeking, inter alia, (i) back wages, benefits, and other compensa-
tions with interest, and (ii) a sum equal to back pay as liquidated damages.'95
Rickel's ADEA case was tried before a jury in 1983. While the jury was
deliberating, the parties reached a settlement under which the employer agreed
to pay Rickel $80,000 immediately and $25,000 during each of the next four
years."9 The settlement agreement did not allocate the settlement amount
among Rickel's various claims for relief.'97
Rickel did not report the $80,000 or the $25,000 as gross income on his
1983 and 1984 tax returns. After the Service issued a notice of deficiency
stating that the entire amount of $105,000 was taxable income, Rickel peti-
tioned. The Tax Court first examined the ADEA and concluded that because
the remedial scheme provided for matching the "additional equal amount"
liquidated damages to the back pay award, it would be logical to conclude that
Rickel's settlement should be split 50-50 between back pay and liquidated
damages.'98 The court, therefore, found that one-half, i.e. $40,000 in 1983
and $12,500 in 1984, of the settlement was attributable to each element of
recovery." 9
The Tax Court then held that the one-half attributable to back pay consti-
tuted taxable income, while the other one-half representing liquidated damages
was not taxable. The court likened the back pay award to damages, received in
an action for breach of contract and, as such, held them includable."l The
tlement as also releasing Grammer from claims by Byrne under state law wrongful discharge
doctrines. Id.
191. Id. at 216.
192. 92 T.C. 510 (1989), rev'd, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
193. Id. at 513.
194. Id. at 512.
195. Id. at 512-13; see also supra note 175.
196. Rickel, 92 T.C. at 513. The settlement was contingent upon the jury answering in
the affirmative to four special interrogatories submitted to them; this subsequently occurred.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 522.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 521-22.
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court viewed the "additional equal amount" liquidated damages as merely a
substitute for difficult-to-measure personal injuries resulting from discriminato-
ry employment practices and, accordingly, held them excludable.2"'
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court.0 2 The Third Cir-
cuit began by reviewing the lessons of Roemer and Threlkeld. °3 The court
approvingly cited the Tax Court's beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis
from Threlkeld and agreed that in determining whether the injury complained
of is personal, the origin and character of the claim must be considered rather
than the consequences that result from the injury."2" The Third Circuit then
proceeded to chastise the Tax Court for failing to apply its own tests to the
case at hand:
[T]he Tax Court then slipped into the old analysis previously aban-
doned by the full Tax Court in Threlkeld, i.e., "mount[ing] an inquiry
to determine whether the components of the [taxpayer's discrimina-
tion] injuries for which the [settlement was] made are personal or
[economic]." Instead, once it found that age discrimination was analo-
gous to a personal injury and that the taxpayer's ADEA action
amounted to the assertion of a tort type right, the Tax Court should
have ended its analysis and found that all damages flowing therefrom
were excludable under § 104(a)(2). By going further and rummaging
through the taxpayer's prayers for relief in order to determine the
nature of his claim, the Tax Court was simply defining the nature of
the taxpayer's injury by reference to its nonpersonal consequences, an
approach ... the full Tax Court rejected in Threlkeld .... [T]he
nonpersonal, economic effects of the employer's act of discrimina-
tion, e.g., loss of wages, does not transform a personal tort type claim
into one for nonpersonal injuries.201
Thus, under the Threlkeld analysis, the only question the Tax Court
should have considered was whether an action under the ADEA was "tort or
tort-type." If so, all damages recovered by Rickel should have been considered
as received on account of a personal injury. Turning to this question, the Court
of Appeals concluded that an ADEA action is in fact more akin to a personal
injury tort action, and not to a breach of contract action:
[F]ocusing on the nature of the claim, we are convinced that the
taxpayer's discrimination suit under the ADEA was analogous to the
assertion of a tort type right to redress a personal injury. By discrimi-
nating against the taxpayer on the basis of his age, Malsbary invaded
the rights that the taxpayer "is granted by virtue of being a person in
the sight of the law." The taxpayer merely sought the remedies af-
forded by the statute as compensation for the personal injury he suf-
fered as a result of his employer's act of discrimination; the requested
201. Id. at 522.
202. Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990).
203. Id. at 659.
204. Id. (quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299); see also supra note 151.
205. Rickel, 900 F.2d at 661-62 (citations omitted).
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remedies were not separate claims in themselves to redress the
employer's breach of a contract. The nonpersonal consequences of the
discrimination, e.g. the loss of wages, does not transform discrimina-
tion into a nonpersonal injury.2"
As in Bent and Byrne, the Third Circuit sided with the taxpayer in Rickel
and held the taxpayer's ADEA recovery fully excludable under §
104(a)(2).
2 7
The Service continued to litigate cases involving recoveries under statutes
such as the ADEA and the FLSA, arguing that such statutes evince a recovery
scheme that is predicated on theories of breach of contract and not tort law.
Generally speaking, the courts were unimpressed with this view and frequently
held that the entire amount of such recoveries fell within the scope of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2).2" For example, in Pistillo v. Commissioner,2" the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Rickel and held
that the taxpayer's recovery in an ADEA lawsuit was fully excludable."'
Subsequently, in Downey v. Commissioner,2" the Tax Court itself fell
206. Id. at 663 (citations and footnotes omitted).
207. When Rickel came before the Third Circuit in 1990, the Service made the same
previously rejected arguments. The Third Circuit reacted as follows:
[Tbo the extent that the Commissioner, in spending an inordinately large part of his
brief attempting to establish that at least half of the settlement comprised payment
for back pay, is arguing that "because the settlement was intended to compensate
[the taxpayer] for economic losses it is therefore compensating [him] for
nonpersonal injuries, we find this argument to have been rejected in Bent [and
Byrne], and we reject it again here" for the third time.
Id. at 662 n.9 (quoting Byme v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211, 214 (3d cir. 1989)) (emphasis
added).
208. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883
F.2d 842, 873 (10th Cir. 1989) (in a non-tax case, holding an award of damages specifically
allocated to back pay as a result of a wrongful discharge in violation of First Amendment
rights nontaxable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)); Redfield v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d
542, 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (also in a non-tax case, holding awards under ADEA and the Cali-
fornia Fair Employment and Housing Act excludable).
209. 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990).
210. Pistillo had been awarded $55,000 in back pay by a jury. and while the case was
on appeal, the parties settled for approximately that amount. Therefore, Pistillo's entire recov-
ery was merely for back pay and no part of the settlement was attributable to "additional
equal amount" liquidated damages. The Tax Court accepted the view of the Service that this
recovery was more similar to a breach of contract recovery and therefore fully includable. At
that time, the Tax Court's decision in Rickel I had not yet been reversed by the Third Cir-
cuit. On appeal of Pistillo, the Sixth Circuit reversed. After approvingly citing the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, the Court of Appeals stated:
Reviewing the nature of Pistillo's claim, we conclude that his age discrimination
lawsuit is analogous to the assertion of a tort-type right to redress personal injuries.
Cleveland Tool discriminated against Pistillo on the basis of his age and invaded
the rights Pistillo "is granted by virtue of being'a person in the sight of the
law.". . . Pistillo's loss of wages-a substantial non-personal consequence of his
employer's age discrimination-did not transform the discrimination into a non-per-
sonal injury.
Pistillo, 912 F.2d at 149-150 (quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308) (citations omitted).
211. 97 T.C. 150 (1991). For a discussion of the subsequent history of Downey, see
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into line and held the taxpayer's entire ADEA recovery to be excludable.
Downey had received $120,000, one-half of which was specifically allocated
to back pay, and one-half of which was allocated to "additional equal amount"
liquidated damages. In a lengthy opinion, the Tax Court reviewed the history
of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), the relevant Regulations, and past cases. The court then
noted:
[t]he inquiry under section 104(a)(2) is whether the nature of the
claim giving rise to the payment is tort or tort-like and whether the
nature of the injury is personal. If the above two questions are an-
swered in the affirmative, then our inquiry should end, and the settle-
ment amount received on account of the personal injury is excludable
from gross income under section 104(a)(2). 2
Applying the foregoing principles, the court decided that the task was to
focus on the nature of the claim on which Downey's ADEA suit was founded.
[T]he consequences of a personal injury, or the actual damages suf-
fered, do not affect our inquiry under section 104(a)(2). Whether the
damages paid to the tort victim reflect a substitute for amounts or
items otherwise taxable or a substitute for amounts or items to be
enjoyed without a tax consequence is irrelevant....
We seek to determine whether petitioner's claim under the
ADEA sounded in tort and whether the nature of the injury arising
from age discrimination is personal for purposes of section 104(a)(2).
If we answer those questions in the affirmative, then our inquiry has
ended, and the payment petitioner received in settlement of the age
discrimination claim is excludable under section 104(a)(2). We need
not consider the nature of the consequences of the personal injury
(such as whether the victim suffered pain and suffering or was de-
prived of all or a portion of his livelihood)."3
Following the lead of the various appellate court decisions finding the
ADEA recovery scheme based on concepts of personal injury tort law and not
breach of contract, the Tax Court explicitly overruled and abandoned its for-
mer position in Rickel and Pistillo21 4 over the dissent of seven judges."5
The Service, however, did not fight completely in vain. In Thompson v.
Commissioner,"6 the Fourth Circuit agreed with the government and the Tax
Court." 7 The Fourth Circuit held that amounts recovered as back pay in a
infra note 260 and accompanying text.
212. Downey, 97 T.C. at 161 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 168-70.
215. The majority opinion was joined by ten other Tax Court judges. In a dissent joined
by six other judges, Judge Cohen 'argued that the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis
was misguided and concluded that the "dual nature" approach followed by the Tax Court in
Rickel was correct. Downey, 97 T.C. at 174-80.
216. 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.1989).
217. Thompson had instituted a class action lawsuit against her employer, the United
States Government Printing Office, asserting gender discrimination claims under the Equal
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gender discrimination suit under the Equal Pay Act2 " and pre-amendment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act" 9 were taxable, although the portion of the
taxpayer's recovery representing "additional equal amount" liquidated damages
was not.
After analyzing the statutory scheme [of the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII] we conclude that Thompson received the liquidated damages
through prosecution of a tort-type claim for personal injuries. We
conclude, however, that the claim for back pay was essentially a
contractual claim for accrued wages. Thus, the Tax Court correctly
held the liquidated damages award excludable under section
104(a)(2), and the award of back pay includable in gross income.22
The Fourth Circuit was convinced, based on its analysis of the Equal Pay
Act and Title VII, that recoveries for back pay under those statutes were
essentially contractual in nature and therefore taxable.22 Recoveries for liqui-
dated damages under the Equal Pay Act, however, were received through a
"tort or tort-type" action for personal injuries and therefore excludable.222
As in Thompson, the Service often enjoyed success in taxing back pay
recoveries under pre-amendment Title VII. As previously noted, the sole mon-
etary remedy available in a pre-amendment Title VII action (in addition to
equitable relief) is a recovery of back pay. 23 This fact strengthened the
Pay Act and Title VII. Thompson, 89 T.C. 632, 633 (1987). In 1982, Thompson received
approximately $66,000 in back pay under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII and approximate-
ly $66,000 in liquidated damages under the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 637. The Tax Court held
that the back pay award, but not the liquidated damages award, was includable in her in-
come, consistent with its decisions in Byrne and Rickel. Id.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
219. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
220. Thompson, 866 F.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
221. The court stated:
Thompson performed essentially the same work as her male co-workers for which
she should have received equal pay. The back pay award was simply recovery for
earned, but unpaid, wages which distinguishes her award of back pay from awards
for lost wages or lost income in traditional personal injury/tort actions. She received
compensation for services rendered whereas a tort plaintiff receives compensation
for the inability to earn an income due to the tortious action of a defendant.
Further, the purpose of the Equal Pay Act is to ensure equal pay for equal
work regardless of the gender of the employee. The amount of the award is calcu-
lated based on the wage differential between similarly situated male and female
employees without regard to tax consequences. If the back pay award were exclud-
ed from gross income, Thompson would be placed at an advantage over her male
co-workers, who presumably reported their total earned wages as gross income.
Id. (citations omitted).
222. The court concluded:
In contrast to the award of back pay, Thompson's liquidated damages award was
not earned income. Rather, it served both as a deterrent to ensure compliance with
the Act, and as "compensation for the retention of a workman's pay which might
result in damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by
liquidated damages." As such, the liquidated damages award constituted compensa-
tion received through a tort or tort-type action for personal injuries.
Id. (quoting Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 710 (1945)),
223. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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Service's arguments that the remedial scheme of the statute was more analo-
gous to breach of contract recovery rather than tort.
224
The taxpayer in Sparrow v. Commissioner25 was a computer specialist
for the Navy. He resigned after receiving a notice of removal, and subsequent-
ly filed a Title VII complaint with the Navy alleging racial discrimination.226
After the Navy rejected the complaint, the case was reviewed by the EEOC.
The EEOC found for Sparrow and ordered his reinstatement. Sparrow opted to
settle with the Navy and received $69,284 in back pay.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit adopted a two-part test in ana-
lyzing I.R.C. § 104(a)(2): the amount received (1) must be for damages and
(2) must result from a personal injury.2  Under this unique approach, which
has never been adopted by any other federal court, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the first test was not satisfied. The amount received by Sparrow
was not received as "damages" but rather as equitable relief. The court noted
that, in enacting Title VII, Congress did not make the legal remedies of com-
pensatory and punitive damages available. Instead, Congress limited the reme-
dy to equitable relief.229 The court concluded that an award of back pay un-
der Title VII did not constitute a remedy of damages. Therefore, the award
was not excludable income under section 104(a)(2).23
In so holding, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, noting that it "leapfrogged over the
damages requirement directly to the personal injury inquiry, at the same time
fusing the distinction between damages and back pay universally recognized in
Title VII cases. 23'
While the two-part test proposed in Sparrow has not won adherence out-
side the D.C. Circuit, the opinion seems to be the first to foreshadow the
approach ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Burke.
3. United States v. Burke
23 2
In Burke, the taxpayers had recovered back pay from their employer (the
Tennessee Valley Authority) in settlement of a Title VII sex discrimination
action brought in 1984.233 The TVA paid a lump sum of $5 million to be
224. In Crossin v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. 111. 1991), the taxpayer had
received $214,913.66 in 1989 for participating in the settlement of a class action Title VII
gender discrimination lawsuit against the FBI. The amount represented wages Crossin would
have earned from 1977 through 1988 had the FBI hired her. Id. at 907. In a somewhat
indecipherable opinion, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the
government that the entire back pay settlement award was taxable. The basis of the court's
holding is unclear.
225. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
226. Id. at 434-35.
227. Id. at 435.
228. Id. at 436.
229. Id. at 437.
230. Id. at 438.
231. Id. at 439.
232. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
233. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119, 1120 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
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distributed among the plaintiffs under a formula devised by the employees'
union. The formula considered the length of service in the affected rates of
pay and salary schedule."M Burke raised the question of whether those pay-
ments were excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
The District Court ruled that, because the taxpayers sought and obtained
only back wages due as a result of TVA's discriminatory underpayments rath-
er than compensatory or other damages, the settlement proceeds did not result
from a "tort or tort-type" action and could not be excluded from gross income
as damages received on account of personal injuries.23
The Sixth Circuit reversed on appeal.236 Viewing the issue "as a quite
narrow one, 237 the Sixth Circuit approvingly restated the Threlkeld begin-
ning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test and then noted:
In other words, determining whether the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies
requires an examination of the nature of the injury to determine
whether the injury and claim are personal and tort-like in nature, and
not whether the consequences of the injury resulted in an award of
compensatory damages or damages for back pay. Thus, our inquiry is
limited to whether injuries resulting from sex discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII are "personal injuries" for the purposes of §
104(a)(2).23
The court answered this latter question in the affirmative. 239 The govern-
ment had argued, however, that a Title VII lawsuit is distinguishable from
other types of actions (such as those brought under the ADEA) because in a
Title VII action the only monetary remedy available is an award of back pay.
Thus, the taxpayer was recovering only for economic injury, not personal
injury.2 " The Sixth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the government's ar-
gument improperly focused "on the consequences of a Title VII violation (the
payment of back pay for lost wages) rather than the personal nature of the
1867 (1992).
234. Id.
235. Burke v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) l 50,213 (E.D. Tenn. 1990),
rev'd, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
236. Burke, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991).
237. Id. at 1121.
238. Id. at 1121 (citations omitted). The court concluded:
In sum, Threlkeld and its progeny require that for the purposes of § 104(a)(2), this
court determine whether the injury is personal and the claim resulting in the dam-
ages is tort-like in nature. If the answer is in the affirmative, then that is "the
beginning and end of the inquiry. .... At no point do we inquire into the na-
ture of the damages involved. Rather the narrow scope of our gaze is properly
limited to the "origin and character of the claim, . . . and not to the consequences
that result from the injury."
Id. at 1123 (quoting Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1299) (citations omitted).
239. The court noted, "Courts have long held that injuries resulting from invidious dis-
crimination, be it on the basis of race, sex, national origin or some other unlawful category,
are injuries to the individual rights and dignity of the person." Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121.
240. Id. at 1122.
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injury (invidious discrimination)."24'
Finding no convincing reason to distinguish an award under the ADEA, as
was held nontaxable in Pistillo, from an award under Title VII, the Sixth
Circuit found the settlement awards in Burke to be nontaxable.242
Recognizing a conflict among Sparrow, Thompson, and Burke, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari, 43 and reversed in a 7-2 decision. In holding
a pre-amendment Title VII back pay recovery to be taxable, the Supreme
Court fashioned an entirely new "scope of the remedies" test for identifying
"tort or tort-type" actions.244
After reviewing the Sixth Circuit's test, 245 Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority, agreed with the test in part: "We thus agree with the Court of
Appeals' analysis insofar as it focused, for purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the
nature of the claim underlying respondents' damages award. Respondents, for
their part, agree that this is the appropriate inquiry, as does the dissent. 246
In an effort to articulate the standards by which it can be determined
whether an action brought under federal antidiscrimination statutes can be
characterized as one attempting to vindicate "tort or tort-type" rights, the Su-
preme Court fashioned a new "scope of the remedies" analysis. The Supreme
Court's analysis emphasized whether the statute in question incorporates suffi-
cient hallmarks of traditional concepts of tort liability and recovery:
A "tort" has been defined broadly as a "civil wrong, other than
breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the
form of an action for damages." Remedial principles thus figure
prominently in the definition and conceptualization of torts. Indeed,
one of the hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a
broad range of damages to compensate the plaintiff "fairly for inju-
ries caused by the violation of his legal rights." Although these dam-
ages often are described in compensatory terms, in many cases they
are larger than the amount necessary to reimburse actual monetary
loss sustained or even anticipated by the plaintiff, and thus redress
intangible elements of injury that are "deemed important, even though
241. Id. (emphasis added).
242. The court was not convinced of
any principled way to distinguish the injuries arising from a claim for invidious age
discrimination, and the claim for invidious sex discrimination . . . except that these
tort claims were brought under different federal statutes. In addition, the government
was unable to demonstrate why injuries resulting from sex discrimination were not
"personal" while other forms of nonphysical tort injuies were "personal" for the
purposes of § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
Id. at 1123.
243. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 47 (1992).
244. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
245. Significantly, the Supreme Court cited with seeming approval the Threlkeld test:
"The Court of Appeals concluded that exclusion under § 104(a)(2) turns on whether the inju-
ry and the claim are 'personal tort-like in nature.' 'If the answer is affirmative,' the court
held, 'then that is the beginning and end of the inquiry."
Id. at 1869 (citations omitted).
246. Id. at 1872 (citations omitted).
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not pecuniary in [their] immediate consequence[s]."
For example, the victim of a physical injury may be permitted,
under the relevant state law, to recover damages not only for lost
wages, medical expenses, and diminished future earning capacity on
account of the injury, but also for emotional distress and pain and
suffering. Similarly, the victim of a "dignitary" or non-physical tort
such as defamation may recover not only for any actual pecuniary
loss (e.g., loss of business or customers), but for "impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering." Furthermore, punitive or exemplary
damages are generally available in those instances where the
defendant's misconduct was intentional or reckless . 247
In order to come within the § 104(a)(2) income exclusion, re-
spondents therefore must show that Title VII, the legal basis for their
recovery of backpay, redresses a tort-like personal injury in accord
with the foregoing principles.4 8
According to Justice Blackmun, if a federal antidiscrimination statute
reflects sufficient indicia of traditional tort concepts of recovery, it will be
viewed as redressing a tort-like personal injury under § 104(a)(2). The main
difference between this analysis and that employed by the Sixth Circuit, then,
is in the manner in which an action involving "tort or tort-type" rights is to be
identified. Under the Sixth Circuit's view and under the view of most of the
courts that had taken up the matter, this determination involved an inquiry into
whether the underlying injury was to the "individual rights and dignity of the
person"; 249 that is, whether there had been an "invasion of the rights that an
individual is granted by virtue of being a person in the sight of the law.' 25
Justice Blackmun did not agree, however, that this was the appropriate
test."' The Supreme Court's test, which focused on the scope of the rem-
edies afforded under the particular antidiscrimination statute, led to a much
different result when applied to Title VII cases:
Indeed, in contrast to the tort remedies for physical and nonphysical
injuries discussed above, Title VII does not allow awards for compen-
satory or punitive damages; instead, it limits available remedies to
247. Id. at 1870-72 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). Justice Blackmun
also pointed to the fact that no jury trial is available in a Title VIi action as further indica-
tion that such an action does not bear the hallmarks of a traditional tort action. Id. at 1872.
248. Id. at 1872.
249. See, e.g., Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121.
250. Threlkeld, 87 T.C. at 1308.
251. The Court noted:
It is beyond question that discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, race,
or any of the other classifications protected by Title VII is, as respondents argue
and this Court consistently has held, an invidious practice that causes grave harm
to its victims. The fact that employment discrimination causes harm to individuals
does not automatically imply, however, that there exists a tort-like "personal injury"
for purposes of federal income tax law.
Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1872-73 (citations omitted).
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
backpay, injunctions, and other equitable relief .... An employee
wrongfully discharged on the basis of sex thus may recover only an
amount equal to the wages the employee would have earned from the
date of discharge to the date of reinstatement, along with lost fringe
benefits such as vacation pay and pension benefits; similarly, an
employee wrongfully denied a promotion on the basis of sex, or, as
in this case, wrongfully discriminated against in salary on the basis of
sex, may recover only the differential between the appropriate pay
and actual pay for services performed, as well as lost benefits.
' * * Nothing in this remedial scheme purports to recompense a
Title VII plaintiff for any of the other traditional harms associated
with the personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional dig-
tress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages.252
While recognizing that other federal antidiscrimination statutes may be
sufficiently "tort-like" under this standard,253 this was not the case in a Title
VII action:2" "Thus, we cannot say that a statute such as Title VII, whose
sole remedial focus is the award of backwages, redresses a tort-like personal
injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2) and the applicable regulations."'255
Accordingly, the majority held that the backpay awards were taxable.5 6
4. Evaluation of Burke's Law
As a practical matter, the specific holding of Burke will have a diminish-
ing impact as time passes and pre-1991 Title VII controversies fall away."5 7
Of more importance will be the utility and practicality of the approach articu-
lated by the Supreme Court for determining whether recoveries under other
federal antidiscrimination statutes are excludable.5 8 It remains to be seen
252. Id. at 1873 (citations omitted).
253. The court stated:
No doubt discrimination could constitute a "personal injury" for purposes of
§ 104(a)(2) if the relevant cause of action evidenced a tort-like conception of injury
and remedy. Indeed, the circumscribed remedies available Title VII stand in marked
contrast not only to those available under traditional tort law, but under other feder-
al antidiscrimination statutes, as well.
Id. at 1873 (citations and footnotes omitted).
254. The Court noted:
Notwithstanding a common-law tradition of broad tort damages and the existence of
other federal antidiscrimination statutes offering similarly broad remedies, Congress
declined to recompense Title VII plaintiffs for anything beyond the wages properly
due them - wages that, if paid in the ordinary course, would have been fully tax-
able.
Id. at 1874 (citation omitted).
255. Id. (footnote omitted).
256. In a concurring opinion that departed wholly from established law, Justice Scalia
agreed that the back pay awards should be taxable, but on the surprising theory that only
damages received for physical injuries should be eligible for exemption under § 104(a)(2).
Id. at 1875. This long-discredited notion had not even been argued by the government.
257. In dissent, Justice O'Connor noted that "[bly resting on the remedies available un-
der Title VII and distinguishing the recently amended version of that law, the Court does
make today's decision a narrow one." Id. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. As previously noted, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 sigrfificantly expanded the reme-
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how the lower federal courts will apply the new "scope of the remedies" anal-
ysis laid down by the Supreme Court, and whether the new test will lead to
heightened uniformity in judicial decisions in this area.
However, if experience in the first two years following the Supreme
Court's decision in Burke is any indication, the courts appear confused. For
example, several courts have attempted to apply the "scope of the remedies"
analysis to back pay and liquidated damage recoveries under the ADEA, with
wildly divergent results. After the Supreme Court's ruling in Burke, the Tax
Court reexamined its decision in Downey v. Commissioner259  at the
government's request. The Tax Court affirmed that decision, holding that the
"scope of the remedies" test is satisfied by the ADEA.2" The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, however, and held that the ADEA does not provide remedies
that are the hallmark of tort liability because liquidated damages-the only
remedy available in an ADEA action that differentiates them from Title VII
actions-do not compensate the victim for the intangible elements of a person-
al injury.26" ' Thus, ADEA recoveries "lack an essential element of a tort-type
claim" 262 and do "not even clear the low hurdle" 263 of being "tort-type" un-
der the Regulations. 26' The Seventh Circuit therefore viewed ADEA recov-
eries as taxable.
The Seventh Circuit is in conflict with the Ninth Circuit over the treat-
ment of ADEA recoveries. In Schmitz v. Commissioner,265 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the ADEA does in fact "establish[] a tort-like cause of action
within the meaning of Burke"2' and held the taxpayer's back pay and liqui-
dies available to a successful Title VII plaintiff. See supra note 177. As to post-1991 Title
VII recoveries, the Service has concluded that recoveries for disparate treatment discrimina-
tion (the remedies for which include compensatory and punitive damages) are excludable (but
specifically declining to rule as to whether a punitive damage recovery would be excludable),
while back pay recoveries for disparate impact discrimination (the remedies for which do not
include compensatory or punitive damages, and are more akin to those available under the
ADEA) are not excludable. Rev. Rul. 93-88, 1993-2 C.B. 61.
259. 97 T.C. 150 (1991), affd on reh'g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993), rev'd, 33 F.3d 836 (7th
Cir. 1994).
260. Downey v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 634 (1993).
261. Downey v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 1994).
262. Downey, 33 F.3d at 840. The Tax Court continues to follow its decision in
Downey. See, e.g., Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116 (1994); Cassino v. Com-
missioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2193 (1994); Fite v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1588
(1993).
263. Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
264. The Seventh Circuit gave no indication as to whether it endorsed the one-step
ThrelkeldlHorion test or the two-step HawkinslMiller test, a controversy that is discussed in
the text below. Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta its approval of the position
taken by Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Burke, see supra note 256, that the plain lan-
guage of I.R.C. § 104 excludes awards only for physical injury, Thus, even if the Seventh
Circuit had concluded that ADEA claims are tort-type, the court would apparently have ruled
Downey's award to be taxable. Downey, 33 F.3d at 838.
265. 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994). Both Schmitz and Downey were argued on April 11,
1994, and decided on August 30, 1994.
266. Id. at 794. The government argued in Schmitz that liquidated damages under the
ADEA represent only punitive damages, and therefore do not compensate the victim for
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dated damage recoveries to be excludable. The other federal courts that have
attempted to apply the "scope of the remedies" test to ADEA recoveries re-
flect hopeless confusion.267
The Supreme Court will soon step in to resolve the application of the
"scope of the remedies" test to the ADEA. On August 31, 1993, in three relat-
ed but unreported decisions, the Tax Court held recoveries under the ADEA to
be excludable. One of these cases, Schleier v. Commissioner,"' was subse-
quently appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed without opinion."6 The
other two cases have been appealed to the Tenth27 and Eleventh"" Cir-
injuries such as emotional distress or pain and suffering. See id. at 793. The government's
position was that, because liquidated damages serve no compensatory purpose and because
the presence of compensatory damages is vital to a scheme of tort recovery, the scope of
the remedies under the ADEA do not include a tort-like conception of remedy. The Schmitz
majority disagreed, concluding that ADEA liquidated damages do in fact serve a compensato-
ry purpose, at least in part, and this factor, taken together with the fact that the ADEA
allows for jury trials, serves to distinguish the ADEA from pre-amendment Title VII as
evaluated in the Burke decisions. Id. Whether or not liquidated damages under the ADEA
are punitive, compensatory, or both, is a matter of controversy in the federal courts. See
infra notes 267 and 509.
267. See, e.g., Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (ruling that
back pay and liquidated damages are not taxable). The court noted that the ADEA, in con-
trast with pre-amendment Title VII, provides for a jury trial and liquidated damages. Whether
ADEA liquidated damages are viewed as serving a compensatory purpose or a punitive pur-
pose is irrelevant. In either case, such damages are a "tort-type remedy which distinguishes
the ADEA from pre-amendment Title VII." Id. at 1245. By concluding that the nature of liq-
uidated damages is irrelevant, the court seemed to adopt a Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-
the-inquiry analysis that is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's later decision in Schmitz.
Both Downey (award taxable) and Rice (award not taxable) involved United Airlines pilots
who were plaintiffs in the same ADEA class action lawsuit.
The recovery of back pay was held taxable in Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F.
Supp. 1553 (N.D. Fla. 1993). The only difference in remedies under pre-amendment Title
VII and the ADEA is the availability of liquidated damages in cases involving willful vio-
lations. Id. at 1556. The purpose of liquidated damages is wholly punitive and noncompensa-
tory and this single difference "does not convert every ADEA award into 'personal injury'
damages for tax purposes." Id. at 1556-57. Maleszewski was criticized, and both back pay
and liquidated damages were held non-taxable in Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 396
(1994). As in Rice, it is irrelevant whether liquidated damages are characterized as compen-
satory or punitive in nature. Id. at 400; see also Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378
(M.D. Ala. 1994) (adopting the reasoning of Maleszewski and holding back pay and liquidat-
ed damage recoveries taxable); Drase v. United States, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,463
(N.D. II1. 1994) (following Maleszewski and Shaw and holding the recovery taxable and
viewing liquidated damages as wholly punitive); cf Wood, supra note 121, at 365 ("On bal-
ance ... it would appear that ADEA recoveries stand an excellent chance of continuing to
be excludable .... ").
268. No. 22909-90 (T.C. 1990), cited in Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M.(CCH) 3116,
3118 (1994).
269. 26 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1994) (table), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994). The
Fifth Circuit considers awards under the ADEA not taxable. See Purcell v. Sequin State
Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d 950, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1993) (a non-tax case).
270. Gates v. Commissioner, No. 17889-90 (T.C. 1990), on appeal to the Tenth Circuit
(Nov. 24, 1993), cited in Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116, 3118 (1994).
271. Estate of Hillelson v. Commissioner, No. 11464-90 (T.C. 1990), on appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit (Nov. 24, 1993), cited in Bums v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3116,
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cuits. In light of the conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on the one
hand, and the Seventh Circuit on the other hand, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Schleier272 on November 14, 1994, to resolve the application of
Burke to ADEA recoveries. In resolving Schleier, the Supreme Court may de-
cide, either directly or indirectly, the issue of whether punitive damages are
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).273
Importantly, the Supreme Court's test in Burke exacerbates the confusion
surrounding the taxation of punitive damages. It is unclear whether the Su-
preme Court validated the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis,
which had been applied by the Sixth Circuit. The Supreme Court cited that
analysis, then subsequently noted that it "agree[d] with the Court of Appeals'
analysis insofar as it focused, for purposes of § 104(a)(2), on the nature of the
claim underlying respondents' damages award. 274 Was this enigmatic state-
ment intended to place a stamp of approval on the Threlkeld analysis? Appar-
ently, the Supreme Court did not have a problem with the notion that, so long
as the injury and the claim are "personal and tort-like in nature," that is the
"beginning and end of the inquiry." The Court seemed only to object to the
manner in which the inquiry itself was to be undertaken and substituted its
"scope of the remedies" analysis for the tests that had been applied by the
lower courts in identifying a tort or tort-type action.
If the Threlkeld analysis survived the Supreme Court's scope-of-the-reme-
dies test, it is arguable that as long as the underlying claim is tort or tort-type,
that is the beginning and end of the inquiry and all damages-including puni-
tive damages-are excludable from income.27 The Supreme Court's analysis
in Burke has crucial significance to the question of the federal income tax
treatment of punitive damages.
On the other hand, it is also easy for a court to distinguish the Supreme
Court's decision in Burke from any case involving punitive damages. Burke
simply did not involve punitive damages and did not address that issue. Re-
gardless of whether Burke is factually distinguishable, it can be argued that the
Supreme Court did not explicitly approve the Threlkeld approach. Therefore,
there is nothing in the Burke decision to preclude the conclusion that if an
injury is found to be tort or tort-type under the scope-of-the-remedies test,
there is also a second inquiry to be considered: whether the resulting recovery
is received "on account of' that injury. If a second test indeed exists and
requires the recovery to be received "on account of" a personal injury, it can
be argued that punitive damages are not excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)
on the theory that punitive damages are not received on account of personal
injury at all, but because of the tortfeasor's malicious or wanton misconduct.
3118 (1994).
272. 115 S. Ct. 507 (1994).
273. See infra note 505 and accompanying text.
274. See United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872 (1992).
275. Note, however, that both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit in Threlkeld seemed
to be addressing the tax treatment of compensatory damages only. See supra notes 155 and
159.
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Whether the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry approach has
survived Burke is a key question affecting the taxation of punitive damages.
Courts attempting to apply the Supreme Court's test in Burke to the tax treat-
ment of punitive damages have come to inconsistent conclusions.
C. The Riddle of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 and its Amendment
of I.R.C. § 104(a)
In the midst of the battle being played out in the courts, described in the
previous section, Congress moved to bring some certainty to the area. In 1989,
as part of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, I.R.C. § 104(a) was
amended to provide that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion "shall not apply to any
punitive damages in connection with a case not involving physical injury or
physical sickness. ' 276 This curious language, phrased as a double negative,
has succeeded only in confounding those judges who have since attempted to
divine congressional intent in adopting the amendment. Serious doubt and
confusion continues to exist over the legislative purpose behind the amend-
ment, and its impact on the proper tax treatment of punitive damages is ex-
tremely problematic.
That the amendment was adopted to address the emerging judicial trend
extending § 104(a)(2) to recoveries for nonphysical injury seems clear. The
House Conference Report277 accompanying the Revenue Reconciliation Act
of 1993 (RRA '93) acknowledges those judicial developments by stating that
"[i]n some cases, courts have held that [the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)] exclusion is
available even though there is no physical injury, for example, in cases involv-
ing employment discrimination." 278 Concerned about this emerging trend,7 9
the House version of the bill had provided that "the exclusion for damages
276. See supra note 10 (emphasis added).
277. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622-23 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3225-26.
278. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3225. The House Ways and Means Committee Report was even more spe-
cific, stating:
Courts have interpreted [the I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)] exclusion broadly in some cases to
cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a physical injury or sickness.
For example, some courts have held that the exclusion applies to damages in cases
involving employment discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no
physical injury or sickness.
Amounts received as damages for personal injury or sickness receive favorable tax
treatment in that they are excludable from gross income. The committee believes
that such treatment is inappropriate where no physical injury or sickness is in-
volved.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1354-55 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2824-25.
279. By 1989, compensatory damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries had been held
excludable in Byme v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1000 (1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.
1989); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd. 848 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1988);
Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986). aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987); Roemer v.
Commissioner, 79 T.C. 398 (1982), rev'd, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 72:2
TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
received for personal injury is limited to cases involving physical injury or
sickness. '280 This provision would have withdrawn the exclusion for all dam-
ages recoveries (both compensatory and punitive) for nonphysical injuries and
thus would have stemmed the tide of recent decisions. The Senate version of
the bill had no corollary provision. In conference, the bill was amended to
read as finally adopted; however, the legislative history gives no hint as to
congressional intent. The final version of the bill therefore limited the reach of
the provision to punitive damages and adopted the double negative phrasing.
Congressional intent behind the amendment as adopted is extremely diffi-
cult to discern. The question of congressional intent has two important aspects.
First, what did Congress think existing law was prior to the amendment? This
question has particular relevance to the recent case law developments concern-
ing punitive damages that are the focus of this article, as those cases all arose
under federal tax law as it existed prior to 1989. Therefore, if one determines
that a particular interpretation of congressional intent is more attractive than
another, one must also consider whether that interpretation is consistent with
the conclusions already reached by the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Federal Cir-
cuits in Miller, Horton, Hawkins, and Reese, respectively.
2
11
A second aspect of this legislative history addresses how Congress intend-
ed to change existing law. That is, what did Congress intend the effect of the
amendment to be on post-RRA '89 damage recoveries? Clearly, after the
amendment, punitive damages for nonphysical injuries are taxable. Conversely,
by implication it would seem relatively clear that punitive damages for physi-
cal injuries are to be excluded subsequent to RRA '89. This interpretation has
received support from the commentators.2 2 Significantly, the Supreme Court
has apparently endorsed this view of post-RRA '89 law, stating in Burke that
"Congress amended § 104(a) to allow the exclusion of punitive damages only
in cases involving 'physical injury or physical sickness.
283
With these questions in mind, several possibilities may explain congres-
sional intent behind the 1989 amendment.
280. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 622, reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3225 (emphasis added).
281. See supra notes I and 2.
282. See, e.g., Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion Over Tax Status
of Personal Injury Damages, 49 TAx NOTES 1565, 1567 (1990); Jaeger, supra note 121, at
111-112; Andrews, supra note 121, at 766.
283. United States v. Burke, 112 S.Ct 1867, 1872 n.6 (1992) (emphasis added). This is
essentially the same conclusion reached by Professor Chirelstein, who states:
The result, as it seems, is that physical injury and nonphysical injury are now to
be treated alike under § 104 except with respect to punitive damages, which are
excluded by § 104(a)(2) if awarded in connection with physical injury but remain
taxable under § 61 if awarded in connection with nonphysical injury.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 101, at 42; see also Matlow, supra note 121, at 390 ("[B]y impli-
cation punitive damages in physical injury actions will continue to qualify for exclusion
under section 104(a)(2)."). The District Court for the District of Colorado has reached the
same conclusion. In Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994), the court
stated that after RRA '89 "[plunitive damage awards are excludable only if the underlying
injury is physical." Id. at 1362 n.2 (emphasis added).
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Interpretation #1. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for both physical and nonphysical injuries were tax-exempt prior to 1989.
Congress intended to change existing law by providing that punitive damages
for nonphysical injuries are now taxable, but that punitive damages for physi-
cal injuries will remain tax-exempt.
2 8
4
This reading of the 1989 amendment implies that Congress intended to
narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) in RRA '89.25 This is a plausible ex-
planation of congressional intent, and is the most immediately obvious result
suggested by the wording of the amendment itself. It is also consistent with
the legislative history, which shows that Congress initially sought to remove
even compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries from the reach of I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2). Limiting the change to just punitive damages can be seen as a
slight retreat from this initial position, and merely a function of legislative
compromise. By expressing a concern over the exclusion of recoveries for
nonphysical injuries only, and by leaving the law unchanged regarding damag-
es for physical injuries, Congress implicitly placed its stamp of approval on
existing law.286
This interpretation of congressional intent, however, fails to explain satis-
factorily the particular double negative phrasing employed. Why did Congress
not simply state in positive terms that "the exclusion for punitive damages
received for personal injury shall only apply in cases involving physicalinjury
or sickness"? This would have made clear both the direct statement (that puni-
tive damages recoveries for physical injury are tax-exempt) and the implied re-
sult (that punitive damages for nonphysical injury are taxable). Congress's
intentional use of the double negative phrasing perhaps suggests the result that
284. See, e.g., Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625, 631 n. 12 (6th Cir. 1994) (dis-
cussed infra); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J.,
dissenting) (discussed infra).
285. As relevant to compensatory damages, the Supreme Court has interpreted the legis-
lative history to indicate that subsequent to RRA '89, "Congress assumed that [damages
other than punitive damages, such as compensatory damages] would be excluded in cases of
both physical and nonphysical injury." Id. The Supreme Court thus reads the 1989 amend-
ment to § 104(a)(2) as finally resolving, if further resolution was necessary, and rejecting the
Service's physical- vs.-nonphysical distinction, at least insofar as compensatory damages are
concerned. The Court did not, however, view this as relevant to the larger threshold question
in Burke: whether Burke's back pay award was on account of a tort or tort-type injury, and
therefore whether I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was even applicable to the recovery.
286. As to the relevance of the amendment to pre-RRA '89 law, see Rickel v. Commis-
sioner, 900 F.2d 655, 664 (3rd Cir. 1990), concluding that the amendment placed a Congres-
sional stamp of approval on the case law trend that had excluded compensatory damage
awards for nonphysical injuries:
In its final conference bill, Congress chose to implicitly endorse the courts' expan-
sive interpretation of § 104(a)(2) to encompass nonphysical injuries and merely cir-
cumscribe the scope of the exemption as to only one type of remedy, i.e., punitive
damages, and not other types of remedies typically available in employment dis-
crimination cases, such as back pay.
Id. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the original House Ways and Means Con-
ference Report specifically disapproved that expansive interpretation. See supra note 278. The
House Conference Committee Report, however, dropped the disapproving language.
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could have been more directly stated was not intended, and that Congress did
not intend to make a definitive statement on the tax treatment of punitive
damages for physical injuries.2"7
Interpretation #2. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for both physical and nonphysical injuries were taxable prior to 1989. Con-
gress intended to change existing law by providing that punitive damages for
nonphysical injuries only will continue to be taxable. Therefore, by implica-
tion, damages for physical injuries are now tax-exempt.2"'
If this view of legislative history accurately represents Congress's assump-
tions in enacting the amendment, it means the effect of RRA '89 was to ex-
pand the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). This view is hardly consistent with the
legislative history, which clearly evinces an intent to narrow that scope.
Moreover, if Congress intended to expand the scope of § 104(a)(2), it would
have made much more sense for the amendment to state simply and affirma-
tively that the exemption extends only to punitive damages received for physi-
cal injuries and not for nonphysical injuries. There is no good reason why
Congress would use a double negative if it intended to expand the statute.
The implication of this interpretation is that, if the Fourth, Ninth, and
Federal Circuits are correct in their apparent belief that all punitive damage
recoveries prior to RRA '89 are taxable,289 and if it is true (as the Supreme
Court has indicated) that after RRA '89 only punitive damage recoveries for
nonphysical injuries are taxable, then these Courts of Appeal have interpreted
the RRA '89 amendment as expanding the scope of § 104(a)(2). Again, this is
completely inconsistent with the tenor of the legislative history accompanying
the amendment.
It perhaps can be argued that, by using the double negative phrasing,
Congress did in fact imply that punitive damages for physical injuries are now
exempt where they were not before, but that this implication was totally inad-
vertent and essentially represents a drafting error. However, this seems a very
strained and unwarranted reading of Congressional intent.
Interpretation #3. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for both physical and nonphysical injuries were taxable prior to 1989. After
the amendment to I.R.C. § 104, punitive damages, whether for physical or
nonphysical injuries, are still taxable; that is, Congress did not intend to
change existing law."g
287. See Dodge, supra note 70, at 143 ("The 1989 amendment seems to be based on
the erroneous, or at least doubtful, assumption that punitive damages generally fall within the
section 104 exclusion.").
288. See, e.g., Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1087 (Trott, J., dissenting).
289. The analysis and rationale of the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits' opinions in
Miller, Hawkins, and Reese, respectively, simply do not permit a distinction to be made be-
tween physical and nonphysical injuries. The implication of these decisions is that pre-RRA
'89 punitive damage recoveries for both types of injury are taxable. If this is the case, then
either Interpretation #2 is true-but that interpretation seems wholly unwarranted-or Interpre-
tation #3 is true.
290. See, e.g., Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086-87 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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This interpretation of congressional intent, which is most favorable to the
Service, is the most strained of the several here discussed. Under this view,
both categories of punitive damages are taxable both before and after the
amendment. It is difficult to believe that this view accurately reflects congres-
sional intent. If the law prior to RRA '89 was complete exclusion, and after
the amendment the law continues to be full exclusion, then the amendment is
completely superfluous and carries no import whatsoever-it does not even
restate or codify existing law in a coherent fashion. Legitimate interpretation
of congressional intent cannot lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to
enact a meaningless statute.
One must consider this interpretation carefully because, if the implication
of the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuit opinions is that all punitive damages,
whether for physical or nonphysical injury, are taxable both before and after
the amendment, the net effect is that the courts have simply written the
amendment out of the statute and have rendered it a complete nullity. This
seems an unprincipled application of legislative history to interpret an
amended statute.
Interpretation #4. Congress believed that punitive damages awarded
for physical injuries were exempt prior to 1989, but punitive damages for
nonphysical injuries were taxable. Congress intended to codify this position by
specifically incorporating it into I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and this remains the rule
following RRA '89.29
Interpretation #4 implies that Congress was simply clarifying, restating,
and codifying existing law, or at least Congress's understanding of existing
law. While this is not an unreasonable reading of the legislative history, it is
not entirely consistent with the tone of the legislative history, which suggests
that Congress intended to narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and not
merely restate existing law.
This interpretation has particular merit considering that by 1989, two
courts 292 had held punitive damage recoveries for nonphysical injuries
excludable. It is entirely plausible to assume that Congress was aware of these
holdings and considered them inconsistent with its understanding of the law.
RRA '89 can therefore be viewed as nothing more than a legslative reversal of
those two cases. 293 Of course, these cases were later determined to be -incor-
rectly decided,2" and in that sense the amendment ultimately would be su-
291. See, e.g., Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082.
292. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983); Miller v. Commissioner,
93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990). The Tax Court decision in Miller
was entered on September 13, 1989. The House Report is dated September 20, 1989, and
the House Conference Committee Report is dated November 21, 1989, the same date that
RRA '89 was passed by both houses of Congress.
293. The main problem with this analysis is that "[t]he legislative history clearly shows
that Congress was rejecting the judicial decisions holding that section 104 covered damages
received from nonphysical injuries rather than decisions that had found punitive damages to
fall within the scope of the section 104 exclusion." Jaeger, supra note 121, at 111-12.
294. Subsequent to RRA '89, the Ninth Circuit disavowed its analysis of punitive dam-
ages from Roemer in Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994), and Miller
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perfluous. However, that fact does not undermine this explanation of congres-
sional intent. While it is true that this renders the 1989 amendment meaning-
less, this was certainly not known at the time, and only subsequent events
created that result.
This interpretation also accurately explains the results in Miller, Hawkins;
and Reese (all of which held punitive damages for nonphysical injuries tax-
able) and in Horton (which held punitive damages for a physical injury29
taxable). However, as noted, the rationale of Miller, Hawkins, and Reese does
not seem limited to nonphysical injury, and it seems clear that the Fourth,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits would also hold punitive damages for nonphysical
injuries includable if faced with that issue, a result inconsistent with Interpreta-
tion # 4.
Interpretation # 5. Congress did not have a clear idea how punitive dam-
ages for physical injuries were taxed under existing law, and perhaps it did
not care one way or the other. However, Congress was concerned about the
emerging trend of courts finding that damage awards, both compensatory and
punitive, for nonphysical injuries fell within the scope of I.R. C. § 104(a)(2).
Congress intended to express its disapproval of this trend and legislatively
reverse those cases. Due to a compromise between the House and Senate, this
reversal was effected only for punitive damages and not for compensatory
damages. Therefore, after the amendment, compensatory damages for non-
physical injuries are still tax-exempt, but punitive damages for nonphysical
injuries are now taxable. The proper tax treatment of punitive damages for
physical injuries was simply not addressed by the amendment and was not in-
tended to be.296
Under this interpretation, the taxation of punitive dmages remains an open
question, except for post-RRA '89 punitive damages for nonphysical injuries,
which are now explicitly taxable. Whether punitive damages for physical inju-
ries both before and after the amendment are taxable, and whether pre-RRA
'89 damages for nonphysical injuries are taxable, are left to the courts.297
In one sense, this interpretation of congressional intent can be viewed as a
variation of Interpretation #4. Under this view, Congress was only concerned
with legislatively overruling those cases that had held punitive damages for
nonphysical injuries excludable. Moreover, Congress did address or consider
the tax treatment of punitive damages for physical injuries, and it had formed
no view as to whether these were taxable or excludable, preferring to let the
law develop. It is therefore quite acceptable for the courts to have ultimately
concluded that punitive damages for both physical and nonphysical injuries,
was reversed by the Fourth Circuit in Miller v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
One therefore begins to suspect that, in one sense, Congress jumped the gun by amending
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) in 1989. Had the matter been left to the courts, they would have ulti-
mately come to the correct conclusion-at least in the view of Congress-without the need
for statutory tinkering and its resulting controversial effect.
295. See infra note 428.
296. See, e.g., Hawkins. 30 F.3d at 1082 n.7.
297. See Dodge, supra note 70, at 143 & n.4.
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recovered prior to RRA '89, are taxable. It is also not inconsistent with the
legislative history to conclude that, after RRA '89, punitive damages for non-
physical injuries are taxable but punitive damages for physical injuries are not,
viewing post-RRA '89 law as consistent with the Supreme Court's apparent
view. While this turn of events does expand the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),
this is neither consistent nor inconsistent with the legislative history as so
interpreted. It is merely a neutral consequence, neither compelled nor preclud-
ed by the amendment.
In reviewing these alternative explanations of congressional intent, Inter-
pretations #2 and #3-and therefore, any treatment of punitive damages under
such interpretations - are the least defensible, for the reasons stated above.
Among the remaining three alternatives, Interpretation #1 seems the most
reasonable and requires the least rationalization. This interpretation would lead
one to the conclusion that punitive damages received prior to RRA '89 should
be within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and therefore nontaxable. Such a
conclusion is inconsistent with the view taken by the Fourth, Ninth, and Fed-
eral Circuits and, as will be explored in Part VI below, will present those
courts the formidable task of explaining away this interpretation of congressio-
nal intent.
V. RECENT CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
TAXATION
The following discussion examines the major cases addressing the taxation
of punitive damages. These cases reflect severe disagreements among the
courts as to the application of punitive damages under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
Three of the cases discussed, Reese, Hawkins, and most recently Horton,
proceeded through the courts on virtually parallel tracks and were decided
within a few months of each other in 1994. Developments in this area have
thus been rapid as well as controversial.
A. Roemer v. Commissioner29
The facts of Roemer have been discussed previously.29 In addition to
his compensatory damages of $40,000, Roemer had also recovered punitive
damages of $250,000 in his libel and defamation suit against Retail Credit.'
The Service sought to tax this component of the recovery, claiming that the
damages were not paid on account of personal injury and therefore were not
excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
At the time of the Tax Court's decision in Roemer,*Revenue Ruling 75-
45301 was still in effect, holding a punitive damage award eligible for exclu-
298. 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
299. See supra text accompanying and following note 126.
300. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 403.
301. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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sion under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). In arguing Roemer's punitive damages taxable,
the Service therefore advanced a litigation position inconsistent with its pub-
lished ruling. The Tax Court's majority opinion, which had already concluded
that Roemer's underlying compensatory damage recovery was taxable, held:
It therefore follows that the punitive damages were [also] not award-
ed "on account of personal injuries" to the petitioner. This is incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co. and the Commissioner's ruling positions in Rev.
Rul. 75-45. Accordingly, we hold that the punitive damages are
includable in petitioner's gross income."
This conclusion was consistent with the theory of Revenue Ruling 75-45:
if the underlying compensatory award is not taxable, neither are any punitive
damages received in the same action. Conversely, if the underlying compensa-
tory damage component is taxable, so is the punitive damage component.'
The majority did not, however, give a ringing endorsement to the
Commissioner's interpretation of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as reflected in Revenue
Ruling 75-45:
Since [the Commissioner's] interpretation arguably comes within the
language of section 104(a)(2), the Commissioner, in his administra-
tive discretion, has chosen to allow punitive damages to be excluded
from gross income in the same manner as compensatory damages
provided they arise out of a personal injury.3"
In dissent, Judge Wilbur would have bifurcated the compensatory damage
award from the punitive damage award. As we have seen, Judge Wilbur force-
fully argued that Roemer's compensatory damages should have been excluded,
using his "fingerless surgeon" example. 5 He then stated:
However, the law is clear that punitive or exemplary damages must
be included in gross income, and I would so hold. Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass Co. ... Punitive damages are certainly not intended
to compensate petitioner for a loss within the purview of section 104.
I realize respondent has a revenue ruling that suggests a contrary
result. Rev. Rul. 75-45. Under appropriate circumstances, respondent
may be precluded from taking one position in a ruling with respect to
taxpayers in general, and a different position in regard to a taxpayer
before the Court. Nevertheless, the facts in Rev. Rul. 75-45 are suffi-
ciently different from those herein to permit the surprising but general
language of the ruling to be disregarded for now.'
On appeal in Roemer, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held
302. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 408 (citations ommitted).
303. Revenue Ruling 75-45 was therefore a largely "pro-taxpayer" ruling: it was incon-
sistent with the return of capital theory, to the taxpayer's benefit. On this basis, the Tax
Court majority was willing to follow its approach.
304. Roemer, 79 T.C. at 408 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
305. See id. at 414 (Wilbur, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 414-15 (citations omitted).
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Roemer's entire award excludable. In doing so, the Court of Appeals held that
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) excluded punitive damages, as long as the underlying injury
was personal in nature. The court noted:
Normally, an amount awarded for punitive damages is includable in
gross income as ordinary income. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co. Nevertheless, the Commissioner liberally interprets § 104(a)(2) to
exclude punitive damages as well as all compensatory damages where
there has been a personal injury. Rev. Rul. 75-45. Therefore, accord-
ing to the Commissioner's own interpretation, the punitive damages
received by Roemer on account of his § 104(a)(2) personal injury
(the defamation( are excludable from gross income. 7
The Ninth Circuit therefore held the Service to its own published ruling
position on punitive damages, and found Roemer's recovery excludable.'
Therefore, whatever the wisdom or correctness of Revenue Ruling 75-45, it
contributed directly to the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that had little to do with
whether punitive damages should be excludable as a matter of statutory con-
struction. Just as the Service was faced with the hurdle of Revenue Ruling in
arguing that punitive damages are taxable, so too would courts later be faced
with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Roemer arriving at the opposite conclu-
sion.
B. Commissioner v. Miller'09
Bonnie Miller had brought defamation actions against her former employ-
ers, alleging they had accused her of embezzlement and other kinds of mis-
conduct to conceal their own participation in schemes involving bribery of
government officials." ° Miller's first suit went to trial and a jury awarded
her $500,000 in compensatory damages and $450,000 in punitive damages.
She and the defendants then settled both actions for $900,000."' After pay-
ment of legal fees and costs from the settlement amount totaling $375,000,
Miller received $525,000 in net settlement proceeds."' The Service took the
view that the entire $525,000 was taxable, 313 and Miller petitioned the Tax
307. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
308. Id.; see also Church v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110 (1983) (finding Church's
compensatory damages, received in a libel action, excludable). In Church, the Service did not
bother to
argue that the punitive damages should be included in income regardless of the
nature of the underlying compensatory damages. [Riespondent, in his adminstrative
discretion, has chosen to allow punitive damages to be excluded from gross income
in the same manner as the underlying compensatory damages, provided they arose
out of a personal injury.
Church, 80 T.C. at 1110 n.7 (citation omitted). The Service therefore conceded that Church's
punitive damages award was excludable. Id.
309. 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
310. Miller, 93 T.C. 330, 331 (1989).
311. Id. at 333-34.
312. Id.
313. In Miller, as in previous cases, the Service argued that a distinction existed between
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Court.
In Miller,"' the Tax Court had no difficulty concluding that I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) excludes from gross income both compensatory and punitive damag-
es received on account of personal injuries, essentially adopting the conclusion
of Revenue Ruling 75-45:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "any damages re-
ceived ... on account of personal injuries." . . . Congress, aware of
[the existence of punitive damages], could have excluded only "com-
pensatory damages" or provided that only damages received "as com-
pensation for" personal injuries be excluded ... It did neither, and
the plain meaning of the broad statutory language simply does not
permit a distinction between punitive and compensatory damages ...
Thus, we read "any damages" to mean "all" damages, including
punitive damages.31
By this time, of course, the Service had reversed its ruling position by
issuing Revenue Ruling 84-108,' 6 revoking Revenue Ruling 75-45. Address-
ing the history of the Service's ruling position on punitive damages, the court
rejected the rationale and holding of Revenue Ruling 84-108, noting:
At one time, the Commissioner also viewed the statute as free of
ambiguity. Revenue Ruling 75-45 ....
. . . In Revenue Ruling 84-108 the Commissioner reversed his
position and stated that section 104(a)(2) does not exclude punitive
damages from gross income. The Commissioner relied primarily .on
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. [H]owever, Glenshaw Glass
does not support respondent's position. Glenshaw Glass involved
two-thirds of treble damages recoveries for violations of Federal anti-
trust laws and a punitive damages recovery for fraud. The taxpayers
had not received any recoveries on account of personal inuries, and
thus the predecessor of section 104(a)(2) was not in issue."'
Revenue Ruling 84-108 had concluded that punitive damages are not
awarded "on account of' personal injury, because they are "determined with
reference to the defendant's degree of fault."3 ' The Tax Court viewed the
Commissioner's construction of the phrase "on account of' as "strained and
unnatural." 3 9 According to the Tax Court, the plain meaning of the
the treatments of physical and nonphysical injuries under § 104(a)(2). This argument had
been rejected in Roemer and by the Tax Court in Threlkeld. In Miller, the Tax Court fol-
lowed Threlkeld, holding that the compensatory damage element of Miller's recovery was
excludable under § 104(a)(2), even if the injury was nonphysical and was to the taxpayer's
"professional" rather than "personal" reputation. Id. at 335-37.
314. Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
315. Id. at 338 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
316. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
317. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339 (citations omitted).
318. See supra note 116.
319. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339.
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statute 32 0 required a conclusion that the receipt of punitive damages is "on
account of' the infliction of the tort due to a relationship suggesting causation:
Webster's defines the phrase "on account of" as: "For the sake of,"
"by reason of," or "because of." These phrases suggest causation.
Punitive damages result from both personal injury and a defendant's
culpability. Without the "invasion of. . . rights" referred to in
Threlkeld, punitive damages are unavailable, and most jurisdictions
require some amount of actual damages before punitive damages may
be awarded. Thus, punitive damages are received "on account of'
personal injury, although personal injury alone may not justify an
award of punitive damages.32
The type of causation described here by the Tax Court can best be de-
scribed as "but for" causation. The Tax Court's view of causation boiled down
to this: punitive damages are received "on account of' personal injury because
the two are linked by a cause-and-effect relationship--but for the personal
injury, there would simply be no punitive damages. In a concurring opinion,
Judge Ruwe reinforced the "but for" causation argument of the majority:
[Plunitive damages can only be awarded if there is a valid underlying
cause of action. In this case, the underlying cause of action is clearly
one for personal injury. The existence of a personal injury is the sine
qua non for an award of any kind of damages, be they compensatory
or punitive. While the primary purpose of punitive damages may well
be to deter egregious conduct on the part of tortfeasor, egregious con-
duct standing alone will not entitle a claimant to punitive damages.
Without an injury, there is simply no basis for awarding punitive
damages, regardless of how much interest society might have in pre-
venting a reoccurrence of egregious conduct. 2
Judge Ruwe was unimpressed with the Service's argument that punitive
damages are accessions to wealth and should therefore be taxed, noting that
under this theory recoveries for lost wages should also be taxed but are
not. 3 As previously discussed, 4 when placed in the context of the return
320. Under the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction, the plain meaning of a
statute is not to be disregarded except to prevent an abusrd result or one that is contrary to
legislative intent. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
543 (1940); Ables v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1019, 1028 (1988); see also Miller, 93 T.C. at
340-41. But see Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) ("But words are
inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to
explanatory legislative history no matter how clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination'."); United States v. The Heirs of Boisdore', 49 U.S. (8 How.) 113, 122 (1849)
("In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or members of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.").
321. Miller, 93 T.C. at 339-40 (citations omitted).
322. Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
323. Judge Ruwe noted:
The very purpose of section 104(a)(2) is to exclude from income amounts which
would otherwise have been taxed. The fact that punitive damages represent an
accession to wealth and therefore would normally be included in gross income is
no reason to preclude the application of section 104(a)(2). Indeed, even certain
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of capital theory, this is a telling observation. The Tax Court majority thus
concluded that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) applied to both compensatory and punitive
damages equally, without regard as to whether punitive damages served a
compensatory purpose. The majority therefore found it unnecessary to analyze
Maryland law to determine the nature of punitive damages in that state.
Judge Whalen dissented, criticizing the majority's expansive reading of
the phrase "any damages," suggesting that an additional inquiry was required:
whether the punitive damages were actually received "on account of" personal
injuries at all. 25 Judge Whalen argued that under this reading of the statute,
one is requierd to examine underlying state law to determine "on account of"
what the punitive damages in question are awarded. Reviewing Maryland
law,326 Judge Whalen determined that Maryland followed the majority view
characterizing punitive damages as a form of civil punishment. 27 The dissent
concluded that in Maryland punitive damages are not recovered "on account
of" a personal injury at all but are instead awarded on account of the
wrongdoer's outrageous conduct as'a form of private fine levied by the ju-
ry.? The dissent would have given effect to the phrase "on account of" as
compensatory damages would seem to be includable in taxable income as an ac-
cession to wealth were it not for the existence of section 104(a)(2). For example,
compensatory damages for personal injury are frequently measured by the injured
party's lost future earnings. Such future earnings would have been accessions to
wealth and would clearly have been taxable. Even respondent agrees that compen-
satory damages, that are determined by reference to lost future income, are
excludable under section 104(a)(2).
Id. at 342-43 (citation omitted).
324. See supra text accompanying note 90.
325. Judge Whalen stated:
I do not believe [the majority'sl approach is justified by the fact that section
104(a)(2) uses the words "any damages" and does not expressly distinguish between
compensatory and punitive damages. Rather, it seems to me that the majority's
analysis on that point begs the question of whether the payment, by whatever name
it is described, qualifies under section 104(a)(2) as an amount "paid on account of
personal injuries."
Id. at 348 (Whalen, J., dissenting) (citations ommitted).
326. See, e.g., Nast v. Lockett, 539 A.2d 1113, It16 (Md. 1988) (stating that punitive or
exemplary damages are damages on an increased scale, awarded not as the measure of actual
loss suffered but "as punishment for outrageous conduct and to deter future transgressions.")
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979)). See also Exxon Corp. v. Yarema,
516 A.2d 990, 997 (Md. 1986):
Punitive damages are inherently different from compensatory damages and the rea-
sons for the award of each differ sharply .. . [T]he award of punitive damages
does not attempt to compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered by him but rather is
exemplary in nature and is over and above any award of compensatory damages.
The fundamental purpose of a punitive damages award is to punish the wrongdoer
for misconduct and to deter future egregious conduct by others.
327. Miller, 93 T.C. at 346 (Whalen, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 344-46. Judge Whalen noted that:
the amount paid to satisfy petitioner's claims for punitive damages was paid "on
account of" the tort-feasor's culpable conduct, not petitioner's personal injuries.
Accordingly, it should be included in petitioner's income under section 61(a) as an
accession to her wealth, rather than excluded as compensation which makes her
personal injuries whole.
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used in the statute, holding that punitive damages awarded in Maryland are not
received "on account of" a personal injury nor intended to compensate the
victim for such an injury, but instead are received "on account of" the
tortfeasor's conduct and intended to punish the wrongdoer. Such damages,
therefore, would not fall within the statutory exclusion.
The Fourth Circuit, which had previously failed to adopt the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis in holding for the government in
Thompson,329 reversed." The court immediately took issue with the Tax
Court's conclusion that the "plain meaning" rule clearly required application
of a "but for" test of causation:
We do not quarrel with the [tax] court's observation that "on account
of' suggests "causation." However, in our view, that observation
blithely smooths over the distinction between "but-for" causation and
"sufficient" causation.... [U]nder a sufficient causation approach,
the fact that personal injury is a prerequisite to punitive damages does
not lead to the conclusion that the punitive damages were "on account
of' the plaintiff's injuries because, even if the other elements of the
tort are present, personal injury alone does not sustain a punitive
damage award. The fact that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages has
to show egregious conduct by the defendant indicates that the
plaintiff's injury was not a sufficient cause of the punitive damag-
es.
3 3 1
The Court of Appeals concluded that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) was inherently
ambiguous.33 - The court therefore resorted to. "extrinsic aids to interpreta-
tion.' 33' The court relied upon two factors in construing the statute. First, the
court noted the "well-recognized, even venerable, principle that exclusions to
income are to be construed narrowly."3" This mitigated against extending
the § 104(a)(2) exemption to punitive damages.
Second, the court invoked the return of capital theory, discussed in Part
III, supra, concluded that this theory persuasively provided a rationale for
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and therefore assisted in construing the scope of the exclu-
sion."' The court found it worth noting that I.R.C. § 104 is entitled "Com-
Id. at 344.
329. Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
330. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
331. Id. at 589-90.
332. Id. at 590.
333. Id.
334. Id.; see Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
335. Miller, 914 F.2d at 590. The court stated:
In discussing the section, the Ninth Circuit has observed that "Idlamages paid for personal
injuries are excluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer whole from a previ-
ous loss of personal rights- because, in effect, they restore a loss to capital." In so com-
menting, the Ninth Circuit aptly relied upon the Supreme Court's comment, in another con-
text, that "[plunitive damages, on the other hand, cannot be considered a restoration of capi-
tal for taxation purposes."
Id. (citing Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962) and Commissioner v.
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pensation for injuries or sickness."" 6 The court concluded that "[tihe Tax
Court's interpretation of § 104(a)(2) extends the section to situations in which
a plaintiff's damages do not serve to make a plaintiff whole and thus runs
afoul of the section's purpose."33' The analysis of the Fourth Circuit thus
dovetailed with that of Judge Whalen's dissent in the tax court and required
the Fourth Circuit to consider the nature of punitive damages in Maryland to
determine whether or not Bonnie Miller's punitive damages served a compen-
satory purpose. Consistent with Judge Whalen, the court of appeals concluded
that, under Maryland law, punitive damages punish the wrongdoer and do not
compensate the victim."' As a result, Miller's punitive damage award could
not be excluded from her taxable income.
The court then addressed the Service's inconsistent ruling position, which
once held punitive damages to be excludable:
It is of little moment that the Commissioner at one time construed §
104(a)(2) to exclude from income punitive damages and that the
Ninth Circuit [in Roemer] held (relying on Rev. Rul. 75-45) the then
Commissioner's "liberal" interpretation to control. The Ninth Circuit
was merely presenting proof that when in Rome one should do as the
Romans do. However, in the first place, the Commissioner's subse-
quent shift in position calls for Roemer, as a Roman, to shift al-
so.... [T]he making of an error does not recommend, let alone,
necessitate, its repetition. The Commissioner does not, in circum-
stances such as those in the present case, adhere to a dubious con-
struction such as was applicable in Roemer. Rev. Rul. 84-108."'
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 432 (1955)).
336. Miller, 914 F.2d at 590.
337. Id.
338. I. at 589. The court stated:
To determine whether Miller's settlement award may be excluded pursuant to §
104(a)(2), "the nature of the cause of action and the injury to be remedied must be
identified." That inquiry requires consideration of the Maryland law that created
Miller's entitlement to relief.
Under Maryland law, a defamation action such as Miller's is an action for
personal injuries. However, it must also be recognized that, under Maryland law,
"[plunitive damages are inherently different from compensatory damages and the
reasons for the award of each differ sharply." A punitive damages award "does not
attempt to compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered by him, but rather is exempla-
ry in nature and is over and above any award of compensatory damages." In the
context of a defamation action, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has com-
mented that "[eixemplary or punitive damages, as the name connotes, are rather a
punishment for and deterrent to wrongdoing than a means of recompensing the
victim. To the victim they are a windfall not necessarily related to the injury he
has suffered."
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
339. Id. at 591 (citations omitted). Miller had argued that it was "unfair to apply the
Commissioner's 'new' rule to her case because she detrimentally relied upon the Com-
missioner's 'old' rule when she negotiated her settlement." Id. The court noted:
While Miller's argument evokes some sympathy, "the Supreme Court has upheld
the retroactive application of revenue rulings on the grounds that the I.R.S. should
not be estopped from correcting a 'mistake of law,' even though a taxpayer may
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The court concluded that Miller's settlement representing punitive damag-
es fell outside the scope of § 104(a)(2) and was therefore includable in in-
come. Such damages were a "'windfall,'..., being 'over and above any award
of compensatory damages'... .340
The Tax Court in Miller took a position analytically indistinguishable
from its Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test, essentially holding
that if the underlying injury is personal and if the claim seeks to vindicate tort
or tort-type rights, then all damages arising out of the action, including puni-
tive damages, are excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit's
opinion can be taken as a direct rejection of the beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis and requiring that a further question be asked: whether the
recovery is truly "on account of" that personal injury. In the case of punitive
damages, this was held not to be the case.
C. Reese v. United States3"
In Reese, both the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit adopted reasoning similar to the Fourth Circuit's analysis
in Miller, holding a punitive damage award to be taxable.
The taxpayer in Reese filed suit under the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act342 against her former employer asserting gender discrimination,
sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of
contract. 3 Following a jury trial, she was awarded $100,000 in punitive
damages as part of a larger award. At the time of her award, the law was
unsettled as to whether punitive damages were in fact available under the
DCHRA.' When the Service included the punitive damages award in her
taxable income, Reese paid the tax and sued for a refund in the Court of Fed-
eral Claims. Noting the inconsistent historical treatment of punitive damages
by the Service in its rulings 5 and the current split developing in the
courts,3 6 the Court of Federal Claims in Reese347 sided with the Fourth
have relied to his detriment on a prior agency ruling.". . . There is nothing about
Miller's alleged detrimental reliance that distinguishes it from any other taxpayer's
detrimental reliance. Hence, the retroactive change in the Commissioner's position
here was permissible.
Id. at 591-92 (citations omitted).
340. Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
341. 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
342. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1981) (hereinafter DCHRA). The jury verdict was re-
flected in a subsequent settlement agreement that also addressed Reese's additional claim for
attorneys' fees and costs.
343. Reese v. United States, 28 Cl. Ct. 702, 703 (1993).
344. Compare Green v. American Broadcasting Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1986)
with Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 614 F. Supp.
1002 (D.D.C. 1985).
345. Reese, 28 Cl. Ct. at 703-04.
346. Id. at 704-05. By this time, the Tax Court's decision in Horton v. Commissioner,
100 T.C. 93 (1993), had been issued, creating a conflict with the Fourth Circuit's decision in
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Circuit and adopted the Miller analysis, taxing Reese on her punitive damage
recovery.
The Court of Federal Claims rejected the Tax Court's "plain meaning"
construction of § 104(a)(2) in Miller and agreed with the Fourth Circuit that
the statute was ambiguous. 48 The court resorted to "alternative bases" for
construing § 104(a)(2). 9 Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the court noted that
"income" is to be broadly defined, while exemptions from income are to be
narrowly construed. 5 °
Second, following the Fourth Circuit in Miller, the court pointed to the
title of I.R.C. § 104, which is entitled "Compensation for injuries or sickness."
Consistent with its title, § 104 sets out various categories of exclusions which
"generally are received as compensation for financial loss" resulting from
injury or sickness such as worker's compensation, accident or health insur-
ance, and disability.35" ' This indicated to the court that the section was not in-
tended to apply to noncompensatory payments or recoveries, and that taxing
punitive damages would be consistent with this perceived purpose.
Relying on authority supporting the view that punitive damages were not
recoverable under the DCHRA, Reese claimed that her award must necessarily
be compensatory in nature. The Court of Federal Claims disagreed with this
position, first pointing out that there was authority in the District of Columbia
for allowing punitive damages under the DCHRA. 2 The Court of Federal
Claims then quoted at length the jury instructions relating to Reese's
claims,35 which clearly demonstrated that the award received by Reese had
no compensatory purpose but was founded on theories of punishment and
deterrence.
Finally, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Court of Federal Claims examined
the legislative history of the 1918 enactment of the predecessor of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2)3"4 and concluded that Congress did not have the tax consequences
of punitive damages in mind when it enacted the provision; rather, it was
codifying, or was at least cognizant of, some of the old "return of capital"
opinions, such as Attorney General Opinion 304, discussed in Part II
above.355 However, the court concluded that those old administrative opin-
ions, even if valid, do not support an exclusion of punitive damages: "Non-
compensatory punitive damages are not in any sense a return of capital and
hence, under the Attorney General's analysis, would constitute "income" sub-
ject to taxation. '
Miller.
347. Reese, 28 CI. Ct. at 702.
348. Id. at 705.
349. Id. at 706.'
350. Id.
351. Id. at 707.
352. See supra note 344.
353. Reese v. United States. 24 F.3d 228, 232 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
354. Reese, 28 CI. Ct. at 707-08.
355. Id. at 708.
356. Reese, 28 CI. Ct. at 708.
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By this time, the Supreme Court had announced its decision in Burke, and
so the Court of Federal Claims turned to the question of Burke's effect on the
application of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) to punitive damages. The court determined
that taxing punitive damages was not inconsistent with Burke. The court con-
cluded that the Burke "scope of the remedies" test only discussed the threshold
determination of whether a particular injury is tort or tort-like, and not to the
additional question whether the recovery in question was "on account of' that
personal injury:
The question before the Supreme Court was not whether the damages
were received "on account of" the violation of the statute and the
resulting injuries, but rather whether the "injuries" suffered as a result
of the violation of Title VII constituted "personal injuries" within the
scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).357
Thus, the Court of Federal Claims implicitly concluded that the Supreme
court neither adopted nor approved the Threlkeld analysis in Burke. Rather,
once it is determined whether the underlying claim was personal in nature
(i.e., whether it is tort or tort-type) under a scope-of-the-remedies analysis, the
Court of Federal Claims added a second question, neither considered nor pre-
cluded by the Supreme Court in Burke: whether the resulting recovery was
"on account of" that personal injury.35 Examining the nature of the punitive
damages recovered in this case, 59 and concluding that they served no com-
pensatory purpose but were intended only to deter and punish,"W the court
held the damage award was not "on account of' a personal injury and was
therefore taxable. 6'
Reese appealed,3 62 and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit af-
firmed. The Court adopted much of the reasoning of the Court of Federal
Claims below, thus siding with the Fourth Circuit and against the Tax Court.
On appeal, Reese argued that the causation implied by the phrase "on
account of' is a "but for" causation; 363 the government, on the other hand,
argued for a stricter causal link ("sufficient" causation). 3' Noting that both
interpretations "are plausible, 365 the Federal Circuit followed the lead of the
Fourth Circuit in Miller, stating that it was not possible to conclude that the
357. Id. at 710.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 710-11.
360. Id. at 711. The Court of Federal Claims placed significant emphasis on the District
Court's jury instructions, which so stated.
361. Id. Subsequent to Reese, punitive damages recovered in an insurance bad faith case
were held fully taxable in Estate of Wesson, 843 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
After noting that "[a] consensus on this issue within the federal judiciary is nonexistent",
Wesson, 843 F. Supp. at 1121, the District Court adopted the principles of Miller, 914 F.2d
586, and Reese, 28 Cl. Ct. 702, declining to follow the Tax Court's Horton decision.
Wesson, 843 F. Supp. at 1121-22.
362. Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
363. Id. at 230.
364. Id. at 230-231.
365. Id. at 231.
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"plain meaning" of the statute clearly supported one interpretation to the ex-
clusion of the other.3" Similar to the Fourth Circuit in Miller and the Court
of Federal Claims, below, the Court of Appeals resorted to extrinsic aids to
construe the statute. The court first noted that the title of I.R.C. § 104 is
"Compensation for personal injuries or sickness," and consistent with its title,
§ 104 sets out various categories of exclusions which consistently "encompass
only the replacement of loss resulting from injury or sickness" such as
worker's compensation and accident or health insurance.367 Second, the court
acknowledged "an abiding principle of federal tax law" that exemptions from
income are to be narrowly construed.36
The Court of Appeals, like the lower court, also drew support for its
conclusion from two other sources. After examining the legislative history of
the 1918 amendment to the predecessor of I.R.C. § 104 in a manner similar to
the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals concluded that the legisla-
tive history "support[s] the conclusion that punitive damages are not
excludable from gross income." 3" The legislative history and its foundations
in the return of capital theory led the court to conclude:
[I]t would be inconsistent with the legislative history to treat punitive
damages as excludable from income, since punitive damages in no
way resemble a return of capital .... [P]unitive damages represent a
pure accession to a taxpayer's wealth and cannot be excluded as
compensation for personal injury.37°
The taxpayer argued, as she had in the court below, that the DCHRA did
not even allow for the recovery of punitive damages. The Court of Appeals,
however, held that subsequent to the lower court's decision in Reese, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals had determined that punitive damages
are available under the DCHRA,37 thus "blunting the force of Reese's
argument." '372 As the Court of Federal Claims had done, the Court of Ap-
peals examined the jury instructions and concluded that Reese's punitive
damage recovery did not exhibit any compensatory characteristics. Thus, the
return of capital theory as reflected in the legislative history weighed against
excluding Reese's punitive damage recovery.
The court also explained that the Supreme Court's opinion in Burke did
not call for a different result. Like the court below, the Federal Circuit con-
cluded that Burke only addressed the question of whether damages are award-
ed for a tort or tort-like action. Punitive damages were not present in Burke,
and the case did not present the Supreme Court with the opportunity to con-
sider whether there is an additional question whether punitive damages are




369. Id. at 232 (citations omitted).
370. Id. at 233.
371. Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1993).
372. Reese, 24 F.3d at 232.
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The Burke case, however, did not present facts requiring the Court to
determine whether punitive damages awarded in a personal injury
action are received "on account of' personal injury so as to be
excludable from gross income by virtue of section 104(a)(2). The
case did not involve punitive damages; thus, we do not regard Burke




Interestingly, Reese had argued that because the Supreme Court in Burke
had relied upon the presence of punitive or exemplary damages in articulating
the hallmarks of traditional concepts of tort liability and recovery,74 and be-
cause the presence of such damages may therefore be helpful in reaching the
threshold conclusion that a claim or injury is "tort or tort-type" for purposes of
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), it would be inconsistent and illogical to conclude that such
damages do not fall within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).31 5 The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, stating that the Supreme Courts reference to
punitive damages "was merely part of a broad definition of tort liability rather
than a holding that" punitive damages should be excludable.376
The Court of Appeals thus held Reese's punitive damage award to be
taxable. Interestingly, while relying largely on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Miller, the court made no mention of the Tax Court's contrary holding in
Horton.
Like Miller, Reese may be read as a rejection of the Threlkeld beginning-
and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, and another vote in favor of the approach that
asks a second question: are the punitive damages really received "on account
of' a personal injury? As did Miller, Reese answered that question in the
negative. Reese adds to this analysis its view that Burke does not preclude this
second question-that Supreme Court in Burke did not implicitly approve the
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis used by the Sixth Circuit."'
D. Hawkins v. United States378
The taxpayer in Hawkins totalled her $8,000 automobile. 79 Her insurer,
Allstate Insurance Company, pressured her into buying an inferior, less expen-
373. Id. at 234.
374. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
375. Reese, 24 F.3d at 234.
376. Id.
377. The two-step analysis employed in Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed. Cir.
1994) was followed in Bennett v. United States, 30 Cl. Ct. 396 (1994). After concluding
that ADEA claims are "tort-type" under the Burke "scope of the remedies" test, the court
went on to consider whether the liquidated damages portion of the award should nevertheless
be taxable, as asserted by the government, because it served merely a punitive purpose and
was not awarded "on account of" personal injury. However, the court concluded that liquidat-
ed damages under the ADEA do in fact serve a compensatory purpose, and are therefore
excludable.
378. 30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994).
379. Id. at 1078.
[Vol. 72:2
TAXATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
sive replacement car, and failed to equip it properly.38 Hawkins sued
Allstate for insurance bad faith (breach of good faith and fair dealing, and bad
faith litigation), and she recovered $15,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5
million in punitive damages." 1 Hawkins's state court action ultimately
reached the Arizona Supreme Court,382 which affirmed the punitive damages
award.383 After the Service included the punitive damages award in her tax-
able income, Hawkins paid the deficiency and initiated a refund suit in the
District Court for the District of Arizona.
In a brief Memorandum and Order, the District Court concluded that the
plain language of § 104(a)(2) extends to both compensatory and punitive
dames, and held that the punitive damages received were on account of per-
sonal injuries Hawkins suffered (arising out of insurance bad faith) and were
therefore excludable. The Ninth Circuit, which had previously held punitive
damages to be excludable in Roemer,3" reversed in a split decision, holding
Hawkins's punitive damage award to be taxable. Much of the Ninth Circuit's
majority opinion is set over to addressing arguments advanced by Judge
Trott's vigorous dissent.
Judge Goodwin, writing for the majority, first noted that both parties were
in agreement that Hawkins's bad faith lawsuit was a tort-type action under
Arizona law. 8 This was not disputed by Judge Trott's dissent. Moreover,
both the majority and dissent agreed that the Tax Court had held consistently
that punitive damages were excludable, while the position of the Service had
been less consistent. 86 Beyond this, the majority opinion and the dissent
found little common ground. The two opinions highlight the major arguments
380. Id. at 1079.
381. Id.
382. Hawkins v. Allstate Insurance Co., 733 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1987).
383. In affirming, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that in Arizona it was clear that
"[tihe purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to express
society's disapproval of outrageous conduct and to deter such conduct by the defendant and
others in the future." Hawkins, 733 P.2d at 1080 (citations omitted). Given this background,
in the Hawkinses' ensuing federal tax refund case the taxpayers did not even attempt to
argue that their punitive damages award served a compensatory purpose. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at
1079. Thus, the nature and purpose of the taxpayers' punitive damage award was not an
issue in Hawkins.
384. The Ninth Circuit ultimately distinguished its Roemer opinion on the grounds that it
relied on Revenue Ruling 75-45, a ruling that contradicted the government's own position in
Roemer. But, as Revenue Ruling 75-45 has since been overruled, the court no longer felt
constrained to follow Roemer's lead. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1081-82; see also Rice v. United
States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993), in which a district court located in the Ninth
Circuit declined to follow Roemer for essentially the same reasons, and held a punitive dam-
ages award to be taxable:
But Roemer relied solely (and perhaps reluctantly) on the 1975 Revenue Ruling that
was subsequently revoked. Before that ruling, it was well-settled that punitive
amages were taxable income because they represented an accession to wealth rather
that restoration of capital. Because the Ruling has been revoked, punitive damages
are again taxable income.
Rice, 834 F.Supp. at 1246 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
385. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1079.
386. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1080 & n.2.
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in favor of and against extending the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to punitive damag-
es.
Judge Trott first asserted that the plain meaning of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2),
particularly as evidenced by its use of the phrase "any damages," "simply does
not permit a distinction between compensatory and punitive damages." '387
Had Congress intended that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) extend only to compensatory
damages, Judge Trott wrote, "it certainly could have made that distinction ex-
plicit." ' The majority, on the other hand, was "not convinced that the 'plain
meaning' of § 104(a)(2) compels exclusion of punitive damages." '389 The ma-
jority concluded:
[Tihe phrase "on account of' does not necessarily mean "but for
causation." ... Rather, 'on account of' could mean what the Miller
court called "sufficient causation"- i.e. all damages to which a liti-
gant is entitled because of her injuries, but not those which serve
solely to punish the wrongdoer."
Turning to the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Burke on the
punitive damages question, the majority simply distinguished Burke by stating
that the taxpayers in that case "had not received punitive damages, and the
Court did not address the excludability of punitive damages."39' According to
the majority, the phrase "on account of" qualifies the remainder of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) and establishes an independent test for exclusion, contrary to the
Threlkeld analysis. 92 Judge Trott's dissent pointed out that the Supreme
Court had "agree[d] with the [Sixth Circuit] Court of Appeals' analysis insofar
as it focused ... on the nature of the claim" underlying the damages
award.393 Judge Trott interpreted this to mean that the Supreme Court had
approved implicitly the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis as
employed by the Sixth Circuit in Burke: "the import of the Court's analysis is
clear. The focus should be on the nature of the underlying claim. The Burke
Court did not mention any additional requirements for exclusion under §
104(a)(2). ' ' "9
The majority did not agree:
[T]he Court did not state that courts should look exclusively at the
nature of the claim underlying the damage award. The Court's alleged
failure to "mention any additional requirements for exclusion under §
104(a)(2)" means little, given that the Court concluded that the
387. Id. at 1084 (Trott, J., dissenting).
388. Id.
389. Id. at 1080.
390. Id. at 1080 n.3 (citations omitted).
391. Id. at 1081.
392. As the dissent summarized, '[tlhe majority believes § 104(a)(2) requires the taxpay-
er to proves both (1) the damages were recovered in a tort-like suit [under the Supreme
Court's scope-of-the-remedies test] and (2) the damages were received on account of personal
injury." Id. at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
393. 1I.; see supra note 246 and accompanying text.
394. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1085 (Trott, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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taxpayers' underlying cause of action was not "tort-like." The Court
had no occasion to discuss any such additional requirements.39
As in Reese, the taxpayers in Hawkins argued that the Supreme Court in
Burke "described the availability of punitive damages as one of the indicia of
traditional tort liability" and relied, in part, on the unavailability of punitive
damages in a Title VII case in holding that Burke's recovery was taxable."l
Given that the Supreme Court viewed the concept of traditional tort liability as
"inextricably bound up with remedies,"'397 including punitive damages,
Hawkins argued that "it follows that punitive damages are received 'on ac-
count of personal injury."'" Judge Trott agreed with this analysis.' 9
The majority acknowledged that punitive damages were certainly one of
the hallmarks of traditional tort concepts of liability and recovery.' ° Howev-
er, the majority was unable to reach the same conclusion as the dissent, noting
that "[p]unitive damages may be an indicia of a tort-like cause of action with-
out themselves being damages received on account of personal injury." ''
In Hawkins, for the first time, the question of congressional intent in
amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as part of RRA '89402 came to the fore. Predict-
ably, this added to the confusion surrounding the taxation of punitive damages.
Judge Trott construed the legislative history to RRA '89 in a manner that, to
him, "offer[ed] a consistent explanation of both the pre-1989 and post-1989
law. 4 °3 According to Judge Trott, the reasonable implication of amending §
104(a)(2) to explicitly tax punitive damages received after RRA '89 on ac-
count of nonphysical injuries is that not all punitive damages received prior to
RRA '89 are taxable. In light of the obvious legislative purpose to narrow the
scope of § 104(a)(2), this suggests:
Before 1989, all punitive damages received in personal injury cases
were excludable from gross income. After Congress's narrowing of
the exclusion in 1989, only punitive damages received in personal
injury cases involving physical injury or sickness were
excludable.0 4
Judge Goodwin likewise reviewed the legislative history to the RRA '89
395. Id. at 1081 (emphasis added).
396. Id. at 1085-86.
397. United States v. Burke, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 1872 n.7 (1992).
398. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
399. Judge Trott declared that "Itlo conclude otherwise, as the majority does, is to say
that although the availability of punitive damages makes the claim tort-like, . . . the punitive
damages themselves are unrelated to the personal injury and should be taxable. I am reluc-
tant to reach such an illogical conclusion." Id.
400. Id. at 1081.
401. Id.
402. See supra note 10.
403. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott's interpretation of the
legislative history of RRA '89 is consistent with Interpretation #1 described supra note 284
and accompanying text.
404. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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amendment to § 104(a)(2),4"5 and concluded that there were several possible
interpretations of congressional intent underlying the amendment. For example,
Congress could have been restating existing law (that is, both before and after
the amendment, punitive damages are understood by Congress to be taxable if
awarded for a nonphysical injury, but not taxable if they arise out of a physi-
cal injury).4 ' Alternatively, Congress may have been aware of the cases that
had recently held excludable punitive damages for nonphysical injury,4 7 and
believing these cases to be inconsistent with its understanding of the law and
incorrectly decided, it amended the statute to make its disapproval clear. While
the majority admitted the weaknesses of these interpretations, the dissent's
view of the legislative history is not the only plausible interpretation.
The majority was therefore unwilling to admit that the effect of the RRA
'89 amendment to § 104(a)(2) was anything other than its one stated effect:
that punitive damages for nonphysical injuries after 1989 are now clearly
taxable. Significantly, the majority would not even concede that the implied
post-1989 effect of RRA '89 makes punitive damages for physical injury
excludable. Judge Goodwin noted that if in fact this is the implication of the
1989 amendment, "this implication could be inadvertent."' Alternatively,
Congress could have declined to consider the question of the taxation of dam-
ages for physical injury at all, since the legislative history "indicates that Con-
gress was not concerned with punitive damages, but with non-physical injury





Judge Trott found this result unacceptable. If in fact the courts ultimately
do determine that pre-1989 punitive damages for both physical and nonphysi-
cal injuries to be taxable, as the majority opinion holds, and if the effect of
RRA '89 is to make punitive damages for physical injury excludable as the
Supreme Court has seemingly held,"' then RRA '89 expanded the scope of
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), 412 a result that Judge Trott found untenable." 3 Accord-
ing to Judge Trott, the only reading of congressional intent that satisfactorily
explains the majority's view was that prior to and after RRA '89, all punitive
damage awards, both for physical and nonphysical injuries, are taxable.
41 4
This, however, means that the amendment was completely without effect, an
indefensible position." 5 Judge Trott concluded:
405. Id. at 1082.
406. This interpretation is suggested by Interpretation #4. See supra note 291 and accom-
panying text.
407. See supra note 292.
408. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1082 n.7.
409. Id. at 1082 n.6.
410. This interpretation is consistent with Interpretation #5. See supra note 296 and ac-
companying text.
411. See supra note 285.
412. This result is discussed as Interpretation #2. See supra note 288 and accompanying
text.
413. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1087 (Trott, J., dissenting).
414. This is discussed as Interpretation #3. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
415. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1086-87 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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The rule the majority announces-damages representing a windfall
are taxable-will undoubtedly be cited in support of the proposition
that all punitive damages are taxable. This court will then have to
chose between rendering the 1989 amendment meaningless or im-
properly construing the amendment as expanding the § 104 exclusion.
My interpretation of § 104(a)(2) avoids that dilemma. 6
The final area of contention over which the majority and dissent differed
concerned the application of the return of capital theory. According to the
majority, I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) "was enacted to exclude damages which compen-
sate a taxpayer for injuries."4 7 The court emphasized that the underlying
rationale of I.R.C. § 104 is that "damages paid for personal injuries are ex-
cluded from gross income because they make the taxpayer whole from a
previous loss of personal rights - because, in effect, they restore a loss to
capital."4 8 This was not the case with Hawkins: the punitive damages were
awarded on account of Allstate's misconduct and the potential harm to other
insureds."9 Hawkins never contended that the punitive award had any com-
pensatory purpose. The court concluded: "[tihe $3.5 million does not compen-
sate the Hawkinses for any injury, economic, intangible, or otherwise. It is a
pure windfall, as much an accession to wealth as a successful lottery ticket or
a game show winnings. The Hawkinses have not been made whole; they have
won the litigation lottery.""42 Under these circumstances, stated the majority,
"the restoration of capital rationale is simply inapplicable."
'4 2
Judge Trott, on the other hand, found the majority's invocation of the
return of capital theory troubling and unpersuasive, pointing out some of the
defects of the theory when applied to the Code's treatment of other transac-
tions, such as the recovery of lost wages.422 Given the weaknesses of the
return of capital theory, Judge Trott concluded: "[a]though I agree that the
majority's restoration of capital rule may make sense as a matter of policy, I
don't think the text of § 104(a)(2), its legislative history, or the case law can
be squared with the majority's interpretation. '423
As noted, the Ninth Circuit majority opinion and dissent in Hawkins high-
light the various factors and corresponding arguments that affect the determi-
nation whether I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) acts to exclude punitive damage awards.
416. Id. at 1087.
417. Id. at 1083.
418. Id. (quoting Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576 (9th Cir. 1962)).
419. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1083.
420. Id. at 1083-84.
421. Id. at 1084.
422. Id. at 1087. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
423. Hawkins, 30 F.3d at 1084.
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E. Horton v. Commissioner424
In Horton,25 the Tax Court addressed whether to abandon its holding in
Miller or to stand by its earlier conclusion, maintaining that punitive damages
are excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).426
The Horton's house had exploded in the early morning after the gas com-
pany failed to detect a leak.427 The Hortons, home at the time, suffered phys-
ical injuries 428 and sued the power company under tort theories of negligence
and gross negligence. The Hortons were awarded $103,552 in compensatory
damages and $520,000 in punitive damages.429 The Kentucky Supreme Court
ultimately upheld the award, affirming the punitive damages award over the
gas company's objections that (i) the awarding of punitive damages is an
outdated concept and should be abandoned in Kentucky and (ii) in any case,
the gas company's conduct did not warrant the imposition of punitive damag-
es.430 In justifying the award of punitive damages in Kentucky, the Kentucky
Supreme Court noted that "[tihe concept of permitting punitive damages in
addition to compensatory damages is one of longstanding in Kentucky"43'
and that many of the older Kentucky cases "recognize and approve the award
of punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. 432
The foregoing description of punitive damages by the Kentucky Supreme
Court appears consistent with a notion that punitive damages do not serve a
compensatory purpose under Kentucky law but are purely penal. Such a view
was also expressed in early Kentucky decisions, which had noted that punitive
damages "are allowed as a punishment of the defendant and to discourage the
defendant and others from similar conduct in the future. 4 3 Under Kentucky
law, it is said: "[plunitive damages represent a sum over and above the
amount a claimant is entitled to receive as compensation for a loss suffered by
him. In theory, they are allowed as a punishment of a defendant for outra-
geous conduct or to deter such conduct in the future. 43'
These statements would seem to indicate that Kentucky follows the major-
424. 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
425. Horton, 100 T.C. 93 (1993).
426. At the time the Tax Court considered Horton, the Ninth and Federal Circuits' de-
cisions in Hawkins and Reese had not yet been issued.
427. Horton, 100 T.C. at 93.
428. While the nature of the Hortons' injuries are not described in detail in the reported
decisions, it can be inferred from the description of the facts that they were physical inju-
ries. See Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Ky. 1985); see
also Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 ("Here, the underlying claim is one for personal, physical inju-
ry.").
429. Horton, 690 S.W.2d at 384.
430. Id. at 390.
431. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
432. Id. (emphasis added).
433. Harrod v. Fraley, 289 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Ky. 1956) (citations omitted); see also
Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 195 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ky. 1946).
434. Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback, 711 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Ky. 1986) (Vance, J.,
concurring).
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ity view concerning the purpose and nature of punitive damages. However, in
Horton, the Kentucky Supreme Court went on to note:
There is a reason for paying the punitive damages to the injured
party. It is because "the injury has been increased by the manner in
[which it] was inflicted. In Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Roth, 130 Ky.
759, 114 S.W. 264, 266 (1908), we explained that although "punitive
damages are awarded as a civil punishment upon the wrongdoer,
rather than as indemnity to the injured party ... it might with much
propriety be said that they are allowed by way of remuneration for
the aggravated wrong done." Thus there are sound legal reasons of
longstanding supporting both the award of punitive damages and their
payment to the injured party in addition to compensatory damag-
s.435
es.
Under this theory, punitive damages serve, at least in part, a compensatory
purpose as "remuneration" for the increased injury suffered from the
tortfeasor's egregious act. This theory would place Kentucky in the minority
view, under which punitive damages are not solely penal in nature. This theo-
ry also distinguishes the nature of the punitive damages received by the tax-
payers in Horton from those recovered by the taxpayers in Miller, Reese, and
Hawkins.
The Hortons received their award in 1985. After the IRS sought to include
the punitive damage element in the Hortons' gross income, the taxpayers
petitioned the Tax Court.
Acknowledging that the Fourth Circuit had reversed the Tax Court in
Miller, the Tax Court nevertheless concluded that its original decision in Mill-
er was correct and declined to follow the Fourth Circuit. In a relatively brief
opinion, the Tax Court majority held that the punitive damages were
excludable from gross income:
After careful consideration of the views of the Fourth Circuit, we
reaffirm our holding in Miller that punitive damages received as a
result of a personal injury claim are excludable under section
104(a)(2). The beginning and end of the inquiry should be whether
the damages were paid on account of "personal injuries." This inquiry
is answered by determining the nature of the underlying claim. Once
the nature of the underlying claim is established as one for personal
injury, any damages received on account of that claim, including
punitive damages, are excludable.436
Similar to Judge Trott's dissent in Hawkins, the Tax Court concluded that
its decision was supported by the Supreme Court's opinion in Burke, which
allegedly embraced the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry approach applied by
the Tax Court in Threlkeld and followed by the Sixth Circuit in Burke. The
Supreme Court's opinion in Burke was thus seen as quarrelling only with the
435. Horton, 690 S.W.2d at 390 (citations omitted).
436. Horton v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 93, 96 (1993) (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted), aff d, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994).
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manner in which the Sixth Circuit went about identifying "tort-type"
injuries,437 an interpretation of Burke arguably adopted in O'Gilvie v. United
States.4"'
The Tax Court also argued (as did Judge Trott) that because the Supreme
Court had singled out punitive damages as one of the hallmarks of a tort-type
action-according to the Supreme Court, punitive damages are "inextricably
bound up" with the concept of tort rights and one of the prime determinants of
whether a claim reflects traditional concepts of tort liability439-it was
"logical to conclude that punitive damages are received 'on account of' such
claims."'
The Tax Court finally noted that the Fourth Circuit's approach in Miller
can prove unworkable." Under Miller, a court is required to analyze the na-
ture of punitive damages as awarded in the particular case to determine if they
are intended to compensate the victim or merely to punish the actor. This
involves resorting to state law where the recovery was obtained under a state
law claim. Here, after examining Kentucky law, including the very Kentucky
Supreme Court opinion affirming the Hortons' award,"2 the Tax Court con-
cluded that "in Kentucky, punitive damages serve both to compensate the
injured party and punish the wrongdoer."" The Tax Court professed itself
in a complete quandary as to how the Miller test ought to be applied in such a
circumstance.444 In any case, under the Tax Court's beginning-and-end-of-
the-inquiry test, the fact that Kentucky might follow the minority rule as to the
nature of punitive damages was not relevant to the outcome.
437. Id. at 97-98.
438. Id. at 98. In O'Gilvie v. United States, U.S. Tax Cas. 1 50,567 (D. Kan. 1992), the
district court had originally held a punitive damage award in a wrongful death case to be
taxable. O'Gilvie's wife died of toxic shock syndrome in 1983, and O'Gilvie obtained a
large punitive damage award against Playtex. See O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 609
F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985). Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Burke,
O'Gilvie filed a motion for reconsideration. In August, the District Court issued its opinion
on reconsideration, and reversed itself, holding for the taxpayer. In its brief opinion, the
court noted:
In our previous order, this court focused on the nature of the punitive damage
award itself, rather than the nature of the underlying claim. In light of Burke, we
believe our focus was misplaced. The Supreme Court's opinion makes it clear that
the proper inquiry for purposes of § 104(a)(2) is on the nature of the claim under-
lying the taxpayer's damages award. As we recognized in our previous order, the
underlying suit giving rise to O'Gilvie's recovery of punitive damages is
indisputedly tort-like in nature. Accordingly, the court believes its previous order is
contrary to Burke and must be reversed.
O'Gilvie, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 50,568 (citations omitted). O'Gilvie did not conclude that a
separate question, whether the recovery was "on account of" the identified tort-like injury,
must also be asked, and therefore apparently views the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis as having survived Burke.
439. See supra note 397.
440. Horton, 100 T.C. at 99.
441. Id. at 99-101.
442. See supra note 428.
443. Horton, 100 T.C. at 100 (emphasis added).
444. li. at 101.
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In a lengthy dissent joined by two other judges, Judge Whalen (who had
dissented in the Tax Court's opinion in Miller) concluded that the punitive
damages award should be taxable. 5 Similar to the courts of appeals' majori-
ty opinions in Reese and Hawkins, Judge Whalen argued that the Supreme
Court in Burke had not necessarily approved the Tax Court's beginning-and-
end-of-the-inquiry approach to § 104(a)(2). Judge Whalen argued that the
Supreme Court had merely provided a test for the threshold question of
whether a particular claim is tort or tort-like. If that question is answered in
the negative, as in Burke, the taxpayer cannot rely on § 104(a)(2). But the
Supreme Court did not give any definitive clue as to what it would do if the
question is answered in the affirmative. 46 The Tax Court majority would
cling to its approach that an affirmative answer is the beginning and end of
the inquiry, and all resulting damages, including punitive damages, are
excludable. Judge Whalen found no express support for this approach in Burke
and concluded that, in fact, there is an additional inquiry: whether the particu-
lar award was paid "on account of' the tort claim. 4 7 Judge Whalen found
the Fourth Circuit's approach in Miller to be the correct one. Moreover, deter-
mining whether an award is "on account of' a tort-like claim requires one to
examine what the recovery was intended to accomplish. This in turn necessi-
tates a review of applicable state law. 45 If the recovery is intended to com-
pensate the victim, then it is excludable. But if the recovery is intended merely
to punish and deter, then the award is not "on account of' of the tort claim at
all, but instead is "on account of' the egregious acts of the tortfeasor. Looking
to Kentucky law, Judge Whalen concluded-despite the statements of the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court in Horton itself-that in Kentucky an award of punitive
damages has only punishment and deterrence as its purpose. 49 Thus, Judge
Whalen would have taxed the $500,000 punitive damages award in its entire-
ty. .450
445. Id. at 104-14.
446. Id. at I11.
447. Id. at 108. Judge Whalen continued:
[T]he statute imposes at least two requirements for eligibility to exclude an amount
from gross income. First, the amount must have been received through prosecution
of a "tort-like personal injury." Second, the amount at issue must have been paid
"on account of' that injury. Petitioners must meet both requirements to qualify for
the exclusion.
Id. (citations omitted).
448. Id. at 107-08.
449. Id. at 105-107. Judge Whalen therefore would not have experienced the same diffi-
culty as the majority professed to face in applying the Fourth Circuit's Miller analysis to the
punitive damages recovery in Horton. See siipra note 444 and accompanying text.
450. In maintaining that the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis did not
survive Burke, Judge Whalen is supported by Judge Halpern, who joined Judge Whalen's
dissents in Miller and Horton, and who separately dissented (joined by Judge Whalen) in
Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124, aftid, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 424 (1994), stating: "I do not think the sole condition for exclusion contained in section
104(a)(2) is that an amount constitute damages received in a suit involving such tortlike
personal injury. Another necessary condition contained in section 104(a)(2) is that the damag-
es be received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness."' Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 139
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Notwithstanding the recent pro-government decisions in Reese and
Hawkins, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in Horton.4"' Siding with
the Tax Court in a split decision, the Sixth Circuit broke with the Fourth,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits, thus deepening the division among the courts. The
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Horton reflects the court's strong belief in the
Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, on which it had previous-
ly relied in Burke.
After summarizing the arguments and conclusion in Miller, Reese, and
Hawkins,"2 the Sixth Circuit turned to the Supreme Court's holding in
Burke, which had reversed the Sixth Circuit in 1992. Using this as a starting
point, the Sixth Circuit interpreted that reversal as nonetheless approving the
Sixth Circuit's approach to analyzing § 104(a)(2), that is, the Threlkeld begin-
ning-and-end-of-the-inquiry approach.453
The Sixth Circuit thus viewed Burke as simply establishing a new thresh-
old test, the scope-of-the-remedies test, for determining whether a claim is
tort-like, but not otherwise altering the resulting beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis to applying § 104(a)(2). Applying this approach, and finding it
mandated by the "plain meaning" of the statute, 414 the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded: "Here, the underlying claim is one for a personal, physical injury;
therefore, the taxpayers' entire recovery is excludable. The Hortons' damag-
es-both compensatory and punitive-were received "on account of their"
personal injuries from the explosion."4"5
As support for its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reviewed the 1989 amend-
ment to I.R.C. § 104(a), noting that the Supreme Court in Burke had viewed
the amendment as establishing that, subsequent to 1989, punitive damage
recoveries for physical injuries are excludable:5 6
Since punitive damages in a case not involving physical injury or
physical sickness are singled out as being includable in gross income,
the clear implication of Congress' phraseology is that punitive damag-
es in a case involving physical injury or physical sickness are
excludable, and were excludable even before the amendment.457
The Sixth Circuit also noted that, under Kentucky law-in fact, as stated
(Halpern, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
451. Horton v. Commissioner, 33 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 1994). To summarize the Sixth
Circuit's holding:
They meant what they said
and said what they meant.
The Tax Court's correct:
One hundred percent!
With apologies to DR. SEUSs, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (1940).
452. Horton, 33 F.3d at 628-29.
453. Id. at 630.
454. Id. at 631.
455. Id.
456. See supra note 285.
457. Horton, 33 F.3d at 631 n.12 (emphasis added). This position is reflected in Inter-
pretation #1. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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by the Kentucky Supreme Court in upholding the damage award in this very
case458--punitive damages serve both a compensatory and a punitive pur-
pose. The Kentucky Supreme Court had stated that "although 'punitive damag-
es are awarded as a civil punishment upon the wrongdoer, rather than an as
indemnity to the injured party ... it might with much propriety be said that
they are allowed by way of remuneration for the aggravated wrong done.' 4. 9
This served to distinguish Miller and Hawkins, where it was determined that
under Maryland and Arizona law, respectively, punitive damages serve no
compensatory purpose.
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on the dual nature of punitive damages under
Kentucky law, while buttressing the majority's ultimate holding, is unfortunate
in that any court disinclined to follow Horton may seek to distinguish it in
cases where the punitive damage recovery in question served no compensatory
purpose. Horton thus arguably becomes a less compelling precedent. On the
other hand, Horton's resort to the dual nature of punitive damages under Ken-
tucky law seems unnecessary to the holding: even if the award served a solely
punitive purpose, the beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis would still
lead to the same result. Thus, even in cases where the punitive damages serve
no compensatory purpose whatsoever, the Sixth Circuit would still presumably
hold the damages to be excludable.
Finally, the court was "not persuaded" by the Commissioner's "return of
capital" theory, under which only damages which serve to make the taxpayer
"whole" should be excludable, and those that are accession to wealth should
not." The court viewed this as
a false dichotomy. For example, a plaintiff in a personal injury suit
who is permanently maimed is really not "made whole" by compen-
satory money damages. That money damages make the injured person
whole in merely a legal fiction. Those money damages do not make
the physical injury disappear; the money is therefore arguable an
"accession to wealth." There is really no bright-line distinction, then,
as the Commissioner contends, between damages which make plain-
tiffs whole and damages which are accessions to wealth.46" '
This statement, too, is unfortunate. It is certainly true that money damages
can never fully compensate the victim of a crippling or disfiguring injury, at
least in a nonmonetary sense. However, it is a hallmark of our system of civil
justice that juries are presumed to attempt to do just that; that is, measure the
immeasurable and place a dollar value on a tort victim's suffering, humilia-
tion, and anguish. Whether or not this is merely a "legal fiction" is of no
moment, and the Sixth Circuit's statements in this regard are not persuasive.
Judge Trott's dissent in Hawkins more tellingly criticizes the return of capital
theory.462 The Sixth Circuit's criticisms, on the other hand, simply miss the
458. Horton v. Union Light, Heat, & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 390 (Ky. 1985).
459. Id. (quoting Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Roth, 114 S.W. 264, 266 (Ky. 1908).
460. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632.
461. Id. (footnote omitted).
462. See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
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mark.
In a brief dissent, Judge Kennedy found the conclusions reached by the
Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits more persuasive-particularly Judge
Goodwin's majority opinion for the Ninth Circuit in Hawkins-and would
have held the Hortons' punitive damage award to be taxable as income."6
The Tax Court now seems deeply committed to the analysis it articulated
in Miller and Horton.4 The Tax Court's approach after Horton and Burke is
to determine if the taxpayer's claim sought to vindicate "tort or tort-type"
rights by focusing on the remedies available to the taxpayer in respect of the
claim pursued. If those remedies are sufficiently broad so as to reflect tradi-
tional concepts of tort liability and recovery, the claim will be seen as tort or
tort-type: that will be the "beginning and end of the inquiry ' and all com-
ponents of any award or settlement will be excludable under I.R.C.
§ 104(a)(2), including punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit seems committed
to a similar approach, founded on the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-
inquiry analysis the Sixth Circuit embraced in Burke.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The federal courts stand hopelessly divided on an important question:
whether I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) applies to exclude punitive damage recoveries from
gross income. The Tax Court"6 and the Sixth Circuit"6 have concluded
463. Horton, 33 F.3d at 632; see also Kemp v. Commissioner, 771 F. Supp. 357 (N.D.
Ga. 1991). The taxpayer in Kemp had received certain amounts in 1986 after successfully
prosecuting a § 1983 action. The recovery included a punitive damages element. The District
Court held the punitive damages to be taxable, basically accepting the government's position
in full:
Although the court agrees that plaintiff's damages derived from violation of a tor-
tious injury, punitive damages are not awarded "on account of" such personal injury
within the meaning of section 104(a)(2). The Supreme Court has recognized that
punitive damages in a section 1983 action "are awarded in the jury's discretion 'to
punish (the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like
him from similar conduct in the future."' Thus, punitive damages are awarded when
the "tortfeasor's conduct . . . calls for deterrence and punishment over and above
that provided by compensatory awards."
Punitive damages awarded under section 1983 clearly serve no "compensato-
ry" purpose. The court therefore agrees with the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in
[Miller]. The court in Miller held that the portion of the plaintiffs settlement that
represented punitive damages was "a 'windfall,' ... being 'over and above any
award of compensatory damages,' . . and therefore, fleIll beyond § 104(a)(2)'s
reach." Punitive damages therefore constitute gross income pursuant to I.R.C. §
61(a).
Id. at 359 (citations omitted).
464. See, e.g., Estate of Moore v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 1925 (1994) (holding
pre-RRA '89 punitive damages received in a malicious prosecution and invasion of privacy
lawsuit to be excludable from gross income).
465. As previously noted, the underlying injury must of course be personal in nature.
See supra note 160; supra note 212 and accompanying text.
466. The Tax Court is, of course, a court of national jurisdiction, and taxpayers from all
parts of the United States may bring their case there. However, in cases appealable to the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the Tax Court will find itself constrained to rule against the tax-
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that such damages are excludable, while the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal4
Circuits have held that punitive damages are taxable. Resolution of the puni-
tive damages controversy turns on one's view of the outcome of several con-
tributing considerations: Has the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry
test survived the Supreme Court's decision in Burke? Does the return of capi-
tal theory point to a clear answer? What was Congress' intent in amending
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) as part of RRA '89?
It is impossible to declare a clear "winner" among the courts' various
positions. However, it is submitted that on balance-and a very delicate bal-
ance it is-Horton seems more correctly decided. First, while the return of
capital theory would provide a compelling model if the courts were writing on
a clean slate, it must be acknowledged that they are not. The manner in which
the Internal Revenue Code operates in the area of personal injury damages
simply does not admit of an argument that the return of capital theory has in
any way been incorporated into the Code or has unambiguously influenced
past administrative and judicial interpretations of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) and its
predecessor.46 The decisions in Miller, Reese, and Hawkins rely greatly on
the return of capital theory, and it is difficult to deny its underlying validity.
However, reliance on the return of capital theory at this late stage of the law's
development surrounding personal injury damages taxation seems hazardous
and unconvincing.
Second, the least strained and most reasonable interpretation of congres-
sional intent in amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) is that, subsequent to RRA '89,
punitive damages recovered for nonphysical personal injuries are now taxable,
and that punitive damages recovered for physical injuries are excluded. This is
the view expressed by the Supreme Court. 7 Given that Congress fairly
clearly intended to narrow the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) in RRA '89, it
follows that pre-RRA '89 punitive damage recoveries for both physical and
nonphysical injuries are excludable.47' While there may be other plausible
explanations of congressional intent, this interpretation is the most defensible
of the alternatives.
Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court did in fact
leave intact the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test: the Supreme
Court took pains to state that it agreed with the Sixth Circuit's analysis "inso-
payer, under the so-called -'Golsen doctrine." See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), affid, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert denied. 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
467. It is submitted that the Third Circuit. which so completely embraced the Threlkeld
beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis in Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1990), would be compelled to follow Horton if the question were raised in that Circuit.
468. Like the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims is also a court of national juris-
diction. Given the pro-govemment position of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
however, forum shoppers are unlikely to turn to the Court of Federal Claims if the tax
treatment of punitive damages is at issue.
469. See supra note 86 and accompanying and following text.
470. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 284 and accompanying and following text.
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far as it focused ... on the nature of the claim," '472 did not explicitly or im-
plicitly criticize the test, and did not indicate that the approach of any other
appellate court was more attractive. There is no hint in Burke of a two-part
test under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2); in other words, that after determining whether a
particular injury is "tort or tort-type," it must also be determined whether the
resulting recovery is "on account of' that personal injury. Moreover, the ma-
jority opinion in Burke seems to assume that if the dissent was correct and the
underlying claim had been found to be tort or tort-type, the back pay award
would have been excludable. The only disagreement between the majority and
the dissent related to the manner in which a tort or tort-type injury is identi-
fied. If the majority felt that the dissent was only addressing the first half of a
two-part test, and that even if the dissent was correct the question of whether
the recovery was "on account of" that injury would remain, it would have
been logical for the majority to say so. Fairly read, the Burke analysis simply
seems more consistent with the Threlkeld approach.
When applied to punitive damage recoveries, utilization of a two-part test
after Burke also creates the undesirable result that the income tax consequenc-
es of such a recovery may vary from state to state, depending upon whether
state law applicable to the particular tort action views punitive damages as
wholly penal in nature, or conversely, as encompassing a compensatory ele-
ment. As the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Miller teaches, application of the
second prong of the two-part test requires one to examine whether or not
punitive damages have a compensatory element.473 If so, the recovery will be
excludable to that extent,474 but if the recovery serves no compensatory pur-
pose it will be taxable. The two-part test would therefore require a case-by-
case analysis of the purpose of the punitive damages award in question, poten-
tially resulting in a patchwork treatment of such awards depending upon rele-
vant state law and undercutting a uniform application of federal income tax
law.
Moreover, use of a two-part test may result in inconsistent treatment of
awards received under the federal antidiscrimination statutes described in Part
IV.B.2. above. For example, in evaluating the tax treatment of ADEA recover-
ies, the question arises whether an award of liquidated damages under ADEA
is in the nature of punitive damages-that is, wholly penal in nature--or
whether such an award serves a compensatory purpose. As has been noted,475
the treatment of ADEA recoveries since Burke has been inconsistent and un-
predictable. One of the major points of contention in this debate is whether a
two-part analysis is warranted after Burke, or whether the Threlkeld beginning-
and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis has continuing vitality. Assuming for the mo-
ment that a two-part test is employed, and that the first test, whether the claim
472. See supra note 246.
473. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
474. Where state law indicates that punitive damages have a mixed nature, serving both
a compensatory and penal purpose, it is unclear how a punitive damage recovery is to be
allocated between such purposes, if at all. See supra notes 441-44 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 259-71 and accompanying text.
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is "tort-type," is satisfied, the next question becomes, on account of what are
liquidated damages under ADEA awarded? That is, what is the nature and
purpose of ADEA liquidated damages? If such damages are punitive and are
awarded on account of the employer's egregious actions,476 then they should
be taxable. On the other hand, if ADEA liquidated damages serve a compensa-
tory purpose, they should be excludable.
This problem was at the center of the recent Schmitz4. case, in which
the Ninth Circuit held, as in Hawkins, that a two-part test should be applied in
evaluating ADEA recoveries. Once again, Judge Goodwin's and Judge Trott's
differing views on the matter highlighted the issues at stake. In holding
excludable both the back pay and liquidated damage awards, Judge Goodwin,
writing for the majority, first determined that an ADEA claim is indeed tort or
tort-type, thus satisfying the first prong of the two-part test.47 Addressing
the second part of the two-part analysis, the government had argued that liqui-
dated damages are awarded "on account of" the employer's willful miscon-
duct, rather than "on account of" the taxpayer's personal injury, and therefore
have no compensatory purpose. Judge Goodwin concluded, however, that a
liquidated damages award recovered in a successful ADEA lawsuit serves, at
least in part, to compensate for nonpecuniary losses.479 Thus, Judge Goodwin
concluded that liquidated damages under ADEA serve both a compensatory as
well as punitive purpose. On this basis, Judge Goodwin held the liquidated
damages award excludable.
Judge Trott's concurring opinion in Schmitz, consistent with his dissent in
Hawkins, argued once again that under Burke, once the ADEA claim is found
to be tort or tort-type, the inquiry is complete and all damages, including
liquidated damages, are excludable. Under Judge Trott's view, the Threlkeld
analysis has survived Burke-in fact was specifically approved in Burke-and
as in Horton, no second test is required. Because Judge Trott agreed with the
majority that an ADEA claim is tort or tort-type, Judge Trott concurred in
Judge Goodwin's conclusion that both the back pay and liquidated damages
component of the taxpayer's award were excludable. However, the
Threlkeld/Horton test used by Judge Trott to reach this result remains at odds
with the Ninth Circuit majority's two-part test. Criticizing the majority in
Schmitz, Judge Trott stated that ADEA liquidated damages are indistinguish-
able from punitive damages, and therefore are not awarded "on account of"
personal injury. Thus, according to Judge Trott, under the majority's own two-
part test Schmitz's liquidated damage award should have failed the second test
and have been declared taxable.48 Judge Trott stated that the Schmitz court's
476. See supra note 175 (award of liquidated damages under ADEA requires a showing
that the employer's violation of ADEA was willful).
477. Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790. 792 (9th Cir. 1994).
478. Id. at 794; see also supra note 266 and accompanying text.
479. Judge Goodwin concluded that liquidated damages under ADEA differ from com-
mon law punitive damages in "significant ways." Schmitz, 34 F.3d at 795. Moreover, such
damages, being equal in amount to the underlying back pay award, are "proportionate to the.
personal injury suffered"; they are not computed in a manner specifically designed to punish
the employer. Id.
480. Judge Trott noted:
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division on the purpose of liquidated damages under ADEA was ample evi-
dence of the basic unworkability of the two-part test, which requires case-by-
case determinations and leads to inconsistent and conflicting results.
A further criticism of the two-part test is reflected in its treatment of back
pay awards under the ADEA. Again, if one is to engage in an analysis of the
true nature and purpose of each element of recovery under an ADEA action to
determine "on account of" what the damages are awarded, it is difficult to see
why a back pay recovery should be excludable. Such an award is merely a
wage or salary substitute and should be taxed as such. Back pay recoveries do
not compensate for any personal injury suffered; they merely replace wages
that should have been paid. Burke teaches, however, that the focus of the
analysis should always be on the nature of the claim, not the consequences of
the injury. The two-step analysis is inconsistent with that teaching.
Concededly, reasonable minds may differ-and have differed--over these
various conclusions. It is impossible to be overly critical of any of the out-
comes reached by the various courts that have recently wrestled with this
issue. The courts are constrained to apply the law as they find it, and in this
area the law is in hopeless confusion: the courts find themselves, as it is said,
in a Syrtis bog, not knowing whether they stand on dry land." ' Seemingly
every important factor impacting the resolution of the controversy is suscepti-
ble of alternate interpretations, and no compelling answers are to be found. In
attempting to unravel these factors and impose order from the punitive damag-
es chaos, the courts are simply "at sea without rudder or compass." '482
Horton is correctly decided as a statement of the law as it now stands.
However, it must be acknowledged that current law is largely indefensible as a
matter of sound tax policy. Although the courts should align themselves with
the Horton analysis, current law as reflected in Horton is in need of
change.483 Legislative action is now required to provide the rudder and the
compass so desperately needed. As Judge Trott has implored, "Congress
should straighten out this mess."4" However, if Congress was to revisit the
Because the majority held in Hawkins that punitive damages are taxable, a logical
application of that rule suggests that ADEA liquidated damages are also taxable.
ADEA liquidated damages, like punitive damages, are only awarded in cases of
willful violation. ADEA liquidated damages, like punitive damages, are intended to
punish and deter.
The majority tries to distinguish ADEA liquidated damages by claiming they
"have both a compensatory and a punitive purpose." What compensatory purpose?
Under the law of this circuit, ADEA liquidated damages do not compensate for the
loss of the use of the money, emotional distress, or pain and suffering. Realistical-
ly, what's left to compensate?
Id. at 798 (Trott, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
481. See JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Book I1, reprinted in 4 HARVARD CLASSICS,
THE COMPLETE POEMS OF JOHN MILTON (1909).
482. MCCULLOCH, TAXATION AND THE FUNDING SYSTEM (1845).
483. See remarks of Ulysses S. Grant in his inaugural address on March 4, 1869: "
know of no method to secure the repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their
stringent execution."
484. Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077. 1087 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., dissenting).
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question, the question becomes: what is the appropriate federal income tax
treatment of punitive damages?
If defensible and internally consistent conclusions are to be reached in this
area, one must have reference to a theory by which the results obtained can be
evaluated, and perhaps criticized. 85  Such guidance can be-and has
been-found in the return of capital theory. The decisions of the Fourth,
Ninth, and Federal Circuits are all greatly influenced by the return of capital
theory. This is understandable, because the theory goes a long way toward
explaining how personal injury recoveries, and particularly punitive damages,
should be treated for income tax purposes.
Imperfections in the return of capital theory have been previously dis-
cussed,486 and it is certainly acknowledged that the theory is not without its
defects. The most damaging criticisms state that the theory does not adequate-
ly or accurately describe certain outcomes under today's Internal Revenue
Code. For example, under the return of capital theory, it can be argued that
recoveries for lost wages should always be taxable, yet this is not the result
that the Service and the courts have reached. The post-RRA '89 treatment of
punitive damages for physical injury, which now appear excludable from gross
income, is also inconsistent with the theory. While these are serious flaws,
they can be rectified, were Congress to address those issues in a top-to-bottom
revision of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
The current confusion over the taxation of personal injury punitive dam-
age recoveries presents Congress with the opportunity to revisit I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) in its entirety and amend the statute, not only to address that confu-
sion, but also to resolve the federal income tax treatment afforded other com-
ponents of a personal injury recovery, providing the internally consistent rules
that are so urgently needed. With this in mind, the following rules487 are
submitted for consideration.488
485. The "aim of theory is to lay down clear and consistent general principles ... on
the basis of which the popular use of concepts can be criticized." NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN
EXPENDITURE TAX (1955).
486. See supra Part III.B.
487. For an argument that I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) should simply be repealed in toto, see
Matlow, supra note 121, at 391-94. Burke and Friel counter by observing that such a result
would be inconsistent with companion provisions in I.R.C. §§ 104 and 105, which exclude a
broad range of recoveries for injury and sickness. Burke and Friel, supra note 70, at 46-47.
488. The following discussion assumes that a damage award can be rationally broken
down into its various components. This may be a hopeful assumption. For example, the
typical employment discrimination claim will usually be accompanied by state law claims of
wrongful termination, age, race, or gender discrimination, sexual harassment, mental anguish,
defamation, pain and suffering, etc. It can be extremely difficult to identify the components
of a lawsuit and more difficult to allocate any resulting recovery among them, especially
where the matter is settled prior to trial, and even more especially where the plaintiff deliv-
ers a blanket release of all claims. See Henry, supra note 70, at 730-34; Morgan, supra note
121, at 888-95; Wood, supra note 121, at 366-67; Yorio, supra note 70, at 707-09. For a
recent case involving a blanket release and a failure by the taxpayer to carry his burden of
proof as to the allocation of his recovery among his purported claims, see Taggi v. United
States, 835 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (where taxpayer cannot carry his burden as to the
proper allocation, the court will not make an allocation for him; entire recovery held tax-
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1. Punitive damages should be fully taxable. Under the generally accept-
ed view, they do not compensate the victim for any monetary or nonmonetary
loss and serve only to punish the wrongdoer for malicious or egregious con-
duct and deter similar conduct by others. Under no reading of the return of
capital theory can punitive damages be viewed as excludable.489 For the sake
of uniformity,4" equity,49' and practicality, punitive damages should be
taxed in full, regardless of whether such damages arguably serve a compensa-
tory purpose under state law concepts. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's approach in
Miller, under which a review of state law is required to determine if a punitive
damages award is actually compensatory in some fashion, would be rejected.
2. Recoveries for past lost income should also be fully taxable.49 To
able).
489. This is consistent with the overwhelming view of the commentators. See, e.g.,
Brooks, supra note 70, at 785-86:
Punitive damages do not compensate the plaintiff. Instead, they penalize the defen-
dant for wrongful conduct. A damage award should be includable if it replaces
something taxable that the taxpayer had and lost before it could be taxed, or if it
substitutes for ordinary income not previously taxed. Punitive damages do not re-
place something the taxpayer had and lost; they arise from the lawsuit and are
intended to punish the defendant for wrongful conduct. . . . A punitive damage
award . . . does not represent recovery of a nonincludable value, and can be re-
garded as a windfall that is ordinary income under the Glenshaw test. Income theo-
ry supports the taxation of punitive damages.
See also Blackburn, supra note 70, at 690; Chapman, supra note 21, at 408; Dodge, supra
note 70, at 180:
As a matter of tax policy, there is little doubt that punitive damages should be
included in gross income. Such damages represent an economic windfall, and do
not compensate for any loss whatsoever. Punitive damages represent a pure accre-
tion to wealth. . . . Punitive damages . . . as opposed to recoveries for human
capital, should not be excluded from income. Such an exclusion is an unwise tax
expenditure with no sound basis in either tax theory or general policy.
Id.; see also CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 101, at 42; J. Martin Burke & Joseph M. Friel, Recent
Developments in the Income Taxation of Individuals, 9 REV. TAX'N INDIVS. 292, 304-305
(1985); Henry, supra note 70, at 741 n.247, 742; Yorio, supra note 70, at 735-36; cf Mor-
gan, supra note 121, at 930 (arguing that punitive damages should be excludable, but only
on the basis of the current wording of the statute referring to "all damages").
490. While state law may create legal interests, relationships, and rights, federal law
determines how and when they are to be taxed. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80
(1940); Bumet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (goal is to "give a uniform application
to a nation wide scheme of taxation").
491. It is commonly asserted that taxpayers with equal ability to pay taxes should pay
equal amounts of tax and, correspondingly, in comparing any two taxpayers with different
levels of ability to pay, the taxpayer with a greater ability to pay should pay more tax than
the other. This concept is sometimes called "horizontal equity." See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, FED-
ERAL TAX POLICY (5th ed. 1987). It has been stated that "horizontal equity in the treatment
of taxpayers requires that the determination [of the underlying character of punitive damages]
be a federal one" so that persons with equal abilities to pay tax are not treated unequally.
Brooks, supra note 70, at 762.
492. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 21, at 408. Complications arise when the jury com-
putes the lost wages award on an after-tax basis, thus effectively imposing the tax on the
plaintiff and under-penalizing the defendant. As discussed infra note 496, juries should be
allowed to consider the tax effects of an award, although the states have been slow to adopt
this view. The most logical approach to recoveries for lost wages is that (i) they should be
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alleviate the harsh tax result that arises under progressive tax rates from
"bunching" the recovery in one taxable period, relief from the progressive
rates should be provided.49' For example, the recovery could be subjected to
a maximum 28% tax rate, and treated in a manner similar to that afforded net
capital gains under current law.4" As a related matter, juries should be al-
lowed, and therefore instructed, to consider the tax treatment of lost income
recoveries in establishing the damage award.495
3. Recoveries for reduced future earning capacity should likewise be
taxed, although the arguments are not one-sided.4"
subject to income tax, thus placing the victim in exactly the same position she would have
been in had she never been injured (and coincidentally penalizing the wrongdoer for the
appropriate amount), and (ii) the jury should compute the award on a before-tax basis, hav-
ing been informed that the award will be taxed when paid.
493. On the "bunching" issue, see Cochran, supra note 70, at 49; Yorio, supra note 70,
at 714-19, 734-35.
494. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (1994).
495. This important question is beyond the scope of this article. In general, however, the
problem is that if the jury ignores the tax treatment of the award, the recovery awarded can
over-compensate or under-compensate the victim. The problem is especially acute under cur-
rent law, where lost income recoveries are in many cases tax-exempt. Even if the jury were
to take the tax-free nature of an award of lost income into account and appropriately set the
award at an after-tax (i.e., "net") level, this can be seen as under-penalizing the tortfeasor,
who need only pay the after-tax value of the victim's claim, thus shifting to the wrongdoer
the subsidy effect of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). On the other hand, if the award is set at pre-tax
(i.e., "gross") levels, under current law the excludability of lost income recoveries provides
an artificial incentive for plaintiffs to pursuant doubtful or meritless claims, because the gross
award will not in fact be subject to tax. This inappropriately distorts the behavior of both
the tort plaintiff and her attorney. The Supreme Court has held that in the context of certain
federal actions, the jury may in fact be instructed as to the tax treatment of a particular
damage award. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980). However, the
majority of the states appear to have concluded otherwise. See generally Robert E. Burns, A
Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death is Tax Exempt: Should We Tell
the Jury?, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 320 (1964-65); Chapman, supra note 21, at 417-423;
Cochran, supra note 70, at 61-62; Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergence of I.R.C. Sec.
104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tar
Policy "Derailed", 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 587-88 (1982-83) (surveying state law);
Matlow, supra note 121, at 380-82; Robert J. Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury
Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1958); Steven T. Potts, Comment, Income Tax Issues in Per-
sonal Injury Litigation, 46 MONT. L. REV. 59, 72 (1985); Annotation, Propriety of Taking
Income Tax Into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Actions, 63
A.L.R. 2d 1393 (1959) and 16 A.L.R. 4th 589 (1982 & 1994 Supp.).
496. Reduced to its essentials, the argument against taxing lost future earning capacity
goes something like this. Assume Taxpayer M owns ten life annuities, each of which is to
pay her an annual amount of $10,000 for the rest of her life. The value of each annuity
today is merely a function of the present value of the annual payments anticipated to be re-
ceived in the future, discounted at prevailing interest rates. Assume this value is $100,000
per annuity. If Taxpayer M suffers a loss of three of those annuities, she will be fully com-
pensated if she recovers $300,000, which she can use to replace the annuities. This
$300,000, of course, merely represents the present value of the future income stream antici-
pated to be earned on the annuities. Despite this fact, no one would characterize the
$300,000 recovery as a recovery of lost future income and thereby taxed. To the contrary, it
is simply assumed that Taxpayer M will invest the $300,000 recovery in new annuities. The
$300,000 recovery is treated as a return of capital, not income, and is so considered for
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4. Recoveries for general compensatory damages, such as pain and
suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, and the like, should be
excludable, largely on the strength of the return of capital theory and the Haig-
Simons definition of taxable income. Such recoveries actually do compensate
the taxpayer for difficult-to-measure losses of human capital and should right-
fully be excluded from gross income under the return of capital theory." 7
income tax purposes. The income later earned off the replacement annuities will be taxed
when received.
Imported into the personal injury arena, this argument has important implications. If
Taxpayer N, a tort victim, receives a $300,000 recovery for loss of future earning capacity,
this recovery is analytically equivalent to the loss and recovery of the future annuity pay-
ments described above: the recovery merely represents the present value of lost earnings
suffered by Taxpayer N as a result of his injury. Just as the amount recovered by Taxpayer
M for the lost annuity payments represents a return of capital in respect of the annuity
contracts, Taxpayer N's recovery for lost income merely replaces the human capital he en-
joyed and utilized to produce income each year in the conduct of his trade or profession.
The $300,000 is, therefore, merely return of capital to Taxpayer N, and should be excluded.
Should Taxpayer N invest the $300,000 so as to produce investment income to replace his
lost future earnings, such investment income would be taxed as received.
The problem with this theory is that, by analogizing Taxpayer N's future income
stream to an annuity, he is essentially treated as a investor in a wasting asset, rather than a
wage earner. As a wage earner, Taxpayer N is simply utilizing his human capital to throw
off income each year. Although Taxpayer N can be seen as having an unacknowledged
"basis" in his human capital derived from expenditures for items such as food, routine medi-
cal care, and the like, he receives neither a current deduction nor an amortization write-off
for those items. Thus, from a tax standpoint, his human capital is not a wasting asset: his
"basis" remains intact until his death (unless, of course, he is tortiously injured).
This view of Taxpayer N does have implications for those who insist on treating Tax-
payer N as an investor rather than a wage earner. While it is possible to prove that the
annuity analogy can place Taxpayer N in the same position, on a present value basis (as if
he had never been injured), see Dodge, supra note 70, at 155-167, the annuity analogy
never exactly duplicates the overall economic consequences to both Taxpayer N and the tax-
collecting government that would have obtained had Taxpayer N never been injured, unless
one assumes that the entire annual annuity payment is taxable. While such an assumption
would be consistent with the treatment of Taxpayer N's ignored basis in his human capital,
it does run counter to the existing tax rules governing annuities. These problems can be
resolved if Taxpayer N is viewed as replacing his lost human capital not with an annuity
but with a non-level payment (i.e., non-amortizing) bond. Such a bond pays an annual
amount of interest, analogous to Taxpayer N's annual wage, with no principal reductions un-
til the bond "balloons" at maturity. The principal of this non-amortizing bond is much more
analogous to one's non-wasting human capital than is an annuity, at least insofar as such in-
vestments are treated for federal income tax purposes. By substituting such a corporate bond
for the annuity in the foregoing discussion, the proper result is reached: Taxpayer N's recov-
ery for lost future income is still excludable, and moreover, assuming Taxpayer N is
analogized to an investor who purchases corporate bonds to make up for the lost income,
the income generated each year exactly replicates (before and after taxes) the result that
would have obtained had he never been injured. In a sense, Taxpayer N is treated like a
bond, rather than as an investor in a bond. The fact that Taxpayer N, if he were to replace
his lost human capital with a bond, has something to pass to his heirs when he
dies-something he cannot do with human capital itself-merely underscores the inappropri-
ateness of analogizing him to an investor rather than an income producer in the first place.
For other views on this debate, see Brooks, supra note 70, at 776-777.
497. It is not suggested that the Code be amended to allow hypothetical Taxpayer C
(described in supra note 86 and accompanying text) a deduction for the value of her loss in
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5. As under present law, recoveries for medical expenses should be
excludable, subject to inclusion in the event the expenses have been previously
deducted under I.R.C. § 213 and a tax benefit thereby derived.
6. Recoveries for statutory interest on a judgment merely represent com-
pensation for the time value of money, and should be taxable accordingly.49 s
7. The current statutory rule under which a "structured settlement" pro-
viding for deferred payments4 is fully excludable should be amended to tax
the interest element, imputed or stated, in the deferred payments."°
8. No distinction between physical injury and nonphysical injury should
be observed in applying these rules. Therefore, so long as the nature of the
underlying claim sounds in tort"°' and is "personal" in nature," 2 exclusion
human capital. Such a provision would simply be impractical to administer and would run
counter to the pervasive principles reflected in I.R.C. § 262(a), which generally denies a
deduction for personal, living, or family expenses. Closely allied to this concept is the notion
of a person developing a "basis" in her human capital. See supra note 101 and accompany-
ing and following text. If a taxpayer is in some fashion contributing to this basis with after-
tax dollars because her everyday consumption expenditures such as food, vitamins, shelter,
clothing, and education are not deductible, it seems unwise and inconsistent, as well as un-
fair, to require her to later prove those costs in showing that a subsequent personal injury
recovery in respect of human capital does not exceed that basis. This "no deduction, no
inclusion" approach is consistent with the Code's treatment of other transactions, most nota-
bly its treatment of life insurance (no deduction for life insurance premiums by virtue of
I.R.C. § 262(a), no inclusion of life insurance proceeds by virtue of I.R.C. § 101(a)). See
Michael J. Graetz, hnplementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575,
1611-1612 (1979) (describing the "yield exemption" treatment of life insurance and its rela-
tionship to an expenditure tax).
498. This rule would codify the result reached by the Tax Court in Kovacs, 100 T.C.
124 (1993). In Kovacs, the Tax Court held that prejudgment interest awarded to the taxpay-
ers under Michigan law as a component of recovery in a wrongful death action was "inter-
est" and not "damages" for purposes of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and was therefore taxable.
Kovacs was followed in Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
Judge Beghe filed a lengthy dissent in Kovacs, arguing that (i) although statutory
interest does carry the label of "interest," nevertheless it is simply a component of the dam-
ages awarded to the taxpayers, and therefore falls within the scope of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and
(ii) under the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry analysis, such interest is excludable
under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) since the underlying wrongful death action is concededly tort or
tort-type. Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 139 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
The District Court for the District of Colorado has declined to follow Kovacs, holding
that mandatory prejudgment interest awarded under COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-101(1) (1982)
in a tort case falls within the phrase "any damages received on account of personal injury"
and is therefore excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp.
1360 (D. Colo. 1994). The District Court's opinion specifically adopted the views expressed
by Judge Beghe in his dissent in Kovacs.
499. See generally DANIEL W. HINDERT, ET. AL., STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS AND PERI-
ODIC PAYMENT JUDGMENTS (1994).
500. Under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), recoveries otherwise falling within the scope of the statute
are excludable no matter how received, "whether as lump sums or as periodic payments."
Under this rule, added to the Code by the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2605 (1982), the interest element in a deferred "structured settlement"
arrangement is excluded along with the principal amount of the award. This result cannot be
defended on sound tax policy grounds, and should be repealed. See generally Frolik, supra
note 496. See also Blackburn, supra note 70, at 683-686.
501. The "scope of the remedies" test as fashioned by the Supreme Court in Burke
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would be appropriate if called for under the enumerated rules.
These rules would effectively abandon the Threlkeld beginning-and-end-
of-the-inquiry analysis, and give separate meaning and import to the phrase
"on account of' as now set forth in I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
Absent congressional action, the tax treatment of punitive damages, as
well as other components of personal injury damage recoveries, likely will
remain uncertain and contentious," 3 leaving taxpayers and their advisors in
the dark, inappropriately affecting the behavior of tort litigants, and encourag-
ing further disputes between taxpayers and the government.
Notwithstanding the need for legislative action, the United States Supreme
Court may soon provide further guidance in this area. In November 1994, the
Court granted certiorari in Commissioner v. Schleier, an unreported Fifth Cir-
cuit case involving the application of the Court's decision in Burke to ADEA
recoveries of back pay and liquidated damages."° This action may clarify the
would control this determination, although its importance would be greatly mitigated if the
enumerated rules were followed.
502. See supro note 160.
503. It is not entirely clear how the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals would rule on the
question whether punitive damages are excludable under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), if presented with
the issue. Two District Courts in the Tenth Circuit have adopted analyses consistent with the
Threlkeld beginning-and-end-of-the-inquiry test, one specifically in the area of punitive dam-
ages, see O'Gilvie v. United States, 92-2 USTC 1 50,567 (D. Kan. 1990) and one in the
area of statutory interest, see Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994).
The emerging law in the Tenth Circuit, therefore, is consistent with Horton and Threlkeld.
In the only recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision relevant to the question,
Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989), the court held that an award of
damages specifically allocated to back pay as a result of a wrongful discharge was nontax-
able under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Wulf was not a federal tax case. Wulf had recovered $160,000
against his employer in the underlying cause of action, a § 1983 case. The trial court added
$80,000 to the award as a 50% "enhancement" to cover presumed federal and state taxes
payable on the award. The defendant objected to the tax enhancement, claiming that the
award was not subject to income tax. The Tenth Circuit agreed, and remanded for a redeter-
mination of the award. In its brief discussion of the issue, the court weighed the contrary
authorities of Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1987) and Thompson v.
Commissoner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989), and sided with the Bent analysis. However,
although the Tax Court had decided Threlkeld by this time, the Tenth Circuit made no men-
tion of Threlkeld. Bent itself was a pre-Threlkeld case, so it is not accurate to assume that
the Threlkeld analysis is subsumed or reflected in Bent and therefore in Wulf. On the other
hand, Bent was decided by the Third Circuit, which has clearly adopted the Threlkeld ap-
proach in subsequent opinions. See supra note 467.
In Brabson, Judge Kane of the District Court for the District of Colorado unequivo-
cally adopted the Threlkeld test, stating that "excludability under § 104(a)(2) ...turns solely
on the nature of the underlying claim. . . . If the underlying claim sounds in tort, that is
the beginning and the end of the inquiry." Brabson, 859 F. Supp. at 1362 (emphasis added).
Judge Kane viewed Wulf as entirely consistent with this analysis, id. at 1363, and specifical-
ly approved Judge Beghe's approval of the Threlkeld test in his dissent in Kovacs. See supra
note 499.
Whether the Tenth Circuit would be compelled to follow Horton and therefore remain
consistent with the Third Circuit is problematic, although the developing view in the Tenth
Circuit, particularly as reflected in Brabson, is decidedly consistent with Horton.
504. Tax Court docket no. 22909-90; see supra note 268 and accompanying text.
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tax treatment of punitive damages, either directly or indirectly, by allowing the
Court to address the larger questions: (a) whether the Threlkeld beginning-and-
end-of-the-inquiry test, as employed in cases like Horton, Rickel, and Burke,
was in fact explicitly or implicitly approved by the Supreme Court in Burke,
or whether the two-part analysis used in cases like Miller, Reese, Hawkins,
and Schmitz is the proper one (or whether the Court has some other test in
mind), and (b) whether ADEA liquidated damages are punitive in nature, and
if so, how punitive damages should be taxed.
Several outcomes are possible under Schleier, including the following:
1. The Supreme Court may skirt the larger issues by following Downey
v. Commissioner," holding that the ADEA recovery scheme is analogous to
pre-amendment Title VII and does not afford the broad range of remedies
necessary to satisfy the "scope of the remedies" test. In this case, ADEA
claims would not be "tort or tort-type," and the Court would hold both back
pay and liquidated damages awards under the ADEA to be taxable. This
would leave the taxation of punitive damages in limbo.
2. The Court may hold that the "scope of the remedies" test is in fact
satisfied by the ADEA recovery scheme, and that under Threlkeld, this consti-
tutes the "beginning and end of the inquiry." Therefore, both back pay and
liquidated damages under the ADEA would be excludable, without reference
to their underlying purposes (and as to liquidated damages, irrespective of
whether they are compensatory, punitive, or both). This outcome would estab-
lish Horton as the law governing punitive damages.
3. The Court may conclude, with the majority view in Schmitz, that the
"scope of the remedies" test is satisfied by the ADEA recovery scheme, and
that under cases like Miller, Reese, and Hawkins, a second inquiry must be
undertaken---on account of what are the damages awarded? In that case, the
back pay award would be excluded." However, as the debate between Judg-
es Goodwin and Trott in Schmitz indicates," 7 the courts are divided over
whether liquidated damages under ADEA are punitive or compensatory."
Two outcomes may be reached:
a. The Court may conclude, as did the majority in Schmitz, that
liquidated damages serve (at least in part) a compensatory purpose, are not
wholly penal, and are therefore excludable. This would establish that Horton is
not the law, although it would not necessarily clarify the taxation of true puni-
tive damages awarded in non-ADEA contexts.
b. The Court may alternatively conclude that liquidated damages
under the ADEA are entirely punitive and are taxable, according to their non-
compensatory nature.5°
505. 33 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Shaw v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1378
(M.D. Ala. 1994); Maleszewski v. United States, 827 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Fla. 1993); Drase
v. United States, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 50,463 (N.D. I11. 1994).
506. As discussed in Part IV, supra, this result runs counter to a strict application of the
"on account of" test, but is compelled by existing rulings and case law.
507. See supra note 478 and accompanying text.
508. See Downev, 33 F.3d at 839, and cases cited therein.
509. As of this writing, no reported post-Burke opinion has held back pay excludable
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Outcome # 3 would essentially bring closure to the debate, at least regard-
ing punitive damages received prior to RRA '89. However, it would not an-
swer whether RRA '89's amendment of I.R.C. § 104(a) means that post-RRA
'89 punitive damage recoveries are excludable if awarded in respect of a phys-
ical injury, discussed in Part V.C. above.
Depending on the course taken by the Supreme Court, Schleier may ulti-
mately answer the question of the taxation of punitive damages. Irrespective of
the outcome in Schleier, however, a congressional overhaul of I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) is greatly needed.
while at the same time taxing liquidated damages.
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TOWARD A SYNTHESIS OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE:
DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE
CONTEXT OF NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
MARK R. FONDACARO"
INTRODUCTION
The struggle for comprehensive reform of the health care delivery system
in the United States has reached another impasse.' As in the past, both social
and economic factors have driven reform efforts. From a social standpoint,
over thirty-six million Americans are presently uninsured, many of them
young children and adolescents.2 Universal access to health care is a long-
term objective of several major proponents of national health care reform.'
* Research Assistant Professor, Center on Children, Families, and the Law. University
of Nebraska-Lincoln. J.D. Columbia Law School (1991), Postdoctoral Scholar, Stanford Medi-
cal School (1985-1987), Ph.D. Indiana University (1985), B.A. State University of New York
at Stony Brook (1979). i am grateful to Professors Charles Black, Jr., Frank Grad, and Mi-
chael Wald for their generous advice, encouragement, and support. I am particularly indebted
to Professor Peter Strauss for introducing me to the intellectual and practical challenges of
administrative law. Eric Hermanson, Janet O'Keeffe, and Professors Craig Lawson and Gary
Melton provided helpful feedback and comments on an earlier draft of this article; Kristi
Kennedy and Julie Meacham provided valuable research assistance. This research was made
possible through support provided by NIMH, Columbia Law School, and the Nebraska De-
partment of Social Services. The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the
author and are not necessarily endorsed by the supporting institutions.
1. Ira Magaziner, senior policy advisor to President Clinton, noted that:
[Clomprehensive health care was first proposed some 80 years ago by President
Theodore Roosevelt. President Franklin Roosevelt initially included a national health
care program as part of Social Security, but it was later dropped. Presidents Tru-
man, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all had health care proposals that were never
enacted ....
Magaziner Seeks Support of UFCW for Clinton Health Reform Plan. DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 144, at D-I I (July 29, 1993).
2. Number of Uninsured Persons Increased to 36.6 Million in 1991, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 7, at A-Il (January 12, 1993). Currently, over 9.5 million children in the United
States are without health insurance. Id. Adolescents may be the most vulnerable. Recent
studies suggest that one in every seven, nearly 5 million adolescents, aged 10-18, do not
have any health insurance. Many more are underinsured. Paul W. Newacheck et al., Financ-
ing Health Care for Adolescents: Problems, Prospects, and Proposals, II J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH CARE 398, 399 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Foreword: Health Care Reform in the United
States-The Presidential Task Force, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 6 (1993) (citing universal
coverage as an objective of the Clinton Administration's health care reform proposal); see
also H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (sponsored chiefly by Representative Richard
Gephardt to ensure "individual and family security through health care coverage for all
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This means millions of presently uninsured Americans stand a chance of being
covered by some form of health insurance when and if comprehensive health
care reform efforts eventually succeed.
From an economic standpoint, cost-containment is a central objective of
recent health care reform efforts. The high priority given to health care reform
by the current Administration is rooted at least as much in the necessity of
controlling spiraling health care costs as in the desire to provide universal
coverage.4 Political pressures have increased to contain the administrative
costs of providing all health care benefits. The resolution of the tension be-
tween these apparently conflicting social and economic objectives will impact
the nature, scope, and quality of benefits ultimately guaranteed under national
health care reform legislation, and indeed, may determine whether or not com-
prehensive reform efforts succeed at any level.
Cost-containment efforts potentially will target the health care claims
review and appeals process. The existing public and private health insurance
systems provide widely varied procedural safeguards to ensure that individuals
who are denied health insurance benefits have such decisions reviewed in a
timely and fair manner. Existing grievance and appeal procedures range from
trial-like administrative hearings and judicial review to reconsideration of a
denied claim by an insurance provider representative without opportunity for
further review.'
On the one hand, formal trial-like procedural safeguards,6 which seeming-
ly provide the most stringent due process protections, can be criticized as
time-consuming, costly, and an inefficient use of administrative and judicial
resources.7 Accordingly, efforts to extend and incorporate such safeguards to
Americans").
4. See Bruce Babbitt & Jonathan Rose, Building a Better Mousetrap: Health Care
Reform and the Arizona Program, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 243, 281 (1986) (quoting Lester C.
Thurow, Medicine Versus Economics, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 611, 611 (1985)) ("The federal
government used to view health care as a social problem. Today it views it almost solely as
a budget-deficit problem. The shift in perspectives is important. Social problems can be left
to fester; budget-deficit problems require more immediate solution.")
5. See infra part IV.A-D.
6. Recent health care reform plans proposed by the Clinton Administration and by
Congress would establish procedures for reviewing health care claim denials that include
opportunities for administrative review and appeal, alternative dispute resolution, and judicial
review and enforcement. See infra part V.A.I-A.6. Many competing health care reform bills
were submitted to Congress earlier in the health care reform process, including: S. 491, 103d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) sponsored chiefly by Senator Wellstone; S. 1770, 103d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1993) sponsored chiefly by Senator Chafee; H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993)
sponsored chiefly by Representative Cooper; and H.R. 3080, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993)
sponsored chiefly by Representative Michel. As is more typically the case with health care
legislation, these competing proposals generally were less comprehensive and less detailed
with regard to due process considerations than are the proposals evaluated in the final sec-
tion of this article.
7. 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 9.2, at 6 (3d ed. 1994) ("[Tlhe kind of procedural safeguards due process requires for
individualized government determinations would be prohibitively expensive and time-consum-
ing if they were required for determinations that affect a large number of people."); see infra
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protect consumers from arbitrary denials of health care coverage are likely to
run into increased resistance in the context of growing demands for cost-con-
tainment and administrative efficiency. On the other hand, health care reform
initiatives and market-based reforms aimed at encouraging the use of managed
care may create new incentives to reduce services in an effort to contain
costs.' While such service reductions ideally will be aimed at unnecessary and
ineffective treatments, there will be increased pressures to ration care, particu-
larly more expensive treatments and services. These conditions precisely illus-
trate the pronounced need for procedural mechanisms which ensure that pa-
tients are not erroneously denied necessary health care.
Overall, the reform of the health care delivery system in the United States
has been and will continue to be an ongoing and dynamic process. Regardless
of the specific timing and nature of health care reforms adopted, there will be
increased demands on the claims review process as health care coverage is
provided to those who are presently uninsured. Likewise, mounting economic
pressures toward cost-containment in the delivery of health care services will
create an additional burden on the claims review process if more people begin
to feel that their requests for services or reimbursement are being unjustly
denied. Thus, any health care reform program ultimately adopted will need to
develop a claims review process that strikes an appropriate balance between
fairness, accuracy, and efficiency in decision making.
The topics of due process and procedural justice have been the focus of
considerable legal scholarship as well as social science research. Social science
research has focused on the assessment of both subjective and objective as-
pects of procedural justice, including the capacity of procedures to influence
individuals' subjective perceptions of procedural fairness and their ability to
promote bias reduction and accuracy in decision making. Similarly, legal stan-
dards of procedural due process traditionally have focused on the promotion of
fairness and accuracy in decision making. Additionally, constitutional stan-
dards of procedural due process increasingly have required that considerations
of fairness and accuracy be balanced against the government's interest in
administrative efficiency and cost-containment. 9
This article draws on both legal scholarship and social science research to
examine and evaluate alternative procedures for reviewing health care benefit
denials. Section I discusses legal aspects of procedural due process, including
threshold constitutional issues, administrative review, alternative models of
administrative justice, and judicial review and enforcement. Section II reviews
the social science literature on procedural justice, covering subjective and
objective aspects of procedural justice. Legal and psychosocial criteria for
evaluating procedural justice are compared and synthesized in Section III. The
procedural mechanisms for reviewing health care benefit denials under the
present Medicaid, Medicare, Managed Care, and fee-for-service systems are
reviewed in Section IV; these procedural mechanisms are evaluated against
part I.
8. See infra part IV.C.
9. See infra part I.A-E.
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legal and psychosocial criteria for assessing procedural justice. The administra-
tive review and appeal procedures outlined in health care reform plans recently
proposed by the Administration, the House, and the Senate are evaluated
against procedural justice criteria in Section V. Finally, general guidelines and
conclusions regarding the evaluation of procedural justice under national health
care reform are presented in the Conclusion.
I. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Considerations of "fundamental fairness" are at the heart of due process
analysis in our constitutional democracy.'" Efforts to define the parameters of
due process and fundamental fairness traditionally have emphasized the impor-
tance of "truth seeking" as well as the promotion of individual and public
perceptions that justice has been done." Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,2 discussing the
objectives and consequences of procedural due process protection, illustrates
this point:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to
give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for
generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done. 3
Justice Frankfurter also recognized that due process is an evolving, flexi-
ble construct, highly dependent on context for its meaning; it is not "a techni-
cal conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstanc-
es." 
14
Over the years, the Supreme Court has echoed Justice Frankfurter's senti-
10. See, e.g., Goss v. Lope, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (requiring the State to use "fun-
damentally fair procedures" in the context of school suspensions).
11. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. Ii, 124 (1978). The Supreme
Court's references to subjective perceptions of fairness have been relatively oblique-the
Court has more typically ignored or down-played the importance of perceptions of fairness
from the subjective standpoint of the individual. Id. at 122.
12. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
13. Id. at 171-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 162. Justice Frankfurter elaborated on the flexible nature of the due process
construct as follows:
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feel-
ing of just treatment which has been evolved through centuries of Anglo-American
constitutional history and civilization, 'due process' cannot be imprisoned within the
treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness be-
tween man and man, and more particularly between the individual and government,
'due process' is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and
stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due
process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a
delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.
Id. at 162-63.
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ments about the evolving nature of due process analysis and the importance of
context and flexibility in approaching issues of due process and fundamental
fairness." Accordingly, the dramatic increase in the number of claims for
government administered benefits has brought about increased recognition that
resources are limited and that government benefits must be administered in
ways that promote not only fairness and objectivity, but also timeliness, effi-
ciency, and cost-containment. 6
A. Threshold Constitutional Issues
The United States Constitution prohibits the federal and state governments
from depriving an individual of "life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."' 7 To determine the scope of due process protection, the threshold
question is whether state action is involved."8 The Federal Constitution only
comes into play in cases involving government or state action.'9 Second, the
government must threaten to deprive a person of liberty or property to which
he or she is legally entitled before constitutional safeguards are required." In
the health care context, this means that the legislative scheme must create an
entitlement to health care services which the Supreme Court would character-
ize as a property interest.2' Finally, if it is established that the legislative
15. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) ("The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible proce-
dures universally applicable to every imaginable situation."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require cita-
tion of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.").
16. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theo-
retical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the
Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974) (arguing that the
elements of fair procedure associated with due process of law in adjudicatory proceedings are
inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claim adjudications which require processes
that will assure the accuracy of claims adjudications).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (determining that termination
of benefits given by statutory entitlement involves state action, which triggers minimum
constitutional requirements of procedural due process).
19. The Fifth Amendment applies to "government action" by the federal government
and the Fourteenth Amendment applies to "state action" taken by state governments.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10-7 (2d ed. 1988). The terms
"state action" and "government action" are sometimes used interchangeably. See id. § 18-1,
at 1688 n.2.
20. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, the Due Process Clause applies only to those
government actions that deprive an individual of "life," "liberty," or "property." Although the
Court analyzes each of these interests separately and in a way that narrows the scope of due
process protection, commentators have suggested that the Court is not required to do so;
some have argued that the scope of the Due Process Clause should reach "any important in-
terest." 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 9.4, at 21; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 409 (1977) ("all interests valued by
sensible men").
21. Certain health care services could conceivably be characterized as involving interests
in liberty or even life, although the Supreme Court may neither be inclined nor find it nec-
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scheme does involve state action and a potential deprivation of property or
liberty, the analysis turns on a determination of "what process is due" in that
particular context.
Constitutional standards reflect the bare minimum requirements of proce-
dural protection against arbitrary government action. In the health care context,
as in other contexts, Congress may establish by statute process rights in the
private realm that parallel those guaranteed by the Constitution in the public
realm. Moreover, in both the public and private spheres, Congress may estab-
lish procedural requirements that exceed the minimum constitutional stan-
dards. - But irrespective of whether a particular health care delivery system is
considered public, private, or a hybrid of both, standard procedures are needed
to guide the review of claims for services or reimbursement that have been
denied.2  Constitutional standards of procedural due process typically have
served as the starting point in the development of administrative procedures
for reviewing the claims denial process.
24
B. Administrative Review
Any evaluation of modern administrative review procedures must begin
with the case of Goldberg v. Kelly,2' decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1970. The Court addressed whether state regulations that allow the
termination of welfare payments with no opportunity for an evidentiary hear-
ing prior to termination of payments violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Goldberg, individuals facing termination of welfare payments were
provided informal pretermination review procedures, but many of the tradition-
al trial-like process features such as the opportunity for personal appearance,
oral presentation of evidence, or confrontation and cross-examination of ad-
verse witnesses were not included.26 Individuals whose payments were ter-
essary to do so. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 9.4, at 42 (suggesting that lack of
analytical coherence makes it difficult to predict whether the Court will characterize an inter-
est in a way that triggers due process protection).
22. See id. § 9.1, at 2 ("Legislatures and agencies can, of course, choose procedures
more demanding than those dictated by due process, but their choice of procedures is influ-
enced heavily by their beliefs concerning the procedures required by due process.").
23. See GEORGE J. ANNAS, ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 270 (1990) (suggesting the
procedures followed by the public insurance payers are based on considerable delegation of
authority to private and quasi-private decision makers). Legal scholars have argued there is a
special need for judicial review in situations like this, where entitlements are conferred out-
side the decision-making institution. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and
Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII 182, 202 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1977).
24. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 9.1 (suggesting that constitutional standards
of due process and the Supreme Court's due process reasoning have a considerable influence
on the procedural choices of legislatures and agencies).
25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. Id. at 258-59. Local social service officials proposing to suspend a recipient's wel-
fare assistance were required to comply with the following pretermination procedures. A
caseworker who had doubts about a welfare recipient's continued eligibility for benefits was
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minated as the result of the informal pretermination review process were enti-
tled to a post-termination "fair hearing."" This involved a proceeding before
an independent state hearing officer at which the recipient could appear per-
sonally, offer oral evidence, confront and cross-examine witnesses, and have a
record made of the hearing. If the recipient prevailed at the fair hearing, he or
she was paid all funds erroneously withheld. A recipient whose aid was not re-
stored by a fair hearing decision was entitled to judicial review. 8
Primarily, the Court had to decide whether the Due Process Clause re-
quires an oral evidentiary hearing before the recipient's benefits are terminat-
ed.29 The Court indicated the termination of welfare benefits involved "state
action"3 and characterized welfare payments as property that could not be
arbitrarily withdrawn by the government.3 The Court noted that welfare pro-
vides "the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical
care" 32 and that due process requires in part a consideration of the extent to
which a person may be "condemned to suffer grievous lOSS. '33 The Court
viewed the termination of welfare benefits as a potential "grievous loss" that
clearly triggered due process protection under the Federal Constitution.34
The Court acknowledged the relationship between due process and respect
for human dignity." The Court also recognized the government interest in
prevention of the "societal malaise" or demoralization associated with the
erroneous denial of welfare payments.36 As will be discussed below, similar
required first to discuss those doubts with the recipient. If the caseworker concluded that the
recipient was no longer eligible, he or she made a recommendation to a unit supervisor to
terminate the aid. The caseworker was then required to send a letter to the recipient stating
the reasons for proposing to terminate aid and notifying the recipient that within seven days
he or she could request that a higher official review the record. The recipient could support
the request with a written statement prepared personally or with the aid of an attorney or
other person. If the reviewing official affirmed the determination of ineligibility, aid was
stopped immediately and the recipient was informed by letter of the reasons for the action.
The letter informed the recipient that he or she could request a post-termination hearing. Id.
27. Id. at 259.
28. Id. at 259-60.
29. Id. at 260.
30. Id. at 262.
31. Id. at 263 n.8.
32. Id. at 264.
33. Id. at 263 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Justice Frankfurter stated "that the right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind . . . is a principle basic to our
society." McGrath, 341 U.S. at 168.
34. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 ("[Tiermination of aid pending resolution of a controver-
sy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits."). The Court acknowledged the basic considerations of survival at issue in
Goldberg and noted that this crucial factor was not a consideration for "virtually anyone else
whose governmental entitlements are ended." Id. Thus, the Court seemed to focus narrowly,
almost exclusively on the welfare context in Goldberg; however, similar "life and death"
considerations may apply in certain health care contexts as well.
35. Id. at 264-65 ("From its founding the Nation's basic commitment has been to foster
the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders.").
36. Id. at 265.
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demoralization costs may result from the erroneous denial of valid health care
claims.
In addressing the question of what procedures are required, the Court held
that an evidentiary hearing must be provided before welfare benefits can be
terminated. Although the required hearing need not take the form of a formal
judicial trial," the recipient is entitled to the following procedural safeguards
or process features: 8
* Timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for termination;
" Personal appearance before the decision maker;
" Oral presentation of arguments and evidence;
" Opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
* Right to retain an attorney at personal expense;
* Statement by the decision maker indicating the reasons for the deter-
mination and the evidence relied on; and
* Impartial decision maker who was not involved in making the deci-
sion under review.39
The Court concluded that "[tihe opportunity to be heard must be tailored
to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."'' Thus,
due process required an oral hearing in the welfare context because the Court
considered written submissions to be
an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational
attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain pro-
fessional assistance. Moreover, written submissions do not afford the
flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the recipient to
mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard
as important."
Thus, the Court suggested, at least for an indigent person, an oral hearing
would better serve the interests of fairness and accuracy of decision making.
An oral presentation would allow the individual to more effectively express
his or her point of view, which, in turn, would provide the decision maker
with better information on which to base a decision.4"
Following Goldberg, there was what some commentators referred to as a
"due process explosion," characterized by the "tendency to judicialize adminis-
37. Id. at 266.
38. Robert Summers used the term "process feature" to denote the specific procedural
mechanisms that guide the administrative review process. See Robert S. Summers, Evaluating
and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values", 60 CORNELL L. REV. I, 8
(1974). Summers notes that process features are based on the rules and norms that define
the process at hand and "can be found in the constitutive and regulative rules (and other
norms) that define the process." Id. at 15.
39. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-71.
40. Id. at 268-69.
41. Id. at 269.
42. See Saphire, supra note 11, at 163-65 (providing a strong statement of the value of
personal appearance and oral participation in the hearing process).
[Vol. 72:2
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
trative procedures."43 In an influential article addressing this issue, Judge
Henry Friendly concluded:
In the mass justice area the Supreme Court has yielded too readily to
the notions that the adversary system is the only appropriate model
and that there is only one acceptable solution to any problem, and
consequently has been too prone to indulge in constitutional codifica-
tion. There is need for experimentation, particularly for the use of the
investigative model, for empirical studies, and for avoiding abso-
lutes.'
Judge Friendly suggested "that the elements of a fair hearing should not
be considered separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitu-
tionally demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for
diminishing or even eliminating another."" For example, with regard to the
need for an unbiased tribunal, he noted that "the further the tribunal is re-
moved from the agency and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be
the need for other procedural safeguards.""4o
More recently, the Supreme Court has held that the full range of proce-
dural safeguards required in the welfare context does not necessarily extend to
other administrative contexts. Rather, the Court typically has applied a balanc-
ing test, which was first clearly articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge."
Mathews focused on the termination of disability benefits under the Social
Security Act (the "Act"). In contrast to its decision in Goldberg, the Court
held in Mathews that disability benefits, unlike welfare benefits, could be
terminated without a prior evidentiary hearing." The Court indicated that due
process analysis requires consideration of the following three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
43. Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268-69
(1975); accord JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 8-9 (1985).
44. Friendly, supra note 43, at 1316.
45. Id. at 1279. Judge Friendly nonetheless compiled a prioritized list enumerating the
factors that have been considered to be elements in a fair hearing: (1) unbiased tribunal, (2)
notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it, (3) an opportunity to present
reasons why the proposed action should not be taken, (4) the right to call witnesses, (5) the
right to know the evidence against one, (6) the right to have the decision based only on the
evidence presented, (7) counsel, (8) the making of a record, (9) a statement of reasons, (10)
public attendance, and (11) judicial review. Id. at 1278-95.
46. Id. at 1279. Judge Friendly recognized that the term "hearing" has an oral connota-
tion, but suggested that in some circumstances a hearing could be based on written materials.
Id. at 1270. He was particularly critical of the universal need for cross-examination and
noted its tendency to result in delay and the polarization of ongoing relationships. Id. at
1284-86.
47. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
48. Id. at 349.
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burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail."
In analyzing the private interests at stake, the Court noted that, unlike
welfare determinations, eligibility for disability benefits is not based on finan-
cial need and, therefore, the disabled worker's need for government assistance
is likely to be less, particularly for those who have access to private resourc-
es."' Moreover, the right to retroactive relief5' for disability benefits denied
improperly seemed to soften the Court's view of the degree of potential de-
privation suffered by the majority 2 of claimants in the disability context.53
In evaluating the fairness and reliability of the pretermination procedures
in effect and the probable value of additional safeguards, the Court considered
medical assessments for purposes of disability determination to be "more
sharply focused and easily documented ... than the typical determination of
welfare entitlement.""4 The Court characterized such medical assessments as
"'routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists.' 5
Based in part on this characterization of medical evidence, the Court conclud-
ed the value of oral presentation and the opportunity to cross-examine adverse
witnesses is substantially less in the disability context than in the welfare
context. 6 The Court emphasized the reliability and probative worth of written
medical reports and concluded that such reports do not raise the "'specter of
questionable credibility and veracity."'5 7 Therefore, the Court held that the
opportunity to provide written submissions prior to the termination of benefits,
coupled with the opportunity for a post-termination evidentiary hearing and
judicial review, satisfied the requirements of due process. 8
The final prong of the Court's analysis in Mathews focused on an assess-
ment of the public interests, including administrative burdens and other soci-
49. Id. at 335.
50. Id. at 340-42.
51. Id. at 340 ("Since a recipient whose benefits are terminated is awarded full retro-
active relief if he ultimately prevails, his sole interest is in the uninterrupted receipt of this
source of income pending final administrative decision on his claim."). In the health care
context, as more people are treated under a managed care model, health care claim denials
will focus not only on reimbursement for services already provided, but also on decisions
about whether specific health care services should be provided at all in a given case. It is in
this later context of treatment denial that retroactive relief is more likely to be an inadequate
remedy.
52. Id. at 344 ("[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent
in the truth finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.").
53. Id. at 341 ("IT]he degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a partic-
ular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative de-
cision making process.").
54. id at 343.
55. Id. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)).
56. Id. at 344-45.
57. Id, at 344 (quoting Richardson, 402 U.S. at 407).
58. Id. at 349. Some commentators have noted that the Supreme Court seems to over-
value costly post-termination trial-type hearings, often requiring such hearings even after
adequate pretermination hearings already have been provided. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
7, § 9.3, at 19.
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etal costs associated with requiring pretermination hearings on demand. 9 The
Court emphasized the costs associated with increased numbers "of hearings
and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending deci-
sion."'  Unlike the decision in Goldberg, the Court's consideration of so
called "social costs" did not address issues of demoralization and loss of pub-
lic confidence associated with erroneous benefit denials. Rather, in support of
its holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination
of disability benefits, the Court stressed the financial costs and administrative
burdens associated "with the constitutionalizing of government procedures."6
The Supreme Court's decision in Goss v. Lopez62 illustrates that pre-de-
privation procedures characterized by informality and flexibility may nonethe-
less satisfy due process requirements. In Goss, the Court held that high school
students were entitled to an informal hearing prior to or within a reasonable
time after a ten day suspension. In addressing the question of what process is
due, the Court acknowledged that "the interpretation and application of the
Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters and that '(t)he very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally appli-
cable to every imaginable situation."'63 The Court held that "students facing
suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest
must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing,"'
which includes oral or written notice of charges, and, if the charges are de-
nied, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity
for the student to explain his or her side of the story.65 Generally, the infor-
mal hearing should take place before the student is removed from school, thus
providing the student with a predeprivation opportunity to be heard.' Note
that the informal hearing format in the school suspension context does not
include the opportunity to secure counsel, to cross-examine adverse witnesses,
or to call witnesses to support the student's version of the facts.67
Neutrality and impartiality on the part of the decision maker are generally
considered to be core requirements of procedural due process.68 In Schweiker
59. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347.
60. Id.
61. Id. Overall, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the balancing test articulated in
Mathews, although there are some general trends. "The Court almost never accords a full ad-
versary hearing prior to termination. Typically, the process due is notice of the grounds for
decision plus some sort of opportunity for response prior to the deprivation, with something
approaching a full evidentiary hearing available after the deprivation." Cynthia R. Farina,
Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 196 (1991).
62. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
63. Id. at 578 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
64. Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 581.
66. hi. at 582. However, under the limited circumstances in which a student poses a
continuing danger or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process, the student may
be immediately removed from school, followed as soon as practicable by the necessary no-
tice and informal hearing. Id. at 582-83.
67. Id. at 583.
68. Note that Judge Friendly placed an "unbiased tribunal" at the top of his prioritized
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v. McClure, ' the Court focused on the impartiality of the decision making
process associated with Medicare Part B payments for physician services and
outpatient care.7" At the time of the decision, the Medicare program autho-
rized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to contract with private
insurance carriers to administer payment of Part B claims.7 If the carrier re-
fused to pay a portion of a claim, the claimant was entitled to a "review deter-
mination," based on the submission of written evidence and arguments." For
disputes involving at least $100, a dissatisfied claimant also was entitled to an
oral hearing, which was conducted by an officer chosen by the carrier. No fur-
ther provision was made for the review of the hearing officer's determina-
tion.73
The Schweiker Court held that the hearing procedures did not violate due
process requirements and that claimants were not entitled to a de novo hearing
conducted by an administrative law judge. 4 The Court indicated that due pro-
cess does require impartiality on the part of those who function in a quasi-
judicial capacity, including hearing officers. However, there is a rebuttable
presumption that these officers are unbiased. "This presumption can be rebut-
ted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for
disqualification."'" The decision maker is particularly vulnerable to charges of
bias when he or she has a direct financial interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding.76
The Supreme Court has operationalized the opportunity to be heard re-
quirement in varied ways, ranging from trial-like predeprivation hearings in
the welfare context," to informal hearings prior to school suspension," to
reliance on post hoc tort remedies for excessive corporal punishment.79 Over-
all, the Supreme Court's procedural due process jurisprudence emphasizes the
balancing of factors associated with fair and accurate decision making against
the government interest in conserving administrative and fiscal resources. The
promotion of impartiality is thought to contribute to both fairness and accuracy
list of I I factors considered to be elements of a fair hearing-judicial review was placed
last. Friendly, supra note 43, at 1278-95.
69. 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
70. See discussion infra part IV.B.
71. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 190.
72. Id. at 191.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 195, 200.
75. Id. at 195.
76. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). This line of cases
suggests that a procedure allowing an individual with a financial stake in the outcome of a
health care benefit determination (e.g., an insurance carrier, a treating physician) to function
in a quasi-judicial capacity in evaluating claims could run afoul of the Due Process Clause.
But see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (general economic interest in subject
matter of dispute not enough to disqualify decision maker where no disciplinary proceeding
is underway).
77. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-71.
78. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975).
79. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977).
[Vol. 72:2
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
in decision making.
C. Objectives of Administrative Procedure: Fairness, Accuracy, and
Efficiency
Clear and consistent definitions of accuracy, fairness, and efficiency are
difficult to discern from either case law or commentaries addressing issues of
administrative due process. In fact, the task of defining administrative objec-
tives, such as accuracy, fairness, and efficiency is a necessary first step in
determining what contributes to their pursuit."0 In one of his early works in
this area, Mashaw defined accuracy as "the correspondence of the substantive
outcome of an adjudication with the true facts of the claimant's situation and
with an appropriate application of the relevant legal rules to those facts. Accu-
racy is thus the substantive ideal; approachable but never fully attainable.""1
Mashaw argues that in contexts where there is no objective external standard
for accuracy, "[tihe nearest approximation to an index of accuracy is consis-
tency in adjudication: if like cases are being treated alike by state agencies,
then claimants are at least receiving formal justice through the existing proce-
dures. In a closed hierarchal structure with no external referents consistency
and accuracy tend to merge." 2 He points out, however, that an emphasis on a
sole criterion such as accuracy tends in practice to "dwarf soft variables" such
as perceived justice and fairness, which are difficult to quantify."
Efficiency, on the other hand, results when an administrative system accu-
rately adjudicates claims for benefits in a cost-effective and timely manner. 4
Administrative costs often are seen as the least problematic costs to assess in
an adjudicatory system because they are easily measurable and can be ex-
pressed in money terms.85
Definitions of fairness often focus on "the degree to which the process of
making claims determinations tends to produce accurate decisions." 6 Note
80. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILI-
TY CLAIMS 195 (1983).
81. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 774-75.
82. Jerry L. Mashaw. The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 28, 44 (1976). Mashaw argues that oral evidentiary hearings are unlikely to
improve accuracy or consistency in decision making when adjudications are mostly concerned
with difficult value judgments. Such decisions elude objective verification and truly can be
legitimized only by authority or consent. Consent is obviously preferred in a democracy.
Accordingly, Mashaw argues that oral hearings provide the procedural approximation to con-
sent by allowing full participation in the decision making process. Id. at 45.
83. Id. at 48.
84. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 775; MASHAW, supra note 80, at 79-85.
85. MASHAW, supra note 80, at 98. Mashaw believes that administrative costs can cause
serious problems when they are "shifted or traded off against other costs that are neither
measurable nor monetizable." Id. A central thesis of this article is that so called "soft vari-
ables" such as "fairness" and "justice" can be quantified through the use of social science
methods.
86. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 775. Mashaw acknowledges later in the same article that
fairness involves more than accuracy in decision making in some contexts and must be "ap-
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that this definition emphasizes objective aspects of procedural fairness, but
does not encompass subjective aspects of fairness, such as the degree to which
claimants perceive that they were treated fairly. However, Professor Rand
Rosenblatt suggests:
[I]t is important to remember that the value of consumer participation
and agency explanation does not lie solely in the opportunity to se-
cure a different outcome .... [T]he right to be heard from, and the
right to be told why ... express the elementary idea that to be a
person, rather than a thing, is at least to be consulted about what is
done with one." Expressed in political terms, this root concept of
human dignity highlights the need for a reconstruction of the demo-
cratic process, in which consultation over fundamental human needs
is not made meaningless by a labyrinthine bureaucracy.87
This perspective seems to recognize and acknowledge the psychological
importance of voicing one's concerns, independent of whether the expression
has any influence on the ultimate decision made. It also suggests that fairness
involves something more than accuracy in decision making or a desirable
outcome."s As will be discussed below, this view has received considerable
support from social science research.89
Along similar lines, Mashaw has proposed a "dignitary theory" of due
process which focuses "on the degree to which decisional processes preserve
and enhance human dignity and self-respect."' The theory is grounded in the
perspective that "the effects of process on participants, not just the rationality
of substantive results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of public
decision making."9 Mashaw acknowledged early social science research by
Thibaut and Walker92 which demonstrated that "people seek to maximize
their personal involvement in decisional processes and that they gauge the
fairness of processes by the degree of that participation."9 However, Mashaw
praised by an independent evaluation of the process elements of adjudication," including a
supplementary check on the procedures and routines used to bring relevant information before
the decision maker. Id. at 797.
87. Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 264 (1978) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 19, § 10-7, at 666) (foot-
note deleted).
88. See Summers, supra note 38, at I (arguing for the importance of evaluating not
only the results of a legal process, but the process itself). Summers distinguishes between
result efficacy and process values, suggesting that
a law-applying process that is procedurally rational, humane, and respectful of indi-
vidual dignity and personal privacy is good in those respects as a process, quite
apart from whether it is also an efficacious means to good results (just convictions,
just acquittals, etc.). For procedural rationality, humanity, and regard for dignity and
privacy are 'process values.'
Id. at 3.
89. See infra part lI.B.
90. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981).
91. Id.
92. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975).
93. Mashaw, supra note 90, at 887.
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was critical of this empirical research and suggested that their work may
"merely demonstrate that we generally regard control or the opportunity for
personal strategic behavior as the best protection for our substantive con-
cerns."' He went on to acknowledge, however, that people seem to value
participation in the political process for its own sake and speculated that this
may be true for other processes as well. 5 This hunch has been borne out by
recent social science research which will be discussed and analyzed in Section
II.
Although evidence that people intrinsically value the opportunity to voice
their concerns and to be heard may encourage legislators to adopt or develop
statutory schemes that take this into consideration, the more difficult issue
from a jurisprudential standpoint is finding a constitutional justification for the
protection of such process values. Mashaw suggested that a dignitary perspec-
tive moves in this direction.
He based his analysis on a family of theories he called "the "liberal tradi-
tion," which has at its core the notion that "individuals are the basic unit of
moral and political value."' Mashaw drew on the works of Immanuel Kant
whose second formulation of the categorical imperative is seen as the core
value of liberal thought and a basis for a dignitary approach to due process.
This formulation commands that each person should be treated as an end,
never merely as a means to an end.97 Thus, participation is seen as a process
by which individuals are treated as ends in themselves.
Kant's categorical imperative provides an aspirational goal but falls short
of specifying defined limits on process claims. According to Mashaw, John
Rawls attempted to render Kant more determinate in his book, A Theory of
Justice."5 Rawls proposed two basic principles of justice. The first principle
requires strict equality with respect to basic liberties, which include universal
suffrage with majority rule, freedom of conscience, speech, assembly, and
freedom from arbitrary arrests. Infringements of these basic liberties are per-
mitted only when such infringements increase the amount of liberty experi-
enced by everyone." Rawls' second principle of justice requires: "(a) that
inequalities be attached to positions and offices available to all under condi-
tions of fair equality of opportunity and (b) that advances in the position of
better-off persons be limited by the requirement that the position of the worst-
off be maximized."'
Drawing on Rawls' work, Mashaw outlined a constitutional strategy for
94. Id.
95. Id. at 888.
96. Id. at 907. Professor Cynthia Farina has suggested that one of the major problems
with the due process doctrine is its focus and emphasis on the autonomy of isolated individ-
uals rather than on the nature of the relationship between people and the government. Farina,
supra note 61, at 191.
97. Mashaw, supra note 90, at 913 (citing 1. KANT, FOUNDATION OF THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 39 (L. Beck trans. 1959) (ist ed. Riga 1785)).
98. Id. at 917 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)).
99. Id. at 917-18.
100. Id. at 918.
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implementing dignitary values which includes a two-tier hierarchy of process
values. The first tier includes basic process values such as equality, minimal
rationality, and privacy. These values are seen as having strong claims to
constitutional protection via judicial review. A second tier of derivative values,
including "individualization" and "direct participation," "present prima facie
constitutional claims for realization.''. These derivative claims can be bal-
anced against competing values and defeated on the basis of the necessary
trade-off among competing values. Although these derivative claims may have
weak constitutional status, they may nonetheless serve as powerful guides to
statutory construction. 2
Overall, although Mashaw makes a legitimate case for the constitutional
status of dignitary interests, he acknowledges that liberal theory fails to pro-
vide "a robust vision of process values.""' Other commentators have come
to share this pessimistic view of the constitutional status of human dignitary
interests."° As will be discussed below, however, even in the absence of
strong constitutional justifications for protecting process rights, there is a long
line of social science research which suggests that there are important policy
justifications for insuring that process rights are acknowledged and enforced
by statute in health care reform legislation.
D. Models of Administrative Justice
In Bureaucratic Justice, Mashaw outlines three models of due process and
bureaucratic justice that have implications for the development of a procedural
framework to guide the administrative review process: (1) professional treat-
ment, (2) moral judgment, and (3) bureaucratic rationality.0 5 Mashaw asserts
that the "justice" of an administrative decision is evaluated in terms of "those
qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for the acceptability of
its decision."" For example, proponents of the professional treatment model
adopt the view that decisions should provide appropriate support or treatment
from the perspective of relevant professional cultures. Advocates of the moral
judgment model, on the other hand, believe that the fairness and acceptability
of decisions should be assessed in light of traditional trial-like processes for
determining individual entitlement. Finally, proponents of the bureaucratic
model argue that decisions should be accurate and efficient realizations of the
101. Id. at 924-25.
102. Id. at 925.
103. id. at 930.
104. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 61, at 216 (discussing inconsistency between the
individual's dignitary interests in consent based on free choice, and the individual's potential
decision to seek freely benefits from the government in spite of the fact that process rights
and dignitary interests are not respected). Professor Farina critiques procedural due process
jurisprudence in general, pointing out "its schizophrenic dependence upon and rejection of the
dictates of the legislature, its simultaneous overprotection and underproduction of interactions
between people and their government, its contorted view of the value of process." Id. at 190.
105. MASHAW, shupra note 80, at 23-25.
106. Id. at 24-25.
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legislative will.'0 '
The professional judgment model is reflected in our current health care
decision making and delivery system and is based on the goal of patient satis-
faction with service delivery. Under this approach, the primary value to be
served by the medical professional is the elimination of a patient's health
complaints, which involves both objective and subjective considerations. For
example, Mashaw contends:
Curing a patient by eliminating a physically identifiable pathology
may be good science, but if the patient still feels sick it is not good
medicine. The objective is to wield the science so that it produces
good as defined by the patient. This entails interpersonal and diagnos-
tic intuition-clinical intelligence-as well as scientific knowl-
edge.
08
An administrative system for health care coverage based on professional
treatment would, therefore, be client-oriented. It would seek to provide those
services that particular clients need to improve their well-being. Treatment is
tailored to the physician's resources: some patients are rejected or given less
attention so that others, who are more needy, may be given more help. In the
professional treatment model, the physician:
combines the information of others with his or her own observations
and experience to reach conclusions that are as much art as science.
Moreover, judgment is always subject to revision as conditions
change, as attempted therapy proves unsatisfactory or therapeutic
successes emerge. The application of clinical judgment entails a rela-
tionship and may involve repeated instances of service-oriented deci-
sion making."°
Under this approach to administration, "[s]ubstantive and procedural rules,
hierarchical controls, and efficiency considerations would all be subordinated
to the norms of the professional culture."" Overall, the legitimating value of
this approach is client service and the primary goal is client satisfaction. More-
over, the ongoing nature of the relationship between patient and physician is
emphasized.
In contrast, the moral judgment model is most similar to civil or criminal
trials and is concerned primarily with the ability of individuals to assert their
rights to benefits.' The process involves individual determinations to de-
cide, on balance, who is to be preferred in the context of conflicting and com-
peting interests. Mashaw asserts:
This entitlement-awarding goal of the moral judgment model
gives an obvious and distinctive cast to the basic issue of adjudicatory
resolution. The issue is the deservingness of some or all of the parties
107. Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 27.
109. Id. at 28.
110. Id.
III. Id. at 21.
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in the context of certain events, transactions, or relationships that give
rise to a claim.
The... "justice" of this model inheres in its promise of a full
and equal opportunity to obtain one's entitlements."'
The overall legitimating value of the moral judgment model is fairness, and
the primary goal is conflict resolution." 3
Accuracy and cost-effectiveness of claims processing are at the heart of
the bureaucratic model. Mashaw summarizes this approach as follows:
A system focused on correctness defines the questions presented
to it by implementing decisions in essentially factual and technocratic
terms. Individual adjudicators must be concerned about the facts in
the real world that relate to the truth or falsity of the [claim]. At a
managerial level the question becomes technocratic: What is the least-
cost methodology for collecting and combining those facts about
claims that will reveal the proper decision? To illustrate by contrast,
this model would exclude questions of value or preference as obvi-
ously irrelevant to the administrative task, and it would view reliance
on nonreplicable, nonreviewable judgment or intuition as a singularly
unattractive methodology for decision. The legislature should have
previously decided the value questions ....
From the perspective of bureaucratic rationality, administrative
justice is accurate decision making carried on through processes ap-
propriately rationalized to take account of costs." '
Thus, the legitimating values of this approach are obviously accuracy and
efficiency and the primary goal is program implementation.
Overall, each of the models proposed by Mashaw is associated to varying
degrees with each of the distinct yet overlapping objectives of administrative
procedures: fair, accurate and efficient decision making. Fairness and accuracy
in decision making also have been the subject of considerable social science
research on procedural justice. In fact, the moral judgment model's emphasis
on fairness from the patients' standpoint has much in common with the social
science research on subjective aspects of procedural justice. Likewise, parallels
exist between the bureaucratic justice model's emphasis on accuracy in deci-
sion making and empirical research on objective aspects of procedural justice.
These issues will be addressed more fully in Section III.
On a more systemic level, Mashaw has argued that the elements of proce-
dural fairness usually associated with due process in traditional adjudicatory
proceedings may be inadequate to produce fairness in social welfare claims
adjudications. As a result, adjudication in this context may require a broader
112. Id. at 30-31.
113. Id. at 31.
114. Id. at 25-26.
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conceptualization of due process." 5 Mashaw argues that
the purposes, necessary modes of operation, and clientele of social
welfare programs so severely limit the value of procedural safeguards
and appellate checks in assuring accurate and timely adjudication of
social welfare claims that there is a need for additional safeguards on
the integrity of this very important segment of the administrative
process." 6
The development of a management system for assuring adjudication quality in
claims processing is one such additional safeguard.
The inadequacies of traditional adversary procedures include the excessive
opportunities they provide for obfuscation, delay, and high costs which may
impede access to the adversary process." 7 These problems have led to in-
creased acceptance of positive case management as a legitimate strategy for
achieving fair, accurate, and cost-effective results. This reflects a shift in focus
from "passive judicial reliance on adversary processes and toward positive
judicial management of adjudication.""' This change in focus is based in
part on the notion that social welfare claims center on a determination of
eligibility for statutorily created benefits rather than on conflict resolution
between disputing parties." 9 Moreover, claims adjudicators are more likely
than judges to be engaged in the affirmative implementation of specified legis-
lative policies. Overall, due process analysis has become increasingly con-
cerned with systemic effects rather than individual injustices and has taken on
a more managerial orientation.'2 1 Some commentators have suggested that
this shift is in part a response to the "practical needs of the modern adminis-
trative state."'-'
The development of a management system of quality assurance to supple-
ment traditional procedural safeguards requires the establishment of standards
and the evaluation of performance against those standards. Corrective action is
then required to upgrade substandard performance. 22 Different standards
may be established for the same procedural objective in different administra-
tive contexts. Thus, the specific standards of accuracy, fairness, and efficiency
established in the health care context may be somewhat different from those
115. See Mashaw, supra note 16, at 775.
116. Id. at 775-76.
117. Id. at 776.
118. Id. at 779.
119. i. at 780. However, the relevance of this reasoning to the health care context is
limited. Cost-containment measures may directly pit the economic interests of health care
providers and insurers against the economic and health care interests of patients, creating a
conflict between disputing parties.
120. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 373 (1993). This systemic focus is reflect-
ed in the Supreme Court's assertion in Mathews that "procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth finding process as applied to the generality
of cases, not the rare exceptions." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344.
121. Fallon, supra note 120, at 373.
122. Mashaw, supra note 16, at 791.
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established in the context of a public assistance program. In general terms
though, accuracy in decision making requires the correct finding of facts and
the application of relevant program policies to those facts, as well as the exer-
cise of judgment. Fairness may overlap with accuracy but requires a supple-
mentary check on the "adjudicatory procedures and routines which are meant
to place the relevant facts, policies, and arguments before the adjudicator and
to facilitate sound decision making-things such as case development effort,
articulation of the bases for decisions, adequate notification of actions to the
claimant, and explanation of opportunities for appeal."'23 Finally, efficiency
may be quantified and assessed by the time spent in claims processing and
appeals and the administrative resources required for decision making (includ-
ing the number of levels of review in the appeals process, as well as the num-
ber of reviewers and their qualifications).
Quality assurance requires ongoing evaluation of decisions and the use of
appropriate sampling techniques to promote economy and efficiency. The
collection of information on the quality of adjudications should not be subject
to the control of the adjudicators whose decisions are being evaluated, and the
information collected should be useful to those in charge of improving claims
processing.' 24 However, such quality control procedures should not complete-
ly obviate the need for more traditional procedural protection given that man-
agement practices are directed at system level problems rather than the correc-
tion of individual decisions.'25 Presumably, however, the need and demand
for individualized appeals and judicial review will be reduced by effective
quality assurance procedures.
E. Judicial Review and Enforcement
Judicial review may nonetheless serve as an important check on the exer-
cise of authority by program administrators.'26 Federal judges in particular
have life tenure, which presumably enhances their ability to function in an
independent and objective manner. Courts currently apply various standards of
review, depending on the nature of the issues examined. The scope of review
"determines how far a court can go in overturning or remanding an agency
decision."' 27 Judicial review may involve questions of fact, questions of law,
and questions of law application. The standard of review varies across these
123. Id. at 797.
124. Id. at 803.
125. Id. at 804.
126. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Courts, Health Care Reform, and the Reconstruction of
American Social Legislation, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 439, 443 (1993) (suggesting
that courts perform at least three important functions in carrying out their rights-enforcing
role: "(1) a 'blocking function,' blocking illegal, often grossly illegal agency actions or refus-
als to act; (2) an 'unmasking function,' forcing into political daylight the gap between
statutory standards and agency structure and performance; and (3) a 'rationality function,'
requiring agencies to articulate their policies and explain them in relation to goals") (citations
omitted).
127. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.2
(1993).
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domains.
In on-the-record adjudicatory proceedings, courts typically apply the "sub-
stantial evidence test" to review agency fact finding."' s Substantial evidence
has come to mean "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.""1 9 Under this test, a court will affirm
an agency's finding of fact even if it would not have made the same decision
on its own, if substantial evidence in the record supports the agency's find-
ing."' Obviously, this is a highly deferential standard of review. Even more
deferential, at least in theory, is the arbitrary and capricious test used by courts
to review informal agency adjudications. 3' Because the substantial evidence
test is highly deferential in its own right, courts have found it difficult in
practice to explain the differences between the substantial evidence and arbi-
trary and capricious tests. The difference appears to be "too subtle to explain
in a manner that is useful to agencies, courts, or practitioners."'
On the other hand, courts engaging in de novo review can make their own
independent findings of fact in addition to examining the record below. The de
novo standard of review allows the court to weigh the facts and use its own
judgment to overrule findings with which it disagrees.'33
As a general matter, courts are more likely to take an independent ap-
proach to reviewing questions of law."3 However, "[t]he farther removed
one becomes from the text of a statute in determining the legality of agency
action, the more likely a court will defer to an agency's interpretation." ' In
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,'36 the Supreme Court
articulated the following two-step approach for reviewing questions of law:
If ... Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute .... Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute. 1
37
This test suggests that once some ambiguity is found in the statutory text,
the court is obliged to defer to an agency's permissible construction of the
statute. More recently, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,'38 the Supreme Court re-
treated somewhat from this highly deferential standard. The Court indicated
that a court must defer to the agency's interpretation only after traditional
128. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
129. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
130. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.4.
131. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
132. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 7, § 11.4.
133. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.6.
134. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 488-91 (1947).
135. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.7.2, at 467.
136. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
137. Id. at 843.
138. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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tools of statutory construction fail to provide an answer.'39 In any event,
these cases suggest that the best way to ensure the potency of judicial review
as an enforcement tool is to clearly spell out important legislative objectives in
the statutory language. 140
A specific standard of judicial review, such as de novo review or the
substantial evidence test, may be explicitly authorized by statute. 4' Although
de novo review may be most desirable from the standpoint of those who advo-
cate the moral judgment model, some courts and commentators have noted
that de novo review of cases already decided at the administrative level is a
costly and inefficient use of judicial resources.' Moreover, the shift to a
more systemic approach to due process means that courts increasingly review
administrative decisions with an eye toward ensuring the agency is acting
within the discretion granted to it by the legislature. 43 Thus, increasingly,
the court's main objective is not to second guess the outcome in a particular
case but to determine whether the process provided to claimants is fair. Not-
withstanding this shift in emphasis, the opportunity for judicial review may
have symbolic significance to claimants and contribute to public perceptions
that justice has been done.'" As a result, individuals who feel they do not
have adequate access to the courts may perceive that they are receiving second
class justice.
The next question becomes how much judicial review is necessary or
desirable in the health care context. The answer here may depend partly on the
nature and structure of the claims processing system established to review
denied claims. If dispute resolution procedures are put in place between claim-
ants and the courts to insure that fair and accurate decisions are made in a cost
139. See id. at 446-48.
140. See Rosenblatt, supra note 87, at 366 n.421 ("Indeed, one of the major lessons of
the health care reform experience is that Congress should define explicit standards and reme-
dies in future legislation seeking to benefit unorganized interests.").
141. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 127, § 13.6, at 459.
142. Id. § 13.1, at 436. Given that cost-containment is a primary consideration in the
national health care reform debate, proposals to provide for de novo judicial review of all
denied health care claims are not likely to be politically viable. However, given the fact that
particular standards of review may be established by statute, it may be possible to propose a
standard that offers most of the benefits of de novo review (including the ability to chal-
lenge assertively decisions denying health care claims in a responsible manner), without in-
curring the costs associated with re-trying the entire matter.
For example, judicial review of factual matters could be based on an independent
judicial reexamination of the record rather than a mere determination of whether the adminis-
trative findings are supported by substantial evidence. The court could be authorized by
statute to reach its own legal and factual conclusions based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence on the record. New factual disputes could be remanded to the administrative body for
resolution. The modified record would then be subject to independent judicial review, if
necessary. This approach would put more teeth into the judicial review process without bur-
dening the courts with the obligation of completely re-trying appealed cases.
143. See Fallon, supra note 120, at 336.
144. This is obviously an empirical question that deserves more systematic study. It is
possible that the significance and symbolic value of judicial review may be somewhat inflat-
ed in the minds of the legally trained.
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effective manner, the need and demand for more costly judicial review is
likely to decline. If a legally and publicly acceptable system is established,
then the courts will serve their function primarily by overseeing the integrity
of the system. If an adequate system is not established, then more judicial
scrutiny will be required by law and demanded by the public. Such increased
demands could overwhelm judicial resources, particularly regarding the review
of claims under a health care system with increased incentives for reducing the
utilization of costly services. In any event, the development and continued
refinement of grievance and appeal procedures for reviewing health care claim
denials should be informed by the growing body of social science research on
procedural justice and dispute resolution.
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A PSYCHOSOCIAL ANALYSIS
A. Background and Theory
The emergence of procedural justice as a field of social science research
is usually traced to the publication in 1975 of Procedural Justice: A Psycho-
logical Analysis by Thibaut and Walker.'45 It was a seminal effort to apply
social-psychological methods to the assessment of fundamental differences
between the adversary and inquisitorial decision making procedures followed
by American and certain European courts, respectively. The book provided an
empirically based analysis of theoretical issues in legal procedure.'46 In re-
viewing this early work, Professor Tom Tyler, a behavioral scientist who has
expanded on this line of investigation, points out:
Thibaut and Walker's treatment of procedural justice involved
attention to both subjective and objective issues. On the subjective
level, they suggested that citizens preferred the adversary system,
which they felt was procedurally fairer. This heightened perception of
fairness, in turn, led them to be more willing to accept verdicts ar-
rived at following the adversary procedure. Thibaut and Walker also
initially asserted that the adversary system was fairer on objective
grounds. They later modified this position to suggest that the adver-
sary system was more likely to lead to decisions that those involved
would feel were fair, while the inquisitorial system was better at
finding "truth."' 47
Thibaut and Walker proposed a general theory of procedure for dispute
resolution in varied legal contexts, including civil, criminal, and administrative
proceedings.'48 They characterized "truth seeking" and "distributive justice"
as the primary objectives of dispute resolution, recognizing the apparent di-
145. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92. For a comprehensive review of procedural
justice research, see Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice Research, I SOC. JUST. RES. 41
(1987).
146. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92, at 5.
147. Tyler, supra note 145, at 42 (citation omitted).
148. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541,
542 (1978).
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chotomy and potential conflict between these objectives.'49 The distribution
of control over the decision making process was considered to be the most
important factor in characterizing a procedural system." Moreover, they
made a distinction between control over the decision and control over the
process. Decision control reflects "the degree to which any one of the partici-
pants may unilaterally determine the outcome of the dispute."'' Process con-
trol "refers to control over the development and selection of information that
will constitute the basis for resolving the dispute."'52 Both decision and pro-
cess control can be in the hands of either a third party (e.g., a judge or arbitra-
tor) or the disputants.
An autocratic system, that is, a system which delegates both process and
decision control to a disinterested third party, was considered by Thibaut and
Walker to produce the most accurate results.'53 On the other hand, proce-
dures that assign process control to the disputants were considered more likely
to foster the idea that "justice" has been done."M Thibaut and Walker postu-
late that providing disputants with the opportunity to state their claim provides
the best assurance that the process will be perceived as fair and the ultimate
decision accepted as being justly decided, regardless of whether the outcome is
favorable.' 5 They suggest, however, that when rules and standards become
more precise, the decision maker's function becomes "less directed toward
justice and more directed toward truth."'
56
149. Id. at 541-42. According to Thibaut and Walker, truth seeking is associated with
accuracy in decision making and distributive justice is associated with the fair apportionment
of outcomes. Id. "In conflicts about the most accurate view of reality, such as scientific dis-
putes, the objective is to determine the truth according to a standard." Id. at 541. They
"suggest that an autocratic procedure is most likely to attain this objective." Id. On the other
hand, "[clonflicts about the apportionment of outcomes, such as inconsistent claims to the
division of assets or losses, are best resolved with the aim of achieving distributive justice."
Id. at 541-42. They use the term autocratic procedure to mean one in which the decision
maker has a high degree of control over the gathering of information and the ultimate deci-
sion reached. Id. at 546-47; see also John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974).
150. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 148, at 546.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 547 & n.15.
154. Id. at 548-49.
155. Id. at 551.
156. Id. at 553. Thibaut and Walker acknowledge that many disputes involve a high de-
gree of conflict over both truth (characterized as a cognitive conflict) and justice
(characterized as a conflict of interest). They propose a two-staged approach to such mixed
disputes. The first stage focuses on truth seeking and resolving issues of fact; the second
stage focuses on resolving policy questions. During the initial phase, procedures for resolving
issues of fact must resolve the cognitive conflict in spite of a continuing conflict of interest.
Therefore, Thibaut and Walker suggest that total decision control should be allocated to a
third party at the initial stage. Furthermore, the decision maker should be allocated a degree
of process control, given the truth seeking objective of the first stage. Some process control
must be retained by the disputants at this stage because the conflict of interest inherent in
the relationship between them remains, even though the explicit goal at this stage is to re-
solve the cognitive aspects of the dispute. According to Thibaut and Walker, the decision
control of the third party must be strong in the initial phase. At the second stage, questions
[Vol. 72:2
NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
Thibaut and Walker's work has spawned a great deal of empirical re-
search on the topic of procedural justice. The remainder of this section will
examine the subjective and objective elements of procedural justice that have
been the focus of empirical investigation by behavioral and social scientists.
B. Subjective Procedural Justice
Recent empirical research has focused on using quantitative methods to
assess subjective aspects of procedural justice. Subjective procedural justice is
defined as "the capacity of each procedure to enhance the fairness judgments
of those who encounter procedures."" 7 As mentioned above, Thibaut and
Walker postulated in their early work that the main ingredient of procedural
justice is the optimal distribution of control between the disputants and the
third party decision maker. They proposed that the "distribution of control
constitutes the basic variable or dimension for analyzing, comparing, and
assessing the justice of all forms of dispute resolution, legal and nonlegal.'
58
The first generation of empirical studies conducted by Thibaut and Walker
revealed the following with respect to subjective factors. First, when disputants
are allowed to choose among methods of dispute resolution that differ in the
degree of third-party control over the decision or outcome of the dispute, most
study participants preferred arbitration or trial-like procedures, followed in
order by mediation, autocratic third-party decision making, and bargaining
procedures. Preferences move toward increased third-party (e.g., judge) control
when the dispute involves a high degree of conflict, when a clear standard is
present, and when there is time pressure.'59 Second, Thibaut and Walker
identified a general preference among study participants for adversary over
inquisitorial procedures. Adversary representation induced greater trust and
satisfaction with the procedure and produced greater satisfaction with the judg-
ment, independent of the favorableness of the judgment to the participant."6
Third, participant satisfaction with the procedure, perceived fairness of the
procedure, and satisfaction with the opportunity to present evidence all in-
creased as procedural methods moved from the inquisitorial to the ad-
versarial. 6' Moreover, greater opportunity to present evidence was associated
with higher levels of perceived fairness and satisfaction.'62 Finally, subjects
involving social values would then be left to procedures that allow for the weighing and
balancing of policy considerations and other relevant factors. Id. at 563-65.
For example, if questions of medical science are at issue, the decision maker should
be a health care expert (or a panel of experts) who is fully able to evaluate competently the
particular claims in dispute. Legally trained generalists typically would not meet these stan-
dards. Moreover, representatives should be health care experts, not necessarily legal advo-
cates. See id. at 564.
157. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 3-4 (1988).
158. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92, at 2.
159. Id. at 14-15.
160. Id. at 80.
161. Id. at 94.
162. Id. at 88-89.
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who were placed behind a "veil of ignorance" (in that they were kept unaware
of whether they were advantaged or disadvantaged by the evidence in their
case) judged adversary procedures "to be the most preferable and the fairest
mode of dispute resolution.""' Even those who were informed about the evi-
dence in their case (i.e., placed in front of the veil of ignorance) preferred
adversary procedures and judged them to be most fair."M
More recently, in summarizing a second generation of empirical research,
Tom Tyler concluded that procedural justice studies consistently demonstrate
that "people are as concerned with the fairness of the way decisions are made
as they are with the fairness of those decisions."'6 "Procedural justice has
been found to be important across methods, areas of study, consequences, and
situational variations."'" Moreover, procedural justice research has expanded
into alternative dispute resolution settings.'67 In reviewing this work, Tyler
suggests that litigants are very concerned with receiving fair process in resolv-
ing their disputes. "Often, however, litigants' conceptions of fair process differ
from the need to have a formal trial and can be accommodated in informal
dispute resolution settings. Typically litigants want a chance to state their
grievance before a neutral third party who will consider their position and
make a decision."'6
Tyler points out that Thibaut and Walker interpreted their research results
to suggest that when parties must surrender a significant amount of decision
control to another, they nevertheless seek to maintain it indirectly by maximiz-
ing control over the presentation of their case to the decision maker. 69 This
type of control is referred to as process control or "voice" and reflects an in-
strumental view of process control where voice is used to maximize outcome
control. "Others have argued that people intrinsically value the opportunity to
state their case, irrespective of whether what they say influences what the
decision maker does. This has been referred to as a value-expressive perspec-
tive on voice."" T
According to Tyler, recent research comparing instrumental and value
expressive perspectives on voice indicates that litigants generally focus more
on process control than on decision control. Disputants find the expression of
their side of the argument to have value in itself, particularly when they are
assured that their arguments are given adequate consideration by the decision
maker.' Even those who receive unfavorable outcomes are more likely to
perceive the process as fair if the decision maker articulates the basis and
rationale for the adverse decision.'72 Overall, the research suggests that
163. See id. at 113-15.
164. hI.
165. Tyler, supra note 145, at 41.
166. I. at 43.
167. Id. at 44.
168. Id. at 45 (citations omitted).
169. id. at 52.
170. I.
171. Id.
172. I. at 52-53.
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"there is more to process fairness than simply the fairness of the outcomes a
procedure produces."'7 As will be discussed further below, disputants also
value being treated with dignity and respect.
Gerald S. Leventhal proposed a multidimensional framework for concep-
tualizing justice which distinguishes between outcomes and procedures and
proposed the following six rules of fair procedure: (1) consistency (across
persons and time), (2) suppression of biases (impartiality), (3) accuracy of
information (quality of decision), (4) correctability (availability of appeal pro-
cedures), (5) representation or "voice" (the amount of access to or input into
all stages of the decision-making process), and (6) ethicality (the extent to
which the decision-making procedure is compatible with the fundamental
moral and ethical values accepted by the individual, including the desire to be
treated with dignity and respect).
7 4
Initial empirical tests of Leventhal's model demonstrated that across dif-
ferent types of situations involving allocation decisions, subjective appraisals
of the following factors contributed most to judgments and perceptions of
procedural fairness: consistency (across persons), accuracy of information,
ethicality (dignified, respectful treatment), and bias suppression. That is, indi-
viduals who perceived the decision making process to be more consistent,
accurate, respectful of personal dignity, and impartial viewed the overall pro-
cess as being more fair. The most surprising finding was that correctability or
the opportunity for appeal was not a very important factor in individuals'
perceptions of procedural justice. Consistency in treatment across persons
emerged as a particularly important determinant of subjective appraisals of
procedural fairness.'75
Tyler combined the criteria identified by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and
Leventhal (1980) to examine procedural justice in the context of citizen expe-
riences with the police and courts. 76 Tyler noted that Thibaut and Walker's
process control and decision control criteria are compatible with Leventhal's
173. Id. at 56.
174. Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches
to the Study of Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEO-
RY AND RESEARCH 27 (Kenneth J. Gergen et al. eds.. 1980). Leventhal defines a justice rule
as "an individual's belief that a distribution of outcomes, or procedure for distributing out-
comes, is fair and appropriate when it satisfies certain criteria." Id. at 30. He describes two
categories of justice rules: distribution rules and procedure rules.
A distribution rule is defined as the individual's belief that it is fair and
appropriate when rewards, punishments, or resources are distributed in accordance
with certain criteria. A specific criterion might require the matching of rewards to
contributions, or matching rewards to needs, or dividing rewards equally. Thus a
contributions rule, needs rule, and equality rule are among the major distributive
rules that can influence an individual's perception of distributive fairness ...
. . A procedural rule is defined as an individual's belief that allocative
procedures which satisfy certain criteria are fair and appropriate.
Id.
175. Edith Barrett-Howard & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Alloca-
tion Decisions, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 296, 300 (1986).
176. Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103, 106 (1988).
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representation criterion. He therefore combined measures of decision and
process control into a single index measuring representation.' Tyler also as-
sessed separately the following three facets of Leventhal's impartiality criteri-
on: honesty, effort to be fair, and lack of bias.' Thus, Tyler used the fol-
lowing eight criteria to assess judgments of procedural fairness: (1) representa-
tion, (2) consistency, (3) lack of bias, (4) honesty, (5) effort to be fair, (6)
quality of decisions, (7) correctability, and (8) ethicality.'
Tyler evaluated the importance of these procedural justice criteria by
examining the relationship between citizens' appraisals of their experiences on
each criterion and their overall judgments about whether they were fairly
treated.8 He conducted two types of analysis. In the first, he determined the
simple correlation between each criterion and overall judgments about proce-
dural fairness. The following seven criteria were significantly correlated with
judgments of procedural fairness: effort to be fair, ethicality, representation,
honesty, lack of bias, quality of decisions, and consistency. Correctability was
the only criterion that was not significantly related to judgments of procedural
fairness. "'
In the second analysis, Tyler used multiple regression analysis to deter-
mine the relative importance of each criterion in predicting procedural fair-
ness.' 8 2 The results of the multiple regression analysis revealed that seven of
the eight procedural justice criteria examined made an independent contribu-
tion to overall assessments of procedural fairness-consistency was the only
criterion that did not make an independent contribution to judgments of proce-
dural fairness when all the other criteria were considered simultaneously. 3
However, the citizen experiences studied by Tyler included a wide range of
177. Id. at 104-06.
178. See id. at 128-31.
179. Id. at 103.
180. Id. at 121.
181. Id. at 121-22. The Pearson correlation coefficients between overall judgments of
procedural fairness and each of the eight procedural justice criteria were as follows: effort to
be fair (r = .71), ethicality (r = .69), representation (r = .62), honesty (r = .59), lack of
bias (r = .43), quality of decisions (r = .37), consistency (r = .32), and correctability (r =
.04, p < .05) which was the only criterion that was not significantly related to judgments of
procedural fairness. See id. at 122.
182. See id. at 121.
183. i. at 121-23. In the multiple regression analysis, Tyler "computed the beta weight
for an equation in which all the criteria were entered simultaneously. This latter number
indicates the independent contribution of each factor." The results of the regression analysis
revealed the following: sixty-nine percent of the variance in citizen judgments about proce-
dural fairness was explained by the procedural justice criteria examined. The respective beta
weights (B) for the seven procedural justice criteria which made an independent contribution
(p < .01) to overall assessments of procedural fairness were as follows: the efforts of author-
ities to be fair (B = .30), their honesty (B = .23), whether their behavior was consistent
with ethical standards of dignity and respect (B = .21), whether opportunities for representa-
tion were given (B = .17), quality of decisions made (B = .17), correctability (B = .14), and
lack of bias (B = .07). The beta weight for consistency, which did not make an independent
contribution to judgments of procedural fairness when all the other criteria were considered
simultaneously, was .04. See id. at 122.
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formal and informal interactions with police and the courts, only some of
which could be characterized as disputes. Tyler suggested that the lack of con-
sistency effects found here "might stem from the fact that most of the
respondents' experiences were not disputes between contending parties.""'
In fact, Tyler found that consistency did matter more when disputes were
involved. When only disputes were examined, consistency did make an inde-
pendent contribution to judgments of fairness.' For disputes, the following
specific criteria made independent contributions in predicting overall judgment
of fairness: representation, ethicality, quality of decision, honesty, and consis-
tency. Again, opportunity for appeal was not an important or statistically sig-
nificant factor in citizens' perceptions of procedural fairness in the context of
dispute resolution. Representation or "voice" emerged as the most important
factor, followed by the desire to be treated ethically and with respect.86
C. Objective Procedural Justice
Objective procedural justice is defined as "the capacity of a procedure to
conform to normative standards of justice, to make either the decisions them-
selves or the decision-making process more fair by, for example, reducing
some clearly unacceptable bias or prejudice."'87 Thus, objective procedural
justice is consistent with one of the primary objectives of bureaucratic models
of justice-accuracy in decision making. As both legal scholars and social
scientists have pointed out, one of the major challenges in attempting to evalu-
ate procedures against objective criteria is the difficulty in identifying or estab-
lishing relevant objective standards. 88 Notwithstanding this challenge, some
important advances have been made in illuminating procedural characteristics
that promote accuracy in decision making. This body of research has been
published in some of the most distinguished law reviews and social science
journals.
The work of Thibaut, Walker and their colleagues is illustrative. They
studied the capacity of adversary and inquisitorial procedures to minimize
pretrial bias and to maximize the amount and accuracy of information consid-
ered by the decision maker. 9 They primarily addressed whether adversary
184. Id. at 127.
185. See id. at 126-27.
186. Id. at 125-27; see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 108 (presenting this data
clearly in table format). For disputes, the significant beta weights (p < .05) in descending
order of magnitude were as follows: representation (B = .38), ethicality (B = .21), quality of
decision (B = .16), honesty (B = .15), and consistency (B = .12). The beta weight for
correctability, which was not statistically significant, was .04 (p > .05). Id. Although the
results reported by Lind & Tyler apparently summarize the same material described above by
Tyler at pages 126 and 127, there are two minor discrepancies: the results reported by Tyler
at page 126 fail to indicate the significance of the quality of decision beta weight and indi-
cate a beta weight of .08 for correctability rather than the .04 beta weight reported in Lind
& Tyler.
187. LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 3.
188. Id. at 19; see also Mashaw, supra note 82, at 44.
189. John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision making, 86
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or inquisitorial presentation of evidence in the subsequent test case would
decrease prior expectancy bias by leading decision makers to rely less on their
past experiences and more on the particular facts of the case immediately
before them."9 The results revealed that subjects with prior biasing experi-
ences who were exposed to new evidence by adversary procedures relied less
on their prior experiences than those in the inquisitorial condition. Thus, ad-
versary presentation apparently contributes to decreased bias and increased
decision making accuracy by reducing decision maker reliance on prior expec-
tancies. "i'
In another study, Lind, Thibaut and Walker investigated whether the use
of adversarial versus inquisitorial procedures influenced the amount and accu-
racy of information ultimately presented to legal decision makers.'92 Law
students who were assigned the role of adversarial attorney were instructed to
present their client's case in a way that would result in the most favorable
outcome for their client. Other law students who were assigned the role of an
inquisitorial attorney were instructed to present their evidence in a manner that
would be most helpful to the judge in making a just determination.'93
Generally, adversary and inquisitorial attorneys gathered about the same
number of facts. However, when the facts disfavored the attorney's client,
attorneys in the adversary role engaged in more diligent search for facts that
supported their client's position. When the evidence in the ca e was either
balanced or favored the attorney's client, there were no differen es between
adversary and inquisitorial attorneys in terms of the number of facts they
sought; both adversary and inquisitorial attorneys tended to present evidence to
the decision maker that reflected the true nature of the case. When the weight
of the evidence was against their client, adversary attorneys presented evidence
biased in favor of the disadvantaged client."9 Thus, the adversary model re-
sulted in a bias that made unbalanced cases look more balanced than they
really were.
Other research by Sheppard and Vidmar has demonstrated that witnesses'
subsequent testimony is influenced by prior interviews with an adversary attor-
ney."9 Witnesses' subsequent testimony was found to be more supportive of
HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972); see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 19-21 (discussing
this study and related research).
190. See Thibaut et al., supra note 189, at 391-95.
191. Id. at 401.
192. Alan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and
Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (1973); see also LIND & TYLER, supra
note 157, at 22-25.
193. Lind et al., supra note 192, at 1132-33. Some of the students were given evidence
that was balanced evenly in terms of whether or not it supported their client's case. Others
were given evidence that favored one side or the other, with 75% of the evidence either
favoring or disfavoring their case, depending on whether they were assigned the favored or
unfavored condition. Thus, there were three conditions: balanced (50% favored-50%
disfavored), favored (75% favored-25% disfavored), and disfavored (25% favored-50%
disfavored). Id. at 1136-37.
194. Id. at 1138-39.
195. Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial
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the side represented by the adversary attorney who had interviewed them
previously. Prior interviewing by an inquisitorial attorney did not have a sig-
nificantly biasing effect on subsequent testimony."
Other studies also have examined accuracy/fairness trade-offs when com-
paring adversary and inquisitorial procedures. For example, Vidmar and Laird
studied the extent to which merely being called to testify by one side or the
other in an adversary trial biased witness testimony. 97 Subjects were shown
a slide presentation of an incident involving alleged assault.' Subjects were
divided into three groups and asked to testify about the incident as a witness
either for the plaintiff, the defense, or the court. Those testifying for the plain-
tiff clearly presented their testimony in a manner that favored the plaintiff;
similarly, the testimony of defense witnesses was more favorable to the de-
fense. Those testifying for the court presented the most balanced testimo-
ny. 199
The results also revealed that biased witness testimony had an influence
on judges' evaluations of the evidence. Judges viewed testimony provided by
witnesses testifying for the plaintiff as more favorable for the plaintiffs case.
Likewise, testimony provided by witnesses testifying for the defense was
perceived by judges as more favorable to the defendant's case.2' Thus,
merely being called by one side or the other in an adversary trial can bias
witness testimony and contribute to less accurate determinations by judges.
In sum, the empirical studies on objective aspects of procedural justice
reviewed above seem to raise the following policy dilemma: whether it is
preferable to choose procedures that are perceived as more fair and reduce the
decision maker's prior expectancy bias (i.e., adversary procedures) or to
choose those procedures that contribute most to presenting accurate informa-
tion to the decision maker (inquisitorial procedures).2"' However, recent re-
search suggests that the dichotomy between these idealized forms of dispute
resolution (i.e., adversary on the one hand, inquisitorial on the other) does not
fully reflect the complexity of procedures actually used for dispute resolution
Evidence: Effects of Lawyer's Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 320, 329 (1980); see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 114-16.
196. Sheppard & Vidmar, supra note 195, at 325.
197. Neil Vidmar & Nancy M. Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on
Witnesses' Communication of Evidence and the Assessments of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 888 (1983); see also LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 114-16.
198. Vidmar & Laird, supra note 197, at 891.
199. Id. at 893-95.
200. Id. Witnesses' own ratings of whether the evidence favored either the plaintiff or
defendant were not influenced by whether they were called by the plaintiff, the defendant, or
the court to testify. All witnesses rated the evidence as fairly balanced, with perhaps a small
but insignificant edge given to the plaintiffs side in the case. LIND & TYLER, supra note
157, at 116.
201. Lind & Tyler have argued that "we might find ways to allow free expression with-
out placing all aspects of evidence production in the hands of the disputants. Once such
hybrid procedures have been designed, additional research will be needed to determine
whether . . . the hybrid procedure retains the protection against prior-expectancy bias that ad-
versary procedures provide." LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 117.
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in varied judicial and administrative settings."2 For example, Sheppard stud-
ied individuals' preferences for adversary, inquisitorial, and hybrid procedures
(with combined adversary and inquisitorial features). The hybrid procedure
allowed disputants to fully express their arguments and evidence in the case,
but also allowed the judge to independently ask questions and seek out evi-
dence. The results revealed that subjects uniformly preferred adversary pro-
cedures over inquisitorial ones but had an even stronger preference for the
hybrid procedures.
Research by Sheppard and others suggests the feasibility of procedures
which balance the accuracy enhancing features of inquisitorial procedures and
the fairness enhancing potential of procedures that provide disputants with an
opportunity to voice their concerns This could be accomplished by allow-
ing claimants or disputants to present the evidence for their own case while
allowing the decision maker to independently seek out relevant information.
Finally, several recent studies of procedural justice have found that people
are more likely to accept negative outcomes from governmental institutions
without losing loyalty to those institutions if they believe that "decisions are
being made in a way that is procedurally [fair]." 2" That is, "procedural jus-
tice strongly influences institutional legitimacy and, through it, the acceptance
of institutional decisions."2 ' This line of research has obvious implications
202. See Blair H. Sheppard, Justice Is No Simple Matter: Case for Elaborating Our
Model of Procedural Fairness, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 953 (1985); see also
LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 86-87.
203. See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness,
and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 361 (1994)(studying hybrid
alternatives to the standard adversary trial procedure).
Similarly, research on witness credibility suggests that it may be desirable to allow
claimants the opportunity to present their case orally, while allowing medical experts and
other witnesses to provide written submissions. Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon, Fac-
tors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
169, 189-91 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982). Miller and Burgoon reviewed
research studies comparing different modes of testimony (live, written, video-tape, audio-tape)
in terms of their impact on observers' abilities to assess witness credibility and detect decep-
tion. Generally, observers were able to detect lying with about a 50% degree of accuracy.
There was no evidence to support the view that live testimony is essential to test witness
credibility. Id.
This suggests that on objective grounds, it may not be necessary for medical experts
and other witnesses to present live testimony at grievance and appeal hearings. Written sub-
missions by medical experts should suffice from an accuracy standpoint and would be desir-
able from a cost-containment standpoint. On the other hand, research on the subjective value
of free expression and voice suggests that allowing claimants to present their evidence orally
would promote subjective judgments of fairness while not sacrificing the accuracy of infor-
mation about claimant credibility provided to the decision maker. Moreover, decision makers
may be less likely to rely on their own normative and stereotypic expectations when testi-
mony is presented by the claimant from his or her unique vantage point, which may reduce
bias and improve accuracy in decision making. See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 148, at
549.
204. Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward Political Authorities: The Role
of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL. Sci. 629, 645 (1989);
see generally Tom R. Tyler, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (exploring factors that
motivate people to follow the law).
205. Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and
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for public acceptance of national health care reform efforts driven partly by
the need to contain costs. These studies suggest that people will be more will-
ing to accept health care services delivered in a more cost conscious way if
they believe that the procedures for allocating these services are fair. Thus,
policy considerations may compel grievance and appeal procedures which
promote voice, consistency, dignity, and respect, despite a less than robust
constitutional mandate for such procedures.
III. SUMMARY AND SYNTHESIS OF LEGAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL CRITERIA FOR
EVALUATING DUE PROCESS AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
In general, there is considerable overlap in the criteria used by the legal
and social science communities to define and evaluate the varied facets of due
process and procedural justice. For example, courts and legal scholars have
focused on fairness and accuracy in decision making, emphasizing the latter
perhaps because so called "soft variables" such as fairness are more difficult
to operationalize, quantify, or measure. Social scientists also have studied
fairness and accuracy or bias reduction in decision making, and have attempt-
ed to refine and quantify the assessment of the more subjective aspects of
procedural fairness.
At a constitutional level, notions of fundamental fairness are at the heart
of due process analysis, although the boundaries of the fairness construct are
faint and vaguely defined. Nevertheless, the broad constitutional contours of
fundamental fairness clearly encompass elements of truth seeking and the
subjective perception that justice has been done.2"
Individuals faced with potential loss of liberty or property are entitled to
due process, which in the context of welfare claims includes traditional trial-
like procedural safeguards, such as the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, to present arguments and evidence orally, to maintain legal
counsel, and to receive reasoned and substantiated decisions by an impartial
decision maker.7 When the individual interests at stake are not threatened
by the level of personal hardship identified in Goldberg,2"s the balancing test
established in Mathews2 ' requires the court to examine whether existing pro-
cedures pose a risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interests involved,
and whether new procedures can provide additional protection at an acceptable
cost.
Fairness, accuracy, and efficiency have been identified as major objectives
of administrative procedure. Procedures based on a moral judgment model
emphasize conflict resolution and seek to promote claimant satisfaction that
justice has been done. This approach values fairness over accuracy in decision
the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 621, 626 (1991).
206. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Black,
J., concurring).
207. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
208. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
209. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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making and does not consciously address issues of cost containment and ad-
ministrative efficiency. Bureaucratic rationality, on the other hand, emphasizes
accuracy and efficiency in decision making. Truth seeking is a primary objec-
tive, but not only for its own sake. Accuracy in decision making is considered
almost synonymous with fairness. Subjective aspects of procedural justice are
seen as intangible, unquantifiable factors which, at their worst, threaten to
cloud objectivity and drive up administrative costs. Finally, the professional
judgment model seeks to promote patient satisfaction and the preservation of
the ongoing relationship between patient and professional decision maker.
Individualized discretion is emphasized under this model, while objective
standards, consistency in decision making, and overall costs are not.
Legal scholars interested in administrative justice have focused on reform
at systemic and individual levels of analysis. At the systemic level, the devel-
opment of a quality assurance management system is seen as necessary to
supplement traditional appellate review in order to ensure consistency, accura-
cy, and efficiency in decision making. Increased efficiency makes the review
process more accessible and ensures that all individuals with legitimate claims
will have a real rather than a symbolic opportunity to be heard, due to de-
creased congestion in the grievance and appeal process. A management system
of quality assurance includes the following elements: positive case manage-
ment by the decision maker, establishment of standards where possible (e.g.,
treatment standards), periodic, independent assessment of decision making
quality, corrective action to upgrade substandard performance, and ongoing
evaluation.
At the individual level, Mashaw has argued that procedures have an im-
pact of constitutional significance on human dignitary interests. His taxonomy
of dignitary process values includes: (1) equality in the treatment and respect
given to both parties to a dispute, (2) rationality, (3) privacy, and (4) the de-
rivative interest in direct participation in the decision making process.
Social scientists have studied both subjective and objective criteria for
evaluating procedural justice. The subjective criteria include: representation
(voice), ethicality (concern for human dignity), quality of decision (perceived
accuracy), impartiality, consistency, and correctability (opportunity for appeal).
Notice the similarities between several of these procedural justice criteria on
the one hand, and the process values outlined by Mashaw on the other. That
is, note the correspondence between equality and ethicality, rationality and
consistency, participation and voice. For example, the process value of equali-
ty emphasizes the equal treatment of and respect for both parties, while the
procedural justice criterion of ethicality similarly emphasizes the importance of
treating a person with dignity and respect. Likewise, the process value of
rationality clearly encompasses the promotion of "correct decision making by
individual adjudicators,"2 ' which in the context of an administrative system
without external objective standards is generally assessed in terms of consis-
210. MASHAW, supra note 80, at 49.
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tency in decision making."' Finally, the relationship between the process
value of participation and the procedural justice criterion of voice is self evi-
dent. Interestingly, in the context of disputes, the procedural justice criteria
which most closely resemble the process values articulated by Mashaw (i.e.,
the procedural justice criteria of voice, ethicality, and consistency) were
among the most important determinants of subjective perceptions of procedural
fairness.
The most fruitful social science research on objective aspects of procedur-
al justice has focused on the issue of process control and has compared ad-
versarial, inquisitorial, and hybrid procedures in terms of their impact on the
accuracy of decision making. Evidence suggests that adversarial procedures
may reduce prior expectancy biases of decision makers; however, they also
encourage advocates to present a biased sample of evidence when the weight
of the evidence is against their client. Moreover, witnesses are more likely to
present biased testimony when they are interviewed by a partisan attorney or
when they are merely identified with one side of the case in an adversarial
proceeding. Inquisitorial procedures, on the other hand, are associated with
less biasing influences on both witnesses and on attorneys who are facing an
uphill battle. Overall, empirical evidence suggests that disputants prefer hybrid
procedures which allow them to fully express their arguments and evidence in
the case, but also allow the decision maker to independently ask questions and
seek out information.
The next section will examine the procedural mechanisms for reviewing
health care claim denials under the present Medicaid, Medicare, Managed
Care, and Fee-For-Service systems. The procedures used in each system to
review claim denials will be evaluated against selected legal and psychosocial
criteria summarized in this section.
IV. EXISTING PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS FOR REVIEWING BENEFIT DENIALS
A. Medicaid
The Medicaid program was enacted by Congress in 1965 to help provide
for the health care needs of the poor. Medicaid is a joint federal/state health
insurance program which is administered largely at the state level." 2 Under
the Medicaid program, individuals are entitled to a fair hearing to challenge
eligibility determinations, dispute the denial of specific services, or contest
actions to reduce or terminate services." Federal regulations establish min-
211. Mashaw, supra note 82, at 44.
212. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney, The Role of Judicial Review Regarding Medicare
and Medicaid Program Policy: Past Experience and Future Expectations, 35 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 759 (1991) (discussing judicial review as a means of achieving policy objectives under
Medicaid and Medicare programs).
213. 42 C.F.R. § 431.200 (1994). Individuals meeting specified criteria for mental illness
or mental retardation have been authorized to use the Medicaid fair hearing and appeals
process to challenge decisions regarding their transfer or discharge from a skilled nursing
facility or to dispute determinations made during a pre-admission screening or an annual
review. Id.; see also 57 Fed. Reg. 56,450 (1992).
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imum procedural safeguards that must be followed by state medical assistance
programs in order to qualify for federal reimbursement." 4
If the decision of a local evidentiary hearing is adverse to the claimant,
the claimant must be informed of the decision and of the right to appeal the
decision to the state agency. The claimant may request that the state agency
review the decision de novo." 5 Unless the claimant specifically requests a de
novo hearing, the state agency hearing may consist only of a review of the
record by the agency hearing officer to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence." 6 If claimants do not request de novo hearings, some
administrative resources may be saved.
The hearing officer who participated in the local decision may not partici-
pate in the state agency hearing." 7 All hearings must be conducted by some-
one who was not directly involved in the initial determination of the action in
question. This policy apparently aims at decreasing actual bias and promoting
perceived impartiality.
Federal regulations do encourage some positive case management. For
example, if a hearing involves medical issues, such as those concerning a
diagnosis, an examining physician's report, or a medical review team's deci-
sion, and if the hearing officer considers it necessary to have an additional
medical assessment, one will be obtained at agency expense and made part of
the record.18 Perceptions of process control are ensured in the following
manner. The person seeking a hearing must be given an opportunity to exam-
ine, at a reasonable time before and during the heaing, the content of the case
file and all documents and records to be used by the state or local agency at
the hearing. The person also must be given the opportunity to (1) bring wit-
nesses; (2) establish all pertinent facts and circumstances; (3) present an argu-
ment without undue interference; and (4) question or refute any testimony or
evidence, including opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses.
219
Furthermore, the federal regulations also require that hearing recommen-
dations or decisions be based exclusively on evidence introduced at the hear-
214. Under the federal regulations, the state's hearing system must provide for a hearing
before the state Medicaid agency or for an evidentiary hearing at the local level, with a
right to appeal to the state agency. 42 C.F.R. § 431.202 (1994). Moreover, the hearing sys-
tem must meet the due process standards set forth in Goldberg. A hearing must be provided
to any applicant who requests it because a claim for services has been denied or has not
been acted upon with reasonable promptness. Medicaid recipients who believe the agency has
taken an action erroneously also are entitled to a hearing. After proper notice, if "the recip-
ient requests a hearing before the date of action, the agency may not terminate or reduce
services until a decision is rendered after the hearing unless lilt is determined at the hearing
that the sole issue is one of Federal or State law or policy." 42 C.F.R. § 431.230(a)(1)
(1994).
215. 42 C.F.R. § 431.232 (1994).
216. 42 C.F.R. § 431.233(a) (1994).
217. 42 C.F.R. § 431.233(b) (1994).
218. 42 C.F.R. § 431.240(b) (1994).
219. 42 C.F.R. § 431.242 (1994).
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ing20 and that the claimant has access to the record at a convenient place
and time.221
By requiring a written decision that summarizes the facts and identifies
the regulations in support of the decision, consistency and rationality are pro-
moted.2 2 In a de novo hearing, the decision must specify its underlying ra-
tionale and identify the supporting evidence and applicable regulations.
223
The public also is allowed access to all agency hearing decisions, subject to
private information safeguardsY.2 4 Finally, the agency must notify the claim-
ant in writing of the decision and inform him or her of the right to either
request a state agency hearing or seek judicial review to the extent avail-
able.225
In sum, the Medicaid fair hearing process includes all of the major proce-
dural safeguards of an adversary trial:
* Timely and adequate notice disclosing the grounds for the action;
* An opportunity to present arguments, witnesses and evidence to the
decision maker;
* An opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses;
* Right to retain counsel at personal expense;
* A written statement by the decision maker of the evidence relied
upon and the reasons for the decision; and
* An impartial decision maker.226
The provision of trial-like procedural safeguards is clearly consistent with
Mashaw's moral judgment model, which places a premium on fairness in
decision making, particularly from the patient's standpoint. The availability of
these traditional procedural safeguards apparently stems from the very serious
threat the loss of health care benefits poses to indigent citizens, since they lack
the financial resources to purchase essential health care services that have been
erroneously denied. However, outside the realm of Medicaid's focus on the
most economically vulnerable citizens, the broader context of health care
reform will likely demand that the emphasis on achieving fairness from the
patient's standpoint be balanced against the goals of accuracy (awarding valid
claims and denying invalid ones) and efficiency (conserving administrative,
judicial, and health care resources).
220. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(a) (1994).
221. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244 (c) (1994).
222. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(d) (1994).
223. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(e) (1994).
224. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(g) (1994).
225. 42 C.F.R. § 431.245 (1994).
226. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970); see generally Friendly, supra
note 43, at 1267.
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B. Medicare
Congress established the Medicare program in 1965 to provide health
insurance for the elderly.2" The Medicare system is divided into two major
branches: Part A and Part B. Part A covers hospital, skilled nursing home,
hospice, and home health services, and Part B covers physician services, other
outpatient care, and some home health services." 8
For beneficiary appeals under Part A, a peer review organization (PRO)
initially determines whether a hospital service is a covered Medicare benefit.
The beneficiary can obtain reconsideration of this initial determination from
the same PRO, but not from the specific individuals who made the initial
determination;229 this requirement is apparently aimed at promoting percep-
tions of impartiality. For skilled nursing and home health services, a fiscal in-
termediary makes the initial coverage and payment determination, and benefi-
ciaries can obtain more independent reconsideration of the initial determination
from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).2 ' "The reconsider-
ation is basically a paper review at which the beneficiary is generally not pres-
ent or represented by counsel. In the PRO reconsideration procedure, the bene-
ficiary, physician, or hospital may submit additional information and examine
the material on which the PRO based its initial determination." '' Determina-
tions made by fiscal intermediaries on claims of $100 or more are subject to
an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (AU)232 and to
judicial review in federal district court for claims of $1,000 or more. 33
These amount in controversy requirements clearly limit the expenditure of
administrative and judicial resources on relatively smaller claims. However,
perceptions of fairness are likely to be low among members of the public who
have several hundred dollars in dispute with no recourse to judicial review.
Moreover, given that the reconsideration phase does not involve an oral hear-
ing or some other procedure to promote voice and perceptions of process
control, individuals with claims under $100 may view the lack of opportunity
for administrative review as unfair.
227. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Dis-
putes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, I ADMIN. L.J. 1, 5 (1987).
228. Eleanor D. Kinney, In Search of Bureaucratic Justice-Home Health Benefits in the
1980s, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 254 (1990). The Medicare appeals system under Part A is
further divided into separate branches for provider appeals of payment determinations on the
one hand, and beneficiary appeals of coverage determinations on the other. Under Part B,
beneficiary appeals of both coverage and payment determinations are reviewed under a com-
bined process. However, providers do not have appeal rights under Part B unless they accept
assignment of Part B Benefits from beneficiaries. Kinney, supra note 227, at 39-40.
229. 42 C.F.R. §§ 473.16, 473.28(b) (1994).
230. 42 C.F.R. § 405.715 (1994); Kinney, supra note 227, at 41.
231. Kinney, supra note 227, at 41.
232. 42 C.F.R. § 405.720 (1994).
233. 42 C.F.R. § 405.730 (1994). Determinations made by PROs regarding hospital cov-
erage on claims of $200 or more are subject to administrative review by an ALJ and to
judicial review in federal district court for claims of $2,000 or more. 42 C.F.R. §§
473.40(a), 473.46(b) (1994).
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According to Eleanor Kinney, a legal scholar who has written extensively
in the area of Medicare appeals:
The ALJ proceeding is the first opportunity for an oral hearing at
which a beneficiary may personally appear and plead his case, al-
though an oral hearing may be waived. The role of the AU in Part A
coverage appeals, as in other Social Security Program appeals, is that
of a non-partisan examiner rather than a judge in an adversarial hear-
ing. In these proceedings, HHS is not represented by counsel, but the
individual claimant may be represented by counsel if desired. The
ALJ has primary responsibility for developing the record, in contrast
to conventional adjudicative proceedings in which counsel for the
parties has this responsibility. There is also an expedited appeals
process for cases where the beneficiary has claimed, and HHS agrees,
that the only factor preventing a favorable decision for the beneficiary
is a statutory or regulatory provision that the beneficiary maintains is
unconstitutional.2 3
Thus, the hybrid procedural requirements of the administrative hearing
apparently attempt to balance the fairness enhancing potential of procedures
that allow claimants to voice their concerns through oral presentation on the
one hand, with the accuracy enhancing potential of inquisitorial procedures
and positive case management on the other. A claimant dissatisfied with the
hearing decision may request review by the Appeals Council in the Social
Security Administration's Office of Hearings and Appeals. 2 35 The Appeals
Council also may initiate review on its own.2"6 The Appeals Council may
review a case if it appears that there was an abuse of discretion committed by
the ALJ, an error of law, a decision rendered without the support of substan-
tial evidence on the record, or "a broad policy or procedural issue that may
affect the general public interest."27
The Medicare appeals procedures under Part B first require an initial
coverage determination be made by a carrier, or by a hearing officer where a
claim has not been acted on by the carrier with reasonable promptness.23
Upon making an initial determination, the carrier issues a notice of initial
determination to each party to the determination and informs them of their
right to a review of the initial determination, performed by the carrier.239 In
this review determination, the carrier must make a separate determination
affirming or revising the initial determination.2" The notice for the review
determination must state the basis for the determination and advise the parties
of their right to a fair hearing when the amount in controversy is $100 or
234. Kinney, supra note 227, at 42 (footnotes omitted).
235. 42 C.F.R. § 405.724 (1994); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1994).
236. 20 C.F.R. § 404.969 (1994).
237. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (1994).
238. 42 C.F.R. § 405.803 (1994).
239. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.803, 405.807 (1994).
240. 42 C.F.R. § 405.810 (1994).
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more.2" According to Kinney:
The fair hearing for claims of $100 or more is an oral hearing
conducted by a hearing officer selected by the carrier. At a fair hear-
ing, the hearing officer may be disqualified if "prejudiced or partial
with respect to any party" or has "any interest in the matter before
him." The regulations expressly provide that the hearing officer is an
employee of the carrier may not serve as "prima facie cause for dis-
qualification," and as a matter of fact, many hearing officers are
carrier employees. 42
Although some regulations allow a claimant to request a hearing officer
withdraw on the basis of prejudice, partiality, or conflict of interest, allowing
carrier employees to serve as hearing officers seems unlikely in any case to
inspire high ratings on subjective procedural justice criteria assessing impar-
tiality. 243
At the fair hearing, the claimant may be represented by counsel, present
evidence and make oral arguments, examine all witnesses, and submit written
briefs.2" Moreover, the hearing officer is authorized to examine witnesses,
consistent with an inquisitorial approach to fact finding.245 The decision must
contain findings of fact and a statement of reasons, and be in writing and
based on the record."l The decision is final and binding on all parties unless
reopened and modified by the hearing officer according to specified require-
ments."" Claimants are entitled to administrative review before an ALJ on a
Part B claims of $500 or more248 and to judicial review in federal district
court for claims of $1000 and above.249
Again, although the amount in controversy requirements limit the expendi-
ture of administrative and judicial resources on relatively smaller claims, per-
ceptions of fairness are likely to be low among members of the public who
have up to $500 in dispute with no recourse to administrative or judicial re-
view. Perceived unfairness may be fueled by the fact that claims between $100
and $500 are reviewed by a hearing officer chosen by the carrier, often an
employee, and individuals with claims of up to $100 are not assured adequate
opportunity to directly voice their grievances. As a possible consequence, wide
scale perceptions of unfairness among the large number of beneficiaries with
relatively small claims could lead to gradual erosion of satisfaction and public
support for the legislative scheme.2"
241. 42 C.F.R. § 405.811 (1994).
242. Kinney, supra note 227, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
243. 42 C.F.R. § 405.824 (1994).
244. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.826, 405.830 (1994).
245. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.830 (c) (1994).
246. 42 C.F.R. § 405.834 (1994).
247. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.835-.842 (1994).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 422.203 (1994).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210 (1994).
250. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-39 (1990) (discuss-
ing relationship between legitimacy and compliance).
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C. Health Maintenance Organizations
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) provide a defined package of
medical services to their enrollees for a fixed payment."' In essence, HMOs
are in a dual relationship with consumers, assuming the role of insurer and
service provider. Problems associated with this dual relationship have been
summarized as follows:
The principal disadvantage of an HMO is its inherent tendency
toward underservicing enrollees, especially with regard to more ex-
pensive services. Since subscribers pay a fixed amount in advance for
covered services, HMOs have a financial interest in minimizing the
total costs of the services rendered; the greater the excess of premium
revenues over the cost of delivering services, the greater the surplus
available for distribution, whether in the form of profits to investors,
incentive payments to participating physicians, or expanded benefits
for subscribers. In theory, an HMO will cut costs by curbing
overutilization of hospital services and substituting less expensive
ambulatory care; in practice, an HMO may, absent appropriate safe-
guards, seek to cut costs by reducing the amount of services provided
through such rationing devices as low physician-patient ratios, under-
bedding, or unduly restrictive prior authorization procedures.
252
Thus, the establishment of fair and objective procedures to review coverage
decisions in this climate of cost-containment is important.
The Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973 (the "HMO Act")
2 53
was adopted by Congress to encourage the development of HMOs and to
"assure that HMOs were structured to promote quality and access while re-
straining costs."2' The HMO Act sought to facilitate the development of
HMOs by providing grants and loans to help meet start up costs and by pro-
viding HMOs with access to consumers with purchasing power; employers of
twenty-five or more employees were required to offer them the option of
membership in any federally qualified HMO in their service area. 5
Under the HMO Act, HMOs are required to provide "meaningful proce-
dures for hearing and resolving grievances" between the organization and its
members.2 " The grievance procedures must assure that: (1) complaints are
transmitted promptly to the appropriate HMO decision making levels with the
authority to take corrective action; and (2) appropriate action is promptly taken
which includes a full investigation if necessary and notification of concerned
parties regarding the HMO's investigation results.5 7
251. ANNAS et al., supra note 23, at 774-75.
252. Andreas G. Schneider & Joanne B. Stem, Health Maintenance Organizations and
the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 90, 97-98 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
253. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
254. ANNAS et al., supra note 23, at 780.
255. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(a) (1988).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(5) (1988).
257. 42 C.F.R. § 417.124(g) (1994).
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Although the specific grievance procedures adopted by HMOs vary con-
siderably across organizations, the following procedures established by Health
America-Lincoln, a Mutual of Omaha Company, serve as an illustrative exam-
ple of grievance procedures established by an HMO.258 The relevant proce-
dures specified in their group service contract (the "Plan") can be summarized
as follows:2 9
The Plan attempts to resolve most grievances informally within thirty days
through a Member Services Department. Grievances should be reported within
ninety days by calling or writing the Member Services Department. When
informal intervention fails to produce a satisfactory resolution to a reported
grievance, the claimant may request review by the Plan's Member Satisfaction
Committee. Requests for formal review by the Member Satisfaction Commit-
tee must be made in writing to the Member Services Representative. The
Member Satisfaction Committee may hold hearings and call witnesses to assist
in resolving formal grievances, although such hearings are not explicitly re-
quired. In any case, the decision of the Member Satisfaction Committee will
be communicated to the aggrieved claimant within sixty days of the formal
review request unless the Plan notifies the claimant that additional time will be
required.
Any claimant who is dissatisfied with the Member Satisfaction
Committee's decision may appeal to the Plan's Board of Directors. The claim-
ant must send'a written request for reconsideration to the Member Services
Department within fifteen days of receiving the Member Satisfaction
Committee's decision. Either the Board of Directors or a designated Grievance
Committee will review the grievance and the recommendation of the Member
Satisfaction Committee within sixty days of receiving the appeal. The claimant
and the other involved parties may be invited to the meeting to discuss the
appeal; however, the claimant is not explicitly entitled to appear before the
decision making body.
The claimant will be notified in writing of the Plan's final decision within
ten working days of the meeting held to consider the appeal. The Plan prohib-
its the claimant from bringing a legal action against the Plan regarding a dis-
pute until all internal grievance procedures are exhausted.2"
Overall, much of the "process control" is left to the discretion of decision
makers at different levels of authority within the HMO. The claimant is not
guaranteed the right to present arguments and evidence orally or to bring and
challenge witnesses. Moreover, the impartiality of decision makers is clearly
suspect under any standard reflecting common sense. As a consequence, pa-
tients with grievances may feel unfairly treated under the established grievance
258. Health America-Lincoln: Group Service Contract, 16-17 (1993).
259. Id.
260. Id. "Any Member who files a formal grievance thereby authorizes the Plan or any-
one designated by the Plan to review or disseminate as necessary to the resolution of the
grievances, such Member's individual medical records, without notice to any person." Id. at
17. Obviously, this last requirement leaves something to be desired regarding a patient's
interest in privacy.
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procedures. Those who receive unfavorable outcomes may be more likely to
pursue legal actions than they would have been under a grievance process that
promoted greater perceptions of procedural justice. As the research evidence
suggests, such increased perceptions of fairness are associated with greater
voice, impartiality, and respect for dignitary interests, including privacy.26" '
Finally, Congress did not specifically create a private right of action with-
in the HMO Act. Thus, with the exception of Medicare beneficiaries, an indi-
vidual who enrolls in an HMO is not authorized to bring a civil action in
federal court to challenge a benefit denial.262 However, the Department of
Health and Human Services is authorized to bring a federal civil action in
order to enforce an HMO's Compliance with the Act.263 The Department's
enforcement action may be based on a patient's complaint regarding a denial
of services or reimbursement. However, such enforcement actions have not
been "sufficient to ensure effective remedial action for individual or class
harms," which has led some health care reform advocates to argue that the
private right to legally enforce entitlement to benefits should be expressly
provided for by statute under any health care reform legislation.264
D. Fee-For-Service
Disputes between insurers and consumers in fee-for-service plans may be
governed by state insurance law, contract and tort principles, as well as federal
legislation such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA"),165 depending on the jurisdiction and whether health insurance is
provided through employment.2" Regardless of specific jurisdictional and
procedural requirements, practicality often constrains the pursuit of remedies
against insurers.
[D]isputes are frequent between subscribers and insurers over the
medical necessity of provided services and over other conditions on
liability. Yet there are few litigated disputes and surprisingly few
appellate decisions. Some industry experts claim that this is because
disputes over coverage are either negotiated informally or handled
through formal arbitration .... [Miany health insurance policies ex-
261. See Tyler, supra note 176, at 121-27. Obviously, whether greater perceived proce-
dural justice leads to decreased appeals and litigation is an empirical question that warrants
further investigation. HMOs and other types of health care organizations may also be inter-
ested in determining whether perceived procedural injustice contributes to consumer dissatis-
faction and increases the likelihood that they will change plans during an open enrollment
period.
262. Medicare recipients who enroll in a federally qualified HMO are entitled to proce-
dures regarding initial determinations, reconsideration, hearings, Appeals Council Review, and
federal judicial review that are similar to those provided to Medicare beneficiaries who par-
ticipate in fee-for-service plans. 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.600-.638 (1994).
263. 42 C.F.R. § 417.163 (1994).
264. Jane Perkins & Abigail English, Designing Health Care That Meets Children's
Needs, YOUTH L. NEWS, July-Aug. 1993, at 1, 6.
265. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
266. ANNAS et al., supra note 23, at 155-56.
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plicitly require arbitration of these and most other disputes over cov-
erage or eligibility. But it is also apparent that the size of the claim
and the nature of the available remedy are also controlling factors. To
the extent that the claim is based solely on a contract theory, the
judgment is likely to be only for the amount of the disputed claim, an
amount that may not justify the time and expense of litigation. It is
only in cases ... where the plaintiff can claim a tort action and, pos-
sibly, punitive damages that the pursuit of a judicial remedy may be
practical.267
Like HMOs, the specific internal grievance procedures adopted by fee-for-
service insurance plans vary across different insurers. However, many fee-for-
service health insurance plans provide grievance procedures that are similar to
those provided in the following Mutual of Omaha plan:2" Claims for re-
imbursement are initially processed by a claims examiner. If the subscriber is
not satisfied with the initial determination, the claim may be appealed and
reviewed by a technical assistant, who is higher up in the chain of command.
At that point, the technical assistant may seek additional records from the
provider. If the subscriber is dissatisfied with the first appeal, the determina-
tion may be appealed to a claims manager, whose determination may in turn
be reviewed by a branch manager. In Nebraska, the subscriber is also entitled
to appeal a denied claim to the Nebraska Department of Insurance, which will
review the claim and make a recommendation to the insurer regarding its
findings.2" Moreover, if, after a hearing, the insurance director finds an
insurer has engaged in an unfair claims settlement practice, the findings are
reduced to writing and the insurer is issued a cease and desist order. The
insurer also may be subject to penalties for flagrant or repeated unfair practic-
es or for violation of the cease and desist order.2 "0 Claimants may also pur-
sue their claims against insurers in state court.
As mentioned above, specific grievance procedures can vary from one
fee-for-service plan to another and from state to state. Many criticisms of the
grievance and appeals procedures established by HMOs also apply to fee-for-
service plans: Much of the "process control" is left to the discretion of deci-
sion makers at different levels of authority within the organization. Oral hear-
ings typically are neither mandated nor provided, and the decision makers
reviewing the claims can hardly be characterized as impartial. As a conse-
quence, patients with grievances may feel unfairly treated under the estab-
lished grievance procedures; this may fuel consumer dissatisfaction, which in
turn may influence consumer evaluations and subsequent choice of health
plans during an open enrollment period.
267. Id. at 157.
268. The outline of grievance procedures is based on a telephone conversation with cus-
tomer service representatives at Mutual of Omaha.
269. Unfair Insurance Claims Settlement Practices Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-1536 to -
1544 (1993); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS., T. 210, Ch. 61, §§ 001 to Oil (1992).
270. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-1542 to -1543 (1993).
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V. APPLICATION OF PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE TO NATIONAL HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSALS
The reform of our health care delivery system will require an ongoing
effort. Regardless of the specific timing and nature of health care reforms
adopted, there will be increased demands on the claims review process as
health care coverage is provided to more people. Moreover, mounting econom-
ic pressures toward cost containment in the delivery of health care services
will place new burdens on the claims review process if more people begin to
feel that their requests for services or reimbursement are being unjustly de-
nied. Thus, any health care reform program ultimately adopted must develop a
claims review process that strikes an appropriate balance between fairness,
accuracy, and efficiency in decision making. The next section examines health
care reform proposals of the Administration, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives of the 103rd Congress.
A. Summary of the Claims Review and Appeals Process in Proposed
National Health Care Reform Legislation
The health care reform plans proposed by the Administration,27' the
House,272 and the Senate273 in the midst of the Clinton Administration's
push towards health care reform would have required each health insurance
plan to establish a grievance procedure for enrollees to use in pursuing com-
plaints.274  The claims review and appeal procedures provided in the
Administration's Proposal, which are very similar to those outlined in the
House and Senate Proposals, are summarized below.
Under the Administration's Proposal, a claim could be submitted for
271. S. 1757, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Administration Proposal]. The
discussion and analysis will focus on the grievance and appeal procedures provided in the
health care reform plans proposed by the Administration and the Senate and House of the
103d Congress. These proposals represent comprehensive yet detailed efforts to deal directly
with due process and the health care claims process. All three proposals take a very similar
approach to these issues. In fact, the House and Senate proposals involve modifications of
the basic framework established in the Administration's proposal. All three proposals have
the same title: the Health Security Act. For the purpose of clarifying the discussion, referenc-
es generally will be to the Administration Proposal; the Senate and House Proposals will be
referred to only when they differ significantly from the Administration Proposal.
272. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) [hereinafter House Proposal] (sponsored by
Rep. Richard Gephart).
273. Amendment 2560 to S. 2351, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Senate Pro-
posall (sponsored by Sen. George Mitchell), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. S 11492 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 1994) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
274. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 1405(a); House Proposal, supra note
272, § 1405(a); Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 1123. Title V of the Administration,
House, and Senate Proposals addresses consumer protection. In the Administration and House
Proposal, subtitle C specifically covers remedies and enforcement, whereas in the Senate
Proposal, remedies and enforcement are covered in subtitle F. Section 5201 of the Adminis-
tration and House Proposals and § 5501 of the Senate Proposal specify the required health
plan claims procedure.
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preauthorization of services, or for payment or provision of benefits;... how-
ever, emergency services would be provided without regard to prior authoriza-
tion.276 Generally, claims would be processed in the following manner.
1. Urgent Requests for Preauthorization
An urgent request for preauthorization of services must be approved or
denied within twenty-four hours. 77 The request must be accompanied by an
attestation that failure to immediately provide the requested service could
seriously jeopardize the health of the claimant (or an unborn child in the case
of a pregnant woman), or that immediate service is necessary because the
claimant is at serious risk of harm to self or others. 78 Otherwise, the claim
is reviewed in accordance with the procedures set out below.
2. Initial Disposition of Claim
Whenever a claim is submitted to a health plan, the plan must provide the
individual claimant279 and any provider claimant 2 ° with written notice of
the plan's approval or denial of the claim within thirty days28 ' after the sub-
mission of the claim.
28 2
3. Reconsideration
A claimant may submit to the plan a written request for reconsideration of
a denied claim. The reconsideration review must be completed within thirty
days after the request for reconsideration. 83 Reconsideration reviews must be
conducted de novo, and may not be conducted by an individual who made the
initial determination to deny the claim. If the issue in dispute requires medical
expertise, the reconsideration must include review by a qualified physician."s
275. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5201(a)(1).
276. Id. § 1406(b).
277. The Senate Proposal would require that urgent requests for preauthorization be ap-
proved or denied within 12 hours. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 5501(c)(2).
278. See, e.g., Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5201(c).
279. An individual claimant is "any individual who submits the claim to a health plan in
connection with the individual's enrollment under the plan, or on whose behalf the claim is
submitted to the plan by a provider." Id. § 5201(a)(2).
280. A provider claimant is "any provider who submits the claim to a health plan with
respect to items or services provided to an individual enrolled under the plan." Id. §
5201(a)(3).
281. The Senate's version would reduce this time frame to 15 days. Senate Proposal, su-
pra note 273, § 5501(b)(1).
282. If the claim is denied, the notice must be provided within five days of the determi-
nation to deny the claim, and must set forth the specific reasons for the denial and include
notice of the right to appeal the denial. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, §
5201(b)(1).
283. Id. § 5201(b)(2)-(3).
284. Id. § 5201(b)(4).
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4. Complaint Review Office
Each state is required to establish and maintain a complaint review office
for each of its regional health alliances.28 Claimants may appeal claims de-
nied by their health plan to the appropriate complaint review office, provided
they have exhausted all remedies under the plan. The complaint must be in
writing and must be made within one year of the alleged violation date.2
Once a complaint is filed with the complaint review office, the claimant
may elect one of the following options:
- forego further review in the complaint review office and rely on reme-
dies available in a court of competent jurisdiction, with specified limita-
tions;
28 7
" submit the claim as a dispute in the Early Resolution Program; 28 or
" submit the complaint for review before a hearing officer in the com-
plaint review office. 9
Under the first option, claimants may rely on legal remedies and judicial
review outside the complaint review office, subject to conditions which the
Secretary of Labor presumably would clarify and specify .2'0 The other two
options for administrative review within the complaint review office are out-
lined below.
a. Early Resolution Program
Each State is required to establish and maintain an Early Resolution Pro-
gram ("ERP") in each complaint review office. The ERP must include forums
for mediation of disputes and other types of alternative dispute resolution,
including binding arbitration, as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe.' The
complaint review office must recruit qualified attorneys to serve as facilitators
for mediation proceedings under the ERP and to monitor and evaluate the pro-
gram on an ongoing basis. 2 2 A claimant must elect to submit a dispute to
mediation proceedings under the ERP within fifteen days of filing the com-
plaint with the complaint review office.29 3 Claimants may elect to participate
in mediation proceedings only by written agreement. Health plans must partic-
ipate in the mediation proceedings if a claimant elects this forum to resolve a
dispute with the health plan.2"
285. The Senate's proposal would require the establishment and maintenance of a com-
plaint review office for each community rating area established by the state. Senate Proposal,
supra note 273, § 5502.
286. See Administration Proposal, supra note 271. § 5202.
287. Id. § 5203(a)(1). The limitation applies to plans maintained by corporate alliances,
where administrative review and appeal under §§ 5203-5204 and § 5205 are the exclusive
means to review complaints brought by aggrieved persons under § 5202(b). Id. § 5202(d).
288. Id. § 5203(a)(2).
289. Id. § 5203(a)(3).
290. Id. § 5203(a).
291. Id. § 5211(a).
292. Id. § 5211(b).
293. id. § 5212(b).
294. Id. § 5212(c). The facilitator prepares the parties for a conference and serves as a
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The findings and conclusions made in the mediation proceedings are treat-
ed as advisory in nature and nonbinding. In the event a settlement is reached,
the settlement agreement becomes a binding contract between the parties,
which any court of competent jurisdiction can enforce." 5
b. Hearings Before Hearing Officers in Complaint Review
Offices2"
Hearing officers will be State employees who meet standards to be pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Labor. The hearing officer will hear complaints
and any motions de novo and base his or her decision upon the preponderance
of the evidence. The decision constitutes the hearing officer's final disposition
of the proceedings and must include the hearing officer's findings of fact." 7
The hearing generally requires written testimony, but the hearing officer may
take further testimony or hear argument and can compel by subpoena the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence. 98
5. Appeal to Federal Health Plan Review Board
The Secretary of Labor must establish by regulation a five-member Feder-
al Health Plan Review Board (Review Board).2 The Administration and
House Proposals provide broad guidelines for the Review Board to follow in
its review process. For example, under the Administration's Proposal, reason-
able notice must be provided for each appeal before the Review Board and
procedures must be established to provide for the "orderly consideration of
arguments."3" The Review Board will review the hearing officer's decision
below based on whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence
neutral mediator at it to help the parties achieve settlement of the dispute. Id. § 5213(a).
This leaves the decision control with the parties. At conference, the facilitator must assist the
parties in identifying undisputed issues and exploring settlement. If settlement is reached, the
facilitator helps prepare a written settlement agreement. If no settlement is reached, the fa-
cilitator presents an evaluation of the dispute, including an evaluation of the likely outcome
of further administrative action or litigation, and provides suggestions for narrowing the is-
sues in dispute. Id. § 5213(c). The mediation proceedings must be completed within 120
days after the election to participate, with allowance for one extension under specified con-
ditions. Id. § 5213(d). The formal rules of evidence are inapplicable to mediation proceed-
ings; all statements made and evidence presented is admissible. The Secretary of Labor is re-
sponsible for promulgating confidentiality rules applicable to the mediation proceedings. Par-
ties may represent themselves or be represented by an attorney throughout the ERP proceed-
ings. Id. § 5213(e)-(g).
295. Id. §§ 5214-5215.
296. Id. § 5204.
297. Id. § 5204(a)-(d).
298. Id. § 5204(c)(2)-(3).
299. Id. § 5205. The Senate proposal does not provide for review by a Federal Health
Plan Board. Rather, the decision of the hearing officer is final and binding on all parties.
The complainant may directly petition any court of competent jurisdiction for enforcement of
the hearing officer's order. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 5504.
300. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5205(b).
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on the record considered as a whole."' The hearing officer's interpretation of
contractual terms are reviewed under the less deferential preponderance of the
evidence standard.0 2
6. Review in Federal Court
Claimants can appeal the Review Board's final order to the relevant Unit-
ed States court of appeals if the amount or value in controversy exceeds
$10,000.3" The court of appeals' decision is subject to review by the United
States Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari or certification. 4
To summarize, the claims review and appeal process under the
Administration's Proposal would be as follows:
- Initial claims processing by the health plan, including the option of
preauthorization within twenty-four hours for specified urgent requests.
" Reconsideration of denials conducted by the health plan.
" Appeal to the alliance's complaint review office with the option of seek-
ing available legal remedies under specified conditions, participating in the
Early Review Program (mediation), or obtaining a hearing before a hearing
officer in the alliance's complaint review office.
" Review by the Federal Health Plan Review Board.
" Review by a federal court of appeals for claims in excess
of $10,000 with the possibility of review by the United States Supreme
Court.
Claimants also have an explicit private right of action against a regional
health alliance in state court or federal district court if the alliance fails to
carry out its statutory obligations."' Otherwise, the claimant must first ex-
haust any administrative remedies provided by law before bringing such an
action in either state court or federal district court."t Finally, each regional
alliance must establish an ombudsman's office to help consumers with prob-
lems arising from health plans and the alliance.3 7
The Administration's Proposal also would establish a National Quality
Management Program" to oversee "a performance-based program of quality
management and improvement designed to enhance the quality, appropriate-
ness, and effectiveness of health care services and access to such servic-
es.,," This latter emphasis on improved access to services is most directly
301. Id. § 5205(c)(1).
302. Id. § 5205(c)(2).
303. Id. § 5205(e). Although the House Proposal follows this same approach by allowing
aggrieved persons with over $10,000 in controversy to have their claims reviewed in federal
court, the Senate Proposal does not. See House Proposal, supra note 272, § 5205(e)(I).
304. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5205(e).
305. Id. § 5237(a).
306. Id. § 5237(b).
307. Id. § 1326.
308. Id. §§ 5001-5013.
309. Id. § 5001. The Senate and House Proposals both establish similar quality manage-
ment programs. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, §§ 5001-5013; House Proposal, supra note
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relevant to the claims review and appeals process because this process ulti-
mately impacts the approval or denial of services and the swiftness of service
delivery.
Section 5002 would establish a National Quality Management Council,
composed of fifteen members appointed by the President. The National Quali-
ty Management Council is required to "develop a set of national measures of
quality performance, which shall be used to assess the provision of health care
services and access to such services."' 0 Specific measures of quality perfor-
mance would be developed to assess, among other factors, access to health
care services by consumers, consumer satisfaction with care, and outcomes of
health care."' Additionally, the National Quality Management Council would
be required to "conduct periodic surveys of health care consumers to gather
information concerning access to care, use of health services, health outcomes,
and patient satisfaction. ' '3 2 Presumably, such consumer surveys could in-
clude measures assessing consumer evaluations of the claims review and ap-
peals process in terms of procedural fairness, although this is not specifically
mandated. Each health alliance, as well as the National Quality Management
Council, would be required to publish an annual performance report which
must include the results of the required consumer surveys.3
Section 5006 of the Administration's Proposal requires the development
and dissemination of practice guidelines that can be used by health care pro-
viders to guide the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and clinical management
of health problems." 4 As discussed above, such guidelines and treatment
standards will likely contribute to accuracy and consistency in administrative
and judicial decision making and could serve as an integral element of an
overall management system of quality assurance in claims processing and
review." '
B. Evaluation of Due Process and Procedural Justice Under Proposed
National Health Care Reform Legislation
The major strengths of the Administration's Proposal include the explicit
statutory specification of a claims review process, including mechanisms for
administrative and judicial review and enforcement. The procedures estab-
lished seem quite attuned to the due process concerns of claimants who have
grievances against health plans. Claimants generally are entitled to at least four
levels of administrative-type review, with the option of directly suing the
272, §§ 5001-5013.
310. Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5003(a).
311. Id. § 5003(b).
312. Id. § 5004(a).
313. Id. § 5005(c).
314. Id. § 5006(a).
315. Although information regarding grievances filed against health alliances and health
plans would be routinely collected under a newly established Health Information System, the
disclosure of individually identifiable information would be subject to privacy and security
standards established under the Proposal. Id. §§ 5101, 5120.
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health plan in some cases, and the opportunity for judicial review in federal
court for very large claims. Claimants also have an explicit private right of
action against a regional health alliance and access to an ombudsman for assis-
tance with problems arising with an alliance or a specific health plan. Thus,
claimants have numerous outlets to voice their concerns. This can be a key
factor in promoting subjective perceptions of procedural fairness and increased
acceptance of decisions, both favorable and unfavorable." 6
However, the multiple tiers of review could inhibit claimants from having
their cases heard in a timely and cost-effective manner. For example, under
both the Administration and House Proposals, a claimant may wait up to thirty
days for the initial disposition of a claim and an additional thirty days for
reconsideration. The Senate Proposal shortens this time frame somewhat by re-
quiring that the initial claim determination be completed within fifteen rather
than thirty days. In any case, the claimant is not entitled to appear personally
at either the initial disposition or reconsideration phase of the review process.
Thus, a claimant could wait over two months under the Administration and
House Proposals and forty-five days under the Senate Proposal before having
the opportunity to appear in person to challenge a denied claim.
This delay could be shortened by giving claimants the opportunity to
present their case personally at either the initial determination or reconsidera-
tion phase. Waiting until the reconsideration phase would be more cost-effec-
tive, because many if not most claims submitted for an initial determination
will be routinely processed and decided favorably for claimants. On the one
hand, allowing for personal appearances at the reconsideration stage of the
review process arguably would cost too much and put too many demands on
health plan resources. However, an investment of time and resources here may
make economic sense in the long run if claimant perceptions that they are
treated more fairly and with greater respect translate into enhanced satisfaction
and loyalty to a particular health plan, given that consumers could change their
health plan on a yearly basis."7 Alternatively, claimants could be provided
with the opportunity to present their side of the case by phone, during either
the initial or reconsideration phase of the review process." 8 Besides any eco-
nomic benefit to particular health plans, resolving more disputes satisfactorily
at the health plan level would mean spending fewer overall resources on more
costly administrative and judicial review and appeal proceedings.
An alternative strategy for reducing delay in the appeals process would be
to allow claimants to appeal their denied claims directly to the complaint
review office. The complaint review office could modify its review options to
ensure that complainants have the opportunity to argue their case orally before
316. Lind and Tyler note that "procedural justice seems likely to be an important cri-
terion for medical policy-making. When life and death decisions are being made, as in the
case when scarce medical resources are being allocated, it is likely that procedural justice
will be especially important to the legitimacy of medical institutions and the acceptability of
their decisions." LIND & TYLER, supra note 157, at 213.
317. See Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 1323(d).
318. More empirical research is needed to determine whether and under what conditions
the opportunity for oral testimony by phone contributes to perceptions of procedural justice.
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a hearing officer (or an arbitrator, should the Early Resolution Program em-
brace binding arbitration as a method of dispute resolution).
One promising systemic aspect of health care reform under all three pro-
posals is the establishment of a quality assurance program and the prospect of
applying that program to claims processing. As discussed above, an effective
quality assurance management system requires the establishment of standards;
positive case management by the decision maker; periodic, independent assess-
ment of decision making quality; corrective action to upgrade substandard
performance; and ongoing evaluation. The quality management programs
proposed by the various plans meet several of these criteria and could be
adapted to address specific issues of quality assurance in claims processing.
For example, The Administration's Proposal would establish a National
Quality Management Council charged with overseeing the development of
treatment guidelines. The Council also would assess consumer access to health
care services and conduct periodic surveys of patient satisfaction. One obvious
way to improve access to care is to ensure the timely and efficient review of
health care claims. Moreover, patient perceptions that claims are processed and
reviewed in a fair, rational, and efficient manner are likely an important ingre-
dient of overall patient satisfaction. The Administration's Proposal requires the
routine collection of information regarding grievances filed against alliances
and health plans. This information could be incorporated into a quality assur-
ance program aimed at monitoring and improving the quality of decision mak-
ing in the claims review and appeals process." 9
At a more specific level of evaluation, individuals whose health is in
serious jeopardy would merit an expedited review of their request for
preauthorization of services. The erroneous denial of preauthorization in cer-
tain health threatening situations could pose risks that arguably rise to the level
of the potential deprivation considered in Goldberg. If so, then the issue be-
comes whether individuals, particularly the poor, who qualify for urgent re-
view are constitutionally entitled to the range of procedural safeguards spelled
out in Goldberg, or whether the balancing approach articulated in Mathews
should apply. The poor obviously are the most vulnerable because they lack
the necessary resources to obtain urgent care on their own, outside their health
plan, when preauthorization for such needed care is erroneously denied.
Claimants could forego an expedited hearing under specified circumstances
and seek judicial review, where available, in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Such judicial review might afford claimants with more explicit procedural
safeguards than the expedited administrative proceedings, but prompt judicial
review of requests for preauthorization of urgent care probably is unrealistic
for most claimants. Therefore, specific procedural safeguards protecting claim-
ants from erroneous denials of urgent care should be more clearly spelled out
in any health care reform legislation.
319. Although the Administration's Proposal apparently does not require specifically that
the National Quality Management Program focus on procedural justice in the claims review
and appeal process, the language of the Proposal clearly would not prohibit such a focus,
and the spirit of the Proposal would seem to encourage it.
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In terms of objective aspects of procedural justice, social science research
has focused on the capacity of a procedure to reduce bias or prejudice and
reach reliable decisions that are consistent with applicable standards. Inquisito-
rial procedures emphasizing positive case management have been associated
with less biasing influences on both witnesses and on attorneys representing
clients with weak cases. Under the Administration's Proposal, the reconsidera-
tion review conducted by a health plan is based on a written request. The
claim is reconsidered under a de novo standard of review by a decision maker
who did not make the initial determination; these requirements apparently are
aimed at bias reduction. However, the bias reducing benefits of an independent
decision maker's de novo review are undermined when the decision maker
likely is an employee of the health plan, with vested interests in the plan's
policies and economic well-being.32
The next level of review is a hearing before a hearing officer in a com-
plaint review office of an alliance. Here, previously denied claims are re-
viewed de novo and the hearing officer's decision is based on a preponderance
of the evidence. Testimony must be reduced to writing, which may promote
overall efficiency, but the hearing officer does have discretion to take further
testimony or hear argument. This places a great deal of process control in the
hands of the hearing officer and is likely to promote accuracy in decision
making. However, research suggests that disputants may prefer hybrid proce-
dures which allow them to fully express their arguments and evidence in the
case, while allowing the decision maker to independently seek out information.
Thus, these hearing procedures may promote accuracy and efficiency by giv-
ing the hearing officer considerable process control, but may diminish
claimants' perceptions of fairness and satisfaction by not guaranteeing them
the right to present their case orally. That is, claimants who, in the discretion
of the hearing officer, are not provided with the opportunity to state their case
in their own terms may feel less process control or voice and less respected as
participants in the hearing process. This may contribute to lower overall sub-
jective perceptions of procedural justice.
Several other process features likely will influence subjective evaluations
of procedural fairness. For example, because hearing officers would apply
treatment guidelines in many cases, perceptions of decision making accuracy
may increase. Further, hearing officers are employed by the State rather than
the health plan, which may enhance appraisals of impartiality. In turn, in-
creased perceptions of accuracy and impartiality likely will contribute to high-
er levels of overall satisfaction with procedural fairness.
On the other hand, although the opportunity to appeal the hearing officer's
decision to the Federal Health Plan Review Board provided under the Admin-
istration and House Proposals probably will merit high ratings on measures
assessing correctability, the social science studies reviewed suggest it will not
be an important factor in overall judgments of procedural fairness.
320. On the other hand, accuracy in decision making may be enhanced by the require-
ment that medical questions be reviewed by a qualified physician.
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The mediation component of the Early Resolution Program places both
process and decision control in the hands of the parties. As a consequence,
these procedures are likely to receive modest to high overall ratings on subjec-
tive criteria of procedural fairness. For example, claimants are guaranteed an
opportunity to present their case in person before a neutral mediator and are
therefore likely to perceive considerable voice or process control and to feel
respected. The use of legally trained mediators may contribute to perceptions
of increased decision making accuracy or quality, albeit, at higher costs than
would be incurred if trained mediators who are not necessarily attorneys also
are allowed to mediate disputes. Moreover, mediators who are employed by
the State rather than a health plan are likely to be perceived as more impartial.
Again, treatment guidelines may contribute to actual and perceived reliability
and consistency in decision making.
However, to the extent that a health care claim dispute can be character-
ized as a conflict of interest between a claimant and a health plan, leaving
decision control in the hands of the disputants is not likely to be the most
efficient means of conflict resolution. Thibaut and Walker's research suggests
that disputes involving intense conflicts of interest are better resolved when
decision control is vested in a third party (as in binding arbitration), particular-
ly when clear standards are present and the parties are under time pres-
sure.
32 1
Nevertheless, even in those cases in which a particular health care claim
dispute is better characterized as a difference in perspective or "cognitive
conflict" between parties regarding objective or factual matters, leaving pro-
cess and decision control in the hands of the disputants likely is not the best
means of obtaining accurate results. In fact, Thibaut and Walker argue that "an
autocratic system delegating both process and decision control to a disinter-
ested third party is most likely to produce truth." '322 In reality, many health
care claim disputes involve elements of both interest and cognitive conflict.
For examples, the parties may have conflicting economic interests over wheth-
er an expensive treatment should be provided under the health plan. The par-
ties also may have a cognitive conflict or difference in perspective over which
treatment is most effective for a particular health problem. Thus, hybrid proce-
dures more similar to binding arbitration may be more suited to resolving the
types of disputes that often arise in the health care context. Such procedures
would allow disputants to state their case, while allowing the arbitrator to seek
out evidence on his or her own. Decision control would be left with the arbi-
trator.
There is little basis for evaluating the Federal Health Plan Review Board's
procedures on objective or subjective grounds because no procedures have
been specified. However, one can ask whether this additional level of adminis-
trative review can be justified by improved accuracy given that correctability
or opportunity for appeal is not an important determinant of subjective percep-
321. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 92, at 15.
322. Thibaut & Walker, supra note 148, at 547.
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tions of procedural justice. The Senate Proposal, which does not provide for a
Federal Health Plan Review Board and avoids this additional tier of review, is
clearly the most cost-effective approach which sacrifices little in terms of
claimant perceptions of procedural justice.
In terms of judicial review and enforcement, the Administration and
House Proposals generally receive high marks for providing an explicit private
right of action against a regional health alliance. However, the proposals
should clarify the process by which a claimant could elect to forego further
proceedings in the complaint review office and take direct legal action against
a health plan.323 Moreover, the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement
for judicial review in federal court seems high even in comparison to the
$1000 amount in controversy requirement under Medicare.324 However, the
overall desirability or necessity of making judicial review in federal court
more or less readily available depends in part on whether claim reView proce-
dures, provided prior to or in lieu of judicial review, resolve claims in a fair,
rational and efficient manner.
CONCLUSION
Law and social science converge on the following factors as critical ingre-
dients of individual and public perceptions that justice has been done: having
the opportunity to state one's case and to be heard; having one's claim decid-
ed in a rational, objective, and impartial manner; and being treated with digni-
ty and respect. Thus, health plans and reform proposals that take these factors
into consideration in developing grievance and appeal procedures are likely to
contribute to increased subjective perceptions of procedural fairness, which in
turn should contribute to increased acceptance of decisions, both favorable and
unfavorable. Overall, procedures for reviewing health care claims should en-
sure that people have a voice, that is, that they are able to present their side of
the dispute at the earliest possible time and to do so orally and in person.
Personal appearance provides the claimant with direct evidence that his or her
views are being heard. It also provides a direct basis for determining the im-
partiality of the decision maker and whether the decision maker has adequately
considered the claimant's views. This also enhances perceptions that one is
being treated with dignity and respect. Ideally, the person presiding over a
hearing should be impartial, in the common sense use of that term. In other
words, that person's income and employment should not depend on pleasing
the reviewing institution.325
323. See Administration Proposal, supra note 271, § 5203(a)(1).
324. The Senate Proposal does not provide for review of specific health care claims in
federal court, regardless of the amount in controversy. However, the Senate Proposal does
authorize the Secretary of Labor to assess civil penalties against health plans for unreason-
able denial or delay in the payment or provision of health benefits in the amount of $25,000
per violation ($75,000 if done in bad faith) and an additional $1,000,000 if a pattern or
practice of prohibited conduct is established. Senate Proposal, supra note 273, § 5505.
325. Moreover, decision makers generally do not need legal training, particularly those
presiding over the initial stages of the claims review process. In fact, knowledge of health
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Providing oral hearings at the earliest feasible point in the review process
likely will decrease the need for multiple tiers of review and reduce overall
demand for costly administrative appeals and judicial review. In any case,
these recommendations raise empirical questions that could be evaluated as
part of a performance-based management system of quality assurance. In fact,
a management system of quality assurance established under national health
care reform could serve as a natural laboratory for basic and applied research
on due process and procedural justice, with empirical data serving as a source
of ongoing feedback for legal and policy reform.
care issues will be more important in many cases.
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TAX PLANNING FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
ADAM CHASE*
INTRODUCTION
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution, has always been subject to
the control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at
which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form
essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it
creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present
and prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds
for its dissolution.'
Justice Field's recognition in Maynard v. Hill of the legislature's broad
authority over the definition of marriage neglects an important element: the
legislature also prescribes who may marry whom.
By denying same-sex couples2 the ability to enter into legally recognized
marriages, legislative bodies have prevented lesbian women and gay men from
availing themselves of the panoply of entitlements and privileges that come as
part of the institution of marriage. This article explores various practical and
economic advantages included in the marital package that are unavailable to
unmarried couples. Specifically, the article focuses on the different tax treat-
ment afforded married couples and gay and lesbian couples. The analysis
highlights methods of achieving parallel rights and benefits through, inter alia,
* Associate, Adams and Johnston, P.L.C., Boulder, Colorado; LL.M. in Taxation, 1994,
New York University School of Law; J.D., 1991, University of Colorado School of Law; B.A.,
1988, Haverford College; B.A., 1987, University of Kent, U.K. The author wishes to thank James
and Ron, and Diane and Ivette for their inspiration and encouragement, and Susan Murray and
Professor Guy B. Maxfield for their direction and comments.
1. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
2. This article uses the terms "same-sex couples," "lesbian women," "gay men," and
"homosexuals" somewhat interchangeably. Terminology-such as the question of whether to
use "lover," "partner," or "significant other"-has taken an important position within the gay-
rights movement, and the phrases used here are intended to be the most sensitive to current
trends and ideas of referring to individuals with a same-sex sexual orientation. For a dis-
cussion of "naming" issues, see Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?
Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46
U. MtAMI L. REV. 511, 530-37 (1992); Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation
Law in the Mid-Eighties (pt. I), 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459, 463-64 (1985); Mary N.
Cameli, Note, Extending Family Benefits to Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 68 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 447, 447 n.3 (1992).
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contracting and tax planning. Finally, the article looks to the future likelihood
of legally recognized same-sex marriages and the tax ramifications of such
recognition.
Marriage, as "the most important relation in life," encompasses far more
than the legal, economic, and property rights relationships that are the subject
of this article. The admittedly narrow scope excludes analysis of the emotion-
al, political, and philosophical arguments that are at least on par with the
material arguments for granting legitimacy to gay and lesbian marriages?
I. SAME-SEX COUPLES AND MARRIED COUPLES: THE CONTRAST IN
TREATMENT
Tax law touches almost every aspect of human conduct. We are taxed
from cradle to grave, and even then our estates-if we have them-are subject
to tax. Accordingly, prudent tax planning involves a comprehensive view of
life's many stages and transactions, encompassing both the expected and unex-
pected.' For a married couple whose legal status carries substantial automatic
tax preferences and protections, the task of tax planning is less difficult than
for a similarly situated lesbian or gay couple that must resort to complex legal
arrangements in an attempt to achieve parity.
As compared to same-sex couples, married couples are given preferential
treatment by the government, employers, insurers, and private organizations. In
response to this discrimination, lesbian and gay couples have entered creative
legal relationships, some of which have substantial tax ramifications. To cir-
cumvent any negative tax consequences resulting from these legal mecha-
nisms, same-sex couples must employ careful tax planning strategies. Accord-
ingly, an exposition of the discrimination against lesbian and gay couples is a
functional starting point for an analysis of tax planning for same-sex couples.
3. For sources of non-materialistic, socio-political arguments underlying the recognition
and acceptance of same-sex marriage, see Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should
Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE 13, 16-19 (Suzanne Sherman ed.,
1992) (explaining politically and philosophically why every lesbian woman and gay man
should have the right to marry the same-sex partner of their choice, and why the gay-rights
movement aggressively should seek full legal recognition of same-sex marriages); Jennifer L.
Heeb, Note, Homosexual Marriage, the Changing- American Family, and the Heterosexual
Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 347, 361 (1993) (acknowledging the inadequacies
of the marriage alternatives for gay and lesbian couples); Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family,
Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 681, 688, 697 (1990) (concluding
that gay and lesbian couples are only able to gain the psychological harmony of emotional
commitment and legal protection through marriage).
4. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behav-
ioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 986-87 (1993) (stating that tax
laws play a role in important decisions affecting everyday life for many American families
and examining tax rules in terms of the types of families they promote through behavioral
incentives and by constraining and shaping individual choices).
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A. During the Relationship
The marital relationship confers upon heterosexual couples special legal
and social advantages affecting their taxes, intestate succession, health care,
insurance, organizational memberships, and their means of holding real es-
tate. 5 In contrast, lesbian and gay couples involved in long-term, intimate
relationships are denied these and other privileges.6
1. Government Discrimination
The government, whether federal, state, or local, treats married couples
more favorably than it does same-sex couples, be it in a legislative, executive,
or judicial capacity. Although this disparate treatment almost always has indi-
rect tax ramifications, the Internal Revenue Code (the Code)7 and Treasury
Regulations (the Regulations)8 provide direct invidious treatment of married
couples. The generous provisions offered by the Code and the Regulations,
which are thoroughly discussed below, include the right to file joint returns,9
5. Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbi-
an Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, " 79
VA. L. REV. 1535, 1535 (1993); Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal
Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874 (1979).
6. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1508, 1611 (1989); see also John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination:
A Proposal for the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1415-16
(1991) (discussing the role that state prohibitions against marital discrimination have played
in protecting the rights of unmarried couples); Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The
Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1640, 1642-43 (1991) [hereinafter Looking for a Family Resemblance] (whether a relationship
qualifies as a family relationship can determine eligibility for "desirable housing, immigration
privileges, public welfare benefits, private insurance benefits, child custody and visitation
rights, and rights of intestate succession"). But see WASH. BLADE, May 31, 1985, at 9 (the
American Automobile Association of Southern California offers gay couples the same dis-
count on auto insurance that married couples enjoy).
7. I.R.C. §§ 1-7803 (West 1994).
8. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.01-1 to 702.9037-2.
9. I.R.C. § 6013 (West 1994). Subject to specified exceptions, taxpayers can file joint-
ly if they are "married" and both agree to file a joint return. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West 1994).
On a joint return, the taxpayers report their combined income and deduct their combined
allowable expenses, thus providing beneficial pooling of disparate income earners. See DE-
PARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 1993 TAX GUIDE FOR INDIVIDU-
ALS (CCH), Publication 17, Cat. No. 10311G, at 22 ("If you and your spouse decide to file
a joint return, your tax may be lower than the tax for the other filing statuses. Also, your
standard deduction . . . may be higher."). Married status includes couples that are married
and living together or separate, couples living together in common law marriage if recog-
nized in their state of residence, and couples separated under an interlocutory divorce decree.
Id.
Note also that signing a joint return may disadvantage spouses who are jointly and
severally liable for underpayments attributable to the other spouse. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (West
1994). The innocent spouse provision, however, provides some relief in extreme cases. I.R.C.
§ 6013(e) (West 1994). See generally Richard C.E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem:
Joint and Several Liability for Income Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317
(1990). Married couples are also not allowed to recognize losses on sales between spouses.
I.R.C. §§ 267, 1041 (West 1994). Similarly, joint-filers are subject to a number of tax attri-
bution rules that treat them as a unitary taxpayer. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 318(a), 453(e) (West
1995]
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beneficial adjustments for gift taxes paid by a decedent spouse," a full mari-
tal deduction for transfers to a spouse upon death," tax-free inter-spousal
transfers,'2 and special estate tax treatment for joint interests of husband and
wife.'3
2. Military Discrimination
The government's most prominent discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation occurs in the armed services. Despite the military's policy of
"don't ask, don't tell," homosexual conduct is still grounds for discharge.
4
While thousands of gay men and lesbian women have discharged from the
military, 5 the armed services is not the only government branch in which
employees have lost their jobs because of their sexual orientation. 6
1994).
10. I.R.C. § 2001(d) (West 1994).
I1. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (West 1994).
12. I.R.C. § 1041 (West 1994); see I.R.C. § 2523 (West 1994) (providing a 100%
marital deduction for lifetime gifts between spouses); I.R.C. § 2513 (West 1994) (providing
joint gift treatment for a gift made by one spouse).
13. I.R.C. § 2040(b) (West 1994). But note that one provision no longer discriminates
in granting tax-exempt status to organizations promoting gay rights. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West
1994). In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the
court struck down Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i), which gave the Commissioner the
discretion to deny exempt status to organizations deemed to be controversial.
14. Gay Rights in the Military: The Pentagon's New Policy Guidelines on Homosexuals
in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1993. at 16. Homosexual conduct is defined as "a
homosexual act, a statement that the member is homosexual or bisexual, or a marriage or
attempted marriage to someone of the same gender." Id. The Pentagon's policy guidelines
make no distinction between off-base and on-base conduct. Id. The policy, though protecting
speech within the context of priest-penitent, husband-wife and attorney-client relationships,
does not extend the privilege to communications between partners in a gay or lesbian rela-
tionship. Id. Finally, the policy states that an individual's sexual conduct is a legitimate
security concern if it could make an individual susceptible to exploitation or coercion. Id.
On March 30, 1995, a federal judge struck down the "don't ask, don't tell" policy as
unconstitutional, on the grounds that it violates gay service members' rights to free speech
and equal protection. Able v. United States, 1995 WL 149460 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1995).
Although the opinion applies only to the six service members who were plaintiffs in the
case, it represents "the first step in a process that could lead to a Supreme Court ruling on
the policy." Military Policy on Gays Ruled Unconstitutional, Judge Blocks Dismissal of Six
Homosexuals Under 'Don't Tell' Rule, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 31, 1995, at IA.
For an additional military discharge case, see Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (finding that the discharge of a Naval midshipman who, upon questioning, ad-
mitted his homosexuality, violated the rational basis test and the Fifth Amendment right to
equal protection). On November 22, 1994, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed the panel decision. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
15. See NAN D. HUNTER El AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: THE BASIC
ACLU GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 41 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS OF
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN] (citing Department of Defense statistics that 6,770 people were
discharged from the military from .1985 to 1989 on the basis of homosexuality). Compare
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1396-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding the Army's right
to fire a gay employee) with benShalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 977 (E.D.
Wis. 1980) (holding that the military's exclusionary policy arbitrarily excludes homosexuals
and violates the First Amendment), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990). See also Develop-
ments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1554-57, 1559 n.31.




In the courts," legally recognized heterosexual marriages are given dis-
parate treatment in a number of ways.18 Gays and lesbians cannot sue in tort
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, or wrongful
death. 9 Nor are communications between gay and lesbian partners protected
by the spousal communication privilege.2" Moreover, courts often have creat-
ed a presumption against granting custody or visitation to gay parents.2' Also,
married couples are allowed jail visitation rights that are often denied to gay
and lesbian partners.22
4. Benefits Discrimination
Whether through legislation or executive decision, the government also
grants special benefits to married couples that it does not extend to same-sex
couples. Programs such as social security, veteran's benefits, and disability
to fire a gay employee), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 337 (1993); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 102-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding the FBI's right to fire a gay employee). But see
City of Dallas v. England, 846 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (clearing the way for a
lesbian to serve in the Dallas Police Department by ruling that the city could not base its
hiring policy on a 114-year-old state law criminalizing sodomy); Ruling on Gay Police Offi-
cers, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at A14.
17. For a comprehensive discussion of the treatment of gay men and lesbian women
within the criminal justice system, including analyses of sodomy statutes, bias crimes against
gay men and lesbian women, sexual orientation criminal defenses, evidentiary issues, and
homophobia as it relates to voir dire, see Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and
the Law, supra note 6, at 1519-52.
18. One explanation for the disparate judicial treatment is the rigid analysis courts have
resorted to in resolving issues that arise when static legal definitions of family relationships
clash with dynamic demographic changes. Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 6,
at 1642-50.
19. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588-90 (Cal. 1988) (holding that an unmarried
partner could not collect damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of
consortium); Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980) (married
status provided prima facie evidence of sufficiently close relationship for collection under
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress); Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873,
877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (concluding that an intimate same-sex relationship does not fall
within the close relationship standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress). See gen-
erally THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 89 (no state has extend-
ed the right to recover damages from those responsible for an accidental death to include
unmarried people); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6,
at 1620-23; Heeb, supra note 3, at 352 n.20, 353 n.26; M. Elizabeth Thames, Comment,
Consortium Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 145, 149-50 (1985).
20. Stoddard, supra note 3, at 15; James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex
Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93, 96 (1993).
21. E.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 1995 WL 234222 (Va. Apr. 21, 1995); Larson v. Larson,
No. CA 94-00154 (Ark. Ct. App. filed Jan. 11, 1994); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694
(Va. 1985); see Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a
lesbian non-biological parent did not have standing as a parent under domestic relations law
to seek visitation rights with a child that she and her ex-partner raised); THE RIGHTS OF
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 94-101. Contra Jenkins v. Jenkins, 447 S.E.2d
554 (W. Va. 1994) (decided in favor of lesbian mother).
22. Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family Benefits Through
Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 46-50 (1986).
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insurance, which grant benefits to spouses and certain family members, ex-
clude same-sex partners as payment recipients. 3 Married couples also are




In the realm of employment, lesbian women and gay men are subject to
mistreatment 2- similar to discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, and disability. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
prohibits employment discrimination by private employers and the federal
government on the basis of all of the above categories but does not protect
against discrimination based upon sexual orientation.26 The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, charged with the enforcement of Title VII, has
refused jurisdiction over sexual orientation discrimination charges.2 7 Further,
23. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 411 (1988) (providing veterans' benefits to surviving spouses
upon the death of a veteran spouse); 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1988) (providing medicare benefits to
spouses of those insured, once the insured reaches age 62); McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d
54, 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (denying veterans' benefits on the grounds that same-sex marriages
were prohibited under state law); THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15,
at 93; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE
613, 615, 1119-22 (1994); Stoddard, supra note 3, at 15.
24. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 86-87; Rivera, supra
note 5, at 874.
25. See generally THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 16-30
(addressing violations of the right to equal employment opportunities and restricted access to
occupational licensing, and noting that the law offers little protection against discrimination
based on sexual orientation).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (equal employment opportuni-
ty statute does not extend rights to gays or lesbians); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (no mention of gays or lesbians in stat-
ute); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-960 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (no mention
of gays or lesbians as protected under the statute); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608
F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VII prohibition of "sex" discrimination does not include
protection of sexual preference); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th
Cir. 1978) (Title VII allows discrimination based on affectional or sexual preference);
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (discharging em-
ployee for having a sex change does not violate Title VII); Rivera, supra note 5, at 464-65
(noting unsuccessful attempts by gays to have sexual orientation considered under Title VII).
See generally I. Bennett Capers, Note, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1158 (1991).
Lesbian and gay rights supporters have sought passage of a national gay-rights bill
that has been repeatedly introduced in Congress since 1975. H.R. 423, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993). If passed, the Civil Rights Amendment Act of 1993 would have amended existing
civil-rights legislation to prohibit private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See
Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1905, 1907-08
(1993).
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1994, introduced into Congress by Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy and Representatives Barney Frank and Gerry Studds, would prohibit
employers from subjecting employees to different standards or treatment, or otherwise dis-
criminating in employment on the basis of sexual orientation. NCLR is Following ENDA's
Progress, NCLR NEWSL. (Nat'l Ctr. For Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, CA), Fall 1994, at
3.
27. 2 EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 919 6493, 6495 (1976). For an in-depth analysis of
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gay and lesbian employees or prospective employees have found little success
in the courts when claiming substantive Constitutional protections such as ra-
tional basis review,2" or the First Amendment.29
6. Insurance Discrimination
As a further inequality, employer-provided health insurance almost always
excludes unmarried partners, but normally covers spouses." For gay and les-
bian employees, the result is total compensation lower than that of married co-
workers performing the same job.3' Same-sex couples also suffer diminished
employment benefits due to marital biases built into bereavement leave and
pension plans.32 Similar invidious discrimination exists in workers compensa-
tion schemes that provide benefits for "dependents" of covered employees.33
Courts generally refuse to recognize the right of a cohabitant to receive work-
ers compensation benefits unless the cohabitant is the covered employee's
legal spouse.'
7. Private Organization Discrimination
Same-sex couples also are subject to discriminatory treatment by private
organizations. Lesbian and gay couples are normally precluded from special
club membership rates,33 home and automobile insurance rates,36 and family
litigation of employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see Rivera, supra
note 2, at 465-540.
28. Singer v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247, 255 (9th Cir. 1976),
vacated, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1557-64.
29. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1571-
73, 1586-02.
30. See, e.g., Stoddard, supra note 3, at 15; Tamar Lewin, Suit Over Death Benefits
Asks, What Is Family?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1990, at B7 (reporting that a lesbian denied
death benefits for her deceased partner is suing AT&T for the benefits).
31. Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace: Equita-
ble Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1990). This
note examines some of the inequalities between married and same-sex employees. Id. at
1069. It refers to Bureau of Labor Statistics in pointing out that employee benefits average
more than twenty-seven percent of total compensation for employees in the private sector. Id.
at 1070. Insurance plans alone, of which health insurance is a major component, constitute
approximately six percent of the total compensation costs. Id. at 1070-71.
32. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PUBLIC EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, LEGISLATIVE
BRIEFING SERIES: DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 3 (1991) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SE-
RIES]; Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
539, 540 (1991).
33. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at
1618-19.
34. See, e.g., id. at 1619 (citing Donovan v. County of Los Angeles, 73 LA 385-107
(Cal. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., Opinion and Notice of Intention, Nov. 3, 1983) (holding
that a deceased employee's same-sex partner of twenty-seven years was a "good faith mem-
ber" of the employee's household and, accordingly, was entitled to workers' compensation
benefits)).
35. See, e.g., Olson v. Y.M.C.A. of Metro. Madison, No. 3110 (Madison, Wis., Equal
Opportunities Comm'n, Oct. 10, 1985) (holding that the denial of a Y.M.C.A. family mem-
bership to a lesbian couple did not violate the local Equal Opportunity Ordinance).
36. Automobile and home insurers use marital status as a premium-rating standard. See
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rates in nongovernmental medical insurance plans such as Blue Cross and
Blue Shield.37 In addition, lesbian and gay partners suffer discrimination by
hospitals with respect to medical emergencies and guardianship."
8. Housing Discrimination
Same-sex couples face substantial discrimination in their efforts to obtain
housing.39 This is attributable to exclusionary zoning laws, restrictive statu-
tory provisions, and narrow judicial constructions of the meaning of "fami-
ly.,,' Lesbian and gay couples also face discrimination in the application of
rent control and stabilization laws. For example, a person involved in a lesbian
or gay relationship is subject to eviction for failure to qualify for the right of
successorship of the named tenant upon the death of her or his cohabitant
partner, the named tenant." Same-sex couples also are subject to private dis-
THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 90-91 (noting that California,
Wisconsin, and Illinois forbid insurance carriers from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation or marital status); Rivera, supra note 5, at 906.
37. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 91.
38. See, e.g., 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied, Feb. 10, 1992
(Kowalski I11); 392 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, Oct. 17, 1986
(Kowalski I1); In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986) (Kowalski I); see also KAREN THOMPSON & JULIE
ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? (1988).
In November 1983, Sharon Kowalski suffered severe brain damage when the car she
was driving was hit by a drunk driver. Id. at 1-8. She was unable to act on her own behalf,
causing a controversy as to who should be appointed as her guardian: Karen Thompson, her
lesbian partner of four years and the woman with whom Kowalski had exchanged rings and
named as beneficiary on her life insurance, or Kowalski's father. Kowalski 1, 382 N.W.2d at
863. After Mr. Kowalski was named guardian, he cut off Thompson's visitation rights. Id. at
864. During the course of the seven-year dispute, however, Thompson was awarded reinstate-
ment of visitation rights and eventually named Kowalski's guardian. Kowalski III, 478
N.W.2d at 791. For a synopsis of the Kowalski story, see Cameli, supra note 2, at 452-54.
39. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 64-69; Developments
in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1612-18. See LEGISLATIVE
BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that unmarried couples are denied HUD hous-
ing).
40. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974) (upholding an ordinance
prohibiting unrelated people from living together in certain types of housing); City of Ladue
v. Horn, 720 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding a city zoning ordinance that
defined "family" as those persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and thereby pre-
venting an unmarried heterosexual couple from cohabitating). But see Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 494-98 (1977) (In striking down the law, the Court distinguished
the Belle Terre ordinance as one promoting family values. In contrast, the East Cleveland
law "slic[ed] deeply into the family itself," because it limited occupancy of a dwelling to
immediate family so as to prevent a grandmother from living with her son and grandson and
his cousin.).
41. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987) (providing that
no occupant of housing shall be evicted if the occupant is either the surviving spouse of the
deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living
with the tenant); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 544 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
the above provision does not extend to a same-sex partner); East 10th St. Assocs. v. Estate
of Goldstein, 552 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258-59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (eviction protection status
was not presumed until there was a showing of "two adult lifetime partners whose relation-
ship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interde-
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crimination in housing due to homophobia on the part of landlords, and to
restrictive agreements on the part of condominium and homeowner associa-
tions.42 Finally, same-sex couples may be denied a mortgage because many
banks and savings and loan associations view lesbians and gay men as
uncreditworthy due to their unorthodox life-styles.43
B. Upon Dissolution
Lesbian and gay couples, unlike their married counterparts, do not have a
set of laws governing the division of property or providing for support pay-
ments upon the dissolution of their relationship.' Nor may they take advan-
tage of community property laws in states under the community property
system because community property applies only to married couples.45 Fur-
ther, a gay or lesbian partner may be subject to gift tax for making support
payments or dividing shared property depending on the amount, circumstances,
and original contribution towards the particular divided asset.'
C. Upon Death
As mentioned above, same-sex couples are subject to higher taxes upon
the death of a partner than are married couples upon the death of a spouse.4
Lesbian women and gay men may not avail themselves of the marital deduc-
tion or the right to election, and therefore must pay higher estate or gift tax-
pendence"). For a general discussion of Braschi, see William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family:
A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L.
& POL. 89, 95-97 (1991).
42. See The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in
renting or selling housing units on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
but not on the basis of sexual orientation); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-34-502, 24-34-601
(1988 & Supp. 1994) (prohibiting discrimination in housing and places of public accommoda-
tion, respectively); THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 68 (airing
the pessimistic view that "there is little a lesbian or gay man can do to challenge an
owner's refusal to sell to him or her, unless there is a statute specifically outlawing housing
discrimination on account of sexual orientation"); Developments in the Law-Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Law, supra note 6, at 1615-17; Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associa-
tions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 473 (1985) (homeowner associations exercise great control
over the people within their boundaries, including unrelated cohabitants).
43. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 67. But see Equal
Credit Opportunity Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting
discrimination in granting credit on the basis of sex or marital status).
44. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 87; Heeb, supra note
3. at 352; see Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE
L. REV. 311, 325 (1980-81) (acknowledging the absence of statutes or legal procedures that
ensure fair treatment between same-sex partners upon separation).
45. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 87.
46. See Bruce Wolk, Federal Tax Consequences of Wealth Transfers Between Unmar-
ried Cohabitants, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1263 (1980) (noting the tax law's distinction be-
tween status and contract in the context of marital dissolution). In Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S.
151 (1917), the Supreme Court held that alimony did not constitute taxable income because
it was "not founded on a contract, express or implied, but on a natural and legal duty of
the husband to support the wife." Id. at 153; see infra note 169 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note II and accompanying text.
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es.48 Moreover, lesbians and gay men are burdened by the necessity of pre-
paring wills or establishing trusts if they want to assure a distribution of their
assets upon death in a manner different from that set out in the intestate stat-
ute of the decedent's resident state.49 That is, if lesbians or gay men want
their partners to inherit any part of their estate, they must specifically arrange
for the transfer by a proper legal device.5" Finally, same-sex couples are ex-
posed to discrimination when arranging funerals for deceased companions.5
48. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. I.R.C. § 2523 (West 1994) provides
for special treatment with regard to gifts between spouses. Combined with § 2056, § 2523
enables married couples to pass substantial sums of wealth between spouses and then to
survivors. I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1994).
49. Intestacy laws control the distribution of a decedent's property when a person dies
without a will. GENERAL PRACTICE SECTION, AM. BAR Ass'N, ALL-STATES WILLS AND Es-
TATE PLANNING GUIDE 1-1 (1993 ed.) [hereinafter ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE] (this guide
includes a state-by-state survey of intestate descent and distribution provisions). "State law
directs the distribution of the decedent's property to his or her heirs and, in effect writes the
will the decedent failed to make." Id. In most states, the surviving spouse inherits a portion
of the estate, or "a fixed sum plus a percentage share of the balance." Id. Surviving children
receive the remainder of the estate in equal shares. Id. "Issue of a deceased child inherit the
share their parent would have received if the parent survived." Id. "Descendants . . . take in
preference of other blood relatives." Id. In the absence of descendants, parents normally take
subject to a surviving spouse's share; then siblings, then nephews and nieces, and so forth.
Id. at 1-2. See THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 87-89.
50. See HAYDEN CURRY & DENIS CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY
COUPLES 9:1 (6th ed. 1991). The authors describe the plight of a gay man whose lover died
intestate. Id. at 9:1. The decedent's family quickly appeared and started removing property
from the couple's apartment. Id. "His mother took the pillows and pillowcases off the bed,"
the lover said, remarking that he had to fight for his own clothes because they wore the
same size. Id. at 9:1-9:2. Note, however, that having a will is no guarantee that a substantial
bequest to a gay lover will be respected by the courts. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue
hIfluence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PIrr. L. REv. 225, 266-67 (1981) (attributing
the phenomenon of same-sex couples' greater risk of having testamentary plans overturned to
homophobia in the courts and in the families of the testators); Cameli, supra note 2, at 464
n.124 (noting that when Gertrude Stein died, her life-companion was left penniless despite
Stein's vast estate); infra notes 77, 97, 119, 137 and accompanying text.
51. See Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Stewart is an exceptional decision allowing a gay domestic partner
of a deceased AIDS victim to enjoin funeral plans by the decedent's family. Id. at 966.
Because the partner of the decedent had been named executor of the will, the court found
that the partner had standing as a representative of the estate. Id. at 968. The decision stated
that "the close, spousal-like relationship that existed between the plaintiff and his 'significant
other' and the strained relationship between [the decedent] and his family in the years prior
to death support the plaintiffs standing as a representative of [the decedent's] wishes." Id.
The decision goes on to note that the plaintiff was not a mere stranger or intermeddler, "but
was a lover and companion of the decedent for over five years," and that he was "attempt-
ing to carry out the final wishes of the person with whom he was building a future." Id.
The fact, however, that the will was silent on the matter of funeral arrangements put a sub-
stantial burden on the plaintiff. Id. See also Significant Others: Gay Partner Claims Burial
Rights, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 86.
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II. THE CURRENT STATUS OF HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE
As the United States Supreme Court has firmly acknowledged,
"[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of [women and men],' fundamental
to our very existence and survival." 2 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, state
laws that restrict fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.53 Neverthe-
less, the basic civil right of marriage is subject to the control of state legisla-
tive bodies' and no state, nor the District of Columbia, has legalized same-
sex marriage." The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the legiti-
52. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)); see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81-82 (1987) (striking down a law
limiting prisoners' freedom to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978) (find-
ing unconstitutional a state statute that required parents under child support obligations to
meet certain financial requirements as a prerequisite to marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (describing the right to marry as older than the Bill of Rights),
see also Heeb, supra note 3, at 347 n. I.
53. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (fundamental liberties
may not "be abridged by the states simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some
rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose"); Developments in the
Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1605-11 (exploring the constitutional
right of gay and lesbian couples to marry and state justifications for prohibiting same-sex
marriage).
54. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888); see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404
(1975) (recognizing state regulation of the marital relationship); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 734-35 (1877) (acknowledging the state's absolute right "to prescribe both the condi-
tions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the
reasons for which it may be dissolved"). Note that so long as each state recognizes marriag-
es performed in other states, if a single state allowed for same-sex marriages, lesbian and
gay couples could get married in that state and then return home as married couples assum-
ing their home state does not change its current recognition of marriages from other states.
See infra text accompanying note 62.
Colorado has a statute that, like most other states, simply adopts the language of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-112 (1987) ("All marriages
contracted . ..outside this state that were valid at the time of the contract or subsequently
validated by the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicile of the
parties are valid in this state."). COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-110 (1987), entitled "Prohibited
marriages," does not address marriages between parties of the same sex, concerning itself
instead with polygamy and consanguinity. See id.
55. Jean Patteson, Gay Couples Seek Benefits, Acceptance of Marriage, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
19, 1993, at 5; For Gays, Wedding Bells May Soon Ring, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1993, at 62;
see, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara,
522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, that the
right to privacy did not prevent states from criminalizing same-sex sexual activity. Id. at
190. Bowers gives states another line of defense against arguments that they should be com-
pelled to legalize same-sex marriage. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 18 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1381, 1387-88 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that "legislative authorization of homo-
sexual, same-sex marriages would constitute tacit state approval of the sexual conduct, to wit,
sodomy, commonly associated with homosexual status-conduct deemed by society to be so
morally reprehensible as to be a criminal offense in the District of Columbia and many other
jurisdictions"). Currently, twenty-three states have valid criminal sodomy statutes. Sherry
Jacobson, Hawaii Debates Gay Marriages: State May Recognize Such Unions After Court
Ruling, Pair's Bias Suit, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 1993, at IA; Trosino, supra
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macy of same-sex marriage, and has declined the opportunity to do so for lack
of federal question jurisdiction.56
A. Recent Cases
Several recent decisions concerning the issue of same-sex marriage shed
new light on the controversy.57 In Dean v. District of Columbia,55 the court
rejected a due process claim brought by two men seeking a marriage license.
The court stated that "[t]he true due process inquiry involves not the funda-
mental nature of an abstract 'right to marry,' but rather, whether the constitu-
tion confers a fundamental right upon persons of the same sex to marry one
another."59 The due process claim failed because gay marriage was not a
right "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," nor "deeply rooted in the
nation's history."'
Proponents of same-sex marriage gained significant ground in Hawaii,
where the state's supreme court held in Baehr v. Lewin6 that a state statute
prohibiting same-sex marriage may violate the state constitution's equal pro-
tection clause. Hawaii's equal protection clause is more elaborate than the
federal counterpart, providing that no person shall be denied equal protection
or be discriminated against in the exercise of civil rights on the basis of, inter
alia, "sex."6 2 The majority of the Baehr court held marriage was a protected
note 20, at 117 n.160.
While only a few states expressly prohibit same-sex marriage, the absence of a statute
has not prevented courts from construing marriage laws to preclude them. See, e.g., Adams
v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (construing
Colorado law and noting that even if same-sex marriages were valid under state law, federal
law may not recognize them as having "spouse status."); Eblin, supra note 31, at 1068 n.10.
56. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); see also Mary Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of Family, 26
GONZ. L. REV. 91, 107 (1991).
57. See Rubenstein, supra note 41 (this article, written by the Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, gives a thorough overview of several
of the more prominent decisions in the area of gay rights).




61. 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
62. Id. at 59-60. Hawaii left an opening for same-sex marriages in 1984, when its
legislature changed the definition of marriage by deleting the word "procreation" as the pur-
pose of marriage in order to accommodate elderly couples seeking marriage. Jacobson, supra
note 57, at IA; see Jane Gross, After a Ruling, Hawaii Weighs Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES,
April 25, 1994, at Al (observing that Hawaii-known for its progressive public policy and
tolerance for diversity-has a constitution that "is more elaborate than its Federal counterpart
and explicitly prohibits sex discrimination"); Jeffrey Schmalz, In Hawaii, Step Toward Legal-
ized Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at A14 (Schmalz notes that while no state
currently allows same-sex marriages, each state recognizes marriages performed in another
state. "Thus, unless other states acted to change current practices, gay couples married in Ha-
waii would have to be recognized as married couples in other states, thereby entitling them
to the tax breaks, health benefits and survivoi benefits that accrue to married partners.").
For a more involved discussion of nationwide recognition and the application of the Full
Faith and Credit clause to same-sex marriages, see Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and
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civil right and that discrimination on the basis of sex warrants strict scruti-
ny.63 The court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing at which the
state must offer the most compelling reasons for refusing to permit lesbian and
gay couples to marry.'
Finally, in the federal case of Shahar v. Bowers, a district court stated that
the plaintiffs "relationship with her female partner constitutes a constitutional-
ly-protected association."" Although the plaintiff technically lost her unem-
ployment discrimination suit against the Georgia Attorney General Michael
Bowers after he learned she was planning to marry another woman and with-
drew her job offer, the decision is viewed by gay rights activists as a legal
victory.' According to a director of the Lesbian and Gay Rights Project of
the American Civil Liberties Union, the "terminology used in this opinion is
unprecedented [and] a major victory for gay and lesbian rights."67
B. Colorado and Amendment 2
On November 3, 1993, by a vote of 53.4% to 46.6%, Colorado voters
passed an amendment to the Colorado Constitution referred to as Amendment
2.68 The amendment not only attempted to repeal existing state laws that pro-
Choice of Law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?
1994 Wisc. L. REV. 1033; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in
Sister States?: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of
Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr
v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551 (1994); Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of
Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450 (1994); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Consti-
tutional and Choice of Law Arguments for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 499 (1995).
63. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
64. Id.; see Notebook-Here Comes the Groom, 22 THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 31, 1993,
at II; see also Gross, supra note 62, at AI (surveying the responses to Baehr by Hawaii's
legislators, Attorney General, gay community, tourism industry, and national conservative
groups); Jacobson, supra note 55, at IA (The plaintiffs identified more than 200 rights and
benefits in the state code that are denied gay couples because they are not allowed to many.
The entitlements afforded by the state to married couples range from tax breaks to lower
rates on hunting licenses.).
65. 836 F. Supp. 859, 863 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
66. Mark Curriden, Lesbian Loses Job Bias Suit, A.B.A. J. Jan. 1994, at 27.
67. Id. "Shahar claimed that [Bower's] decision violated her rights to free association,
religion, and equal protection." Id. First Amendment experts project an ultimate victory for
Shahar because the government must show a compelling interest before it can interfere with
the right of association. Id. According to First Amendment attorney Bruce Fein, the
"marriage itself was not a homosexual act" of the type prohibited by Bowers v. Hardwick.
Id.
68. Amendment 2 provides:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
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tected gay people from discrimination, but also attempted to ban all future
laws that would recognize such claims by lesbians and gay men.6 On De-
cember 11, 1994, the Colorado Supreme Court found the amendment unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution." Colorado is the first state to witness a successful effort on the
part of right-wing, fundamentalist Christian groups to restrict the rights of
lesbians and gay men, but similar campaigns have been started in at least eight
other states.71
In discussing the tax planning measures available to same-sex couples, it
is necessary to look at the underlying state substantive law in order to discern
the federal tax ramifications. Because Colorado has taken the unfortunate
position as the bellwether state on the issue of anti-gay-rights initiatives, this
article will apply Colorado law as the default, pointing out other state laws
when relevant.7"
self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30(b) (permanently enjoined from enforcement by Evans v. Romer,
882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 1994 WL 706873 (Feb. 21, 1995).
69. Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 26, at 1905; Trosino,
supra note 20, at 99-100 (comparing the prejudices against same-sex marriages and arguing
that white supremacists in the post-Civil War Era maintained the "status quo by emphasizing
the handful of social effects" that could result from granting equal rights to such groups).
70. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 1994 WL 706873
(Feb. 21, 1995). The court reaffirmed its earlier decision requiring strict scrutiny review. Id.
at 1341. This previous decision was an appeal from the state challenging a preliminary in-
junction issued by a district court judge. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). At trial, the state had to show that Amendment
2's infringement on the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process was
in support of a compelling state interest narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose in the least
restrictive manner possible. Id. at 1275. The court held that the state failed to meet its bur-
den. 1I. at 1286. The Colorado Supreme Court stated:
Amendment 2 expressly fences out an independently identifiable group ...
Amendment 2 singles out that class of persons (namely gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals) who would benefit from laws barring discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation. No other identifiable group faces such a burden-no other group's
ability to participate in the political process is restricted and encumbered in a like
manner. Such a structuring of the political process undoubtedly is contrary to the
notion that "[tihe concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes no
preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifica-
tions."
Id. at 1285 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963)).
71. See Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 26, at 1905-06;
Tamar Lewin, Sights Are Set on Other Anti-Gay Measures, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1993, at
A22. Amendment 2 was sponsored by Colorado for Family Values, a group associated with
the right-wing Christian fundamentalist movement. Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay Rights
Initiatives, supra note 26, at 1905 n.6. Similar groups have begun to rally behind parallel
state constitutional amendments in Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, Ohio, Ore-
gon, and Washington. Id. at 1906 n.9. On April 12, 1995, an Oregon appellate court upheld
a 1993 law designed to invalidate local anti-gay rights ordinances in 27 cities and counties.
DeParrie v. State, 1995 WL 217945 (Or. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1995); Charles E. Beggs, Court
Backs Nullifying of Anti-Gay Laws, DENV. POST, Apr. 13, 1995, at 5A.
72. The author makes his home in Boulder, Colorado, one of the cities that has a law
prohibiting discrimination against gay men and lesbians in housing and employment. See
BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 12 (1981).
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III. OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES
"Marriage provides the ultimate form of acceptance for personal, intimate
relationships in our society, and gives those who marry an insider status of the
most powerful kind.""' For same-sex couples, who are denied such insider
status, the discrimination translates into a variety of disadvantages, including
higher taxes. To combat that situation, same-sex couples have looked to the
advantages of not having their relationship defined by law and entered into
relationships the terms of which they define themselves.
There are many mechanisms for creating legal relationships outside of
marriage, and this section will explore some of them while focussing on the
tax considerations. Defining a same-sex relationship according to a couple's
desires, structuring it to circumvent various legal constraints, and adapting it to
anticipate the tax ramifications requires a somewhat comprehensive approach.
A well-planned legal relationship involves strategies for cohabitation, finance,
property ownership, parenting, insurance, pensions, medical emergencies,
dissolution, support, incapacity, death, and estates.
A. Living Together Contracts and Similar Arrangements
The Human Rights issue we are concerned about here
is the fundamental freedom of every human being, man or
woman, gay or straight, to form primary relationships, to
fall in love, to develop relationships of caring that may or
may not involve parenting, to make commitments to one
another, and to have those relationships treated with re-
spect and dealt with equitably by the law.74
Same-sex couples are able to construct their own legal relationships
through bilateral contracts that define the rights, duties, obligations, responsi-
bilities, and other parameters of the relationship. The parties have tremendous
flexibility in deciding how comprehensive they want the contract to be and, as-
suming they are carefully drafted, these contracts will be respected by the
courts." Cohabitation agreements can either be express, implied, or structured
73. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIAN
AND GAY MARRIAGE 20 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992). In contrast to the tone expressed in
the quoted passage, Ettelbrick argues that the institution of marriage, which is "[slteeped in a
patriarchal system that looks to ownership, property, and dominance of men over women as
its basis," will constrain lesbian and gay relationships. Id. She contends that same-sex mar-
riage would undermine the purpose of the gay-rights movement and begin a process of si-
lencing the gay voice because lesbian and gay couples would then be forced to assimilate
into the mainstream. Id. at 21. For a related discussion, see infra notes 234-39 and accompa-
nying text.
74. San Francisco Supervisor Harry Britt, quoted in LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SERIES,
supra note 32, at I.
75. In the notorious decision Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), the California
Supreme Court proclaimed, "the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy
based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable expectation of the parties to a nonmarital rela-
tionship should be removed." Id. at 122. For the most part, they have. See Whorton v.
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into a form such as domestic partnership. These arrangements may involve
joint bank accounts, joint ownership of property, parenting arrangements, or
strategies for handling future contingencies.76
1. Express Pooling Agreements
A pooling agreement is an arrangement by which lesbian and gay couples
agree to share whatever income both parties receive while neither party is
required to perform any services for the other. Pooling agreements have a
number of drawbacks from a tax perspective.77
First, although this type of contract parallels a marital arrangement, it does
not entitle the parties to file a joint income tax return because they will not
qualify as "husband and wife.""8 Further, even though one party in a lesbian
or gay relationship is sharing all her or his earnings with the other, she or he
must recognize the full amount of that income on her or his separate tax return
due to the assignment of income principle.79
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (construing a two party contract,
the court ruled that the inference to sex-using the term lover-could be deleted and the
contract enforced); Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144, 148 (Or. 1976) (holding that an agree-
ment by unmarried cohabitants was not void as against public policy). In the Latham agree-
ment, the consideration was not restricted to sexual intercourse, but incorporated all the bur-
dens and amenities of married life. Id. at 147. See also Koslowski v. Koslowski, 403 A.2d
902, 906 (N.J. 1979) (upholding an agreement between unmarried cohabitants when the ar-
rangement was not explicitly founded on sexual services); CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note
50, at 2:2-2:4; THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 82-85; SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, § 3.04[21[b] (Roberta Achtenberg, ed. 1993); Cameli, supra
note 2, at 458-62; Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6,
at 1624-26. But see Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal.Rptr. 130, 133 (Ca. Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to
uphold a gay living-together contract because it explicitly referred to rendering services as a
lover in exchange for property, and was, therefore, an agreement for prostitution).
76. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at
1623-24 (noting that "same-sex couples have employed a number of legal mechanisms to
circumvent the barriers posed by state laws").
77. There are also negative bankruptcy problems associated with pooling agreements, but
they go beyond the scope of this article. For a general discussion of the tax aspects, see
Mary Wenig, Marital Status and Taxes, in UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW 189 (Gra-
ham Douthwaite ed., 1979). For a bankruptcy analysis, see William A. Reppy, Jr., Property
and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status,
44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1699-04 (1984).
78. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West 1994).
79. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Lucas involved a pooling agreement be-
tween a wife and husband. Id. at 113-14. The Supreme Court held that the husband was
taxable on the whole of his income because a salary earner may not shift the tax burden to
another by assigning the right to receive income through anticipatory arrangements and con-
tracts. Id. at 114-15; see also United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 447 (1973) (holding
that contributions to a retirement fund were taxable income for a medical partnership);
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 124 (1940) (holding that the assignment of future in-
come was taxable to the assignor in the year of payment); Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Cou-
ples and the Federal Tax Laws, I L. & SEXUALITY 97, 109-23 (1991) (providing an in-
depth discussion of the assignment of income principle as it applies to same-sex couples
entering into income sharing agreements). Cain offers a concrete example of how Lucas
applies to a same-sex couple and suggests a way of planning around the assignment of
income problem through a compensation arrangement. Id. at 120-23. Further, Cain proposes
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Pooling agreements have another negative tax aspect: when one party
receives more income than the other, and pooling causes a net transfer of
income to the party with less income, that transfer may be treated as a taxable
gift." Thus the greater income earner is subject to double taxation: once
when the income is earned, and again on the net amount that is treated as a
gift.s' The amount received by the transferee is excluded from gross income.
If the net transfer is not treated as a gift, 2 the lower income earner in the
pooling agreement will be taxed under the Code's broad definition of gross
income from the net transfer. s3
an alternative to the assignment of income principle that uses support payments and taxes
the recipient partner instead of the partner earning the larger income. Id; see also SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at 3-15 to 3-17; RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL.,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION I 10.01[10][al (6th ed. 1991) (discussing the assign-
ment of income as the "well-known income tax 'fruit' from the "tree" of Justice Holmes'
opinion in Lucas and exploring the overlap and clashes between the gift tax and the income
tax); Reppy, Jr., supra note 77, at 1694; Wolk, supra note 46, at 1244.
80. To the extent the net transfer from the greater income earner to the lower income
earner is viewed as being paid in consideration for the lower income earner's love, emotion-
al support, or other services upon which a monetary value may not be placed, the transfer is
a gift. The services are not an obligation that can be valued in "money's worth" under
I.R.C. § 2514 and, therefore, the payment will be treated as a gift. I.R.C. § 2514 (West
1994); see STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, I 10.01; Wenig, supra note 77, at 197, 201.
81. Only the net amount of the pooled income in excess of $10,000 per year will be a
taxable gift. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994). For an in-depth discussion of the gift tax con-
sequences of express pooling agreements, see Cain, supra note 79, at 114-16, 124-29; Wolk,
supra note 46, at 1275-90.
82. For federal gift tax purposes, a gift is a transfer of property "for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth." I.R.C. § 2512(b) (West 1994).
The amount of the gift is the difference between the value of the property transferred and
the consideration received. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992) (excluding
from the gift tax transfers made in the ordinary course of business, defined as a "transaction
which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent"). The definition for
gift tax purposes, unlike that for income tax purposes, uses an objective standard, thus ren-
dering the transferor's motivation irrelevant. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (as amended in
1986). As a result, the presence of consideration sufficient to make a promised transfer en-
forceable for state contract law purposes will not necessarily prevent some part of the trans-
fer from being a gift. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-384, 1979-2 C.B. 344. Accordingly, a wealth
transfer between same-sex partners will constitute a gift for gift tax purposes unless the
transferor receives consideration having an economic value equal to the property transferred.
Wolk, supra note 46, at 1276-77.
Gift taxes are normally payable by the donor. I.R.C. § 2502(c) (West 1994). If the
tax is not paid when due, the donee becomes personally liable for the tax to the extent of
the value of the gift. I.R.C. § 6324(b) (West 1994). Because the definition of "gift" is dif-
ferent for income and gift purposes, it is technically possible for a transfer to be considered
a gift under I.R.C. § 2512(b), but not a gift under the income tax definition. In that case,
the transfer would be subject to both gift and income taxation. See Commissioner v. Beck's
Estate, 129 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1942); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7921012 (Feb 16, 1979); Cain supra
note 79, at 124-25.
83. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 1994) defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived." In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955), the
Supreme Court held that income includes "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized,
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Moreover, regulations provide that
gross income includes income realized in any form, such as money, cash, services, property,
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In Commissioner v. Duberstein,' the Supreme Court held that a gift un-
der section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code must proceed from "detached
and disinterested generosity" prompted by "affection, respect, admiration,
charity or like impulses."85 This requires the motive for a transfer be ascer-
tained in order to determine whether the transfer qualifies as a gift. It is easy
to say a transfer from one lesbian or gay partner to the other is motivated out
of affection, respect and the like, but whether the transfer proceeded from
detached and disinterested generosity poses a more complicated question.
The facts surrounding a same-sex couple's relationship will be crucial to
the determination of motive, and one of the most important factors will be the
terms of the pooling agreement. In the case of a living-together contract con-
taining a reciprocal agreement to provide services and share property, the
Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") will take the position that the transfer
constitutes the purchase of companionship such that it is not a gift, but taxable
compensation to the recipient. 6 As a result of this quid pro quo agreement
the parties are treated as being engaged in an employer-employee relationship.
Complications arise when the amount of the transfer exceeds the fair market
value of the services rendered. The payments must be bifurcated as compensa-
tion for the fair market value of the services and gift for the remainder. 7
Whether the net transfer through a pooling agreement of a same-sex cou-
ple with income differentials is compensation or gift could have significant tax
ramifications. Characterization of the wealth or property transfer as a gift
normally results in less aggregate tax paid by the lesbian or gay couple 8 than
it would if the transfer is compensation for services.8 9
meals, and accommodations. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1993). However, I.R.C. § 102 (West
1994) excludes from gross income the value of property acquired by gift.
84. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
85. Id. at 285 (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956), and Robert-
son v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)).
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(1) (1993); see, e.g., Jones v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1323 (1977) (finding that a taxpayer who claimed both that she was a "kept woman"
and that amounts received from a married man were gifts was receiving compensation");
Brizendine v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 149 (1957) (finding promise to give compan-
ionship constituted sufficient consideration to negate classification of the payments as gifts);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 9 10.01121[g] (because the gift tax applies only to transfers
of property under I.R.C. § 2501, the gratuitous performance of services does not qualify for
gift tax treatment).
87. There is also the problem of the uncertain value of the imputed compensation for
the homemaker services, especially given the lack of an "arm's length" business transaction.
See Wolk, supra note 46, at 1251-52 ("Given this inherent uncertainty in valuation and the
fact that the parties have entered into a formal agreement, doubts may well be resolved
against the taxpayer. ... ).
88. Only amounts greater than $10,000 will be subject to tax at the transferor's tax
rate. 1.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994).
89. The entire net transfer would be counted as income and taxed at the transferee's
rate. In addition, the transferee would have to pay self-employment Social Security and hos-
pital taxes of approximately fifteen percent. I.R.C. §§ 1401(a)-(b), 1402(a)(12) (West 1994).
If the partner providing the services is hired as an "employee," then half of the Social Secu-
rity and hospital tax will be paid by the employer partner who may deduct those tax pay-
ments. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3111 (West 1994).
[Vol. 72:2
SAME-SEX TAX PLANNING
A possible advantage of a pooling agreement in a situation where one
partner provides services for the other in return for support is the availability
of deductions for personal exemptions. The Code provides a deduction for
personal exemptions for unrelated dependents for whom the taxpayer provides
over half the support during the year, if the dependent is a member of the
taxpayer's household and the dependent's gross income is less than the exemp-
tion amount.90 Note, however, that this provision is denied if the relationship
between the taxpayer and the dependent violates local law.9 Therefore, the
dependency exemption may be unavailable in states that still have anti-sodomy
laws on their books.92
If pooling agreements are drafted such that the net transfer from the high-
er income earner to the lower income earner is treated as an advance that is
repaid-say, when one partner in a lesbian or gay relationship is supporting
the other through school and the student promises to repay the advancements
when she or he graduates and is gainfully employed-the couple will be treat-
ed as being involved in a debtor-creditor relationship.93 These loan transac-
If, however, the gay or lesbian relationship revolves around a business such that the
net transfer qualifies as deductible compensation expenses for either the business or the trans-
feror, the compensation alternative may be more favorable. Further, if the amounts transferred
are less than the current taxable floor of $ 6,050 (zero-bracket amount of individual deduc-
tion plus personal exemption), the couple may fare well under the compensation outcome.
I.R.C. §§ 63(d)(2), 151(b) (West 1994); see I.R.C. § 119 (West 1994); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.119-
l(a)(l), (b), (c) (as amended in 1985) (excluding meals and lodging as a further reduction of
income for a homemaker-cohabitant partner). To be excluded from income pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 119, meals and lodging must be furnished on the business premises of the employer, for
the convenience of the employer, and the employee must be required to accept the meals or
lodging as a condition of her or his employment. I.R.C. § 119 (West 1994); see also Wolk,
supra note 46, at 1244-56; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at 3-17 to
3-21.
90. I.R.C. §§ 151(c)(1), 152(a)(9) (West 1994). In spite of the language of these sec-
tions, case law sheds some doubt on the applicability of deductions for personal exemptions
to unmarried cohabitants. Compare Hamilton v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 927, 929 (1960)
(board and lodging furnished by taxpayer in return for services is compensation, not support,
for purposes of I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) and is therefore taxable to recipient) and Angstadt v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 693, 695 (1968) (medical expenses paid on behalf of an-
other are considered compensation and are therefore taxable to the recipient) with Whalen v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 611, 612 (1976) (head of household exemption is not ap-
plicable if dependent is unrelated to taxpayer).
91. I.R.C. § 152(b)(5) (West 1994).
92. But see SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[31[a] (main-
taining that the lesbian or gay taxpayer should take the position that the relationship is legal
even though the sexual relations are illegal); Cain, supra note 79, at 121 n.l 17 (noting that
no state has a law prohibiting same-sex cohabitation, and making the distinction between sta-
tus and conduct); Hogan, supra note 14, at 38 (discussing the "status vs. conduct" distinction
and debate, and pointing out that while laws forbidding homosexual conduct are constitution-
al on their face, the status of homosexuality cannot be forbidden).
See Ensminger v. Commissioner, 610 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1979); Shackelford v. United
States, 45 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 80-1074 (1980) (treatment of the legality of the relationship for
purposes of qualifying for the dependency exemption); Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.
758 (1957).
93. See STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 10.01121[f] (addressing the tax treatment of
below-market interest rate loans).
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tions have several negative tax ramifications, and should be avoided unless the
loan provides for adequate stated interest and the advanced sums will be re-
paid.'
2. Domestic Partnerships
With significant changes in our family structure, rela-
tionships and social norms, we cannot afford to be inflexi-
ble in our attitudes towards individuals who do not fit
society's traditional mold. By recognizing domestic part-
nerships citywide, we are not only recognizing committed
and caring relationships among unmarried heterosexuals
and our lesbian and gay brothers and sisters, but also the
relationships and diverse living arrangements in which
many of our elderly and disabled residents are involved.
We are many families-bonded by love.95
Same-sex couples may, as an alternative to entering into an express con-
tract, register as domestic partners, assuming the availability of domestic part-
nership registration. Domestic partnership ordinances allow lesbian and gay
couples to form legal relationships entitling them to many of the affirmative
rights, privileges, and responsibilities of married couples.' However, domes-
tic partnership legislation has been restricted to the municipal level,' and
94. I.R.C. §§ 163(h), 1274, and 7872 (West 1994) combine to address below-market
interest and gift loans by imputing interest income in the amount of the applicable federal
rate to the creditor, taxing the creditor as making a gift of the interest, and denying the
debtor's interest deductions. Further, if the debtor never repays the loan, I.R.C. § 61(a)(12)
(West 1994) treats the amount advanced as income to the debtor from the discharge of
indebtedness. Note that I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(A) (West 1994) provides a de minimis exception
for gift loans between individuals for loans of $10,000 or less. Thus, for smaller loans there
is neither deemed interest nor a gift unless the loan is directly attributable to the purchase or
carrying of income-producing assets. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(2)(B) (West 1994). See generally Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (as amended in 1980); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note
75, at 3-25 to 3-26; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 10.01[2][fl.
95. New York City Mayor David N. Dinkins, "Many Families, All Valued," Information
on Domestic Partnership Registration in New York City.
96. For a full discussion of domestic partnerships, see CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note
50, at 4:11-4:13; LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 32; Vada Berger, Domestic Part-
nership hitiatives, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 417 (1991) (analyzing the protections, effectiveness,
and weaknesses of several domestic partnership initiatives); Cameli, supra note 2, at 468-77
(observing that one of the weaknesses of domestic partnership ordinances is that they are
subject to repeal efforts); Eblin, supra note 31, at 1069-86 (commenting that "[dlomestic
partnership provisions, although not a substitute for marriage, mitigate the economic discrimi-
nation otherwise suffered by gay couples," and surveying domestic partnership laws that may
benefit municipal and private employers). In light of the recent religious right-wing "pro-
family" campaigns such as those discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 71-72, this
is a very real concern.
97. See Rubenstein, supra note 41, at 93-94 (noting the fact that because domestic part-
nership laws have been enacted only at the municipal level, their ability to affect state laws
governing family and relationship rights is limited); Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Fami-
ly--Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System Has Refused to Protect Nonlegal
Parents in Alternative Families, 8 J.L. & POL. 5, 65 (1991) (noting that domestic partnership
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only a limited number of municipalities nationwide have enacted domestic
partnership laws.98 Beyond providing benefits and responsibilities to munici-
pal employees, the legal status conferred by these city governments primarily
provides the private sector with a means of extending employment benefits to
same-sex couples." However, only an estimated fifty private employers in the
United States offer domestic partner benefits."
From the tax perspective, domestic partnership benefits are not very at-
tractive.'0 ' Employees must include in income the value of the benefits re-
ceived by their partners, unless their partners qualify as dependents,0 2 be-
provisions are confined to limited geographic areas); Gross, supra note 62, at B8 (discussing
the likelihood of a state-wide domestic partnership provision in Hawaii and observing that
the result of "judicial and legislative jockeying, virtually everyone agrees, will be either
legalization of gay marriage by the court or a broad domestic partnership act").
98. Among the cities that have passed domestic partnership laws are: Berkeley, Cal.;
San Francisco, Cal.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Laguna Beach, Cal.; Sacramento, Cal.; Santa Cruz,
Cal.; West Hollywood, Cal.; New York City, NY; Ithaca, NY; Madison, Wis.; Shorewood
Hills, Wis.; Seattle, Wash.; Takoma Park, Md.; Minneapolis, Minn; West Palm Beach, Fla.;
Cambridge, Mass.; Ann Arbor, Mich.; East Lansing, Mich.; and Washington, D.C.; see
Cameli, supra note 2, at 468 n.163 (citing Ann Belser, Rights, Privileges, and Gay Lovers,
THE ADVOCATE, Feb. 25, 1992, at 57); see also Eblin, supra, note 31, at 1072-77; Gross,
supra note 62, at B8 (noting that about 150 municipalities have enacted limited statutes
giving medical and other benefits to the gay partners of city employees); Schmalz, supra
note 62, at A14. The benefits and responsibilities under these ordinances vary from merely
symbolic to granting full medical insurance to partners of city employees, hospital and jail
visitation rights, and protection from housing discrimination.
99. Wilson, supra note 32, at 540; Zimmer, supra note 3, at 692.
100. Domestic Partner Programs Praised for Business Value, Yet Few Exist, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA), Jan. 18, 1994. Electronic and entertainment firms have been the quickest to
change their health care plans, arguing that they do not want to lose their productive and
creative gay and lesbian employees. Jay Mathews, Gay Partners Gain Benefits; Big Firms
Quietly Agree to Pay Medical Bills, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1993, at Al; Susan Canfield,
Defining Family Becomes More Flexible, SEATrLE TIMEs, June 14, 1993, at E3; see Sam H.
Verhovek, Texas County Retreats Over Apple's Gay Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at
A18 (describing a Texas county's reversal of its initial decision not to grant Apple Computer
Corp. tax breaks because of the company's policy of granting health benefits to lesbian and
gay couples).
AIDS and the high costs of treating the illness has been a primary excuse used by
employers for not extending domestic partner benefits. Those excuses are unpersuasive, given
the figures indicating coverage for lesbian and gay domestic partners has tended to be less
expensive due to the fact that they are often younger, fewer sign up for the benefits, and
are less likely to have a pregnancy. Domestic Partner Programs Praised for Business Value
Yet Few Exist, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Jan. 18, 1994; see Jean L. Griffin, Push for Domes-
tic-Partner Benefits Picking Up Steam, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 1993, at 3 (noting that the aver-
age lifetime cost of treating someone through HIV infection to death from AIDS is about
$120,000, compared with the $250,000 cost of caring for some premature babies).
101. See Berger, supra note 96, at 444-45 (concluding, however, that the value of the
benefits associated with partnership initiatives probably outweigh the negative consequences
such as an increased tax burden).
102. See I.R.C. § 105(b) (West 1994) (exempting from taxation medical benefits received
by an employee on behalf of the employee's spouse and dependents); I.R.C. § 213(a) (West
1994) (allowing as a deduction the uncompensated medical expenses of a taxpayer, spouse,
and dependents to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income);
1993 Tax Guide for Individuals, supra note 9, at 166 (stating that medical expense deduc-
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cause domestic partnerships are not recognized by the Service. 1' Neverthe-
less, domestic partnership status may give definition to the partners' financial
obligations upon dissolution for income and gift tax purposes,"° and provide
evidence of a family-type relationship for estate tax purposes.
If a lesbian or gay couple can show they are "a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by means of
which any business, financial operation or venture is carried on," they may
establish a partnership under Subchapter K of the Code. 5 Thus, given a
good faith business venture, a same-sex couple could enter into a partnership
agreement, open a separate joint partnership account, acquire an employer's
identification number from the Service, and file partnership income tax re-
turns." 6 Partnership agreements allow for great flexibility and, assuming cer-
tain conditions are met, the lesbian or gay couple can take advantage of the
nonrecognition provisions contained in Subchapter K. 7
tions include expenses for the taxpayer, taxpayer's spouse, and children, including adopted
children). This provides an opening for the use of a domestic partnership in conjunction with
adult adoption, especially when the expenses are substantial, as in the case of AIDs. The
Tax Guide also provides for the filing of 'an amended tax return when a decedent's estate
pays unpaid medical expenses of the decedent within one year of the date of death. Id. at
169; see infra notes 146-155 and accompanying text and supra notes 90-92 and accompa-
nying text (addressing adult adoption and the use of a dependency exemption, respectively).
103. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-34-048 (May 29, 1990) (the Service ruled that benefits to domes-
tic partners are taxable income to the employee if the domestic partner fails to meet the
"dependent" test of I.R.C. § 152). Nonspouse cohabitants who do not receive more than fifty
percent of their support from the employee do not qualify as dependents such that benefits
extended to nonqualifying domestic partners are considered taxable fringe benefits to the
employee. Id. Those benefits are taxed at their fair market value-the amount that an indi-
vidual 'would have to pay for the particular benefit in an arm's-length transaction. Id.; see
also Eblin, supra note 31, at 1084-85; Domestic Partner Programs Praised for Business
Value, Yet Few Exist, supra note 100; Mathews, supra note 100, at Al.
See Wolk, supra note 46, at 1265-75 (suggesting that the Code be altered to take on
a more equitable domestic partnership approach for tax purposes that would give unmarried
couples who fulfilled certain requirements a status similar to that of married couples).
104. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text; cf. I.R.C. §§ 151(c)(1), 152(a)(9)
(West 1994) (providing for a deduction for personal exemptions for unrelated dependents). A
domestic partnership agreement in which the parties agree one partner will support the other
is substantial evidence to support the dependency exemption. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[31[a].
105. I.R.C. § 761(a) (West 1994); see Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
In Culbertson, the Court applied the definition of "partnership" to a family partnership con-
sisting of a rancher and his sons. The focus was the intent of the parties to carry on a
business or venture for joint economic gain, to be determined in light of all the facts and
circumstances. Id.; Mary Rowland. Family Values in Estate Planning, N.Y. TIMES, April 3,
1994, § 3 at 15 (discussing the popularity of family limited partnerships as methods of
shifting assets from senior family members to younger members and quoting a Service
spokesperson as saying the Sevice considers family partnerships to be legitimate estate plan-
ning mechanisms). Under Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (as amended in 1972), a joint undertaking
merely to share expenses is not a partnership absent a business purpose.
106. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[51.
107. I.R.C. § 721 (West 1994) allows a partner to avoid recognizing gain or loss upon
contribution of property in exchange for a partnership interest. I.R.C. § 731 (West 1994)




Same-sex couples may opt for a less formal relationship and forego ex-
press oral or written pooling agreements and domestic partnership approaches.
Nevertheless, a lesbian or gay couple that shares income and property and
provides services for one another may avail themselves of judicially-enforce-
able property rights pursuant to implied-in-fact or implied-in-law agreements
despite the absence of contractual formalities. 8 Marvin v. Marvin"° pro-
vided a springboard for palimony remedies, such as quasi-contracts, construc-
tive or resulting trusts, or quantum meruit, in settings where unmarried cohab-
itants have no express agreements.' °
Any recovery under the application of an implied agreement theory in-
volves an explicit payment for services provided during the relationship and,
therefore, should probably be treated as taxable compensation to the recipient.
Nonetheless, the classification of income derived from Marvin-type palimony
remedies is not always easy to determine for tax purposes. In Carlson v.
Olson,"' for example, a cohabitant couple lived together for twenty-one
upon the termination of the partnership (assuming substantial economic effect), except to the
extent money is distributed in excess of the partner's basis in the partnership. Partners are
taxed on their pro rata share of partnership income pursuant to the terms of the partnership
agreement, thus avoiding the assignment of income problems of Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill
(1930). See supra note 79 and accompanying text. Finally, pursuant to I.R.C. § 741 (West
1994), the character of the gain recognized when a partner sells her or his partnership inter-
est generally is considered capital gain. Capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than ordinary
income under the new tax amendments. MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 22.01
(1994).
108. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[2]. Like express agree-
ments, implied and quasi-contract theories reflect an understanding between the parties of the
same-sex couple. The difference is that the understanding is revealed in their conduct and
particular circumstances. Whether an implied agreement conveys any rights between the par-
ties for tax purposes is determined by looking at the origin of the rights under local law. Id.
For situations in which courts have failed to apply equitable remedies of implied contract,
see Estate of Alexander v. Alexander, 445 So.2d 836 (Miss. 1984) (finding no implied
agreement to co-own property); Marone v. Marone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1154-55 (N.Y. 1980)
(refusing to apply the implied contract theory as "conceptually so amorphous as practically to
defy equitable enforcement"). The problem with these implied contracts is the gift versus
income distinction, the outcome of which has been left to the courts to determine on a case-
by-case basis. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[2].
109. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
110. Id. at 122-23 (Cal. 1976). The court generously provided:
Our opinion does not preclude the evolution of additional equitable remedies to
protect the expectation of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which
existing remedies prove inadequate; the suitability of such remedies may be deter-
mined in later cases in light of the factual setting in which they arise.
Id. at 123 n.25.
For discussion, criticism, and analysis of Marvin v. Marvin, see SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §§ 3.04[21[a), 3.05[21; Herma H. Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin
v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977); Reppy, supra note 77, at
1682-93; Wolk, supra note 46; Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law,
supra note 6, at 1624-26.
I1I. 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); see Case Comment, Family Law: Property, Rights of
Unmarried Cohabitants, 62 MINN. L. REV. 449 (1978) (providing an exhaustive analysis of
Carlson v. Olson).
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years, raised a son, and acquired a home and personal property. During the
relationship, Olson provided most of the income used to purchase the home
and property, which was held in joint tenancy." 2 After the relationship end-
ed, Carlson sought to partition their accumulated property."' The court relied
heavily upon Marvin in allowing an equal partition on the theory that half
constituted an irrevocable gift to Carlson "in consideration for the wifely and
motherly services she performed during the period of their cohabitation.""'
Unfortunately, the Carlson decision leaves substantial ambiguity as to the tax
treatment of Carlson's "wifely and motherly services" that were held to consti-
tute a gift."5
Recently, in Walsh v. Ray,"6 a Wisconsin appellate court affirmed a jury
award to Walsh for housework she performed during the nine years she
cohabitated with Ray. Walsh v. Ray expands upon Marvin's list of quasi-con-
tractual palimony remedies by compensating housekeeping services based on
the tort theory of unjust enrichment."7 In the past, palimony awards under
unjust enrichment normally had been restricted to quantifiable economic con-
tributions such as mortgage payments.' The court also affirmed an award
on Ray's counterclaim that Walsh was unjustly enriched by the housing he
provided to her and her children." 9
Further, in an unusual decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied the
theory of constructive trust as between two gay men.2 ° In that case, a gay
man in the process of divorcing his wife tried to hide assets by agreeing to
turn over funds to his male partner who used the money to purchase a house
in his own name.' 2' When the men separated shortly thereafter, the purchaser
claimed that the funds were a gift and refused to turn them over.'22 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the purchaser
112. Carlson, 256 N.W.2d at 250.
113. id.
114. Id. at 250-55.
115. See Wolk, supra note 46, at 1259-62 (criticizing the Carlson court's failure to
"explain the trial court's paradoxical rationale of a gift in consideration" for the services
because, "[bly definition, a gift is a gratuitous transfer, without consideration"). Compare
Newsom v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1188 (1974) (in which a live-in homemaker
was characterized as "more in the nature of an employee" and taxed on the income from the
exchange of services for support even though the couple was married the following year)
with Pascarelli v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1082 (1971) (examining the couple's relationship
and holding that it was "akin to that of husband and wife" such that the sums of money
received by the homemaker partner who performed "wifely duties" were given gift treatment
for tax purposes).
116. No. 91-1981, 1992 WL 464075 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1992) (unpublished opinion),
rev denied, 501 N.W.2d 457 (Wis. 1993). The reader should note that, as an unpublished
decision, Walsh v. Ray has no precedential value.
117. Id. at *3.
118. ArLynn L. Presser, Palimony Award for Housework, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1993, at 32.
119. Id.
120. Bramlett v. Selman, 597 S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980).
121. Id. at 81-82.
122. Id. at 82.
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held title to the home as a constructive trustee for his partner. 23 The sup-
reme court held that a "confidential relationship" had existed between the two
men, and that they had a fiduciary responsibility towards each other.'24 The
decision concluded that "[a]ll homosexual involvements are not as a matter of
law confidential relationships sufficient to support a constructive trust, but a
court of equity should not deny relief to a person merely because he is a ho-
mosexual." 2 '
4. Joint Accounts and Joint Ownership of Property
Sharing bank accounts and co-owning property are other common practic-
es that same-sex couples use to facilitate cohabitation.'26 Joint accounts may
be kept either for the couple's general expenses or for limited purposes, such
as household expenses, vacations, and special purchases.'27 There are no tax
ramifications as a result of creating a joint account. 2 ' Even if one partner in
a gay or lesbian couple deposits all of the money into the account from which
the other partner may draw, the Service treats the transaction as a revocable
transfer such that there is no completed gift. 29 It is only when the non-de-
positing partner withdraws an amount from the joint account for her or his
own benefit that there is a taxable gift transfer from the depositing partner to
the withdrawing partner in the amount of the withdrawal."3
When a lesbian or gay couple purchases property and takes title as joint
tenants, the partners share the property equally and each has the right to use
the entire property. 3' Joint tenants also have the right of survivorship, mean-
123. Id. at 81.
124. Id. at 84. The court reasoned that the two had been lovers for a year and had
lived together for most of that year. Id.; see also Cameli, supra note 2, at 466-67.
125. Bramletn, 597 S.W.2d at 85.
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1-109 (1992) prohibits discrimination in consumer loans on
the basis of "race, creed, religion, color, sex, marital status, national origin, or ancestry."
Sexual orientation is conspicuously absent from the list.
127. See CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 4:15. The authors suggest that couples
limit the purpose for joint accounts and that they keep adequate records. They note that both
signers on the account are responsible for all checks drawn on it, "even if your lover vio-
lates your trust, empties the account and puts the money on the nose of a slow pony." id.
The authors also addresses the use of joint charge accounts, cautioning that they are risky.
Id. at 4:16.
128. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (as amended in 1986) (there is a taxable gift
transfer only when a non-depository partner withdraws an amount for his/her own benefit).
129. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 10.01[5][c]; see Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4)
(as amended in 1986) (this regulation also applies to the purchase by A of a United States
savings bond, registered as payable to "A or B," such that there is a gift to B when B
surrenders the bond for cash without any obligation to account for part of the proceeds to
A). Same-sex couples should be cautious to check their state statutes when using this joint
account strategy because some states deem the transfer as complete upon deposit. See Cain,
supra note 79, at 113 n.82 (providing examples of different state law treatments of joint ac-
counts).
130. It is at that time that the transfer is completed because the amount withdrawn pass-
es out of the depositor's control. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(4) (as amended in 1986);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 10.01[511cl. Note that the amount will go untaxed if the
$10,000 tax-free gift threshold of I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994) has not been surpassed.
131. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 5:14.
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ing that if one tenant dies, the other automatically owns both shares.'32 If one
of the joint tenants sells her or his share, the sale ends the joint tenancy such
that the original tenant and the new purchaser become tenants in common.'33
The purchase of property by a partner for herself or himself and her or his
partner as joint tenants constitutes a gift of one half the value of the proper-
ty. " There is also the possibility that income will be imputed to the pur-
chasing partner in the amount of fair market rent.
35
Joint ownership of property may result in constructive trust treatment1 36
Weeks v. Gay'.. concerned a dispute between a gay man and his deceased
partner's family over two pieces of property the men owned together. The
deceased's heirs asserted a half-interest in one of the properties that was co-
owned and a full interest in the other, which was in the decedent's name only.
A Georgia appellate court affirmed a trial court's finding that as a result of the
surviving partner's supporting the decedent and providing most of the purchase
price for the two properties, the surviving partner had an interest in the proper-
ties through an implied trust. 3
5. Children and Parenting
Although a comprehensive analysis of the range of issues relating to
same-sex couples and parenting is beyond the scope of this article,'39 it will
132. See id. at 5:14 & n.16 (pointing out the probate advantages, but warning lesbians
and gay men who own property on their own that if they put the property in joint tenancy
with their lover they will not only suffer gift tax consequences, but if the couple splits up
the original owner has no right to have the property deeded back).
133. Id. at 5:14.
134. Treas. Reg. § 25.251 1-1(h)(5) (as amended in 1986). Note that this regulation offers
a further example of discrimination against same-sex couples who do not qualify for the
exception by which a husband and wife who create either a joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship or a tenancy by the entirety are not considered to have made a transfer
includable for gift tax purposes at the time of the creation of the tenancy. Id.; see also
Treas. Reg. § 25.2523(d)-i (as amended in 1986) (marital deduction allowed for creation of
joint interest between spouses), I.R.C. § 2040(b) (West 1994) (addressing the fact that prop-
erty owned in joint tenancy by the decedent and another on the date of death generally is
included within the decedent's taxable estate and is subject to death taxes). See generally
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 10.01[3][f].
135. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (West 1994). Alternatively, the purchasing joint tenant may be
deemed to give the non-contributing tenant a gift in the amount of the value of the rent.
The latter result is more favorable due to the $10,000 annual exclusion.
136. For the tax treatment of trusts, see infra notes 228-238 and accompanying text.
137. 256 S.E.2d 901, 902 (Ga. 1979).
138. Id. at 903-04. The supreme court stated that equity prevented the blood heirs from
a windfall recovery when the beneficial interest should flow to the partner. Id.; see Cameli,
supra note 2, at 467.
139. For discussion and analysis of issues such as adoption, children from prior relation-
ships, foster parenting, guardianships, termination of parental rights, and access to reproduc-
tive technology, see CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 6:12-7:42; Cox, supra note 97;
Elizabeth A. Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally Recognizing
the Relationship Between the Nonbiological Lesbian Parent and Her Child, 43 HASTINGS L.
J. 177 (1991); Myra G. Sencer, Note, Adoption in the Non-Traditional Family-A Look at
Some Alternatives, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191 (1987); Developments in the Law-Sexual Ori-
entation and the Law, supra note 6; Note, Looking for a Familv Resemblance: The Limits of
[Vol. 72:2
SAME-SEX TAX PLANNING
touch upon some of the tax aspects of rearing children. A parent may claim an
exemption for each dependent child younger than nineteen and each child
under twenty-four who is a student during the tax year." ° The Code applies
special rules for parents who have divorced or legally separated from the other
parent of a child. 4 With certain exceptions, only a parent who has custody
of a dependent child or children for the greater portion of the year may claim
the dependency exemption.' A lesbian or gay nonbiological parent should
be able to claim the child of her or his partner if she or he provides the major-
ity of support for the child and the nonparent's home is the child's principal
residence.'43
In same-sex households, if the parent of a child provides more than half
the cost of maintaining the household and the home is the child's "principal
place of abode" for the tax year, the parent is entitled to head of household
rates.'" Head of household status permits the taxpayer to take advantage of
special tax rates, but the status is only available for unmarried individuals who
maintain their homes as households for children, stepchildren, or descend-
ants. "'45 Although a lesbian or gay male who maintains a household and sup-
the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991);
NCLR NEWSL., supra note 26, at 8-9.
140. I.R.C. § 151(c) (West 1994); see (discussion of dependency exemption deduction),
supra note 104. Exemption claims qualify for legally adopted children as well as illegitimate
children. Rev. Rul. 54-498, 1954-2 C.B. 107.
141. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (West 1994).
142. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1) (West 1994); see I.R.C. § 152(e)(2), (4) (West 1994) (granting
the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent if the custodial parent signs a declara-
tion that he or she will not claim the child or children as dependents, or if the noncustodial
parent provides support of at least $600 per year pursuant to a pre-1985 separation instru-
ment); I.R.C. § 152(c) (West 1994) (allowing for multiple support agreements under certain
specified conditions).
143. I.R.C. § 152(a)(9) (West 1994); see Widen v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 695
(1969) (the Service allowed taxpayer's dependency exemption for child of unmarried cohabi-
tant); 1993 Tax Guide for Individuals, supra note 9, at 26-35 (outlining and explaining the
five dependency tests that must be met before a person can qualify as a dependent: (1)
member of household or relationship test; (2) citizenship test; (3) joint return test; (4) gross
income test; and (5) support test); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §
3.05131[bl.
144. See I.R.C. § 2(b) (West 1994).
145. I.R.C. § 2(b) (1988); see 1993 TAX GUIDE FOR INDIVIDUALS (CCH), supra note 9,
at 24. An individual qualifies for head of household status if she or he is: (1) unmarried or
considered unmarried on the last day of the year; and (2) has paid more than half the cost
of keeping up a home for her or himself and a qualifying person for more than half the
year. A taxpayer is considered unmarried on the last day of the year if she or he satisfies
all of the following requirements: (a) filed a separate return; (b) paid more than half the
cost of keeping up the home for the tax year; (c) the spouse did not live in the home dur-
ing the last 6 months of the year; and (d) the home was, for more than half the year, the
main home of child, stepchild, adopted child, or foster child whom the taxpayer may claim
as a dependent. A taxpayer will still satisfy the last test if the child cannot be claimed as a
dependent only because: (i) the taxpayer states in writing to the noncustodial parent that he
or she may claim an exemption for the child, or (ii) the noncustodial parent provides at
least $600 support for the dependent and claims an exemption for the dependent under a
pre-1985 divorce or separation agreement. Id.
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ports her or his cohabitant and the cohabitant's child may claim the child and
possibly the cohabitant as a dependent for dependency exemption purposes,
she or he will not qualify as head of household for tax purposes."4
6. Adult Adoption
One of the more creative methods by which lesbian and gay couples have
sought to obtain some of the benefits bestowed upon married couples is to
have one partner adopt the other. Adult adoption is a legal arrangement in
which a person obtains parental rights and responsibilities for another, result-
ing in an irrevocable legal union between the adopter and adoptee. 47 The
primary purpose behind adult adoption is securing inheritance rights. 4 ' Con-
sidering the failure of traditional property assignment mechanisms, such as
wills and trusts, to withstand challenges by blood relatives who claim that the
decedent's lesbian or gay partner exerted undue influence over the decedent,
the adoption strategy appears attractive. 49
Adult adoptions become final upon execution and provide an effective
means of nullifying the status as heirs of the adopter's blood relatives so that
they are without standing to contest his or her assignment of property. 5 ' The
146. I.R.C. § 2(b)(3)(B)(i) (West 1994) (taxpayer shall not qualify if the dependent
would only be a dependent because of § 152(a)(9) (dependent is unrelated person)); SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.05[3][c]; see Whalen v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 611 (1976) (Service conceded that taxpayer was entitled to dependency ex-
emption for cohabitant, but denied use of head of household rates because the member of
his household was unrelated to the taxpayer).
147. As the term implies, adult adoption is the adoption of one adult by another, creat-
ing a relationship of parent and child, with the exception that the adopting partner has no
legal duty to support the adopted partner. see Cameli, supra note 2, at 465 (observing that
adult adoption has the effect of severing the legal relationship between the adopted partner
and her or his biological parents); Heeb, supra note 3, at 356; Peter N. Fowler, Comment,
Adult Adoptions: A New Legal Tool for Lesbians and Gay Men, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 667, 677 (1984).
148. See ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 4-1 to -378 (providing a com-
pendium of state statutes dealing with intestacy); Cameli, supra note 2, at 465 (beyond nulli-
fying the status of blood relatives of the adopted partner, adult adoption is helpful in situa-
tions in which next-of-kin status is critical, such as medical emergencies, gaining access to
personal and medical files, and making funeral arrangements); Developments in the
Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626 (stating that every state cur-
rently recognizes the inheritance fights of an adopted child of an unmarried intestate decedent
over those of the decedent's nonimmediate blood relatives); see also SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at §l.05[21[al-[g] (including as advantages of adult adoption
the acquisition of employment, housing, and evidence of a close relationship for purposes of
beneficiary designation on a life insurance policy).
149. Developments in the Law-Sexuality and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626; see
Jefferey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 PITT. L. REV. 225,
253-62 (1981); Heeb, supra note 3, at 356.
150. Sherman, supra note 50, at 253-54. Note, however, that although the blood relatives
of the adopter would not have standing to contest the will, they would have standing to
contest the adoption itself after the adopter's death. Id. at 259. Sherman promotes adult
adoption as advantageous to the homosexual testator who promptly informs prospective heirs
of the adoption so that the statute of limitations on actions to vacate adoption decrees may
run. Id. at 260. Nevertheless, he notes inheritance rights are usually determined by the stat-
utes in force at the time of the decedent's death rather than at the time of adoption such
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statutory treatment of adult adoption varies from state to state, 5' as does its
treatment in the courts.'52 Nevertheless, due to the permanency and possibili-
ty of prosecution for incest, same-sex couples should be cautious about opting
for adult adoption.'53
From a tax standpoint, adult adoption raises estate tax concerns such as
who should adopt whom. Because those who have been adopted lose the right
to inherit from their biological parents, it is probably better to have the partner
with the wealthiest relatives be the adopter.'54 Another consideration is the
that "adoption is necessarily a somewhat speculative estate planning technique, since the
applicable law can be changed after adoption." Id. at 256 n.147; see also Developments in
the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626.
151. See Sherman, supra note 50, at 254-56, 255 nn.141-42 (four states-Hawaii, Idaho,
Ohio, and Virginia-restrict adoption such that same-sex partners would not be allowed to
adopt under their statutes; five others-California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Nevada, and
New Jersey-require that the adoptee be younger than the adopter, while Arizona and Ne-
braska do not allow adult adoption under any circumstances); see also Sol Lovas, When Is a
Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance Within the Non-Tradition-
al Family, 24 U. IDAHO L. REV. 353, 373 (1988); Heeb, supra note 3. at 356 n.45; Devel-
opments in the Lavv-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626-28.
152. Compare hI re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984) (denying
petition of 57-year-old man to adopt his lifelong 50-year-old gay partner because the adop-
tion was seen as a quasi-marital vehicle for legitimizing a sexual relationship between unmar-
ried partners) with 333 East 53rd Street Assocs. v. Mann, 503 N.Y.S.2d 752,755 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1986) (permitting adoption involving two adult women for purposes of succeeding in
tenancy following the death of the co-tenant under New York City rent and eviction regula-
tions because economic concerns were the primary motivation of the adoption), aff'd, 512
N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1987) and In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Fam.
Ct. 1981) (holding that public policy did not bar adoption of 26-year-old man by his 22-
year-old gay partner because the two were competent and consenting adults and the adoption
was for legitimate legal and economic reasons). See also Developments in the Law-Sexual
Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at 1626-28.
153. See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 6, at
1626 n.151. There are several disadvantages to adult adoption. The foremost is that adoption
is final, as are the attendant property assignments. There is no equivalent to divorce available
to adopted partners who may wish to dissolve their relationship. Another disadvantage is that
some state statutes prevent adopted partners from inheriting from their biological parents.
Also, in some states adult adoption may subject the parties to state incest laws. Id.; see also
Heeb, supra note 3, at 357-58 (stating that adult adoption is an inadequate option because
adoption defines the relationship as parent-child, rather than marital, and adoptions are irrevo-
cable). Because of lack of consanguinity, sexual interaction between adopter and adoptee
does not constitute incest without a specific reference to adopted children in an incest stat-
ute. Sherman, supra note 50, at 258.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-302 (1986) provides that sexual penetration or sexual in-
trusion inflicted on an adopted child under twenty-one constitutes aggravated incest. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-6-301 (1986) provides that sexual penetration or sexual intrusion inflicted
on a descendant (for the purposes of this section, descendant includes a child by adoption
only if the person is not legally married to the child by adoption) constitutes incest, a less
serious felony.
154. Sherman, supra note 50, at 257. Further, a lesbian or gay partner from a wealthy
family should be the one to adopt when there are conditions put upon her or his ability to
pass on the family wealth. For example, if the daughter or son of wealthy parents is only
allowed to pass inheritance to "issue," she or he will be able to pass on the wealth to her
or his same-sex partner by adopting them. The Uniform Probate Code reflects the modem
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
relative probabilities of which partner will outlive the other. The partner who
is more likely to die first should be the adopter.'55 In addition, adult adoption
triggers income tax considerations such as dependency exemptions and head of
household status.
7. Life Insurance
Life insurance provides another mechanism by which same-sex couples
can attain some of the benefits bestowed upon married couples. By purchasing
life insurance and naming her or his partner as the beneficiary, a lesbian wom-
an or gay man accomplishes a wealth transfer at death similar to a testamenta-
ry disposition.'56 An advantage of life insurance is that it allows the insured
to retain inter vivos power to cancel the policy or alter the beneficiary desig-
nation.'57
The disadvantages of life insurance, however, are worth considering. First,
there is the limitation that the person who procures and owns the life insurance
must have an "insurable interest" in the life of the insured.' An insurable
interest exists when there is kinship, a reasonable expectation of advantage
from the continuance of the insured's life, common ownership of property, or
a business relationship between the beneficiary and the insured."'9 The ab-
sence of one of these relationships, however, does not bar the use of life insur-
ance if the insured procures her or his own insurance and names her or his
partner as beneficiary."
The increased potential of a will challenge by the original beneficiary on
view that class gift terminology such as "issue," "children," "descendants," and "heirs," in
wills and trusts should be interpreted in accordance with the rules governing intestacy with
regard to the inclusion of adopted children. Unif. Probate Code § 2-611 (1983); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-109 (1987) (defining "child" to include the child of an adopting
parent and the adopted person's natural parent for inheritance purposes, except when the
inheritance rights have been divested).
155. See Sherman, supra note 50, at 256 ("If the adopter is the first to die, the adoptee
will inherit by intestacy to the exclusion of the adopter's blood relatives."). In contrast, if
the adoptee predeceases the adopter in a jurisdiction in which adoption cuts off the right of
the adoptee's natural parents and relatives to inherit from the adopted child in the event of
intestacy, they would be without standing to contest a will executed by the adoptee in which
she or he names the adopter partner as beneficiary. Id.; see also infra notes 215-19 and
accompanying text (regarding planning for the use of the $600,000 unified credit against es-
tate tax under I.R.C. § 2010).
156. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1110 (1986) (stating that the beneficiary designation in
a life insurance policy serves the same function as the devisee designation in a will).
157. Sherman, supra note 50, at 262.
158. Id.
159. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.1011]; Sherman, supra
note 50, at 262.
160. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.10[l] (proposing that
the insured purchase the policy, naming a relative as the beneficiary, and subsequently
change the designation as beneficiary to her or his partner); Sherman, supra note 50, at 262
("An insured may procure and own an insurance policy on his own life and designate any-




the grounds of undue influence presents a second disadvantage that arises
when the insured changes the designated beneficiary. 6' Also, there may be a
requirement that applicants submit to an HIV antibody test to comply with life
insurance eligibility requirements. 62
Finally, the life insurance strategy has negative estate and gift tax conse-
quences. Assuming the insured retains control over the identity of the benefi-
ciary until death, the insurance proceeds will be taxed as part of the insured's
estate. 6 ' To avoid inclusion, "the insured could irrevocably assign the life in-
surance policy to the beneficiary."'" If the assigned policy is worth more
than $10,000, the insured will be subject to a gift tax on the excess. 65
B. Dissolution of Relationship
1. Contractual Provisions
Many of the problems addressed above with regard to express pooling
agreements and joint ownership may be avoided by including dissolution
agreements in the contracts."6 Beyond the tax consequences, including divi-
sion of property provisions in addition to cooling off, mediation, or arbitration
clauses in the living-together agreement saves frustration and offers the flexi-
bility that married couples gain through prenuptial agreements.'67 Unfortu-
161. Sherman, supra note 50, at 263; see infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text (dis-
cussion of will challenges).
162. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.10[l].
163. 1.R.C. § 2042 (West 1994) (providing that life insurance proceeds are includable in
the decedent's gross estate if the decedent possessed at death any incidents of ownership,
which include the power to change the beneficiaries, to surrender or cancel the policy, to
assign it, revoke it, or pledge the policy for a loan); see I.R.C. §§ 2037-39 (West 1994);
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 4.14[4][a].
164. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.11[4].
165. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(a) (as amended in 1974); see SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.11141 (advising couples who have not yet purchased life insur-
ance to have the beneficiary purchase the insurance on the life of the other, presumably the
wealthier partner, so that the policy would be owned by the beneficiary and it would not be
included in the insured's estate).
166. Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that co-
habitation contracts for both heterosexual and homosexual couples are enforceable); see
Zimmer, supra note 3, at 695-96 (stating that contracts provide the only alternative for sepa-
rating same-sex couples because equitable distribution and community property designations
are only available to legally married couples).
167. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 11:3 to 11:14; see Kaylah C. Zelig, Com-
ment, Putting Responsibility Back Into Marriage: Making a Case for Mandatory Prenuptials,
64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (1993). Zelig observed that antenuptial contracts encourage
couples to discuss openly their expectations prior to their commitment, decreasing the need
for courts to exercise what is often abusive discretionary power in discerning the parties'
actual intentions. Another benefit of a contractual provision for dividing property is that
valuations are better made at inception than upon dissolution. Id.; see also SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[8] (stating that it is "of utmost importance to
include provisions for termination of the lesbian or gay relationship in the written agree-
ment"). The authors include a checklist of considerations that should be included in such an
agreement. Those considerations include: division of assets upon termination; whether the
agreement is to be similar to community property laws; support arrangements after termina-
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nately, the comparison between divisions of property by married couples upon
legal separation or divorce and that of same-sex couples upon dissolution is of
little help because transfers between spouses incident to a divorce do not result
in the recognition of gain by either spouse." The manner in which the par-
ties of a same-sex couple hold property and the terms of their agreements
primarily determine the tax consequences of the property division upon termi-
nation of the relationship."6 Accordingly, the tax treatment will differ de-
pending on whether the division is equal. An approximately equal division of
the total value of jointly owned, noncommunity property is a nontaxable divi-
sion in which neither gain nor loss is recognized.7 0 The transfer or partition
of jointly held assets upon termination of the relationship should be a nontax-
able division. 7'
In contrast, an unequal division of property-for example, one based on
fair market value instead of in kind-may result in the recognition of gain or
loss if the Service treats the division as a sale or exchange.' Further, the
unequal division possibly will be subject to gift tax.'
If a same-sex couple has selected to take the partnership approach to their
relationship, it is assumed that they did so because they had a financial rela-
tionship or business venture sufficient to meet the tax definition of a partner-
ship. "'74 The partnership is advantageous because no gain or loss is recog-
nized upon distribution of partnership assets to the partners upon termination
of the partnership, except to the extent money distributed exceeds the partner's
tion; treatment of loans made during the relationship; joint tenancy treatment; and agreements
on the disposition of property upon death. Id.
168. I.R.C. § 1041 (West 1994); see SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note
75, § 3.06111 (offering tax analysis of division of property upon dissolution of marriage in
community property settings).
169. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[21; Wolk, supra note
46, at 1252.
170. Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 158 (stating that the basis of each individual asset
received upon division is the basis of the property when jointly owned). Although this ruling
addressed the division of property pursuant to a divorce proceeding, it should apply to un-
married cohabitants holding property as joint tenants.
171. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(5) (as amended in 1986).
But see United States v. United States Nat'l Bank, 239 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1956) (noting that
the exception to the nonrecognition treatment arises when one party contributes capital while
the other contributes personal services to jointly held property, in which case, the division of
the property may be considered compensation and is taxed as ordinary income).
172. I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011-12 (West 1994); see United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65
(1962); Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975). affd, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.
1977); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06131; Wolk, supra note 46,
at 1252-53.
173. This result is less likely, but may arise in situations in which a same-sex couple
agrees generally to share their wealth upon termination, but have made no agreement regard-
ing services. The Service may argue that the division results in taxable compensation, but
the couple will assert gift treatment. See supra notes 77-94 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing express pooling agreements). This also raises the issue of implied agreements and Marvin
v. Marvin quasi-contract and quantum meruit remedies. See supra notes 108-24 and accompa-
nying text.
174. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
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basis in the partnership. 75 The distributee partners take a basis in the proper-
ty equal to their bases in their partnership interests reduced by any money dis-
tributed in the same transaction.
76
2. Support Payments
Lesbian and gay couples do not qualify for the tax treatment applicable to
married couples upon their dissolution.'77 Periodic payments of spousal sup-
port are included as gross income to the recipient spouse, but the payor spouse
is allowed an offsetting deduction."7 Alternatively, child support payments
are neither income to the recipient spouse nor deductible to the payor.79
Support payments between same-sex partners upon dissolution likely would
not be income to the recipient partner or deductible to the payor.'" However,
the tax consequences of support payments between same-sex partners have not
been addressed by the Service or the courts, and are, therefore, unclear.' 8'
3. Termination as a Result of Death
The death of a lesbian or gay partner has several federal estate tax conse-
quences. This section will address those consequences, and the ensuing section
will cover estate planning. There are distinct differences between the estate tax
treatment of married couples and unmarried couples. Special provisions are
available for married couples. For example, only one-half of property held in
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety is included in the estate of a decedent
spouse, while the amount included for a lesbian or gay decedent is determined
based upon contribution.8 2 Married couples also are given the opportunity to
175. 1.R.C. § 731(a) (West 1994).
176. 1.R.C. § 732(b) (West 1994).
177. The relevant Code sections-§§ 71 and 215-specifically refer to the receipt of
periodic support payments by the "spouse," such that it is unlikely that these provisions
apply to same-sex couples. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (West 1994); see Cain, supra note 79, at 115-
16, 118-23, 129-31 (proposing tax reform recognizing some form of "tax marriage" that
would give parity between married and same-sex couples). Cain suggests an approach that
would tax support payments between same-sex partners at the marginal bracket of the trans-
feree and to exclude the payments from gift taxation.
178. I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (West 1994).
179. I.R.C. § 71(c) (West 1994). For dissolved lesbian or gay relationships involving
children, same-sex couples are actually in an advantageous position because, unlike divorced
couples, the child support payments will not be subject to scrutiny by the Service as dis-
guised alimony.
180. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) (holding, in a pre-section 71 case,
that alimony was not income to the recipient because it was "not founded on a contract,
express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife").
181. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[6]. Citing the lack
of treatment by the courts or the Service, the authors caution that "it is difficult advising
clients with any certainty in these matters." The payments could be treated as gifts if they
are voluntary, or ordinary income if they are made pursuant to an ann's-length bargain based
on a quid pro quo understanding. Id.; see also Reppy, supra note 77, at 1699-1704 (address-
ing the effect bankruptcy has on an obligor's duty to make payments according to a dissolu-
tion agreement). In contrast to payments in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support
(which are not discharged by bankruptcy), periodic payments made pursuant to an express or
implied contract between ex-cohabitants are subject to discharge. I1 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)
(1988).
182. I.R.C. § 2040 (West 1994). Section 2040 provides an exception for married couples,
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capitalize on the unlimited marital deduction for all property passing to a
surviving spouse."8
In ascertaining the federal estate tax consequences that result upon the
death of a lesbian or gay partner, the first consideration is to determine the ex-
tent to which property accumulated during the same-sex couple's relationship
is included in the gross estate of the first to die." The major factors in mak-
ing that determination are the form of property ownership and the adequacy of
consideration furnished by the surviving partner.'85 For example, if a lesbian
or gay couple kept their ownership interests separate, or owned property as
tenants in common, the decedent's separately owned or one-half interest is
included in the decedent's estate.
8 6
Complications arise, however, when property is held in joint tenancy. As
noted above, the full value of the jointly held property is included in the gross
estate of the first joint tenant to die, except to the extent that the surviving
tenant contributed money or property toward the acquisition of the proper-
ty." 7 Surviving joint tenants have argued that the performance of domestic
services should constitute adequate consideration for purposes of section 2040-
(a). '8 Structuring the domestic services as part of a contractual duty, howev-
er, may have more favorable estate tax consequences.'89
The adequate consideration problem of section 2040(a) is not limited to
joint tenancy property. If a same-sex couple agrees to divide equally at death
but otherwise requires that the value of the decedent's gross estate include the full value of
all property held by the decedent and any other person as joint tenants. Unless the surviving
joint tenant contributed to the acquisition, the full value of the jointly held property will be
included in the decedent's gross estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a)(2) (1958). The decedent's
estate has the burden of proving that the contribution originated with the survivor. See, e.g.,
Estate of Heidt v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 969 (1947), aff'd per curiam 170 F.2d 1021 (9th
Cir. 1948).
183. I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1994) (allowing a spouse to pass wealth tax-free to her or his
spouse). Up to $600,000 may be passed tax-free to others persons. See I.R.C. § 2010(a)
(West 1994) (allowing a $192,800 estate tax credit that effectively shields transfers of
$600,000 or less from estate tax liability). Thus, through careful planning, a married couple
is able to shelter as much as $1.2 million of their combined estate from federal estate tax.
In contrast, the estate tax on an unmarried person with an estate of $1.2 million is approxi-
mately $470,000. I.R.C. § 2001 (West 1994).
184. See I.R.C. § 2031 (West 1994) (defining "gross estate").
185. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1290.
186. See I.R.C. § 2033 (West 1994).
187. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1291-92.
188. When a same-sex partner purchases joint tenancy property solely with her or his in-
come, § 2040(a) treats that partner as furnishing the full consideration for the purchase,
unless the creation of the tenancy is supported by consideration in money or money's worth
furnished by the other partner. If the other partner is supplying domestic services instead of
furnishing property or other easily quantifiable contributions, courts have uniformly held that
in the context of marriage such services performed by a spouse do not constitute consider-
ation in money or money's worth for purposes of § 2040(a). See, e.g., Estate of Lyons v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 605, 610 (1976) (quoting Estate of Loveland v. Commis-
sioner, 13 T.C. 5, 7 (1949)); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[7];
Wolk, supra note 46, at 1294-95.
189. As part of a contractual duty, the performance of domestic services may constitute
adequate consideration for purposes of § 2040(a). See I.R.C. § 2040(a) (West 1994).
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all property accumulated during their relationship, the surviving partner may
have an enforceable claim against the decedent's estate."9 A claim against an
estate, founded upon a promise or agreement, is deductible to the extent that it
was "contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth."' 9' Presumably, a good faith agreement to perform do-
mestic services, in return for a transfer of property at death, gives rise to a
deductible claim supported by adequate and full consideration under section
2053. 192
Once the amount of the decedent's taxable estate is determined, all of the
decedent's taxable gifts are added to the sum,' 93 and the tax is calculated on
the total."9 The estate is allowed a unified credit against the tax of
$192,800," g  which effectively shields estates of $600,000 or less from estate
taxes.'" Because the highest estate tax is now fifty-five percent, 97 the de-
nial of the unlimited marital deduction for lesbian and gay couples clearly re-
sults in tremendous inequity.
C. Estate Planning
In general, it is the fact of being neither legally mar-
ried nor biologically related to one's intended beneficiary,
rather than the fact of being lesbian or gay, which presents
special problems. Much folklore and misconception, how-
ever, abound in the lesbian and gay community regarding
estate planning. People often wait too long to seek legal
advice, or never seek it at all. When that happens, the
client is at the mercy of a legal system which was not
designed to recognize, facilitate, or benefit relationships,
no matter how long-term, between two lesbians or two gay
190. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1296 (citing Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1973)).
191. I.R.C. § 2053(c)(l)(A) (West 1994).
192. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. United States, 422 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir.
1970). In Amarillo, an individual brought an action against the decedent's estate alleging the
decedent had promised to leave her his property upon his death in return for her promise to
help manage his household, run the ranch, and take care of his personal needs. Id. at 1386.
The court held that the claim was "against the estate," and therefore, the amount paid to
settle the claim was deductible for estate tax purposes. Id. at 1388. However, similar agree-
ments have not fared as well in producing deductible claims for purposes of I.R.C. § 2053.
Such agreements raise the issue of whether the performance of domestic services constitute
adequate consideration for purposes of § 2053. Additionally, any such agreement presumably
will be subject to judicial inquiry as to whether it was made at "arm's length," and for full
and adequate consideration. Wolk, supra note 46, at 1296-97; see also SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 3.06[7].
193. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2503 (West 1994).
194. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (West 1994).
195. I.R.C. § 2010 (West 1994).
196. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1) (West 1994).
197. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1) (West 1994). The highest estate tax is assessed on estates of $3
million or more. Id.
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males.'98
Estate planning for lesbian women and gay men is a subset of general
estate planning.'" This section addresses some estate planning problems that
are peculiar to same-sex couples. The primary objective in estate planning for
lesbian women and gay men is to secure a method of carrying out their inten-
tions, regarding both the management of assets and personal care, should they
become incapacitated, as well as the disposition of their estates upon death. As
one treatise observes, "if anything sets estate planning for the lesbian or gay
client apart from estate planning for any other unmarried person, it is the need
for a comprehensive written plan in documents which are absolutely clear in
their intent, possibly to the point of being redundant."'
1. Intestacy
As discussed earlier, state intestacy laws discriminate against same-sex
couples in that lesbian and gay relationships are considered invalid for purpos-
es of distributing the estate of a decedent partner who dies without a will. -0'
To prevent leaving a surviving partner out of the distribution of the decedent
partner's estate, lesbian women and gay men may resort to adult adoption, 2
or other more conventional estate planning mechanisms such as wills, trusts,
joint ownership, powers of attorney, conservatorships, insurance, and living
wills. Unfortunately, these planning options are not always utilized, leaving the
surviving partner in the uncomfortable position of trying to maintain posses-
sion of her or his deceased partner's assets despite the intestacy laws. 3
2. Wills
Wills present a problematic area for same-sex couples. Although preparing
a will is usually a better strategy than intestacy, a bequest to a same-sex part-
ner often will be subject to challenge by relatives of the decedent testator. 4
198. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.02.
199. For general estate planning analysis, see 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS (1984 & Supp. 1993); CHARLES L. B.
LOWNDES & ROBERT KRAMER FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (2d ed. 1962); STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 79; Tax Mgmt. (BNA) I I lth.
200. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.02.
201. See supra note 49 (summarizing the state's role in effectively writing a will for a
decedent without one, but noting that only spouses and relatives receive under intestacy
laws).
202. See supra notes 146-154 and accompanying text.
203. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.12. The surviving
partner can pursue a number of actions to increase the likelihood of succeeding in her or his
attempt to gain some or all of the estate. Among them are: (a) administrating and preserving
the estate; (b) jointly owning personal property; (c) using gift "causa mortis" clauses; (d)
leasing and owning homes together; (e) incorporating claims for services rendered; and (f)
supplying benefits to the survivor through legal representation. Id.
204. See CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:6 (cautioning lesbian women and gay
men who have relatives vehemently opposed to their sexual orientation that they stand a
greater risk of having their wills challenged if they leave property to their partner or to a
gay rights organization); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[6]
(noting that a will should be used in addition to non-probate devices, such as joint tenancy
and trusts, as a means of assuring the avoidance of intestate succession). See generally
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If a gay or lesbian person wishes to leave any part of his or her estate to
anyone other than a family member, execution of a will is essential. Although
there are four types of wills-statutory, holographic, nuncupative or oral, and
soldiers' 2"--Iesbian and gay couples should use statutory wills, and should
be careful to observe all technical formalities, such as using proper witnesses,
to increase their chances of withstanding a potential will challenge."
A same-sex couple also should be aware of grounds for contesting a will,
such as improper execution, mental incompetence of the testator, duress, undue
influence, and fraud.2 7 A lesbian woman or gay man can prevent such chal-
lenges to her or his will by drafting new wills periodically without destroying
prior versions. 2 ' This deters potential challengers because the repetition pro-
vides evidence of the testator's seriousness and intent, and because a success-
ful challenge to the last will merely means the previous one is in effect."
A lesbian or gay testator also should revoke any old wills naming ex-
spouses or adult children as legatees or devisees, if it is not her or his inten-
tion that such persons share in the distribution of the estate."' Further, if the
testator desires to exclude his relatives from sharing in the estate, the new will
should name and specifically disinherit those relatives, or leave them a de
minimis amount.2"'
A "no contest" clause is another testamentary mechanism that can be used
to discourage will contests. 1 12 Also known as conditions against contest,
Sherman, supra note 50.
205. See ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 1-4 to 1-5. Generally, a statu-
tory will must be written or typed, signed by the testator, and formally subscribed by two or
three witnesses. A holographic will is a handwritten will that evidences a testamentary intent
and is signed by the testator. A nuncupative will is an oral will. Such wills are not recog-
nized in many jurisdictions, except in circumstances where death is imminent at the time of
declaration. A soldiers' will applies to testators who are in actual service. Id.; see also CUR-
RY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:9 (discussing the benefits of formal, typed wills over
holographic or nuncupative wills).
206. ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at I-8 to 1-10; CURRY & CLIFFORD,
supra note 50, at 9:8 to 9:9; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §
4.04111; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-501 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (requiring the testator be
a minimum of age 18 and of sound mind); COL. REV. STAT. § 15-12-407 (1987) (governing
who has the burden of persuasion as to various issues that arise when a will is contested);
COL. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (stating that a formal statutory will
must be: (1) signed by the testator, or by someone in the testator's presence and under his
direction; and (2) signed by at least two witnesses).
207. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 90; SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[8]; Sherman, supra note 50, at 225; Cameli,
supra note 2, at 464.
208. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 91. In Colorado, a
will is revoked by subsequent will, in part or in whole, either expressly or by inconsistency.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-507 (1987 & Supp. 1994). Revocation is also effectuated by
physical destruction with intent to revoke. Id.
209. THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, supra note 15, at 91-92.
210. ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 1-6; CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra
note 50, at 9:14; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[2].
211. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:14; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
supra note 75, § 4.04[2].
212. See Sherman, supra note 50, at 248-49 & nn.113-14. Sherman criticizes these testa-
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these devices purport to preclude any legatee or devisee who contests the will
from receiving any legacy or devise thereunder.
From an estate and gift tax perspective, the use of disclaimers adds conve-
nience and flexibility to wills. A "qualified disclaimer" is an irrevocable and
unqualified refusal by a named beneficiary to accept an interest in the devised
property." 3 When a transferor makes a testamentary transfer to another per-
son who makes a qualified disclaimer, federal tax law treats the situation as if
the person making the disclaimer never received the property." 4 According-
ly, federal tax law views the property as passing directly from the testator to a
third party.25 Thus, through the use of disclaimers, a same-sex couple can
name one partner as the primary beneficiary, and designate secondary benefi-
ciaries to whom interests in the estate will pass if the primary beneficiary
disclaims her or his interest.
Since the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the
federal government has allowed a "unified credit" against estate taxes.2"6 The
unified credit effectively exempts estates worth $600,000 or less from federal
estate tax.217 The unified credit, especially when used in conjunction with
$10,000 nontaxable gifts"8 and charitable deductions, 29 is an effective tool
in estate planning.22
3. Living Wills, Powers of Attorney, Conservatorships, and
Guardianships
One special concern for H.I.V.-positive testators is the increased likeli-
hood of a will challenge, especially when the testator executes or alters her or
his will while in a weakened mental or physical state induced by the onset of
AIDS dementia.2 ' The specter of AIDS and the case of Sharon
mentary provisions as having limited utility in the case of lesbian and gay testators. The
primary fault of these clauses is that a successful challenge invalidates the condition against
contest. Sherman recommends that conditions against contest be drafted with a provision for
gift over to another legatee in the event a contest is instituted. This protects the no contest
clause in jurisdictions that enforce them only if the will contains a gift over. Id.
213. I.R.C. § 2518(b) (West 1994). The refusal will be deemed a "qualified disclaimer"
only if: (1) the refusal is in writing; (2) the refusal is timely; (3) the refusal is not made
after an acceptance; and (4) as a result of the refusal, the interest passes to the spouse of
the decedent or to a person other than the person making the disclaimer. Id.; see STEPHENS
ET AL., supra note 79, 9 10.07[21[a]-[dl.
214. See I.R.C. § 2518 (West 1994).
215. I.R.C. § 2518(a) (West 1994).
216. I.R.C. § 2010 (West 1994).
217. l.R.C. § 2010(a) (West 1994). Section 2010(a)'s credit of $192,800 serves to offset
the $192,800 tax liability assessed on an estate of $600,000. Id.; see SEXUAL ORIENTATION
AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.1111]; STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 1 3.02.
218. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (West 1994).
219. I.R.C. § 2055 (West 1994).
220. ALL-STATES PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 49, at 2-5. Complex estate planning
strategies make use of the unified credit in combination with disclaimers, gifts, trusts, spill-
overs, bypasses, and other creative mechanisms that are beyond the scope of this article.
221. Rubenstein, supra note 41, at 91. Rubenstein asserts:
AIDS has made the lack of a legal relationship crushingly apparent to lesbian
and gay couples: a gay man whose partner is dying of AIDS may have diffi-
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Kowalski222 should motivate same-sex couples to turn to living wills and du-
rable powers of attorney in anticipation of medical emergencies. Living wills,
or directives to physicians, permit individuals to specify in advance the types
of medical treatment they want performed, or do not want performed, in the
event they become incapacitated .1 3 Living will statutes generally allow the
testator to designate someone to whom such decision-making powers are to be
transferred. 224 A power of attorney-either conventional, durable, or spring-
ing-is also an attractive device for anticipating serious illness or a medical
emergency."z
Conservatorships, custodianships, and guardianships are similar to spring-
ing powers of attorney. The former arise after a court makes a determination
culty inquiring about his condition or visiting him in the hospital because the
couple has no legal relationship to one another. Once the lover dies, the surviv-
ing partner will not automatically share in his estate, nor enjoy the tax benefits
of so doing, and may indeed lose control of property the couple purchased to-
gether.
Id.; see CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:6 (noting there have been a number of le-
gal challenges to AIDS patients' wills, and encouraging AIDS patients to prepare their wills
promptly); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.04[31 (highlighting the
need to create documentation and to preserve evidence of capacity); Amy L. Brown, Note,
Broadening Anachronistic Notions of "Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried
Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1066 (1990) (blaming the AIDS epidemic for an increasing
number of cases in which the lover of an incapacitated adult will have to fight the victim's
legal family, the judicial system, and society's views, in order to have a say in her or his
partner's decisions).
222. See supra note 38.
223. See CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 8:21 to 8:24 (exploring the desire for
"self-deliverance" and the right to a natural death, and offering several resources that are
available to terminally ill patients); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §
4.08. See generally Gina N. Torielli, Note, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of
Medical Crisis, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 220 (1989).
224. See Cameli, supra note 2, at 462-63 & n.l10 (maintaining that the use of a living
will-type document in the Kowalski case would have been instrumental, especially if Sharon
Kowalski had manifested her intent to have Karen Thompson act on her behalf). COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987) contains the "Colorado Medical Treatment Decision
Act" which generally recognizes the right of a competent adult to accept or reject medical or
surgical treatment affecting his or her person. The Act allows a person to make declarations
as to medical treatment and has been amended to include declarations as to artificial nourish-
ment, life-sustaining procedures, proxies, advance medical directives, durable powers of attor-
ney, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation directives. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18.5-101 to
15-18.6-108 (Supp. 1994).
225. A power of attorney is "a legal document in which one person authorizes another
person to act on the former's behalf." CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 8:2. A con-
ventional power of attorney "is used when a competent person wants someone else to handle
financial matters for her or him." The conventional power automatically terminates when the
creator becomes incapacitated or dies. A durable power of attorney "remains valid even if
the person creating it becomes incapacitated," but terminates upon the death of the creator. A
springing power of attorney is a durable power that does not become effective until the
creator becomes incapacitated. Id.; see id. at 8:3 to 8:20 (discussing generally the importance
of powers of attorney for people with AIDS); SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra
note 75, § 4.07 (exploring the uses of conventional powers of attorney, durable powers, and
"authorization and consent to medical treatment," as a specialized form of power of attorney
in states lacking "durable power of attorney for health care" provisions).
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that an individual is incompetent, while the latter are automatically triggered
by incompetency. 26 Conservatorships, custodianships, and guardianships are
statutory mechanisms that enable a nominated appointee to oversee the estate
of the incapacitated, the person, or both.22 These devices are more formal
than living wills or powers of attorney and require judicial supervision.228
4. Trusts and Nonprobate Transfers
In addition to being subject to challenges, wills are problematic because
they require probate-court proceedings in which the will is filed, assets gath-
ered, debts and taxes paid, and remaining property distributed to beneficia-
ries."' Fortunately, there are several estate planning techniques for avoiding
probate. Inter vivos, or revocable living trusts, are an efficient and effective
wealth-transfer device for same-sex couples .2 1 Irrevocable trusts, when com-
226. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 8:3; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
supra note 75, § 4.06.
227. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.06[!]-[3] (explicating
the process of nominating a conservator or guardian, supporting the nomination with supple-
mental material, and observing the formalities of execution). The difference between a con-
servatorship and a guardianship, in jurisdictions that provide for both, is that a guardianship
usually requires a finding of legal incompetency, while a conservatorship only requires a
finding of incapacity. Id. § 4.06.
Colorado follows the Uniform Probate Code distinction between guardians and conser-
vators. A testamentary guardian is not a general guardian, so if management of assets is
needed, a separate conservatorship proceeding may be necessary. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-
209 (1987 & Supp. 1994). If permitted by the court, a guardian may receive and expend up
to $5,000 per year for the ward's support, care, and education without conservatorship.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-103 (1987). A testamentary guardian may be appointed by will
or by other writing. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-202 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
228. Because they require judicial supervision, conservatorships, custodianships, and
guardianships are expensive to administer. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra
note 75, § 4.06 (recommending the use of less expensive alternatives, unless there is a need
for close judicial supervision and management of an incapacitated person's personal or finan-
cial affairs).
229. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:24. Because of the substantial effort and
detailed paperwork required in the process, probate is expensive. Furthermore, probate can be
a lengthy process that prevents beneficiaries from receiving their inheritance for years, de-
pending on the details of the estate and the probate court's docket.
230. Unlike testamentary trusts, which are contained in a will, and therefore subject to
probate, inter vivos trusts or living trusts avoid the costs and delays of probate. Inter vivos
trusts usually name the trustor as trustee during her or his lifetime, and provide for a named
successor trustee upon death or incapacity. The substitution of trustee normally occurs with-
out court proceedings so that the details of the trustor's estate remain private. SEXUAL ORI-
ENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.05. See generally CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra
note 50, at 9:25 (stating that revocable living trusts are "usually the best way for a lesbian
or gay person to avoid probate"). But see Sherman, supra note 50, at 262-65, 266 & n.209.
Sherman cautions that an inter vivos trust used by a homosexual may be set aside on the
ground that it was procured by a lover's undue influence. The author sets out the facts of
Knowles v. Binford, 298 A.2d 862 (Md. Ct. App. 1973), and maintains that the applicable
law of undue influence would be the same in the proceeding as in a will contest. A funded
revocable inter vivos trust, however, has a practical advantage over testamentary devises be-
cause it provides for payments to the settlor throughout her or his life, amounting to evi-
dence that the settlor was consistently reminded of the instrument and refrained from revok-
ing it. Sherman, supra note 50, at 262-66.
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bined with "Crummey powers," '23 also can be an effective wealth-transfer
device for lesbian and gay couples. Trusts also are advantageous because they
allow same-sex couples to avoid conservatorship or guardianship of their prop-
erty in the case of incapacity.
232
Revocable living trusts are classified as grantor trusts for tax purposes,
and even if they become irrevocable upon incapacity or death, the trust income
is still taxable to the grantor during her or his lifetime. 33 As discussed above
with regard to the creation of joint bank accounts, the creation of a trust is an
incomplete gift."M Gift tax liability attaches when the grantor dies or be-
comes incapacitated, at which time the trust is considered irrevocable.23 The
primary disadvantage of an inter vivos trust is that the value of the trust prop-
erty is included in the gross estate of the grantor, and is taxable if the grantor
retains a beneficial interest in, or control over, the trust property.2"
Other strategies for avoiding probate are less formal. Totten trusts and
payable-on-death accounts are simple trust-type mechanisms that are essential-
ly normal savings accounts, except that the person owning the account desig-
nates a beneficiary who receives the funds when the depositor dies.237 Life
insurance is another convenient nonprobate alternative for same-sex couples
because one partner can be named as the beneficiary on the policy.23 Final-
ly, joint tenancy ownership also serves as a popular estate planning device for
231. An irrevocable trust may be created to reduce the grantor's estate tax liability by
means of pre-death transfers of assets, protected in part by the $10,000 annual exclusion.
Under an irrevocable transfer, the grantor does not retain a reversionary interest. The purpose
of an irrevocable trust is usually to shift both the property itself and its income from the
grantor's gross estate. Tax Mgmt. (BNA) I1 Ilth, A-17, A-62 to 68.
The transfer of property into an irrevocable trust will result in a transfer for gift tax
purposes. I.R.C. § 2503 (West 1994). However, by making the transfer irrevocable, the
grantor's estate no longer includes the transferred property under I.R.C. §§ 2036. 2037, or
2038. The attractiveness of irrevocable trusts can be enhanced by making them "demand" or
"Crummey" trusts. See Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). "Crummey"
power trusts give the trust beneficiary an annual availability to withdraw from the trust by
extending a demand right that expires at the end of the year. Under this demand scheme,
the annual gift exclusion is preserved while avoiding the ongoing power to terminate the
entire trust.
232. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, § 4.11[5].
233. I.R.C. § 671 (West 1994).
234. The creation of a trust is not subject to gift tax. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2(b) to (c)
(as amended in 1983).
235. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(f) (as amended in 1983).
236, I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (West 1994).
237. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:26; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW,
supra note 75, §§ 4.05A, 4.10[2]. Totten trusts are available to most depositors of banks and
savings and loan associations. The depositor is allowed to name a beneficiary who receives
ownership of the account balance at the time of the depositor's death. Pay-on-death accounts
only exist in states that have enacted statutes providing therefor. Upon the death of the
owner of the account, the designee can receive the funds upon serving proof of death. Nei-
ther Totten trusts nor payable on death accounts require probate. Note, however, that the
balance in either account will be included in the gross estate of the depositor. I.R.C. §§
2036, 2038 (West 1994).
238. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:27, 9:33; see supra notes 156-165 and ac-
companying text (discussing the tax treatment of life insurance).
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avoiding probate.239
5. State Death Taxes
Almost half the states impose a death tax on the estate, and some of those
death taxes discriminate against property left to anyone other than legal fami-
ly. 2" For estate tax purposes, the applicable state is determined according to
the decedent's domicile state, i.e., her or his principal residence. 24' The estate
receives a limited federal estate tax credit for the amount of state death taxes
actually paid, whether they are in the form of property transmission taxes,
inheritance taxes, or a combination of the two. 2 In addition to state death
taxes, testators should be aware of complications that arise with regard to
choice of law when a will fails to specify which state's law is controlling.243
III. CONCLUSION: A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
Not only does marriage have a future, it has many
futures. There will be, for example, options that permit
different kinds of relationships over time for different
stages in life, and options that permit different life styles
or living arrangements according to the nature of the rela-
tionships .... It is not, however, the specific forms the
options will take that is important but rather the fact that
there will be options, that no one kind of marriage will be
239. See supra notes 125-137 and accompanying text. See generally CURRY & CLIFFORD,
supra note 50, at 9:26 to 9:27; SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, §§
4.09, 4.11131, 4.12121.
240. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:31. Colorado does not have a death tax.
ld; see Lovas, supra note 150, at 382. Lovas notes that there are two basic types of state
death taxes: (1) an estate tax, which is calculated by taxing a certain percentage of the as-
sets owned by the decedent at the time of death; and (2) an inheritance tax, whereby each
heir is taxed a certain percentage on the value of the property that the heir receives. The
author maintains that state death taxes cause "significant problems for the non-traditional
family in four areas: the estate tax marital deduction, the inheritance tax rates, the taxability
of jointly-owned property, and the allocation of the burden of paying the tax due." Id.
241. CURRY & CLIFFORD, supra note 50, at 9:31 to 9:32. A principal residence is usual-
ly the state in which the taxpayer votes and is licensed to drive. Taxpayers who move
around on a frequent basis may be subject to multiple estate taxes and should declare one
state as their legal home. Id.
242. I.R.C. § 2011 (West 1994); cf I.R.C. § 2604 (West 1994) (a credit allowed under
§ 2604 for a state tax imposed on a generation-skipping transfer will not qualify for the §
2011 credit against federal estate taxes); STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 79, 3.03. If the
estate falls prey to death taxes in two states, both taxes qualify for the credit. Id. (citing
Rev. Rul. 70-272, 1970-1 CB 187). The credit for state death taxes is limited because it
cannot be applied in conjunction with the unified credit of I.R.C. § 2010 to result in a tax
refund. I.R.C. § 2011(f) (West 1994).
243. The meaning and effect of a disposition is determined by the law of the state se-
lected by the testator in her or his will, unless contrary to provisions relating to elective
share, exempt property, and property allowances, or other public policies of Colorado. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-602 (1987). In Colorado, a written will is valid if its execution com-
plies with the law of the state where it was executed at the time of execution, or of the
law of the state where, at the time of execution or death, the testator was domiciled. COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-11-506 (1987 & Supp. 1994).
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required of everyone, that there will be recognition of the
enormous difference among human beings which modem
life demands and produces. It will come to seem incongru-
ous that everyone has to be forced into an identical
mold.2"
As discussed earlier, Hawaii has taken steps towards legalizing same-sex
marriage.245 Additionally, a growing number of municipalities have passed
domestic partnership provisions that expand the availability of certain benefits
that were previously reserved for married couples.2" These victories indicate
a growing momentum. They signal a movement within the political structure
to recognize the validity of same-sex relationships and put an end to patent
discrimination. Whether these acknowledgments are the result of expanded
acceptance of the gay community or merely a recognition of changing times
and the reality of the dramatically altered appearance of the American house-
hold, they are significant.247 It may take several years, but the day will come
when lesbian women and gay men are allowed to enter into legally-recognized
marriages.
Legalizing same-sex marriage would have dramatic tax ramifications.
Same-sex couples could probably take advantage of joint return filing, marital
deductions, interspousal transfer provisions, estate tax benefits for joint inter-
ests in property, and the like. However, many of the federal tax provisions
benefitting heterosexual couples use words such as "husband" and "wife,"2
such that the Code would have to be amended to expand the definition of
spouse. Although legalizing same-sex marriages would effectively remove
many of the discriminatory legal barriers faced by lesbian women and gay
men, it would not remove discrimination altogether. Some members of the gay
community, however, do not support the prospect of legalized same-sex mar-
244. JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 270-71 (1982).
245. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; Richard D. Mohr, The Case For
Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 215 (1995); Otis R. Damslet,
Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 555 (1993); William M.
Hohengarten, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 1495
(1994).
246. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
247. See Cox, supra note 22, at 5 (stating that the impetus for the movement to expand
the provision of recognition and benefits from traditional nuclear families to alternative fam-
ilies is the recognition of the decreasing prevalence of the nuclear family in the last few de-
cades); Eblin, supra note 31, at 1086 (commenting that the definition of family has been
evolving away from the traditional norm of a nuclear family); Looking for a Family Resem-
blance, supra note 6, at 1640 n.l (citing 1988 census figures indicating only 27% of Ameri-
can households consist of two parents living with children). For an illustration, see Braschi
v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 51, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that "the term fami-
ly ... should not be rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relation-
ship by obtaining ...a marriage certificate," but rather "should find its foundation in the
reality of family life").
248. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2040(b) (West 1994) (concerning estate tax treatment of "joint
interests of husband and wife").
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riage. Opponents 49 of same-sex marriage argue that marriage is a sexist,
patriarchal institution,2" and that by entering into such an institution, lesbian
women and gay men are forced to assimilate into mainstream society and lose
their voice and visibility. 25' Additionally, they argue that same-sex marriage
should be opposed because marriage, by definition, holds certain relationships
more valid than others, s2 and is simply not the best option for a lesbian
woman's or gay man's personal lifestyle. 53
Despite this opposition, the idea of same-sex marriage has garnered sub-
stantial, if not overwhelming, support. One commentator has observed:
Advocates of lesbian and gay marriage as a high priority argue
that as long as lesbian and gay people are denied this privilege, they
are denied full citizenship. While they recognize the possible prob-
lems with embracing marriage, because of its patriarchal history, they
also suggest that allowing lesbian and gay people to enter marriage
would transform the institution. Marriage could become an institution
of intimacy between equals if same-sex couples could marry. Thus,
attaining marriage for lesbian and gay people should be a priority,
because that step would make marriage-dependent benefits available
to lesbian and gay people while radicalizing the institution of mar-
riage."
Clearly, the priority of endowing same-sex couples with the range of tax
benefits otherwise reserved for heterosexual married couples is an important
argument for legalizing same-sex marriage.
249. For the purposes of this article, the arguments against legalizing same-sex marriage
are restricted to those in the gay community. For alternative arguments against legalizing
same-sex marriage, see G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 541 (1985). For a discussion of the gay and lesbian intra-community
debate, see Harlon L. Dalton, Reflections on the Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate, I LAW
& SEXUALITY 1 (1991); Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage,
I LAW & SEXUALITY 31 (1991); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men, and the Intracommunity Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming May 1995); Claudia A. Lewis, Note, From This Day Forward: A
Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage, 97 YALE L.J. 1783 (1988).
250. Ruth Colker, Marriage, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321 (1991); Cox, supra note 22,
at 66; Ettelbrick, supra note 73, at 20.
251. Ettelbrick, supra note 73, at 21, 22 ("The moment we argue, as some among us in-
sist on doing, that we should be treated as equals because we are really just like married
couples and hold the same values to be true, we undermine the very purpose of our move-
ment and begin the dangerous process of silencing our different voices."). But see Colker.
supra note 250, at 321-22 (stating that some members in the lesbian and gay community be-
lieve there is no reason to assume marriage will help lesbians and gays achieve social legiti-
macy, and that same-sex marriages will result in lesbians and gays having to "sacrifice some
of their anonymity, making them even easier targets for discrimination").
252. Ettelbrick, supra note 73, at 20.
253. Cox, supra note 22, at 66; Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1994).
254. Colker, supra note 250, at 322.
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A HISTORICAL VIEW OF LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP ROLL-UPS:
CAUSES, ABUSES, AND PROTECTIVE STRATEGIES
GORDON B. SHNEIDER*
INTRODUCTION
The limited partnership has a long history as an investment vehicle and
business organizational form.' In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress enacted stat-
utory changes intended to alter the limited partnership's conceptualization as
an investment vehicle and business organization to reflect more accurately
both the tax incentives of the investor and the financing requirements of the
limited partnerships.' Section I of this Article describes the limited
partnership's history. Section II discusses the impact of the various partnership
statutes on the reorganization of limited partnerships.
Economic conditions in the latter half of the 1980s had a major impact on
* Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law, J.D. DePaul University,
LL.M. University of Chicago. The author wishes to express his thanks to Professor Sandy
Braber-Grove for her patient and careful research assistance. Her help was invaluable, but
icsponsibility for the use to which it was put is mine.
1. ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 2 (1968).
Bromberg indicates that partnerships, as profit seeking arrangements, date back to Babylonia
and continue through classical Greece and Rome. Limited partnerships as a specialized form
were recognized in the courts of England, using equity principles, and were known as the
Commenda or Societe en Commandite in continental Europe. Later cases were decided by
common law courts using mercantile customs supplemented by the civil law. The extensive
use of partnerships in the nineteenth century resulted in codification to reduce confusion and
uncertainty. In the United States the Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act were completed in 1914 and 1916 respectively. id. § 2, at 10-13.
2. See 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 11.02(c)-(d) (1994). In 1976, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("the Conference") adopted a revision to the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act of 1916 ("ULPA") intending to modernize the ULPA after sixty years of experience
and major economic change in the United States. REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6
U.L.A. 347-48 (1976) (prefatory note). In 1985, the Conference adopted amendments to the
1976 Act. See REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AT, 6 U.L.A. (1985).
The Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916 and the Revised Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act of 1976 and 1985 are discussed throughout this article. The 1916 Act will be
cited as the "U.L.P.A. (1916)." The 1976 revision will be cited as the "R.U.L.P.A. (1976)."
The 1985 amendments will be cited as the "R.U.L.P.A. (1985)."
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 and 1993 will be cited as the "U.P.A. (1914)"
and the "U.P.A. (1993)" respectively.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the asset values of many limited partnerships During the same period, Con-
gress changed the Internal Revenue Code, radically reducing the tax advantag-
es of using the limited partnership form.4 Section III details the manner in
which these variables provided incentives for the use of limited partnership
roll-up transactions.
Economic and tax changes resulted in a wave of reorganization and at-
tempted reorganization.5 These reorganizations, often described as "roll-ups,"
take several technically distinguishable forms.6 For purposes of this introduc-
tory discussion, the term "roll-up" will generally describe the reorganization of
one or more limited partnerships into a new investment vehicle. Many inves-
tors involved in a roll-up suffered large economic losses.7 It is not clear what
portion of those losses may be ascribed to the reorganization transaction' and
what portion resulted from the forced market recognition of the diminished
value in the underlying assets.9
The long history of limited partnerships as investment vehicles and orga-
nizational forms provides a testament to their societal value."0 Maintaining
this value mandates that investors in limited partnerships requiring reorganiza-
tion be afforded adequate protection from unscrupulously and incompetently
planned roll-ups." This protection must not, however, jeopardize this valu-
able form of business organization. Section IV describes the various attempts,
through legislation and regulation, to accomplish such "efficient" protection.
3. See infra part IIl.A.
4. See infra part III.B.
5. See infra part III.C.
6. The reorganization "roll-up" transaction extends the life of a limited partnership,
combines two or more limited partnerships into a limited partnership with a longer term, or
reorganizes one or more limited partnerships into a new entity. See infra part 11.
7. Anthony Carideo, More Roll-ups Likely to Leave Investors Feeling Rolled Over,
STAR TRIB., Feb. 17, 1991, at DI; Kirstin Downey, Partnership "Roll-ups" Leave Some
Investors Down, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1991, at FI; Laura Evenson, Probers Turn Attention
to Real-estate Roll-ups Technique Said to Cost Investors $1.6 Billion, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 3,
1990, at Cl; David Satterfield, Roll-ups are Financial Deals that Often End in More Losses,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 1991, at KI; Richard D. Wollack Partnership Roll-ups Hurt Small
Investors, Economy, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 24, 1992, at D5.
8. As a result of the multiple roll-up transactions available and the fees and costs in-
herent in such transactions it is difficult to isolate the economic impact of the transaction it-
self. See infra part If.
9. In a setting of diminished value in the underlying assets and costs of the transac-
tion itself, it is difficult to specifically quantify the proportional source of the investor's loss.
See infra part III.A.
10. See supra note 1.
I. See Deborah A. Demott, Rollups of Limited Partnerships: Questions of Regulation
and Fairness, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 617 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the
Delaware Limited Partnership and Its Implications for Corporate Law, 16 1. CORP. L. 299
(1991); Craig B. Smith, Limited Partnerships - Expanded Opportunities Under Delaware's
1988 Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43 (1990); Kenneth R.
Hillier, Note, Rolling Down the Curtain on "Roll-ups": the Case for Federal Legislation to
Protect Limited Partners, 90 MICH. L. REV. 155 (1991); John A. Sellers, Comment, Publicly
Traded Limited Partnerships: are the Limited Partners Being Rolled Over in Roll-ups?, 69
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 627 (1992).
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This Article features a survey of the Limited Partnership Roll-up Reform Act
of 1993 and assesses the impact of remedial efforts in the context of a bal-
anced response which provides investor protection without destroying the
efficacy of an evolving useful reorganizational tool.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND ITS STATUTORY
REGULATION
A historical view of the limited partnership provides insight into its value
as an investment vehicle and an organizational tool. The common law devel-
oped the general partnership as the basic model for organization of a business
enterprise. 2 In 1902, the Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws ("the Conference") set out to codify these developments. By 1914 the
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) was recommended to the states. 3 The virtues
of the general partnership included its ease of formation, 14 informality of op-
eration, 5 and potential for internal flexibility resulting from the partnership
agreement. 6 However, unlimited personal liability" and the fragility of the
organization s created unacceptable risks for some investors.
The historical alternative to the general partnership was the chartered
corporation, of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, succeeded by the statu-
tory corporation of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 9 This organi-
zational model provided limited liability for passive investors, continuity of
life, and formal operations. ' Prior to broad acceptance of the close corpora-
tion, however, the public corporation model proved cumbersome and ill-suited
to a business organization lacking the characteristics of a large public corpora-
tion.2'
12. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 1.04 (2d. ed. 1990).
13. See I BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 1.02(b).
14. See U.P.A. § 6 (1914) (defining a partnership as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit"); U.P.A. § 7 (1914) (providing rules
for determining the existence of a partnership).
15. See U.P.A. § 18(e) (1914) (providing that "[alll partners have equal rights in the
management and conduct of the partnership business").
16. See U.P.A. § 18 (1914) (providing that "[tlhe rights and duties of the partners in
relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between themn")
(emphasis added).
17. U.P.A. § 15 (1914) provides: "[all partners are liable (a) Jointly and severally for
everything chargeable to the partnership under sections 13 [partner's wrongful acts] and 14
lpartner's breaches of trust]. (b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partner-
ship."
18. See U.P.A. § 29 (1914): "[tlhe dissolution of a partnership is the change in the
relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as
distinguished from the winding up of the business."
19. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, § 1.04.
20. See id. § 1.02[C]13]; REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1984) (providing
for limited liability of shareholders); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (1984)
(providing the affairs of the corporation be managed by a board of directors).
21. A famous, oft-quoted opinion recognizing the need for broad recognition of close
corporation concepts is Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964).
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The limited partnership offered a model for investors dissatisfied with the
polar models.2" The limited partnership was used most often by passive in-
vestors desiring protection from creditors, and by non-public ventures of a
limited duration in need of protection from unexpected dissolutions. 3 Nine-
teenth-century state experiments with statutory models resulted in the
Conference's recommendation of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1916
(ULPA).24 Courts generally measured compliance with this unique statute in a
strict manner.2 5
The development of potential pitfalls under the ULPA resulted in a less
than uniform application among the adopting states. 6 Difficulties centered
around a series of provisions. First, the formality of formation made entry or
exit before dissolution difficult. In order to form a limited partnership each
member had to sign and swear to a certificate of limited partnership which
was filed with the state.27 Any addition or substitution of limited partners
required all members of the partnership to sign and swear to an amendment to
the certificate.28 In addition, a limited partner could only assign his or her
interest to a substituted limited partner (requiring unanimous consent of the
other partners) or to an assignee with limited rights.29 Second, the condition-
ing of limited liability on a limited partner's non-participation in control of the
business" resulted in ambiguous interpretations and potential oppression of
limited partners." This second factor also diminished the importance of the
limited partnership agreement, because attempts to provide voting protection
for limited partners risked exposing such limited partners to unlimited liabili-
ty.32 Finally, the absence of provisions governing potential litigation to cor-
rect abuses created intolerable conflicts.33
Three models-general partnership, limited partnership, and the corpora-
tion-represented options for business organization and investment in the early
twentieth century. Choices were relatively straightforward. Balancing advan-
tages and disadvantages of each form resulted in a choice for investors and
entrepreneurs as to which form best suited their perceived needs. From the
standpoint of the entrepreneur, an appropriate business organizational form
provided a managerial model consistent with the business enterprise and at-
22. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 11.01(b)-(c) (comparing limited part-
nerships with general partnerships and corporations).
23. See id. § 12.01 (discussing the nature, definition, and scope of limited partnerships).
24. See U.L.P.A. (1916).
25. BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26(a), at 144 & n.25.
26. See id. § 2, at 13-14.
27. U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916).
28. U.L.P.A. § 8 (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate for addition of limited part-
ners); U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate adding or substituting
limited partners be signed and sworn to by all members, the added or substituted limited
partner, and the assigning limited partner in the case of substitution).
29. U.L.P.A. § 19 (1916).
30. U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916).
31. See BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 26(c).
32. See 4 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 15.15(f).
33. See generally U.L.P.A. (1916).
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tractive to potential investors in that particular economic area. For a small
managerial group desiring substantial control over the enterprise, the general
partnership was of some utility, but unlimited liability made it a flawed model.
On the other hand, unless the business enterprise was large and carried a high
likelihood of success, the corporate model could prove too expensive and
speculative to attract capital.
Thus, because the general partnership proved unattractive to potential
investors and the corporate form proved to be economically risky, the limited
partnership was attractive to investors and management. For the investor desir-
ing limited liability and no active participation in management, the limited
partnership offered possibilities unavailable in a statutory corporation.' The
passive investor could assure limitation of the nature of the economic pro-
ject," limitation on the duration of the project,36 and a dissolution and liqui-
dation which would conform to a predetermined statutory model.37
Beginning in the mid-1930's, the fact that typical state statutes' restric-
tions on public corporations, while appropriate for public corporations, were
less well suited to corporations which were more private in nature began to be
recognized. Thus arose the "close" corporation.39 This term referred to a
business organization possessing characteristics which enabled a court to inter-
pret legislative models less restrictively.4" Eventually, legislatures recognized
this need and developed statutory close corporations.4' Absent other external
developments, the popularity of, and need for, the limited partnership might
have been destroyed by the rise of the close corporation.
The increases in individual marginal income tax rates and corporate tax
rates were the major external developments reinforcing the continuing need for
limited partnerships. These two significant external events impacted heavily on
34. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, § 11.01(c) (comparing corporations
and limited partnerships); RIBSTEIN, supra note 12, § 2.04[A] (discussing reasons for select-
ing limited partnerships).
35. See U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(lI) (1916) (requiring the character of the partnership business
be included in the certificate of limited partnership); U.L.P.A. § 24(2)(f) (1916) (requiring
amendment to certificate for "change in the character of the business of the partnership");
U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate to be signed and sworn to by
all members of the partnership).
36. See U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(V) (1916) (requiring the term for which the partnership is to
exist be included in the certificate of limited partnership); U.L.P.A. § 24(2)(h) (1916) (requir-
ing amendment to certificate for change in the time for dissolution of the partnership);
U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate to be signed and swom to by
all members of the partnership).
37. See U.L.P.A. § 23 (1916).
38. See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER ASsOCIATIONS 359-60 (1992) (noting that corporate law norms may be less suitable
for the typical closely held corporation than for publicly held firms).
39. See Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (111. 1964) (discussing close corporations);
Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936) (for an early ambiguous case on close corpo-
rations).
40. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 584.
41. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1984) (providing an example of an
integrated statute).
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business organizational forms. High individual marginal tax rates created a
need to "shelter" distributions to individual investors. The second develop-
ment, higher corporate rates (which worsened the "double taxation" phenome-
non) reduced investors' after-tax income.42 This created substantial tax
disincentives to the use of the close corporation, especially when distributions
to "passive" investors were needed to make their investments attractive. 3
This second problem could be solved by "passing through" the income of the
business organization to individual investors, avoiding double taxation to indi-
viduals. The basic system of taxation for partnerships allowed income to "pass
through."'  As a result, this externality to issues of business organization be-
came an' important driving force in the choice of business organizational form.
The entrepreneur found her choice dominated by the external tax impact on
the needed passive investors. The renewed prominence of the limited partner-
ship as a tax sheltering business organizational form in the 1970s and 1980s
resulted in changes to the governing uniform statute.45 These changes took
place in a number of substantive areas, each of which will be discussed sepa-
rately.
First, there was change in the uniform statute's requirements in the certifi-
cate of limited partnership. The ULPA operated on the premise that limited
partnerships existed only by statutory authorization.46 Necessary for compli-
ance with statutory requirements was the partners' sworn execution and re-
corded filing of a certificate of limited partnership.47 Section 2 of the ULPA
required the inclusion of substantial detail in that document."5 Consequently,
42. See WILLIAM H. PAINTER. CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD COR-
PORATIONS 10-11 (2d ed. 1981). The "double taxation" concept is straightforward. The net
taxable income of the corporation is subject to tax at a rate dependent upon the level of in-
come. Any distributions to investors would be made from the after-tax income of the corpo-
ration and would then again be subject to taxation at the rate applicable to the distribution
receiving investor. See id. The details of the deduction available and the tax computation are
complex, but the basic concept is straightforward.
43. See id. (noting that the double taxation of close corporations is a disadvantage).
Since 1982 there has been tax relief available for subchapter S corporations but only under
the details of qualification for such an election. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (West 1994). These
limitations are restrictive to the formation and operations of the business organizational mod-
el.
44. See I.R.C. § 701 (West 1994) which provides: "[al partnership as such shall not be
subject to the income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners
shall be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities."
45. See R.U.L.P.A. (1976); R.U.L.P.A. (1985).
46. See U.L.P.A. § 1 (1916) defining a limited partnership as: "A limited partnership is
a partnership formed by two or more persons under the provisions of Section 2, having as
members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners." (emphasis added).
Thus, its existence is dependent upon meeting the provisions of U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916).
47. See U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916).
48. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a) (1916) required:
(1) Two or more persons desiring to form a limited partnership shall
(a) Sign and swear to a certificate, which shall state
I. The name of the partnership,
11. The character of the business,
111. The location of the principal place of business,
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the limited partnership certificate became the dominant governing document
for the operation of the business organization. Rigid detail was further compli-
cated by statutory requirements relating to the amendment of the certificate.49
Such rigid requirements reduced the flexibility of operation and created sub-
stantial "hold-out" power for each investor. Both the 1976 Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act and the 1985 amendments substantially reduced the
required inclusions in the formal certificate."0 The 1985 amendments reduced
required inclusions in limited partnership certificates to the partnership name
and address, the name and address of general partners, and the latest date for
dissolution." Such changes meant that the partnership agreement replaced the
limited partnership certificate as the critical governing document.5 2 This
change in the formal requirements removed one of the disincentives to the use
of limited partnerships and provided broad latitude for negotiating the terms of
the relationships of the partners inter se."
IV. The name and place of residence of each member; general and limited partners
being respectively designated,
V. The term for which the partnership is to exist,
VI. The amount of cash and a description of and the agreed value of the other
property contributed by each limited partner,
VII. The additional contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner
and the times at which or events on the happening of which shall be made,
VIII. The time, if agreed upon, when the contribution of each limited partner is to
be returned,
IX. The share of the profits or the other compensation by way of income which
each limited partner shall receive by reason of his contribution,
X. The right, if given, of a limited partner to substitute an assignee as contributor
in his place, and the terms and conditions of the substitution,
XI. The right, if given, of the partners to admit additional limited partners,
XII. The right, if given, of one or more of the limited partners to priority over
other limited partners, as to contributions or as to compensation by way of income,
and the nature of such priority,
XIII. The right, if given, of the remaining general partner or partners to continue
the business on the death, retirement or insanity of a general partner, and
XIV. The right, if given, of a limited partner to demand and receive property other
than cash in return for his contribution.
Id.
49. See U.L.P.A. § 25 (1916) (requiring a swom writing signed by all members of the
partnership).
50. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a) (1985).
51. Id.
52. R.U.L.P.A. § 201 cmt. (1985) provides:
The 1985 Act requires far fewer matters to be set forth in the certificate of limited
partnership than did Section 2 of the 1916 Act and Section 201 of the 1976 Act.
This is recognition of the fact that the partnership agreement, not the certificate of
limited partnership, has become the authoritative and comprehensive document for
most limited partnerships. ...
Id.
53. The flexibility resulting from the use of the partnership agreement as the critical
document is recognized in other sections of the 1985 Act as well. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. §
302 (1985) (providing that "the partnership agreement may grant to all or a specified group
of the limited partners, the right to vote"); R.U.L.P.A. § 401 (1985) (providing that "addi-
tional general partners may be admitted as provided in writing in the partnership agree-
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Second, there was a change in the limited liability of the limited partner.
Under the ULPA, limited liability was dependent upon the passive nature of
the investor.' Section 7 of the ULPA provides, "[a] limited partner shall not
become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his
rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the busi-
ness."" The ambiguity of this broad statement made protection of the passive
investor hazardous. Consultation with, or decision making by, limited partners
created the risk of participation in the "control of the business."56 Section 303
of the RULPA, while retaining the general preclusion of participation in the
control of the business, changed its scope in two ways.5" First, liability as a
result of participation in control requires reliance on the limited partner's
conduct as a general partner.58 Second, the statute now identifies a list of acts
which by themselves do not constitute participation in the control of the busi-
ness.59 Significant items on this list are: (1) managerial roles of a corporate
general partner; (2) consulting with, or advising, the general partner; (3) par-
ticipating in a derivative action on the part of the partnership; (4) requesting or
attending a meeting of partners; (5) proposing and voting on matters related to
dissolution, sale or exchange of partnership assets, incurring partnership in-
debtedness other than in the ordinary course of business, a change in the na-
ture of the business, membership of general or limited partners, acts to amend
the partnership agreement or certificate of partnership; or (6) participating in
approval of matters designated in the partnership agreement as subject to limit-
ed partner approval or disapproval.' Thus, outside of daily management ac-
tivities, limited partners may become extensively involved in policy planning
and approval, and more effectively protect their investments, without risking
general liability to creditors.
Third, there was a change in the limited partner's ability to insure an early
return of funds invested in the organization. Under the ULPA the formal cer-
tificate of limited partnership was required to identify the term of the partner-
ment"); R.U.L.P.A. § 503 (1985) (providing that "profits and losses of a limited partnership
shall be allocated among the partners, and among classes of partners, in the manner provided
in writing in the partnership agreement").
54. U.L.P.A. § I cmt. (1916) (noting that one fundamental principle of the ULPA is
that a limited partner is a partner in all respects, except that to retain limited liability he or
she must comply with the statutory requirements of the certificate and refrain from participa-
tion in the conduct of the business).
55. U.L.P.A. § 7 (1916).
56. See Stephen I. Burr, The Potential Liability of Limited Partners as General Part-
ners, 67 MAss. L. REV. 22, 23-27 (1982) (discussing judicial decisions concerning the mean-
ing of "control of the business").
57. See R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (1985).
58. R.U.L.P.A. § 303(a) (1985) provides that "if the limited partner participates in the
control of the business, he [or she] is liable only to the persons who transact business with
the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that
the limited partner is a general partner."




ship,6 the time for return of contribution if agreed,6" and the right (if avail-
able) and terms of limited partner substitution.63
Significantly, amendment of these restrictions was conditioned upon the
unanimous agreement of all partners,' creating in each partner veto power
over any change in the term of the investment. Furthermore, the restrictions on
alienation rendered uncertain any limited partner's attempt to recoup an invest-
ment by transferring the limited partnership interest for consideration. Assign-
ing an interest to a substitute limited partner would require either permission
in the certificate to substitute limited partners,65 or the unanimous amendment
of the certificate.' Finally, although the statute provided for assignment of a
limited partnership interest without substitution67 (avoiding a unanimous vote)
the assignee's limited rights6" made such assignments difficult to negotiate.
The illiquidity resulting from these statutory proscriptions received special
attention by the drafters of the RULPA and its 1985 amendment. The model
for resolution of the problem was incorporated into several parts of the
RULPA. First, the certificate of limited partnership no longer requires either
the names of, nor sworn execution by, limited partners.69 Thus, no statutory
unanimous execution of the certificate is required. In its place, the partnership
agreement becomes the governing document.7"
Under the RULPA, the partnership agreement may now identify in writing
the date or events that permit withdrawal by any limited partner." As a result
of this provision, unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, the
withdrawing limited partner "is entitled to receive, within a reasonable time
after withdrawal, the fair value of his [or her] interest in the limited partner-
ship as of the date of withdrawal.""2 Additionally, partnership interests are
now assignable in the absence of preclusion by the partnership agreement.
More importantly, the agreement itself can create the power in the assignor to
grant limited partner status in the assignee.74 Thus, the negotiated partnership
61. U.L.P.A. § 2(1)(a)(V) (1916).
62. U.L.P.A. § 2(I)(a)(Vill) (1916).
63. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(X) (1916).
64. U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b) (1916).
65. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(X) (1916).
66. U.L.P.A. § 25 (1)(b) (1916).
67. U.L.P.A. § 19(1) (1916).
68. U.L.P.A. § 19(3) (1916).
69. R.U.L.P.A. § 201 (1985).
70. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201 cmt. (1985) (noting that the partnership agreement has be-
come the authoritative document of limited partnership).
71. R.U.L.P.A. § 603 (1985) (providing a limited partner with the right to withdraw
from the partnership at the happening of events specified in the partnership agreement or
upon six months notice to each general partner if the partnership agreement does not specify
a definite time for dissolution or specific events for withdrawal).
72. R.UL.P.A. § 604 (1976).
73. R.U.L.P.A. § 702 (1976).
74. R.U.L.P.A. § 704 (1985) provides that "[aln assignee of a partnership interest ...
may become a limited partner if and to the extent that (i) the assignor gives the assignee
that right in accordance with authority described in the partnership agreement, or (ii) all
other partners consent." id.
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agreement could make alienation possible and practical. This third alternative
of distribution to all partners upon early dissolution appeared to require una-
nimity under the ULPA75 or a judicial dissolution,76 neither of which were
of much aid to liquidity. In an attempt to clarify the right to dissolution, the
RULPA provided for non-judicial dissolution either at the time specified in the
certificate" or upon the happening of events specified in the partnership
agreement." Under the RULPA, judicial dissolution is permissible when "it
is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the
partnership agreement."79 Thus, one could negotiate terms for a dissolution,
perhaps as a liquidity option of last resort.
Fourth, there was a change in the concept of standing. The ULPA did
little to clarify the historically confused concept of standing in the partnership
context. The ULPA provided that "[a] contributor, unless he is a general part-
ner, is not a proper party to proceedings by or gainst a partnership, except
where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to
the partnership."8 Thus, except in those narrow circumstances where the sub-
stantive theory was based upon a duty owed directly to the limited partner and
the injury was sustained directly by the limited partner, a limited partner did
not have standing in a proceeding by or against a partnership.
With the advent of the flexibility resulting from the predominance of the
partnership agreement, this ambiguity concerning the source of the power to
bring causes of action required clarification. The RULPA drafters chose the
entity concept unambiguously and provided for the addition of derivative
actions in limited partnerships.8 ' As a result, limited partners had the statuto-
ry power to act, irrespective of the complications of entity theory, because the
action could be instituted in the form of a class action or derivative suit as the
theory required, while retaining the financial efficiency of a multi-party ac-
tion.2
75. See U.L.P.A. § 2(I)(a)(V). (VIII) (1916) (requiring the certificate of limited part-
nership to include the partnership term and the time for contribution); U.L.P.A. § 25(l)(b)
(1916) (requiring unanimous consent to any amendment of the certificate).
76. The limited partner's right to judicial dissolution was narrow and ambiguous.
U.L.P.A. § 10(l)(C) (1916) provides that "[a] limited partner shall have the same rights as a
general partner to . . . [hiave dissolution and winding up by decree of court." However, the
ULPA did not grant specific statutory powers to a general partner to "have a dissolution."
Section 16 of the ULPA allowed the limited partner to demand return of contribution or
dissolution only when he or she could rightfully do so under the certificate of limited part-
nership. U.L.P.A. § 16 (1916).
77. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(l) (1985).
78. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(2) (1985).
79. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985).
80. U.L.P.A. § 26 (1916).
81. See R.U.L.P.A. § 1001 (1985):
A limited partner may bring an action in the right of a limited partnership to re-
cover a judgment in its favor if general partners with authority to do so have re-
fused to bring the action or if an effort to cause those general partners to bring the
action is not likely to succeed.
Id. For details of the procedure under this section see, R.U.L.P.A. §§ 1002-04 (1985).
82. See R.U.L.P.A. §§ 1001-04 (1985).
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II. TRANSACTIONAL MODELS FOR REORGANIZING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
While the ULPA served a useful purpose, modem business organization
and finance had become too sophisticated for the 1916 statute.8" In order to
retain the efficiency of limited partnerships a more flexible enabling statute
was required. With the development of increased marginal tax rates and the
consequent need for sheltering income, the need for revision became more
pressing. The RULPA and its amendments represented reactions to these de-
velopments. The RULPA's flexibility and reliance upon the partnership agree-
ment constituted a reasoned response to this need.
The impact of the RULPA and its amendments on the subsequent and
unanticipated need for reorganization of the limited partnership entity seems
inadvertent but rational within the developed scheme. The RULPA created a
system in which a bargained-for agreement could meet the developing needs
of a changing economy.' The measure of rigidity retained by the 1976 Act
was intended to protect creditors, not parties to the bargain, in their dealings
with the limited partners.85
Typically, passive investors would be reasonably economically successful,
with a desire for cash flow, negligible income, and/or pass-through losses. The
partnership would create (or purchase and manage) assets which would pro-
duce those results for a limited period of time and which, at the end of that
period, could be sold to return the investment with tax advantages. 6 Certain
events, however, could frustrate the cash flow objectives and render unsound
the anticipated sale of the assets at the scheduled time of dissolution and sub-
sequent distribution. In such a circumstance, a postponement of liquidation,
through some form of reorganization, appears desirable.87 There are a number
of transactional models for reorganization of limited partnerships for the pur-
83. One of the major developments which radically changed one use of limited partner-
ships was the potential for their change in size. As opportunities for large scale economic
developments in real estate, oil and gas, and other large projects offered tax sheltering ad-
vantages, due to tax pass-throughs of expenses, the potential for large groups of limited
partners presented itself. In one format the passive investors received traditional limited part-
nership interests usually in private placements, Another format for the large offering was to
place the limited partnership interest in trust and have the trustee offer participation units in
the trust. This format, most commonly referred to as a master limited partnership, could pro-
vide registration and trading in these resultant limits. The transactions available in this mod-
em setting were inconsistent with smaller privately held enterprises which were provided for
by the ULPA. Thus, a Revised Act suitable to these potential transactions was needed.
84. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201 cmt. (1985) (noting that the partnership agreement has be-
come the authoritative document of the limited partnership).
85. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (1985) (liability to third parties); R.U.L.P.A. § 403(b)
(1985) (liabilities of general partners); R.U.L.P.A. § 607 (1985) (limitations on distribution);
R.U.L.P.A. § 804(1) (1985) (priorities in the distribution of assets).
86. This is a paradigm of the persons involved in a limited partnership tax shelter and
their traditional desires.
87. The concept described is predicated upon a judgment that the assets have value, but
due to external conditions they are temporarily undervalued. Liquidation at the scheduled
time would be financially undesirable and there should be reason to believe that the ability
to postpone the liquidation would have economic benefits to the investors.
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pose of postponement of liquidation. In discussing the transactional models for
reorganization, it is helpful to compare the statutory impact of the ULPA and
the RULPA on such reorganizations.
A. Pure Extension by Amendment
The most straightforward approach to reorganization is to extend the term
of the partnership and establish a new date for the asset sale and subsequent
dissolution. Even this simple transaction proved difficult under the old ULPA,
primarily because the basic governing document was the certificate of limited
partnership.8 The ULPA required the term of the partnership and the time
for return of the limited partner's contribution to be included in the certificate
of limited partnership. 9 A change in the certificate required an amendment
signed and sworn to by all members of the partnership.' This could prove
both cumbersome and exceedingly difficult in many situations. If the dates in
the certificate were ignored and no attempt to amend was made, each limited
partner would be entitled to demand return of the contribution9 or, if the
demand was unsuccessful, dissolution of the partnership.92
The RULPA provides a less formal means of accomplishing the pure
extension by amendment. It requires the certificate of limited partnership state
the last time at which the limited partnership may dissolve.93 However,
amendment may be made for a proper purpose at the discretion of the general
partners.' Additionally, due to the informality under the RULPA, the certifi-
cate no longer requires the sworn execution of all the partners.95 Thus, chang-
es in the partnership term are less difficult under the RULPA than under the
ULPA.
In certain situations, however, the specific term of the partnership would
be important to the partnership's marketability. Under the RULPA, which
provides wide latitude as to provisions inter se in the agreement,' the specif-
ic term of the partnership could be included in the partnership agreement.
Thus, the term of the partnership and the means by which that term could be
modified could be provided in the negotiated partnership agreement. The only
88. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
89. U.L.P.A. § 2(l)(a)(V), (VIll) (1916).
90. U.L.P.A. § 24(2)(h) (1916) (requiring amendment to certificate for a change in the
time for dissolution or return of a contribution); U.L.P.A. § 25(1)(b) (1916) (requiring
amendment to be signed and sworn to by all members of the partnership).
91. U.L.P.A. § 16(2)(b) (1916).
92. U.L.P.A. § 16(4)(a) (1916); see also U.L.P.A. § 10(l)(c) (1916) (providing the
limited partner with the same fights as a general partner to "[have a dissolution and wind-
ing up by decree of court").
93. R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a)(4) (1985).
94. R.U.L.P.A. § 202(d) (1985).
95. See R.U.L.P.A. § 201(a) (1985) (not requiring sworn execution by all members of
the partnership or inclusion of the limited partners names in the certificate); R.U.L.P.A. §
204(a)(1) (1985) (requiring only general partners to sign certificate).
96. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985) (providing wide discretion for the partnership
agreement to grant or restrict voting power of the limited partners).
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major limitation on the power of the partnership agreement to provide for the
term of the partnership would be the provision for judicial dissolution.9
The ULPA made it extremely difficult to extend the life of a limited
partnership absent unanimous consent of all the partners. The RULPA, though
not specifically intended to resolve the extension-of-term problem, did so by
providing the discretion necessary to accomplish an extension.
B. Buyout of Limited Partners
The term of the partnership could also be modified by a buyout of the old
limited partners. A straightforward cash purchase would be a voluntary trans-
action. A cash price based upon the present value of the partnerships's assets
would not be conducive to such a voluntary sale.9" Rather, the transaction
could be structured as an exchange offer of an interest in a new enterprise,
resulting in a delayed liquidation of the old limited partnership assets." The
unanimity required by the ULPA, however, would render the transaction
impractical."
The alternative to unanimity is some form of "cramdown" that would
force recalcitrant limited partnership holders to accept the transaction or some
"fair" substitute."' 1 There seems to be no such direct relief in any of the uni-
form partnership acts. The RULPA, however, permits substantial latitude for
governance in the partnership agreement."2 An implication of the power to
include such a transaction in the agreement would require the combination of
concepts from a number of sections in the RULPA."' Section 303 specifical-
97. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985) provides for judicial dissolution "[oln application by or for
a partner . . .whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in confor-
mity with the partnership agreement." Non-judicial dissolutions are controlled by the partner-
ship agreement. R.U.L.P.A. § 801 (1985).
98. The problem posited which creates the need for an extension is based upon an asset
with temporarily reduced value. The intent is to postpone a present liquidation at a substan-
tial loss in the hope that changing conditions will create a better value for a subsequent
liquidation.
99. For examples of recent litigation concerning the buyout form of reorganization, see
Coleman v. Global Ultimacc Systems, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 8467 (LLS), 1986 WL 5804
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1986); Enserch Corp. v. McLane Gas Co., 633 A.2d 369 (Del. Super. Ct.
1993).
100. See U.L.P.A. § 2 (1916) (requiring all partners to sign and swear to the certificate
of limited partnership); U.L.P.A. § 25(1)(b) (requiring all partners to sign and swear to any
amendment to the certificate). To the extent that even one limited partner holds out, a cash
buy out of that partner could prove exceedingly expensive and totally counter productive in
terms of its impact on other partners. The problem is worse in the real world of large mod-
em tax shelter limited partnerships due to the large number of interests involved.
101. While variations of "cram downs" are commonplace in other reorganizations, such
as insolvency, the term can have a broader meaning indicating the forced acceptance of a
transaction when some predefined level of voluntary acceptance has been reached.
102. See, e.g., R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985) (providing wide discretion for the partnership
agreement to grant or restrict voting power of the limited partners).
103. R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985) (providing the authority of the partnership agreement to
allocate voting power of limited partners); R.U.L.P.A. § 303 (1985) (describing actions which
may be taken by limited partners without participating in control of the business).
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ly provides that limited partners may vote on matters which transfer all or
substantially all of the assets of the partnership without destroying their limit-
ed liability status." 4 Thus, RULPA seems to contemplate terms in partner-
ship agreements providing for a common form of business reorganization: the
sale, lease, or exchange of all or substantially all of an entity's assets, not in
the regular course of business.0 5
In this manner, the partnership agreement could provide for a successful
reorganization buyout. First, a successful exchange offer to limited partnership
members would give interests in the new company to a majority (or super-
majority) of limited partners. As a result of the exchange, the new company
would own more than the required number of "old" limited partnership inter-
ests. Second, the "cramdown" would be accomplished by selling the assets of
the old limited partnership to the new company, while the "old" limited part-
nership would receive interests in the new company equivalent to those ac-
cepted in the voluntary exchange. Finally, the transaction would be completed
by the dissolution of the "old" limited partnership and a distribution in
kind"° of the interests in the new company to the remaining recalcitrant lim-
ited partners, thus completing the cramdown.
In summary, the RULPA, through its liberal approach to flexible control
via the partnership agreement, allows for the reorganization of a limited part-
nership through a voluntary exchange of interest, provided a sufficiently large
voluntary transaction can be accomplished.
C. Sale of Assets
A third avenue for modifying the term of a limited partnership is the
negotiation of a sale of the limited partnership's assets to a new entity,
through the old owners."0 7 There are two problems with this form of reorga-
nization.
First, a disclosure documents would be required explaining the complex
implications of this simple transaction, including an explanation of the assets
sold and the new interests purchased. °S Furthermore, if the general partner(s)
received different consideration than the limited partners, complex descriptions
of the difference and equivalence would need to be included. Even if the
general partner(s) received the same form of consideration as the limited part-
ners, description of equivalency would be complex.J" In addition, the disclo-
104. R.U.L.P.A. § 303(b)(6)(ii) (1985).
105. Id. This traditional form of reorganizations is found in all corporate statutes and is
one recognized form of reorganization in the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 368(a)(I)(C)
(1988).
106. R.U.L.P.A. § 605 (1985) (indicating substantial latitude in the partnership agreement
as to provisions for distributions in kind).
107. The RULPA permits this type of reorganization by allowing limited partners to vote
on matters concerning the sale, exchange, or other transfer of all or substantially all of the
limited partnership's assets without losing limited liability. R.U.L.P.A. § 303(b)(6)(ii) (1985).
108. The disclosure document would be required for the limited partners' information and
accurate record keeping. See R.U.L.P.A. §§ 105, 305 (1985).
109. This transaction as an artificial model is complex due to its two-step nature. The
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sure itself creates risks of misrepresentation and the sale arguably contains
risks of indirect unfairness.
The second problem with an asset sale would involve the efforts required
to procure votes in favor of the transaction. The complexity of the information
might require professional solicitation of positive votes. Even without such
outside assistance, the process would be costly.
If these difficulties are surmounted, dissolution of the old partnership
would result in a distribution in kind. The dissolution could take place on the
natural date of dissolution in the certificate of limited partnership."' Alterna-
tively, the transaction may render the old limited partnership subject to judicial
dissolution because no assets would be available to "carry on the business in
conformity with the partnership agreement.'' A distribution in kind would
be essential," 2 and depending upon the assets received as consideration for
the sale, flexibility would exist"' once all creditors were paid.' 4
The asset sale approach would obviate the tender offer described in Sec-
tion II.B. The tender offer, with incentives, might be a possible alternative if
the necessary votes for a sale of assets are in doubt.
D. Merger
If several limited partnerships exist, either independently or in affiliation,
the sale of assets model becomes unnecessarily complex."5 Extending the
dissolution dates of such a number of entities, however, may also be accom-
plished by a merger."6
sale of assets must result in the receipt by the old limited partnership entity of interests in,
the new entity as consideration for the physical assets sold. These interests, which would be
the only assets of the old entity, would be distributed in kind upon the dissolution of the
old limited partnership. Because the old limited partnership had at least two different kinds
of owners that distribution would be complex depending upon the intended capitalization of
the new entity.
110. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(1) (1985).
Ill. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985).
112. R.U.L.P.A. § 605 (1985) (implying that the partnership agreement may compel
acceptance of a distribution in kind).
113. Statutory limitations on distributions inter se are conditioned by the partnership
agreement and thereafter subject to proportionality of interests. Under U.L.P.A. § 23 (1916)
priorities between limited and general partners made this form of distribution extremely com-
plicated. Under R.U.L.P.A. § 804(2)-(3) (1985), the lack of priority makes distributions in
kind less complicated.
114. R.U.L.P.A. § 804(l) (1985).
115. The multiple organizations may have differing dissolution dates, different voting
procedures, different distribution agreements, different general partnership requirements, all of
which, when folded into the formal sale of assets/distribution in kind model, result in too
complex a transaction.
116. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § I1.01(a) (1984) (providing for statu-
tory mergers). Common law courts also recognize the concept of a merger. See, e.g., Farris
v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958) (recognizing de facto mergers). Additionally,
the Internal Revenue Code includes mergers within its definition of corporate reorganizations.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (West 1994).
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Neither the UPA, ULPA, nor the RULPA provide explicit authorization
for mergers. However, the UPA, arguably, provides implicit authorization for
such transactions. The process for finding such implied authorization is not
straightforward, but it can be persuasive in the event of a challenge.
Two arguments support the idea that the UPA impliedly authorizes merg-
ers. First, since no actions prior to the merger itself seem to serve as a basis
for a judicial decree of dissolution under the UPA,"7 it can be argued that
such mergers are authorized. The UPA defines a dissolution as "a change in
the relation of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in
the carrying on ... of the business.""' Under this definition, a merger
would not seem to cause a dissolution, because a partner does not necessarily
have to discontinue her association with the business after the merger.
The second argument supporting the notion of "implied authorization" is
dependant on the first; it can only be argued if it is agreed that a merger does
not effect a dissolution of the partnership. If it is agreed, the resolution of the
legal issues incident to the merger would be governed by section 5 of the
UPA,"9 and section 29 of the ULPA, 2 ° which state that the rules of law
and equity, including the law merchant, are to govern. Accordingly, unless a
court determined that conduct prior to the merger violated some rule of law or
equity, the merger would be permissible under the UPA and ULPA. It should
be noted that under the RULPA, such a merger would be permissible if the
terms for approving it were specified in the partnership agreement or its provi-
sions for amendment.
2'
In corporate reorganizations, proposals to merge usually require approval
117. Section 32 of the UPA states the instances in which a judicial decree of dissolution
is required; mergers are not specifically mentioned. U.P.A. § 32 (1914). Arguably, however,
actions prior to a merger could trigger a judicial decree of dissolution under the "catch-all"
provision listed in section 32. See U.P.A. § 32(l)(f) (1914) (stating that on application by or
for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution whenever circumstances render a dissolution
equitable); cf. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985) (stating that a court may decree a dissolution when-
ever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the part-
nership agreement); see also R.U.L.P.A. § 801(1) (1985) (stating that the certificate of limit-
ed partnership can specify a time for dissolution); R.U.L.P.A. § 801(2) (1985) (stating that a
partnership can be dissolved upon the happening of events specified in writing in the part-
nership agreement). Under the RULPA, then, the partners can agree in advance, either in the
certificate of limited partnership or in the partnership agreement, that certain events preceding
a merger will trigger a dissolution. Absent such a written provision, however, RULPA, like
the UPA, offers judges little guidance to help them determine whether to decree a dissolu-
tion.
118. U.P.A. § 29 (1914).
119. U.P.A. § 5 (1914).
120. U.L.P.A. § 29 (1916).
121. See R.U.L.P.A. § 301(b)(1) (1985). This section states that a person can acquire a
partnership interest directly from the limited partnership if the partnership agreement so pro-
vides. Id. Because RULPA includes corporations, associations, trusts, estates, and other lim-
ited partnerships within its definition of "person," a merger of one or more limited partner-
ships would be permissible under RULPA if it was provided for in the partnership agree-
ment. See R.U.L.P.A. § 101(11) (1985) (defining person for purposes of the Act).
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by management,22 and subsequent approval by some agreed-upon majority
or super-majority of shareholders. 23 In a limited partnership scenario, the
parallel for management approval is approval by the general partners, and the
equivalent of shareholder approval is approval by the limited partners.
Under old state statutes shareholders were required to approve a merger
by at least a majority of the shares.'24 With the advent of non-voting shares
newer state statutes, and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, only
require a vote of "shareholders entitled to vote."'" Corporations can use this
provision to substantially limit the classes of shareholders entitled to vote,
unless some outside agency requires otherwise.' 26
Similarly, under the RULPA, limited partnerships can limit the classes of
limited partners entitled to vote.'27 The Act expressly states that the partner-
ship agreement "may grant to all or a specified group of limited partners the
right to vote (on a per capita or other basis) upon any matter."'' 28 Arguably, a
court of equity applying equitable considerations could place limitations on
such a voting procedure. Thus, under the RULPA, the partnership agreement
can provide that a certain voting procedure be used in the event of a merger.
If the procedure is used to restrict certain limited partners' right to vote, it
may be possible to extend the life of the limited partnership.
E. Outsider Transactions
All of the previously discussed methods for extending the life of a limited
partnership have assumed general partners or other internal investors are the
moving force behind the transaction. The impetus for the transaction, however,
may also come from "outsiders."
Certain circumstances must ordinarily be present, however, for an "outsid-
er" to take an interest in extending the life of a limited partnership. First, some
incentive must stimulate the interest of the outsider. If the underlying assets
are be currently depressed, the future of the assets must appear bright. Second,
the outsider must believe that the cost of interests in the extended entity (old
or new) will be based upon relative present values. Third, because most of the
entities under consideration will be controlled by one or more general part-
ners,129 a deal must be struck whereby the outsider is admitted as a general
122. See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, § 11.03(b) (1984).
123. See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, § 11.03(e) (1984).
124. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 52 (Starr & Curtiss 1885) (requiring a two-
thirds vote of the shareholders to consolidates a business).
An exception to the rule requiring majority approval, arises when a parent corporation
attempts to merge with one of its subsidiaries and the parent corporation owns 90% or more
of the subsidiary's stock. In such circumstances, no vote of the shareholders is statutorily
required. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.04 (1984).
125. See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.03(b)(2) (1984).
126. Stock exchange or self regulatory organizations can provide additional protection for
shareholders of corporations traded under their auspices. See, e.g., American Stock Erchange,
Constitution and Rules (CCH 1993).
127. R.U.L.P.A. § 302 (1985).
128. Id.
129. See R.U.L.P.A. § 403(a) (1985) (stating that a general partner of a limited partner-
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partner and control of the entity is shifted to her. 3'
Certain ULPA provisions governing dissolutions, however, can make the
"outsider" approach both risky and problematical. For instance, section 20
states that the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner will dissolve
the partnership.' Additionally, section 16 states that a limited partner may
have the partnership dissolved when she rightfully demands the return of her
contribution, 1 2 or when the partnership is insolvent and she is entitled to the
return of her contribution. 3 Thus, under the ULPA, the "outsider" method
for extending the life of a limited partnership can result in an unintended
dissolution.
Outsider intervention under the RULPA is also risky. A partnership may
be dissolved under RULPA: (1) upon the happening of events specified in the
partnership agreement;'34  (2) with the unanimous consent of all
members; 35 (3) upon the withdrawal of a general partner if there is no con-
tinuation agreement; 36 and (4) when a judge, in her discretion, finds that it
is impracticable to carry on the business in conformity with the partnership
agreement.'37 Absent persuasive terms in the partnership agreement, there-
fore, outsider intervention under the RULPA may also result in an unintended
dissolution. However, the partnership agreement can be written to largely limit
this risk under the more flexible RULPA.
F. "Special" Statutory Regulation
Although the Uniform Acts have been instrumental in shaping modem
partnership law, many state partnership statutes differ significantly from the
Acts. Craig Smith, one of the drafters of the 1988 revision to the Delaware
limited partnership statute, has noted that the Delaware statute was revised to
provide for the reorganization of limited partnerships.'38 In addition to Del-
ship, unless otherwise provided, has the same rights and powers as she would have if she
were in a partnership without limited partners); see also U.P.A § 18(e) (1914) (stating that
all partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business);
cf R.U.L.P.A. § 303(a) (1985) (stating that a limited partner will lose her limited liability,
and be liable as a general partner, if she participates in the control of the business).
130. Under the ULPA, the admission of an additional general partner requires the written
consent or ratification of all the limited partners. U.L.P.A. § 9(l)(e) (1916). However, under
the RULPA, the partnership agreement can provide a procedure for admitting additional gen-
eral partners without the consent or ratification of the limited partners. R.U.L.P.A. § 401
(1985).
131. U.L.P.A. § 20 (1916). There are two exceptions to this rule of automatic dissolu-
tion. First, the partnership will not be dissolved if the partnership agreement explicitly pro-
vides for continuation of the business under the circumstances. Second, the partnership will
not be dissolved if all members consent to its continuation. Id.
132. U.L.P.A. § 16(4)(a) (1916).
133. U.L.P.A. § 16(4)(b) (1916).
134. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(l) (1985).
135. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(3) (1985).
136. R.U.L.P.A. § 801(4) (1985).
137. R.U.L.P.A. § 802 (1985).
138. Craig B. Smith, Limited Partnerships-Expanded Opportunities Under Delaware's
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aware, Eight other states and the District of Columbia have revised their codes
to allow for limited partnership reorganizations.'39 Because these ten jurisdic-
tions expressly provide for limited partnership mergers, an "implied" analysis,
as described earlier,"4 is unnecessary.
In Delaware, limited partnerships, irrespective of whether they survive, are
permitted to merge or participate in a consolidation with corporations, other
limited partnerships, trusts, limited liability companies, and other partner-
ships. "' The Delaware statute also includes formal procedures for recording
the merger or consolidation,' and a protective provision to avoid the risk of
dissolution. 4 All of these procedures, however, are subject to broad varia-
tion by agreement."
Importantly, however, statutes that expressly provide for limited partner-
ship reorganizations are relatively new, and appear in very few states. Whether
such a reorganization will be allowed in a particular state will depend on that
state's interpretations of the ULPA and the RULPA. As stated earlier, these
two Acts, at best, only impliedly authorize mergers and other forms of reorga-
nization.
III. CAUSES OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP REORGANIZATIONS
It is useful to identify the economic events and changes in the tax law
which brought into focus the dire straits of many limited partnership inves-
tors) 45 The recognition that an effective limited partnership tax shelter re-
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43, 51-58 (1990).
139. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 41-428 (1990 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-
9-206.1 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-16-3-12 (Burns 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-1609
(1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 10-208 (1993 & Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-14-211 (1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-42-320 (Law Co-op. 1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 61-2-211 (1989 & Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-I (West
Supp. 1995).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(a)-(b) (1993 & Supp. 1994).
142. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(c) (1993).
143. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(h) (1993) (stating that, unless otherwise
agreed, the merger or consolidation of a limited partnership shall not require the dissolution
of that partnership).
144. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-211(b) (1993) (stating the procedure for approval
of a merger but recognizing that the partnership agreement may set forth a different proce-
dure).
Thus, according to the Delaware Code, if a partnership agreement contains -a provision
restricting the right of limited partners to vote on a merger, the restriction is binding. Id.
Such a procedure for extending the life of a limited partnership may be of utility to general
partners who desire to merge but do not believe they, have the support of the limited part-
ners.
145. It is premature at this point in the article to attempt to identify the proportion of
limited partnership investors' losses which resulted from reorganization transactions and the
proportion which resulted from economic conditions prior to those transactions. The problem
is exaggerated by the lack of a market for the interests involved. When the transaction oc-
curs, it often creates a market, which for the first time since purchase, objectively defines
the value of the interest.
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quires a combination of certain characteristics is necessary to this analysis.
First, the optimal investment would include as many investors as possible. The
underlying assets in operation would produce a reasonable cash flow, return-
able to the investor in periodic payments. In the tax shelter setting, these pay-
ments would not constitute a taxable event. Second, the operational use of
those assets would result in substantial taxable deductions avoiding substantial
pass-through tax liability for investors, and perhaps even creating pass-through
tax losses to shelter investors' other taxable income. Deductions could include
interest expenses in highly leveraged operations, large depreciation or deple-
tion allowances, and any other deductions which could be loaded into the early
years of the investment, especially if the actual cash drain for the deduction
would be postponable. Finally, assets would ideally retain value and be subject
to sale subsequent to the final liquidation of the limited partnership. That sale
might constitute a taxable event due to reduced bases in assets, but it would
occur at an advantageous tax rate for the pass-through investor.
For the high tax-rate investor, this shelter would ideally provide a period
of regular cash flow with little or no tax liability, or even tax losses followed
by a cash draw at an attractive tax rate.
One of the most traditional investments used to accomplish these goals
was commercial real estate, including office buildings, shopping centers, in-
dustrial properties, urban hotels, and resorts.'46 A second category of such
investments lay in the oil and gas industry, including exploration, drilling,
ownership of fields, and production." 7
The effectiveness of limited partnerships as tax shelter investment vehicles
led to a wider, even exotic, range of investments. Limited partnerships invest-
ed in: computers and computer software; 8 residential real estate; 49 and
horse breeding. 5" Changes in the climate surrounding these investments,
however, began to take their toll in the mid-1980s.
146. The Equitec partnerships provide an example. These real estate partnerships were
rolled up into a master limited partnership known as Hallwood Realty Partners. Hallwood
now has more than 3,000 limited partners, and in 1990 owned, directly or indirectly through
joint ventures, 19 major properties in 9 states. See Amy Friedman, Rolling Peter to Pay
Paul, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 7 1991, available in LEXIS, Merger Library, IDD
File.
147. An example of such an investment would be Mesa Limited Partnerships. This com-
plex investment in the oil and gas industry has been transformed back and forth from a cor-
poration to a limited partnership and back to a corporation again. See Odmark v. Mesa Ltd.
Partnership, No. 3:91-CV-2376-X, 1992 WL 203541 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 1992).
148. An example a limited partnership established to sell IBM compatible equipment and
software is STC Ultimacc associates which was eventually rolled up into Global-Ultimacc
Systems. See Coleman v. Global Ultimacc Sys., Inc., No. 85-CIV-8467 (LLS), 1986 WL
5804, (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1986).
149. An example of limited partnerships which invested in federally insured residential
mortgages are AIM 86 and AIM 88 which were the target of a tender offer by a Real Es-
tate Investment Trust. American Insured Mortgage Investors, Inc. v. CRI, Inc., 1991 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,730 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
150. An example of limited partnerships which invested in breeding stock are the
Kinderhill limited partnerships whose interests were privately placed and eventually rolled up




In the oil and gas industry, one of the modes of choice for limited part-
nerships, prices generally plummeted after 1985: 5'
Yearly Consumer Price Index for Energy
1980 86.0 1981 97.71
1982 99.2 1983 99.9
1984 100.9 1985 101.6
1986 88.2 1987 88.6
1988 89.3 1989 94.3
The drop-off in natural gas and petroleum crude was even more dramat-
ic: 152
Average Prices for Mineral Products











Because of the drop in prices investments dependent upon natural gas or
crude oil were negatively impacted. Limited partnerships investing in this
industry typically generated lower cash flows after 1985. Additionally, those
partnerships that were due for liquidation during this period were often forced
to liquidate their assets at a greatly reduced value.
Similarly, investments in commercial real estate suffered from increased
office building vacancy rates during this period. 5 '
Yearly Office Building Vacancy Rates (% of available space)
1980 4.6 1983 13.5
151. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 478 (1991).
152. Id. at 488.
153. Id. at 732 (rates for 1981 and 1982 are not available).
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1984 15.5 1985 16.9
1986 18.6 1987 19.0
1988 18.6 1989 19.5
Major cities, home to many limited partnerships, reflected similar
trends: 5
Office Building Vacancy Rates in Selected Cities
Atlanta, Georgia: 4.6% in 1980; 21% in 1985
Boston, Massachusetts: 7.2% in 1980; 15.9% in 1986
Chicago, Illinois: 7.0% in 1980; 19.6 in 1986
Dallas, Texas: 8.6% in 1980; 30.9% in 1986
Los Angeles, CA: 0.9% in 1980; 19.0 in 1987
San Francisco, CA: 0.4% in 1980; 16.6% in 1986
From 1988-89, leasable space growth in large shopping centers also de-
clined. While smaller centers grew at an 8.9% rate, centers with 800,000 to
1,000,000 square feet of leasable space grew at only 3.7%, and those with
over 1,000,000 square feet grew at only 5.1%.' The weak economy and the
reduced growth of large shopping centers helped contribute to the 0.2% overall
reduction in retail sales per square foot that occurred between 1988 and
1989. 156
Thus, the value of various assets underlying many limited partnerships
declined during the 1980's. Two specific impacts must be noted. First, unless
the partnership was a publicly traded partnership, no information was available
about this reduction in value through the marketplace. Thus, limited partner-
ship investors had no means of quantifying the diminution of their
investments' value. Second, for those interests that were due for liquidation
during periods of asset devaluation, the forced nature of the sale exacerbated
that decline in value.
In order to avert these potential disasters, limited partnerships would en-
gage in "roll-up" transactions. "Roll-ups" would reduce risk by combining the
assets of multiple limited partnerships into a single, larger, and more diversi-
fied, "liquidation-extended" entity. The "roll-up" itself would require some
form of investor approval and some disclosure of diminished values. The
surviving entity of the "roll-up" would often include liquid resulting interests,
thereby causing an immediate market disclosure of highly reduced investment
value.
154. Id.




B. Changes in the Law
During the 1980s, the federal government addressed the need to raise
more revenue and reacted to wealthy taxpayers' manipulation of tax shelters.
The government focus on these areas resulted in a major modification of the
taxation of limited partnerships and their investors.
The basic model for the partnership tax scheme is established by subchap-
ter K of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC").'" According to the IRC, the
partnership, as an entity, is not required to pay taxes.5 8 Rather, the
partnership's taxable income is allocated to the individual partners for inclu-
sion in their individual returns.'59 Thus, taxes "pass through" the partnership
to reach the individual. While this tax scheme appears simple, it becomes
more complex when "distributive shares'" are passed through as both in-
come and deductions.
The partnership taxation model has many advantages, including: (1) taxes
are only paid by the partner, in contrast to the corporate form in which taxes
are paid twice; once by the corporation as an entity; and once by the individu-
al shareholders if and when they receive dividends from the corporation;1
6
1
(2) if a partnership is engaged in business with deferred income cash flow
distributions to partners, the partners may be able to avoid an immediate
tax; 162 (3) if the partnership business is highly leveraged and/or produces
non-cash expenses such as depreciation or depletion resulting in entity losses,
these losses are immediately deductible to the partner; 63 and (4) because
after the dissolution and sale of the partnership assets the final distribution is
taxed as a current distribution, the possibility for capital gains treatment exists.
These generalizations are, of course, subject to limitations; a detailed discus-
sion of which is beyond the scope of this article."
While partnerships continue to enjoy many tax advantages today, 65 the
Tax Reform Act of 1986,'" and the Revenue Act of 1987, 67 eradicated
many of the tax advantages partnerships had previously enjoyed. These two
acts were equally as devastating to limited partnerships as the economic
157. I.R.C. §§ 701-61 (West 1994).
158. i.R.C. § 701 (West 1994). But see I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1994) (stating that certain
publicly traded partnerships may be given corporate tax treatment).
159. I.R.C. § 701 (West 1994).
160. See I.R.C. §§ 702, 704 (West 1994) (concerning distributive shares).
161. I.R.C. § 701 (West 1994).
162. I.R.C. § 731(a) (West 1994).
163. I.R.C. § 704(d) (West 1994).
164. While a full discussion of these limitations is beyond the scope of this article, they
do not affect the basic concepts underlying the tax treatment of limited partnerships .
165. See generally Donna D. Adler, Master Lintited Partnerships, 40 U. FLA. L. REV.
755 (1988) (discussing the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue Act of 1987, and their
respective impacts on the tax treatment of master limited partnerships).
166. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
167. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-382 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
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changes discussed in Section III.A were.
The IRC now places tight restrictions on the ability of a partner to utilize
partnership deductions. For instance, § 704(d) limits a partner's distributive
share of the partnership's capital and non-capital losses."6 A partner can on-
ly deduct partnership loss to the extent of the adjusted basis of the partner's
interest in the partnership at the end of the partnership year in which the loss
occurred.169 Any loss distributed to the partner in excess of the adjusted basis
is suspended, for personal deduction purposes, until an increased basis be-
comes available.1
70
A similar loss limitation is found in § 465, which limits losses allowable
under § 704(d). 17' This additional limitation applies to losses resulting from
deductions which exceed income from the partner's distributive share.' Sec-
tion 465 limits these losses to the partner's interests at risk. The losses, how-
ever, can exceed the partner's adjusted basis because they include, in addition
to the partner's investment, those debts for which the partner is liable. Section
465 has less of an impact on limited partnerships, however, because of the
limited liability of limited partners.
The passive activity loss provisions of § 469 carry much stronger meaning
for limited partnership interests. It defines "passive activity" as "any activity
which involves the conduct of a trade or business, and, in which the taxpayer
does not materially participate."'' 73 This definition includes normal business
activity, but excludes purely passive income resulting from portfolio
transactions that do not constitute a trade or business activity.' Such pas-
sive income or loss is treated specially: passive losses may only be offset
against passive income.'75 This creates a major limitation on the use of dis-
tributive losses generated by tax shelter partnerships.
Other portions of section 469 carry even stronger consequences for limited
partnerships. First, limited partnership interests can never become material
participation in the activity of the partnership. 7 6 Second, in a publicly traded
limited partnership, losses cannot be offset against passive income.' 77 Third,
the section severely limits a partner's ability to utilize losses from special
activities typical of tax shelter limited partnerships.7 7 Additionally, the sec-
tion limits a partner's ability to deduct investment interest (a considerable
expense in tax shelters).
79
Finally, new limitations exist on the according of partnership tax status to
168. I.R.C. § 704(d) (West 1994).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. I.R.C. § 465 (West 1994).
172. Id.
173. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1)(A)-(B) (West 1994).
174. Id.
175. I.R.C. § 469(d)(1) (West 1994).
176. I.R.C. § 469(h)(2) (West 1994).
177. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (West 1994).
178. I.R.C. § 469(i) (West 1994).
179. I.R.C. § 163(d) (West 1994).
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publicly traded limited partnerships, regardless of their legal status as limited
partnerships." If a secondary market is maintained for interests, the publicly
traded limited partnership risks being taxed as a corporation. To escape this
treatment, the partnership must realize 90% of its income from statutorily
defined sources of passive "qualifying" income, or income resulting from the
disposition of capital assets held for the production of income.'
These tax changes proved devastating to limited partners. Investment
programs designed to generate pass-through losses resulted in losses unavail-
able to shelter other income. Attempts to create liquidity, by creating markets
for the interests, resulted in greater restrictions on the use of these losses to
shelter even other passive income. Publicly traded partnerships risked treat-
ment as a corporation for tax purposes. From a tax perspective, the value of
these investments deteriorated substantially. In many situations, the absence of
a market for the interests masked the extent of the erosion in value.
C. Roll-ups: Strategies and Reactions
The economic events and tax changes of the late 1980s forced those with
partnership interests into a reactive mode. General partners, investment advi-
sors, and financial specialists who marketed these interests, devised a strategy
including two goals: (1) the extension of liquidation dates to avoid liquidation
in a depressed market; and (2) the combination of entities to attempt diversifi-
cation and provide liquidity. The strategy most often used to address these
economic and tax problems was the roll-up of limited partnerships.
1. The Roll-up Strategy
The procedure employed to roll-up limited partnerships created fertile
grounds for abuse.'82 One aspect of the procedure that was often abused con-
cerned disclosure. A typical roll-up required disclosure of information material
to limited partners' interests, including analysis of present risk, analysis of
risks involved in extending liquidation and maintaining the investment, and
analysis of the risks implicit in negotiating with lenders in highly leveraged
enterprises. Many of these items were often not disclosed.
Another area of abuse concerned the solicitation of investor approval for
the roll-up. In order to garner the affirmative votes required, solicitation of
formal approval was often necessary. Independent market professionals, whose
fee depended on a successful solicitation, often employed aggressive tactics to
gain the requisite votes for approval.
Another aspect of the procedure that was often abused concerned the
valuation of general partners' interests; disclosure of the results was geometri-
cally more complex than the problem of valuing limited partners' interests. In
addition to valuation, new management compensation agreements were
180. See I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1994).
181. Id.
182. See infra note 197.
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needed. They required some compensation for termination of the old agree-
ment, for services performed in accomplishing the roll-up, and for future man-
agement services to the new entity. Even more complexity resulted from the
merging of multiple entities. Underlying this entire procedure was the risk that
a conflict of interests could arise during the creation of the new relationship
and negotiation of the successful transaction. It is easy to see how these prob-
lems created a fertile ground for abuse.
2. Reactions to Roll-up Abuses
Three independent forums verified the reality of these potential problems.
As the transactions began to occur, the financial press began documenting the
abuses.'83 Thereafter, congressional hearings detailed the abuses,"s and fi-
nally, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reported the results of
its roll-up studies to Congress.'85 Selected documentation from each of these
sources describes a pattern of intentional and fraudulent activity in some cases,
and inept mismanagement in others. The reports also criticized the inherent
complexity of the roll-up transaction. This documentation ultimately created a
perception of abused investors suffering overwhelming investment losses.
a. The Financial Press
The financial press has been generally critical of the results of roll-ups. A
1988 article in Forbes magazine posited that:
Last October's market crash and 1987 tax law change have made
roll-ups into master limited partnerships much less palatable these
days . . .[N]othing in the tax law is likely to change a long standing
rule of limited partnership investment: The operator almost always
does well, even if the investors fare terribly."
The National Realty, L.P. roll-up, for example, involved 20,000 limited
partners in 35 limited partnerships. Assets were represented to investors to
have appraised values of $10 per share in the new roll-up. After approval, the
interests opened on the American Stock Exchange at a little over $3 per unit, a
shattering 70% discount from the appraised value.' The article further doc-
umented the benefits received by the general partners of the rolled-up limited
partnerships. 88 "'Every single roll-up done to date has done harm to the in-
vestors,' said Barry Vinocur, editor of Stanger's Investment Advisor, which
follows the investment industry. 'There are varying degrees of disaster, but
they've all worked out badly."""
183. See infra part IIl.C.2.a.
184. See infra part IlI.C.2.b.
185. See infra part II1.C.2.c.
186. Howard Rudnitsky, Roll-Up as Rip-Off, FORBES, Jan. 1988, at 254.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 254-256.
189. Mary Rowland, Your Own Accounts; The Hazards of Roll-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1990, at A3.
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A 1991 article in Investment Dealers Digest quotes roll-up critics as say-
ing:
[G]eneral partners have paid themselves lavish fees, ranging from
acquisition fees for each property bought for a partnership to ongoing
management fees for upkeep and maintenance that sometimes exceed-
ed the cash flow available from the leases. Then, when the partner-
ships were mere carcasses, with the most properties sold and the
worst given back to the lenders.. . The general partners proposed to
change the agreements by 'rolling up' a group of partnership into one
investment, ostensibly to improve liquidity, allow the assets to work
harder for the limited partners and create (or enhance) the available
cash flow."°
A 1991 Boston Globe article described in detail the specific losses of
individual investors and noted that over 300,000 investors lost $1.6 billion in
five years. 9 A Los Angeles Times article the same year cited Richard
Wollack, Chairman of Liquidity Fund, in noting that limited partners' interests
dropped an average of 44% on their first day of trading following 13 different
roll-ups.'92 A 1992 Financial World article posited:
Roll ups in themselves are not bad. Some have served investors
well. . . During the 14 months ended Dec. 31, shares of traditional
real estate investment trusts climbed 32%, but those of roll ups fell
11%. And the 20 roll ups completed in 1991 lost almost 50% of their
initial value before years end. Clearly something has gone dreadfully
wrong with the roll up concept."'
Finally, a 1992 San Francisco Chronicle article produced the most ex-
treme commentary:
The stain of abusive roll-ups ... started spreading across America in
the 1980's. To date, more than 500,000 limited partners have wit-
nessed their equity plummet an average of 70 percent in these ill-
fated 'deals', every single one of which has been a loser for victim-
ized investors. However, roll-ups have been a bonanza for general
partners and investment bankers, who have reaped tens of millions of
dollars in fees."9
190. Amy Friedman, Rolling Peter to Pay Paul, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Jan. 7,
1991, available in LEXIS, Merger Library, IDD File.
191. Michael K. Frisby, Loopholes, Investor Losses Spur House Probe of "Roll-ups",
Boston Globe, Mar. 20, 1991, at I.
192. Catherine Collins, Washington; Proposals Aim to Protect Investors When Partner-
ships Are "Rolled-up", L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1991, at D2.
193. Ronald Fink, Rollup Roundup, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 31, 1992, at 100.
194. Richard G. Wollack, Partnership Roll-ups Hurt Small Investors, Economy, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 24, 1992, at D 5.
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b. Congressional Hearings
Testimony at congressional hearings provided a major source for the
overwhelmingly negative information in the financial press about roll-up abus-
es. Excerpts from some of these hearings are set forth below.
On October 3, 1990, the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance, of the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce,
held hearings on limited partnerships. Testimony was given regarding not only
roll-up abuses, but also the importance of reorganization transactions to inves-
tors. Two of the witnesses emphasized the value of properly structured "roll-
ups," and the pressing need to eradicate abuses in the process to preserve the
"roll-up" as an effective reorginazational tool.
Christopher Davis, President of the Investment Partnership Association,
testified early in the hearings. His organization was described as a trade group
for limited partnership program sponsors and their principal selling organiza-
tions. With an openly disclosed bias, his organization claimed to represent the
"interests of approximately 10 1/2 million Americans."'' 5 The needs cited for
limited partnership reorganizations included the long-term nature of interests,
the depressed value of assets due to their illiquidity, and the financial difficul-
ties of managing general partners."9 After discussing claims regarding abus-
es of the process and recommendations for controlling the specific abuses,'97
Davis stated the position of his organization:
"as in all matters of public policy and debate among differing interests, the
IPA believes the issue of partnership roll-ups or consolidations is one of bal-
ance. Policy makers must distinguish between abusive practices and the efforts
of general partners to improve the performance of inadequately performing
investments." '  The organization's recommendations included improved
disclosure to protect both investors and important economic transactions.
Cezar Froelich, a partner in the law firm of Shefsky and Froelich in Chi-
cago, also testified.' Froelich emphasized the need for roll-up transactions.
He argued that new layers of regulation would operate to the disadvantage of
investors.2 In place of restrictive regulation, Froelich argued for increased
195. Limited Partnerships: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1990) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Mr.
Christopher Davis).
196. Id. at 45.
197. The specific abuses recognized in the testimony were inadequate disclosure gener-
ally, inadequacy of research supporting fairness opinions, lack of recognition of the impact of
market effects on underlying assets and the form of resulting interests from the roll-up, prob-
lems between finite and infinite life investments, lack of a system for appraisal rights, prob-
lems inherent in voting requirements, lack of board of independent trustees, and payment for
votes approving transactions. Id. at 51-52.
198. Id. at 52.
199. House Hearings, supra note 196, at 92 (statement of Mr. Cezar Froelich).
200. Id. at 97 n.12. The cited advantages include: (I) creation or enhancement of
investors' liquidity, (2) diversification of underlying assets, (3) increased access to capital
sources, (4) potential for growth, (5) increased distributions to investors, and (6) cost savings
and operating efficiencies. Id.
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disclosure to resolve perceived detriments,"' and maintain adequate investor
protection."'
Hearings before House 23 and Senate21 committees were held again in
1991. Frank Wilson, of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"9),2 5 argued before the Senate that agencies and Self-Regulatory
Organizations ("SROs") had the rule-making power to address roll-up abus-
es. 2' 6 Dee Harris, of the North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion, indicated that state regulations already effectively policed this prob-
lem.
20 7
c. The SEC's Response
The second round of hearings included the SEC's study, results, and posi-
tion. '00 Chairman Richard Breeden testified that the SEC had serious concern
about roll-up abuses. Breeden stated that $150 billion in limited partnership
interests were registered with the SEC and tens of billions more were sold in
unregistered private placements during the 1980s.2°' He added that "[s]ince
1985, 65 roll up transactions involving approximately 1200 entities with an
aggregate exchange value of about $6.9 billion have been registered with the
Commission. '21 0
The SEC prepared a major report on those transactions in February
1991.2"1 Subsequent SEC reports were issued in March 199122 and April
201. Id. (identifying as detriments: (I) securities selling at discounts after the transaction,
(2) increased super-majority voting requirements to protect managers after the transaction, (3)
lack of dissenter rights in the transaction, (4) paid solicitation of votes, (5) extended or
perpetual life durations of new entities, and (6) dilution of investor interests).
202. hI. at 101.
203. Limited Partnerships: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fi-
nance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 44-45 (1991) [hereinafter House Hearings #21.
204. See Limited Partnership Reorganizations, or "Roll-ups:" Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.
Ist Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Senate Hearingsl.
205. See id. at Ill (statement of Mr. Frank Wilson, executive Vice President of NASD).
206. See id. at 120 (statement of Mr. Frank Wilson):
As a general matter the NASD prefers the flexibility of agency and self regulatory
organization rule making to the rigidity of legislation. To the extent that govern-
ment agencies or self regulatory organizations do not have the authority to make
the changes discussed above, we would recommend that they be given the neces-
sary rule making authority.
Id.
207. Senate Hearings, supra note 205, at 135 (statement of Mr. Dee Harris) ("For the
federal government is largely reserved the role of coping with truly national and market-wide
problems, including insider trading and mergers and acquisitions. To this list of national
marketplace issues has been added the current roll-up crises.").
208. Senate Hearings, supra note 204, at 71; House Hearings #2, supra note 203, at
187, 419.
209. Senate Hearings, supra note 204, at 73.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 102.
212. See House Hearings #2, supra note 203, at 140.
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1991,23 detailing several critical points. The SEC admitted that the "roll-up"
problem was significant, but contended that investor losses had been exagger-
ated by reliance on "exchange values" which did not indicate true value.2"4
Second, protective devices were available for investors: (1) adequate informa-
tion requirements to enable investors to understand the consequences of pro-
posed transactions, (2) state law fiduciary duties of managers owed to passive
investors, (3) voting rights protections for extraordinary transactions, and (4)
recourse to the courts to enforce these protections."5 Breeden indicated that
the SEC and the SROs had launched attempts to protect investors and noted
that the SEC preferred these initiatives to legislation." 6
IV. PROTECTIVE REACTIONS
Section III detailed the economic and legal causes of roll-ups, as well as
investors' losses from roll-up transactions. Recent years have seen various
attempts by the NASD, the SEC, and, more recently, Congress, to protect
investors from these losses. This Section will survey these three areas of pro-
tective efforts.
A. The National Association of Securities Dealers
The NASD was concerned that legislative controls could result in over-
protection of investors and the destruction of economically valuable transac-
tions in which many NASD members were vitally involved. Due to these
concerns, the NASD proposed rules in January 1992 in hopes of forestalling
congressional action." 7
The NASD Board of Governors approved amendments to its own
ruleS2 8 and proposed a new rule for SEC approval." 9 If adopted, these
rules would permit NASD member participation in roll-up transactions and
allow the resulting securities to be listed for trading on the NASDAQ, contin-
gent upon compliance with a series of restrictions. First, general partners or
sponsors of a proposed roll-up would be required to provide the prior limited
partners with a right to: (a) receive compensation based upon an appraisal of
the partnership assets of the pre-existing limited partnership; or (b) receive or
retain a security with rights, privileges and preferences similar to their prior
units. Second, the transaction's terms could not unfairly reduce or abridge the
voting rights of the prior limited partners. Third, the old investors could not be
required to bear an unfair portion of the costs or the transaction. Finally, no
213. See id. at 419.
214. Id. at 141-43.
215. Id. at 188.
216. Id. at 210.
217. See 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 17 (Jan. 3, 1992).
218. See 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1772 (Nov. 20, 1992). The amendments were
made to "Appendix F to Article III, § 34 of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice, and Sched-
ule D to the Bylaws, National Association of Securities Dealers. Id. at 1772-73.
219. See 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 189 (Feb. 5. 1993).
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inappropriate restrictions could be imposed on general partner or sponsor
compensation."
Transactions in violation of the rules might still occur because non-NASD
member solicitation specialists could provide roll-up services, and the
NASDAQ is not the only forum available to trade the new entity's interests.
Weak sanctions, combined with ambiguous compliance standards which could
"chill" fair roll-up transactions, severely dilute the value of the NASD's pro-
posal to investors.
B. The Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC did not wait for SRO action before proposing its own form of
investor protections. Its first step was an interpretive release clarifying the
impact of existing rules on roll-up abuses, accompanied by a release proposing
new rules to supplement existing regulation.22'
Predictably, the SEC's protective scheme centered on improved disclosure
to investors. In the June 1991 release, the SEC identified two critical transac-
tions already covered by current disclosure regulation. First, Section 14 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act") governed approval of
roll-up transactions,22 if pre-existing interests in a limited partnership were
registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act. 23 Regulation 14A 224 and
Schedule 14A22 would provide guidance on information required for disclo-
sure. This scheme, however, would not encompass the solicitation of interests
not registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act.
Second, and more likely to trigger investor protection disclosure, were
issues of new securities resulting from the roll-up. Section 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933 ("the 1933 Act") 2 6 prohibits the offer, delivery, or sale of a se-
curity, absent registration or use of an exemption under the 1933 Act. In the
absence of an exemption2 7 both the registration statement228 and the pro-
spectuses29 used in the transactions must provide the disclosure.
The SEC had previously developed a large body of instructional regula-
tion regarding statutory disclosure requirements. The required information in a
220. Id.
221. Limited Partnership Reorganizations and Public Offerings of Limited Partnership In-
terests, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-6900, 34-29314, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,979 (1991).
222. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West Supp. 1994). This section authorizes the Securities and
Exchange Commission to promulgate rules for the protection of investors in connection with
the solicitation of any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security registered
pursuant to § 781. Id.
223. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78/ (West Supp. 1994).
224. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to 240.14a-14 (1994).
225. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1994).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
227. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77c (West Supp. 1994); 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1988).
228. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77f (West Supp. 1994).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1988). This section details required information for prospectuses,
which are defined in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1988).
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registration statement can be found in three sources. First, Regulation C23°
describes the form of registration statements and the content of prospectuses.
Second Regulation S-K 23 contains the basic instructions for filing disclosure
forms with the SEC. Third. the regulations designated Form S-4 as the pri-
mary document to be used as a registration statement in reorganization trans-
actions, including roll-ups, regulated by Rule 145.232
In its June 1991 interpretive release, the SEC identified specific concerns
regarding its present requirement as applied to disclosure in roll-up transac-
tions. Identifying "readability" as the key to adequate disclosure, the release
emphasized pre-existing standards which would have special application to
roll-up transactions. As disclosure regulation is primarily designed to provide
investors with "clear, comprehensible and complete information regarding the
issuer, security, offering transaction and the risks of the investment, 233 the
complexity of roll-up transactions requires meticulous care."' The release
also emphasized the importance of a "clear, concise and coherent 'snapshot'
description of the most significant aspects of ... the transaction or partnership
'11offering" '235 in the required summary.
The release further highlighted significant issues in roll-up transactions,
including names and descriptions of the entities involved; a brief description
of the transaction itself; existing investor voting rights and any significant
changes resulting from the transaction; changes in the business plans; changes
in management or management compensation; the likelihood that new securi-
ties would trade at substantial discounts from disclosed "exchange" valuations;
dissenters' approval rights; reports, opinions or appraisals which served as the
basis for the transaction; a clear description of the risks and benefits of the
proposed transaction; and the importance of the quality or readability of the
disclosure. -37
The SEC next supplemented the existing rules with special roll-up transac-
tion disclosure rules, primarily by adding subpart 900 to Regulation S-K.
These new rules clarified and significantly altered the prior disclosure scheme.
First, they carefully identified the new roll-up disclosure rules as applying only
to combinations or reorganizations of two or more finite limited partnerships,
newly identified "other finite entit[ies]," and reorganizations of one finite
limited partnership or entity into a new entity.2 "3 The new rules thus do not
230. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.400-.479 (1994).
231. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.802 (1994).
232. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1994).
233. Limited Partnership Reorganization and Public Offerings of Limited Partnership In-
terests, supra note 221, at 28,980.
234. Id. See In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964) (discussing requirements for
clear, concise and understandable disclosure).
235. Limited Partnership Reorganization and Public offerings of Limited Partnership In-
terests, supra note 221, at 28,981.
236. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(a) (1994) (discussing required information for summaries
included in complex prospectuses); 17 C.F.R. § 229.801(e) (1994) (explaining which guide to
follow with respect to preparation of registration statements relating to limited partnerships).
237. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.901-.915 (1994).
238. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.901(c)(1) (1994).
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apply to roll-ups or reorganizations of infinite life entities, REITs, or 1940
Investment Company Act entities.
If the new roll-up definition does not eliminate a transaction, the recently
adopted 900 series regulations impact disclosure in at least three ways. First, if
two or more entities are included in the transaction, a separate supplementary
disclosure document for each entity is required. 3 ' This document provides
investors in each rolled-up entity with special disclosure of significant infor-
mation concerning the investor's own entity as well as special risks associated
with its roll-up.
Second, the new rules mandate the inclusion of specific disclosure in a
required summary to be located in the forepart of each disclosure docu-
ment."4° These summary items identify the critical issues subject to abuse.
Accordingly, clear, concise, comprehensible summaries of these issues set out
in the forepart of the disclosure documents should alert investors to these criti-
cal issues. Moreover, the 900 series regulations not only identify the specific
areas of required disclosure in detail, 241' but also expand the information pro-
vided in the required summaries and add other critical technical data not sum-
marized. Finally, due to the complexity of the transactions and the newly
required disclosures, the SEC required a minimum solicitation period of sixty
days.
242
The effectiveness of disclosure as a method of protection is dependent
upon one of three assumptions. First, the investor may vote his own self-inter-
est once the information to make an appropriate judgment about that self-inter-
est is available. This theory's weakness is evidenced by the SEC's recognition
of the complexity of the transaction. Second, adequate disclosure may permit
study by sophisticated market professionals who will understand these com-
plex transactions. This theory, however, ignores the fact that no market price
is available to broadly disseminate the resultant advice in a timely manner.
Finally, adequate disclosure may serve as a disincentive to unfair transactions,
because insiders not wanting to disclose this information will forgo the trans-
action completely. This theory, overlooks disclosure's potential chilling effect
on fair transactions. As a result, increased disclosure adds to the cost of the
transaction without assurance that investors will benefit from the information.
239. 17 C.F.R. § 229.902 (1994).
240. . 17 C.F.R. § 229.903 (1994). This section requires disclosure of material risks of the
roll-up transaction in a summary statement. Examples of material risks include changes in
business plans, voting rights, cash distributions, ownership interest, general partner conflicts
of interest with the roll-up, material terms of the transaction, and outside parties' assessments
regarding fairness of the opinions. Id.
241. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.904-.915 (1994). Items listed in these sections include risk
factors, comparative information, allocation of roll-up consideration, background of roll-up
transaction, conflicts of interest, fairness, reports, opinions and appraisals, sources and
amounts of funds and transactional expenses, other provisions in the transaction, pro forma
financial statements and federal income tax consequences. Id.
242. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(c) (1994). This requirement may only be altered by an
applicable state law permitting a shorter period. Id. Note that the sixty-day minimum applies
to Williams Act tender offers as well. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1994).
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Even less clear is the new disclosure rules' impact on litigation under the
federal securities statutes. As most entities rolled up into new, larger entities
will not have been registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act,21 implied
causes of action2" for disclosure violations of Proxy Rule 14(a)9 24 will be
unavailable. Because registration will usually 24 be required under the 1933
Act, however, misleading disclosure in the registration statement24 7 or other
media may give rise to liability. 24s In cases involving non-disclosure (the ma-
jority of cases), the new, itemized disclosure rules could make it difficult to
prove the materiality of facts not specifically mentioned in the rules.
In sum, the SEC's new disclosure rules potentially provide an increased,
more readable flow of information to the investor, without destroying the
potential benefit roll-ups afford. While disclosure skeptics may doubt the
added value of the new rules to investors, increases in disclosure undoubtedly
remediate the extreme abuses identified in the congressional hearings.
C. Congress
Congress's interest in protecting investors injured in roll-up transactions
began in 1990. The first bill, which was virtually ineffective, to combat roll-up
transactions was introduced in May 1990.249 However, April 1991 saw the
introduction of a substantial bill regulating roll-ups?5 The proposal largely
survived as the bill eventually passed by the House in November 1991.21
Interestingly, the Chairman of the SEC urged Congress to set aside this pro-
posal until the SEC had an opportunity to act.252 In June 1991, however,
Senator Dodd introduced a major roll-up reform measure in the Senate."
The Office of Management and Budget reported the Bush Administration's
opposition to this legislation," based on the notion that (1) it would infringe
243. 15 U.S.C.A. § 781 (West Supp. 1994).
244. See J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430 (1964) (recognizing that private
parties have a right to bring suit for violations of § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934).
245. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1994):
246. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1988) requires that all prospectuses shipped in interstate com-
merce and mails be registered.
247. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988). This section imposes civil liability upon those making
false registration statements. Id.
248. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). This section imposes civil liability upon those is-
suing prospectuses which include untrue statements or material omissions. Id.
249. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA) (May 2, 1990).
250. 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 551 (Apr. 19, 1991). (reporting on HR 1885).
251. 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1613 (Nov. 8, 1991).
252. See Kevin G. Salwen, SEC Chief is Wary of Measure to Curb "Roll-Up" Abuses,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1991, at C9. The SEC began discussing its potential involvement in
the area as early as the previous February. See 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 317 (Mar. I,
1991). By June 21, the SEC proposed rule changes for comment. See 23 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 954 (June 21, 1991).
253. Securities - Senator Dodd Introduces Bill to Curb Abuses in Limited Partnership
Rollups, Wash. Insider (BNA) (July 1, 1991).
254. 23 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1613 (Nov. 8 1991).
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on state partnership law, and (2) the SEC proposal provided adequate protec-
tive regulation under existing legislation. The Dodd bill eventually languished
in the Senate.
Soon afterward, however, the Clinton Administration's desire for legisla-
tive enhancement of investor protection revived Congress's interest.2" The
House passed a new version of the previous bill in March 1993,256 and by
November 1993, after a new bill was introduced in the Senate,25 a joint bill
passed both houses and was sent to the president."' On December 17, 1993
President Clinton signed into law the Limited Partnership Roll-up Reform Act
of 1993 (hereinafter "the LPRRA" or "the Act")." 9
The LPRRA affected limited partnership roll-ups by making several
amendments to the 1934 Act.26 Comments prior to the House vote indicate
this congressional response to the roll-up debacle considered the SEC's and
NASD's remedial actions. 6' The LPRRA was a product of gaps in that ac-
tivity, codifying and expanding the rulemaking of these two regulatory bodies.
It is therefore useful to identify those changes.
LPRRA combines patterns of regulatory methods developed under the
1933 and 1934 Acts. The basic substantive regulatory provisions resulted from
an amendment to section 14 of the 1934 Act262 and became the new section
14(h).263 Section 14 provides the SEC with authority to promulgate rules for
transactions in which persons seek proxies,2" renders it "unlawful" to engage
in such activities in contravention of those rules,265 and limits the application
of those rules to transactions in certain securities.2 New section 14(h)267 is
255. See 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 267 (Feb. 26, 1993).
256. See 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 292 (Mar. 5, 1993) (reporting passage of H.R.
617 on Mar. 2, 1993).
257. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 268 (Feb. 26, 1993) (reporting the introduction of
S424 by Senators Dodd, Riegle and D'Amato).
258. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1605 (Dec. 3, 1993) (reporting passage of S422 on
Nov. 22. 1993, and H.R. 617 on Nov. 23, 1993).
259. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1708 (Dec. 24, 1993).
260. The Amendments to the 1934 Act are a new addition to Section 14, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n (West Supp. 1994), two new additions to Section 15A(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b) (West
Supp. 1994), and an addition to Section 6(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(b) (West Supp. 1994).
261. See 139 CONG. REC. S422, 10,956-69 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993 (comments of Con-
gressman Mackey).
262. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (West Supp. 1994).
263. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h) (West Supp. 1994).
264. Section 14(a) applies to the solicitation of proxies, consents, or authorizations. 15
U.S.C.A. § 78n(a) (West Supp. 1994). Section 14(d) applies to tender offers. 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n(d) (West Supp. 1994). Section 14(e) applies specifically to disclosures in connection with
tender offers. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(e) (West Supp. 1994). Section 14(f) adds Section 13(d)
insiders' reports to the regulation. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(f) (West Supp. 1994).
265. Each major subdivision of the Section uses the phrase "it shall be unlawful for any
person to .... " thereby creating the potential for Commission Civil action or Justice De-
partment Criminal action under other sections of the Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u (West
Supp. 1994) (civil proceedings) and 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West Supp. 1994) (criminal penal-
ties). For a discussion of issues regarding private causes of action, see J.1. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
266. Sections 14(a)-(d) are specifically limited to transactions related to securities regis-
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entitled "Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers in Connection With Limited
Partnership Roll-Up Transactions, '2' and states that "[iut shall be unlawful
for any person to solicit any proxy, consent or authorization concerning a
limited partnership roll-up transaction, or to make any tender offer in fur-
therance of a limited partnership roll-up transaction, unless such transaction is
conducted in accordance with rules prescribed by the Commission. ' '2 9 This
provision incorporates the express civil investigatory power and SEC causes of
action from section 2127' and the express criminal penalties available to the
Justice Department under section 32.271 The availability of implied private
civil causes of action remains subject to judicial application of the standards
adapted by the Supreme Court in 1975.272
Unlike the previously adopted subsections of section 14, the LPRRA now
specifically identifies substantial and specific mandatory disclosures to be
included in the Commissioner's rules. Thus, the Commission's rulemaking
power in the area of these disclosures will be limited to interpreting the man-
dates and adding "such other matters deemed necessary or appropriate. ' 273
First, the SEC's rules should mandate the standard for disclosure to be
"clear, concise and comprehensible" in distributed solicitation materials.274
These materials must include: (1) changes in the business plan, voting rights,
form of ownership, or general partner compensation from the original limited
partnerships; (2) any conflicts of interest of the general partner; (3) expecta-
tions of any significant differences between disclosed exchange values of the
limited partnership interests and trading prices of the securities to be issued;
(4) valuation of the limited partnerships involved, the method used in that
valuation, and the valuation of the interests to be exchanged in the transaction;
and (5) the differing risks and effects of completing the transaction with less
than all of the solicited partnerships.
29
Subject to the same standard is a required statement by the general partner
as to whether the proposed roll-up is fair to the investors in each limited part-
nership, including a discussion of the basis for the conclusion. The general
partner's statement is also required to include an evaluation and description of
the alternatives to the roll-up, including liquidation. 76 While it seems unlike-
ly that a general partner would describe the proposed transaction as unfair to
one of the entities to be rolled up, a discussion of the basis for determining
fairness involves some discussion of the relative exchange value computations.
tered under Section 12 of the Act. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1994).
267. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h) (West Supp. 1994).
268. Id.
269. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h) (West Supp. 1994).
270. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u (West Supp. 1994).
271. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff (West Supp. 1994).
272. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 78 (1975), and its securities law progeny, Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
273. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(D)(vii) (West Supp. 1994).
274. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1994).
275. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(D)(i)-(v) (West Supp. 1994).
276. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(I)(E) (West Supp. 1994).
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Significantly, the description and evaluation of the alternatives to the transac-
tion may prove a mine field of disclosure traps.
• The LPRRA also requires SEC rules regarding disclosure of outside opin-
ions, appraisals or reports (other than those of counsel) materially related to
the transaction, subject to the same readability standards and required to be
included in solicitation materials."' Due to the significance of the external
evaluations, substantial disclosure is mandated,278 including (I) an analysis of
the transaction, the scope of the review, the preparation of and basis for the
opinion, and representations and undertakings included;279 (2) the identity
and qualifications of the preparer, the methods used in the selection process,
and material past, existing or contemplated relationships between that person
and others involved in the transaction;... (3) any compensation contingent on
approval of the transaction;2 1' (4) any limitations imposed on the preparer's
access to personnel, premises or records; 2 2 (5) reasons for limitations on ac-
cess; 283 (6) if not included, reasons why a valuation opinion is unnecessary
for an informed decision;2' and (7) an open-ended opportunity for the SEC
to add other protection disclosures to this list.285
These statutory provisions may mean that transactions included under
these regulations will be time consuming and expensive. The extent of deter-
rence to valuable transactions is difficult to assess at this early stage; however,
the LPRRA requires an evaluation by the Comptroller General within eighteen
months of the statute's operation regarding the usefulness of the disclosure to
limited partnership investors.
286
As mentioned earlier, the statute's implementation of required disclosure
borrows from the 1933 Act.287 The first section of the LPRRA outlaws par-
ticipation in a roll-up transaction absent compliance with the listed disclosure
rules.288 Thereafter, it broadly defines a limited partnership roll up transac-
tion, as one "involving the combination or reorganization of one or more lim-
ited partnerships, directly or indirectly,"2'8 9 provided the transaction also re-
sults in the following: (I) issued securities will be traded on a national ex-
277. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F) (West Supp. 1994).
278. While these external evaluations are of substantial value in aiding the successful
solicitation of approvals, the degree of disclosure required could potentially discourage solici-
tation of such valuable information. However, non-use requires an explanation of why an
external evaluation is unnecessary. Id.
279. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(i) (West Supp. 1994).
280. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(ii) (West Supp. 1994).
281. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(iii) (West Supp. 1994).
282. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(F)(iv) (West Supp. 1994).
283. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(G) (West Supp. 1994).
284. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(H) (West Supp. 1994).
285. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(K) (West Supp. 1994).
286. See Limited Partnership Rollup Reform Act of 1993, P.L. 103-202, § 302(c), 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 2363-64.
287. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b-e (West Supp. 1994) (discussing definitions, exempted se-
curities, exempted transactions and prohibitions, respectively).
288. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l) (West Supp. 1994).
289. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4) (West Supp. 1994).
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change or the national market system,29 (2) the interests to be exchanged
have not been traded as of the filing date,29' (3) investors involved are sub-
ject to change regarding voting rights, term, management compensation, or
investment objectives,292 and (4) no investors have an option to retain the
security under the same terms and conditions as the original issue.293
Continuing the pattern of the 1933 Act, the new statute follows the broad
definition of a roll-up transaction with a group of specific exemptions entitled
"Exclusions from definition."2" The exclusions include (1) transactions in-
volving limited partnerships which retain funds for reinvestment, rather than
distribution;2 9 (2) transactions in which the exchange of interests was includ-
ed in the terms of the original limited partnership and the new operating com-
pany was also identified in the original agreement;29 (3) transactions in
which the newly issued securities do not require registration under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933;297 (4) transactions involving issuers not required to report
under section 12 of the 1934 Act; 9 (5) transactions resulting in roll-ups
generated by non-affiliated outsiders requiring approval by no less than two-
thirds of the outstanding units and existing general partners receiving no ex-
traordinary compensation; 29 and (6) transactions in securities under a plan
declared effective before the enactment of the Act. 24X
Based upon these exclusions, Congress was not concerned with small or
private transactions resulting in the issuance of non-publicly traded interests.
Thus, under reorganizations effected to extend the life of a limited partnership
without creating a new market for the interests, investors receive no new pro-
tection. There is also no additional protection for investors involved in reorga-
nizations of infinite life partnerships or investors in limited partnerships in
which the takeover (reorganization) transaction was effected by an outside in-
terest. Apparently, new protections are only available in cases of roll-ups of
limited partnerships generated by general partners (or sponsors affiliated with
general partners), who choose not only to extend the life of the limited part-
nership but also to create a trading market for the resulting interests.
Certain realities, however, support the definitional exclusions in the
LPRRA. First, it would be difficult to gain approval of roll-ups without creat-
ing a market for resale of the new interests. If market creation is an incentive
to encourage the roll-up transaction, substantial disclosure is required.3"'
290. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
291. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
292. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
293. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(4)(D) (West Supp. 1994).
294. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5) (West Supp. 1994).
295. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1994).
296. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
297. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
298. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(D) (West Supp. 1994).
299. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(E) (West Supp. 1994).
300. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(5)(F) (West Supp. 1994).
301. Unfortunately, since no market exists to reflect the values identified by the man-
dated disclosures until after the transaction, investors can benefit only if the decision to
approve is based on an understanding of the disclosure documents, rather than the opportuni-
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Second, locked-in investors have little to lose, and disclosure protects new
investors from paying an excessive price for the new interests via the market's
reaction to the mandated disclosure in pricing the new securities. This latter
cynical (but realistic) assumption indicates the old disclosure scheme's failure
to protect against those injuries most clearly identified in the congressional
hearings.
The final piece of the disclosure scheme enacted in the new legislation
responds to the latter observation;3;2 it provides for special SEC rulemaking
to assure that holders of interests in proposed roll-up transactions can engage
in preliminary communications with fellow interest holders without the rigors
of section 14(a) proxy restrictions. 3 Under this provision, the SEC must
promulgate rules requiring issuers to provide such investors with lists of other
investors who will be involved in the transaction's approval.3" Finally, rec-
ognizing the complexity of the disclosed information, the LPRRA requires a
minimum solicitation period of sixty days.0 5
In addition to basic disclosure rules, the LPRRA also attempts to provide
some indirect protections. First, in an attempt to remedy abuses identified in
the congressional hearings regarding compensation of proxy solicitors, the Act
goes beyond the NASD rules" and prohibits "compensating any person so-
liciting proxies, consents or authorizations ... contingent on the approval,
disapproval or completion of the limited partnership roll-up transaction. ' '
As a second indirect protection, the LPRRA extends the rules governing
the registered securities associations' rules of fair practice. 8 by imposing
limits on its members' participation in roll-up transactions." These
members' participation is conditioned on the transaction bearing certain char-
acteristics, including dissenters' rights, protection of voting rights, fair transac-
tional cost distribution, and restrictions on general partners' contingent inter-
ests. 3  The mandatory alternative dissenters' rights include: (1) appraisal and
compensations; (2) a new security offering substantially the same terms as the
old security; (3) approval by no less than 75% of the outstanding interests of
each limited partnership; (4) use of an "independent committee" approved by a
majority of the interests of each participating partnership with authority to
action behalf of the limited partners; or (5) comparable rights prescribed by
the registered association designed to protect dissenters.3 ' Only if dissenters
ty to "bail out" in a subsequent sale. This assumption is speculative at best.
302. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(I)(A)-(B), (J) (West Supp. 1994).
303. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1994). This section also places limitations
on the availability of such assurances and limitations on potential abuses. 15 U.S.C.A. §
78n(h)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1994).
304. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1994).
305. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(1)(J) (West Supp. 1994).
306. 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 189 (Feb. 5, 1993).
307. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(h)(l)(C) (West Supp. 1994).
308. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3 (West Supp. 1994).
309. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(12) (West Supp. 1994).
310. See U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(12)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 1994).
311. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(12(A)(i)-(iv) (West Supp. 1994).
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are permitted one of these five options may members of registered associations
participate in the roll-up transaction.
A third type of indirect protection results from amendments to the statuto-
ry requirements for listing on national securities exchanges" and statutory
standards for admission to the automated quotation system. 3 The listing and
quotation standards mandated by the LPRRA are those dissenters' rights re-
quired for participation of members of registered associations. It i s, o f
course, difficult to predict the effect of a statutory amendment on the heels of
its adoption; however, some matters are readily apparent. The amendment will
only impact roll-ups designed to result in the public trading of interests for-
merly privately held. Such transactions will be subjected to the time and ex-
pense involved in tailoring them to the new statutory mandates. The disjunc-
tive nature of the requirements, however, will allow lawyers to design transac-
tions which comply with only one alternative while providing substantial like-
lihood of approval by interest holders. Nonetheless, the combination of disclo-
sure, dissenters' rights alternatives, and veto power created by delay and inter-
investor communications, will add expense to already costly transactions.
Public investors purchasing new interests from old investors in the preexisting
partnerships may still purchase them at greatly discounted prices. As a result,
old investors will face a Hobson's choice: denying the transaction and receiv-
ing substantially discounted liquidation values, approving the transaction and
acquiring greatly discounted prices for their interest, or holding a new form of
their old investment, which has the potential of a market but which also was
created at substantial expense. It is not clear that the new statutory amend-
ments offer old investors anything more than a clearer view of a larger loss.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to provide an overview of the debacle suffered
by investors in some limited partnership roll-ups. This overview is dependent
upon a background understanding of the various alternative transactions which
can result in the roll-up. Additionally, awareness of the changes in the state
statutes which regulate the limited partnership and how they facilitate or frus-
trate these alternative transactions is essential.
The substantial losses suffered by limited partnerships, and consequently
by investors, resulted from the confluence of several legal and economic vari-
ables. As limited partnerships became highly desirable business organization
forms, the modernization of governing state statutes unintentionally laid the
groundwork for unanticipated subsequent reorganizations. The elimination of
prior tax advantages also contributed to unexpected diminutions in value of
these investments, which were often difficult to quantify. Almost simulta-
neously, economic conditions negatively impacted the value of the assets un-
derlying these entities' investments, and the lack of a market for the individual
investors' interests masked such losses.
312. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(b) (West Supp. 1994).
313. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(13) (West Supp. 1994).
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The sponsors and general partners of these entities were the first, and
perhaps most informed, witnesses to these changes. For a variety of reasons,
including the pressures of required imminent asset liquidation and reduced
liquidation distributions to investors, these managers sought means to postpone
forced losses and to diversify their investors' risks. Roll-up reorganizations of
these limited partnerships offered that opportunity. Press recognition of
investors' losses from tax changes and economic impacts, as well from excess-
es in the reorganization transactions themselves, created a demand for new
protections from these transactions.
The economic conditions leading to the use of roll-ups, as well as abuses
in roll-up transactions, have generated investor-protective reactions from sever-
al sources. State legislatures have not been particularly instrumental in devel-
oping protective devices. The self-regulatory organizations in the securities
industry have developed limited rules to regulate the most abusive conduct of
their members. None of these initiatives, however, have had major impact, and
large portions of the roll-up problem seem outside the control of these organi-
zations.
The SEC has clarified and expanded its regulation of these transactions.
Its protective scheme revolves around increased disclosure requirements. Opin-
ions differ regarding the effectiveness of disclosure as a direct investor protec-
tive device which protects by increasing investor awareness of risk; nonethe-
less, heightened disclosure may indirectly dilute roll-up sponsors' excesses.
Indirect disincentives created by more extensive mandated disclosures include
increased costs and increased delays in needed transactions.
Indicating either its lack of confidence in the effect of the SEC's expand-
ed rulemaking or its political need to respond to the roll-up debacle, Congress
has amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to add to the investor-pro-
tective arsenal with the Limited Partnership Roll-up Reform Act of 1993
("LPRRA"). These changes, added to the SEC's earlier disclosure mandates,
have intensified the regulations' financial impact on roll-up transactions. The
investors whom the LPPRA seeks to protect may, however, ultimately bear the
costs of the new statutory regime.
Ultimately, if public systems of prevention prove inadequate, private liti-
gation offers perhaps the final hope for investor protection. Because roll-up
transactions represent a relatively new phenomena, the litigation they have
generated has not yet developed into a consistent body of substantial analysis
tested by appellate scrutiny. Common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty
represent one potential approach to future litigation. Undoubtedly, the LPRRA
will generate additional theories of litigation, but the federal courts' willing-
ness to imply those causes of action must first be developed.
The multiple sources of recently-developed protective devices will mean
substantially greater lawyer involvement in planning roll-up transactions,
which should become even more complex in the wake of the LPRRA. In-
creased complexity implies increased cost. If these developments become
prohibitively expensive, our economy will see the loss of a valuable invest-
ment vehicle. This article provides a framework for evaluating these various
effects. As litigation and rulemaking develops under the LPRRA, it is hoped
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that subsequent analysis will be forthcoming.
NOTE
ABORTION PROTEST: LAWLESS CONSPIRACY OR PROTECTED
FREE SPEECH?
Introduction . .......................................... 446
1. Strict Statutory Construction Creates an Anomaly .............. 451
A. The Ku Klux Klan Act ............................. 451
B. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic ............... 453
1. Facts and Procedural History ...................... 453
2. The Supreme Court's Plurality Opinion ............... 454
3. The Hindrance Clause ........................... 455
C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ........... 457
D. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler ............ 460
1. Facts and Procedural History ...................... 460
2. The Supreme Court's Unanimous Opinion ............. 462
3. The Concurring Opinion ......................... 463
E. Reconciling Bray and Scheidler ....................... 464
1. The Harm Remedied ............................ 464
2. The Group Targeted ............................ 464
3. The Plain Meaning Approach and Stare Decisis ......... 466
II. Balancing Clinic Protection and First Amendment Free Speech .... 468
A. The Standard Applied in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc ....................................... 468
B. The First Amendment Implications of Madsen ............. 472
C. Post-Madsen Decisions ............................. 474
1. Demonstrations On and Around Clinic Property ......... 474
2. Residential Picketing ............................ 477
III. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ................. 482
IV. The Resulting Framework ............................. 485
A. The Short-term Solutions ........................... 485
B. The Long-term Solutions ............................ 486
C onclusion ........................................... 488
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
In Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme Court established a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy within the first trimester. The Court deter-
mined that the abortion decision fell within a cumulative right of privacy
implicit in the Constitution.- This landmark 1973 decision legalized abortion,
put reproductive choice solely in the hands of individual women, and shielded
that choice from government interference. Immediately following Roe, oppo-
nents of abortion began to organize? At first, their efforts remained within the
political process. Abortion opponents attempted but were unable to pass a
constitutional amendment declaring a fetus to be a human person, but were
successful in cutting Medicaid funds for abortion with the first Hyde Amend-
ment in 1977. Today, no federal funding exists for abortion or abortion-re-
lated services unless a woman's life is in danger or in the case or rape or
incest.' On the state level, abortion opponents have successfully passed laws
I. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152, 153. The right of privacy is not explicit within the text of
the Constitution. The Court in Roe, however, looked to many of its prior opinions that rec-
ognized "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain zones of privacy." Id. Various
places within the Constitution have been found to protect an element of privacy. See Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (finding privacy within the First Amendment); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (finding privacy within the Fourth and Fifth Amendments);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding privacy within the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights and in the Ninth Amendment); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (finding privacy within the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Because the right of privacy had been extended to encompass mat-
ters relating to marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); to procreation in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); to family relationships in Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); and to child rearing and education in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. 535 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court in Roe extended the
zone of privacy to include a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at
153.
3. For an in-depth political and historical commentary, see ROSALIND P. PETECHESKY,
ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE (1990). The Catholic Church organized "right-to-life"
committees to oppose legalization of abortion as early as 1970. After Roe, it launched a full-
scale legal and educational campaign against abortion. /d. at 241-51; see also STEPHEN M.
KRASON, ABORTION POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 62-75 (1984) (discussing
the emergence of the antiabortion movement).
4. See PETECHESKY, supra note 3, at 242. When their efforts to pass a constitutional
amendment failed, antiabortion activists shifted their attention to federal funding of abortions.
What became known as the "Hyde Amendment," was a 1976 amendment to the annual
appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare which prohibited the
use of federal funds for abortions "except where the life of the mother would be endangered
if the fetus were carried to tem." Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976). The
Supreme Court subsequently upheld the Hyde Amendment based on its conclusion that a
constitutional right does not necessarily translate into an entitlement. Thus, neither the states
nor the federal government is obligated to fund non-therapeutic abortions. See Williams v.
Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
5. The most recently enacted Hyde Amendment, adopted as part of the federal Medic-
aid budget, allows funding for abortion in cases of rape and incest in addition to life endan-
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creating barriers to abortion such as waiting periods and parental notification.6
These political victories, however, were not enough. Abortion remained
legal. To those opposing it, the only solution was to stop abortion. Such ideol-
ogy has led to protest activities outside abortion facilities in the form of pick-
eting, leafletting, and "counseling."7 Violent tactics have been used as well.
As early as 1977, protestors began bombing clinics, threatening clinic person-
nel, and assaulting patients in their effort to stop abortions.8 Since 1977, there
have been 1,712 reported incidents of violence against abortion providers.9
Following Roe, the abortion debate became a source of political and social
division within the United States, creating an immutable boundary between
those who sought to overturn Roe and those who fought to uphold it."
In 1992, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to overturn Roe. In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey," the Court preserved the central holding of
Roe that a woman has the right to end her pregnancy within the first trimes-
ter. The decision did, however, open the door to restrictions that do not
place an "undue burden" on a woman's right to undergo an abortion." When
the decision was announced, Justice David Souter characterized the case as
one in which "the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contend-
ing sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution.""
germent. See Portrait of hijustice, REPROD. FREEDOM IN THE STATES (Center for Reprod. L.
and Poly. New York, N.Y.). Oct. 25, 1994. Some states voluntarily provide coverage beyond
life endangerment, rape, and incest, while other states restrict coverage to life endangerment
and are in conflict with federal law. Challenges to restrictive Medicaid funding measures are
pending in Colorado. Louisianna, Michigan. Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota. Oklahoma,
and Pennsylvania. Id.
6. Sixteen states require a woman to delay her procedure by a number of hours or
days after receiving state-mandaled literature designed to discourage abortion. Mandator
Delavs ond Biased Infornation Provisions. REPROD. FREEDOM IN THE STATES (Center for
Reprod. L. and Poly, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 9, 1995. Laws in thirty-six states require
young women to obtain the consent or to notify one or both parents prior to obtaining an
abortion. Restrictions on Young Women, REPROD. FREEDOM IN THE STATES (Center for
Reprod. L. and Polry, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 8, 1994.
7. See EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, POLITICS, AND THE COURTS 138 n.72 (1982).
8. Id.
9. Incidents of Violence & Disruiption Against Abortion Providers, 1994, NEWS RE-
LEASE (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1994 (on file with author). In
1994 alone, protestors committed 159 acts of violence. The figure includes: 5 murders, 8
attempted murders, 3 bombings, 5 arsons, 4 attempted bombing/arsons, 2 clinic invasions, 42
acts of vandalism, 7 assaults. 59 death threats, 3 burglaries, and 22 stalking incidents. In
1993, there were 434 acts of violence perpetrated against abortion providers, most notably
the murder of Dr. David Gunn in Pensacola, Florida and the attempted murder of Dr.
George Tiller in Wichita. Kansas. Id.
10. See generally EVA R. RUBIN, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY (1994); see also
PETCHESKY, supra note 3, at 252.
II. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
12. hi. at 2816-17.
13. Id. at 2819. For examples of the kinds of restrictions that became permissible after
Casev, see supra note 6.
14. hI. at 2815; see also David J. Garrow. Juistice Souter Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
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Unfortunately, battle lines in the abortion controversy remain unmoved.
Antiabortion organizations such as Operation Rescue and the Pro-life Action
League continue to organize protests across the country in their crusade to
stop abortion."s Frustrated by their lack of success in the courts, in the legis-
lature, and in public opinion," many abortion opponents continue to go be-
yond peaceful protest. 7 Of recent note is the murder of two clinic personnel
and the wounding of five others in Brookline, Massachusetts on December 31,
1994. These murders, along with the 1994 murders of Dr. John Britton and his
volunteer escort and the 1993 murder of Dr. David Gunn, increased the death
toll to five." Other terrorist tactics employed by antiabortion activists include
verbally assaulting clinic patients, stalking clinic personnel, harassing family
members and neighbors of abortion doctors and clinic personnel, and issuing
death threats. 9 Protestors physically prevent access to abortion facilities by
25, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 36, 39 (discussing Justice Souter's role in Casey and his com-
mitment to stare decisis).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 306, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 699, 706 (Attorney General Janet Reno testified that "much of the activity has
been orchestrated by groups functioning on a nationwide scale, including, but not limited to,
Operation Rescue whose members and leadership have been involved in litigation in numer-
ous areas of the country."); see also John W. Whitehead, Civil Disobedience and Operation
Rescue: A Historical and Theoretical Analysis, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (1991).
16. A Democratic Leadership poll found 57% of registered voters believe abortion gen-
erally should be available. AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Poll Update DLC Poll: 57% Say
Abortion Should Be Generally Available, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 86, Nov. 18, 1994, avail-
able in WL, APN-AB Database, List & Date Query. A National Gallup poll found that 83%
of Americans believe it is inappropriate for individuals to block women's access to abortion
clinics. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, FACT SHEET (The Fund for the Feminist
Majority, Arlington, Va.), Nov. 1993. In a 1992 poll testing identification of the public with
the pro-life and pro-choice positions, 58% of the adults polled were in favor of choice.
RUBIN, supra note 10, at 282. However, a Wirthlin poll conducted for the National Right to
Life Committee following the November 1994 elections indicated that only 41% of Ameri-
cans say they are pro-choice. AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Results Pro-Life Poll: Finds
53% of Americans Say They're Pro-Life, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 80, Nov. 10, 1994, avail-
able in WL, APN-AB Database, List & Date Query.
17. E.g., Laurie Goodstein & Pierre Thomas, Clinic Killings Follow Years of Antiabor-
tion Violence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at Al; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Booklet Preaches,
Teaches Violence-Abortion Rights Forces Condemn Radical Publication as Proof of a Ter-
rorist Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1995, at A8.
18. Alarmingly, some anti-abortion activists believe the murder of abortion doctors is
'justifiable homicide." See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Life and Death Choices, Antiabortion
Faction Tries to Justif, Homicide, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1994, at Al; David Van Biema,
Apologists for Murder: The FBI Launches a Probe of Abortion-Clinic Violence, Shining a
Spotlight on Extremists Who Defend Homicide, TIME, Aug. 15, 1994, at 39; see also Inside
the Anti-Abortion Underground, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 1994. at 28. Edward Walsh, a pro-life
Pennsylvania businessman, explained, "[ilethal force was a necessary next step because noth-
ing else was stopping abortion." Fawn Vrazo, A Small Chorus for Vigilantes, DET. FREE
PRESS. Jan. 15, 1995, at IF. Other abortion opponents, however, have publicly denounced the
violence. See, e.g.. Tamar Lewin, Death of a Doctor: The Moral Debate-Abortion Doctor
and Bodyguard Slain in Florida; A Cause Worth Killing For? Debate Splits Abortion Foes,
N.Y. TIMES. July 30, 1994, at 1; Tim Nickens, Anti-Abortion Organizations Join to Cull for
Peaceful Protests, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 19, 1995, at lB.
19. For example, Warren M. Hem, M.D., Director of the Boulder Abortion Clinic in
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pouring glue into keyholes, locking their heads to clinic doors, and chaining
themselves to immobile vehicles in front of clinic entrances.0 In addition,
bombings, arson, and butyric acid attacks have seriously harmed clinic em-
ployees and caused millions of dollars worth of property damage. -'
State remedies proved to be an inadequate avenue of redress.22 State stat-
utes often do not encompass the totality of such activity and local law enforce-
ment is often unwilling or unable to combat the problem.23 Because protes-
tors persisted unabashed in their efforts and it became evident that their ac-
tivities were organized on a nationwide scale, abortion providers and pro-
choice organizations sought protection in federal court. Plaintiffs across the
Boulder. Colorado, has been the target of personal harassment since 1973 when he first
received telephone death threats. In 1979, one of the protestors at the Boulder clinic at-
tempted to run Dr. Hem down with his car in the clinic parking lot. In 1980 and 1982,
antiabortion activists threatened Dr. Hem's life to his face at various speaking engagements.
In 1984, Joseph Scheidler, founder of the Pro-Life Action League, told Dr. Hem that he
planned to put him "out of business." In 1988, five shots were fired through the front win-
dows of Dr. Hem's waiting room. On August 16, 1994, Dr. Hem received a letter that
spoke of an "underground network" that was preparing to "take out a number of you abor-
tionist Isic] at the same time no matter where you are." The letter also warned that "bullet
proof vests are not enough to protect guilty murderers. There are other areas on the body
that invite fatal wounds." On December 30, 1994, the night John Salvi murdered two abor-
tion personnel in Brookline, Massachusetts, radio-TV talk show host Bob Enyart invited
viewers to take action against Dr. Her. Enyart displayed Dr. Hem's yellow pages ad on the
screen, including his name, address, and telephone number. Viewers calling into the show all
advocated violence against abortion providers. The two most commonly uttered words on the
program were "Hem" and "kill." Special Report prepared by Warren M. Hem, M.D.. M.P.H.,
Ph.D., Director, Boulder Abortion Clinic for Jo Ann Harris, Director Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Wash., D.C. (Jan. 6, 1995) (copy on file with the author); see also
Rene Sanchez, From Year of Promise to Year of Violence Abortion Rights Advocates Decry
Trend Towards Militant Opposition, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1994, at A14.
20. E.g., Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994) (No. 92-780).
21. In 1994, abortion providers across the country reported $670,335 worth of damage
resulting from arson, bombings, and other vandalism. Reported Arson and Bombing Jncidents
(National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), Dec., 1994 (on file with author). In 1993,
abortion providers reported $3.7 million worth of damage caused by arson and bombings,
Reported Arson and Bombing Icidents (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), Dec.,
1994 (on file with author) and $853,050 caused by chemical vandalism, Noxious Chemical
Vandalism Incidents at Abortion Clinics (National Abortion Fed'n, Washington, D.C.), May,
1994 (on file with author). In addition, The Feminist Majority Foundation reported that "[in
at least two facilities, staff have suffered long-term disability due to respiratory problems
from the caustic butyric acid used." 1993 Clinic Violence Survey Report 3 (The Feminist
Majority Foundation, Arlington, Va.).
22. Elizabeth L. Crane, Abortion Clinics and Their Antagonists: Protection Front Protes-
tors Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1993) (explaining that
state laws may not be enforced against protestors, and that stiff federal penalties deter pro-
testors more effectively than the minor fines and jail terms imposed by a state); see also
Eleanor H. Norton, Federalizing Feminism: Protection of the Civil Rights of Women Against
Criminal Attacks Needs the Force of Federal Law, THE RECORDER, Aug. II, 1994, at 8; cf
Dana S. Gershon. Stalking Statutes: A New Vehicle to Curb the New Violence of the Radical
Anti-Abortion Movement, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215 (1994) (arguing that "the time
may have come to reconsider state remedies").
23. Crane, supra note 22, at 183.
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country invoked § 1985(3) of the Reconstruction Era Ku Klux Klan Act 24 and
§ 1962(c) of Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, entitled
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" (RICO), - in an effort to
bring a halt to the violence. Along with defenses based on statutory interpreta-
tion, protestors claimed their actions constituted First Amendment protected
free speech. Freedom of speech, however, has never been without limitation
and has never been a shield for lawless violence.
When called upon to interpret the role of federal law in curtailing violent
abortion protest, the Supreme Court has carved out only a handful of remedies
and left further measures up to legislators. The Court has applied strict statuto-
ry construction, staunchly upheld prior precedent, and claimed to keep under-
lying politics out of the process.26 In 1993, the Supreme Court refused to ap-
ply § 1985(3) to clinic blockaders in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic," but a year later approved application of RICO in National Organiza-
tion for Women v. Scheidler." Also in 1994, the Court decided that some
provisions of a judicially created "buffer-zone" were constitutional in Madsen
v. Women's Health Center, Inc.29 Unfortunately, protection for clinics, pa-
tients, and staff has been slow in coming and is still, in many ways, ineffec-
tive. Women won the right to choose in Roe, but that victory is rendered nom-
inal when the government fails to provide adequate protection and women are
forced to defend themselves against militant protestors in order to exercise that
right.
Part I of this Note examines the Court's narrow interpretation of the Ku
Klux Klan Act in Bray, compares it with the Court's expansive reading of
RICO in Scheidler, and offers a possible explanation for the disparate results.
Part 1I discusses the First Amendment concerns in Madsen and considers the
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons . . . the equal protection of the laws; . . . the party so
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
26. Justice Scalia defended this judicial approach in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health
Clinic, saying, "[wle construe the statute, not the views of most members of the citizenry."
113 S. Ct. 753. 768 (1993). Proponents of an original historical interpretation of the Consti-
tution believe the Court should play a neutral role and apply the law mechanically. Never-
theless, they agree that the Court's decisions are not free from outside influence. For a dis-
cussion of current interpretative theories and the role of the Supreme Court in deciding so-
cial issues, see ROBERT J. MCKEEVER, RAW JUDICIAL POWER? THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993). See also LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME
COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992).
27. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
28. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
29. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
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impact of that decision on future injunctions. Part III addresses the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act, its resistance to constitutional challenge, and
the possibility of review by ihe Supreme Court. Part IV outlines the current
framework available to combat clinic violence and maintain access to abortion
,services. Finally, this Note argues that because the abortion debate is certain to
continue, courts should focus on defining the limits participants must respect
in expressing their viewpoints.
I. STRICT STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CREATES AN ANOMALY
A. The Kit Klux Klan Act
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, prohibits conspira-
cies that either deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or hinder law
enforcement's efforts to maintain equal protection." The legislation, passed
in 1871, was initiated in response to the violence and intimidation perpetrated
by the Ku Klux Klan against blacks and Republicans in the post-Civil War
South."' The language of the original act was subsequently amended, limiting
the civil remedy to private conspiracies aimed at particular classes of citi-
zens. 32 Fearful that the statute would become a general federal tort remedy,
the Supreme Court also narrowed its application in numerous decisions.
Beginning with Collins v. Hardymnan3" in 1951, the Court systematically
denied the broad application § 1985(3) that was intended by the Forty-Second
Congress. In Collins, the defendants were accused of forcibly disrupting the
meetings of a California political association. 4 The association sought relief
under § 1985(3), claiming defendants' actions demonstrated a private conspira-
cy to deprive them of their right to peaceably assemble." The Court, howev-
er, decided that congressional authority to enact § 1985(3) came from the
Fourteenth Amendment, which only proscribed a denial of equal protection by
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988); see supra note 24.
31. Debate on the floor of the Senate at the time the Ku Klux Klan Act was passed,
however, indicates the legislators had in mind a remedy for the protection of all classes of
persons. Dissenting in Brayv, Justice O'Connor cited several legislators from the 42nd Con-
gress. Included in her dissent were the statements of Rep. Garfield that the legislation pro-
tects "particular classes of citizens" and "certain classes of individuals"; statements of Rep.
Barry that "white or black, native or adopted citizens" would be protected under the statute:
statements of Rep. Lowe that "all classes in all States, to persons of every complexion and
of whatever politics" would be protected; and the statement of Rep. Buckley that "yes, even
women" were protected. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 800-01
(1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing CONG. GLOBE. 42d Cong., Ist Sess. app. 153-54
(1871)).
32. For a thorough analysis of the legislative history and background of the Ku Klux
Klan Act, see Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic:
The Supreme Court's Next Opportinir to Unsettle Civil Rights Low, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1357,
1362-80 (1992).
33. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
34. id. at 653-54.
35. hi. at 655.
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the state.36 Section 1985(3), therefore, could only protect victims of conspira-
cies in which the state was an actor. In one swift blow, the Court com-
pletely eliminated protection for individual civil rights against violations by
private actors. This was a questionable decision considering that the statute
was enacted in response to the actions of the Ku Klux Klan which was, de-
spite membership by state officials, a purely private entity.
Twenty years later, the Court changed its mind in Griffin v.
Breckenridge,38 a case in which several black motorists were stopped along a
Mississippi highway and subsequently beaten by a group of white men.39 In
Griffin, the Court declared that congressional power under § 1985(3) was not
solely derived from the Fourteenth Amendment and that the statute should be
given a sweep as broad as its language.' The Plaintiffs were allowed to pro-
ceed under a private conspiracy theory, claiming a deprivation under the Thir-
teenth Amendment. The Court, still wary that § 1985(3) would become all-
encompassing, limited the statute in other ways. It developed two new require-
ments: first, a plaintiff had to prove the conspirators acted with a "racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus;"'" second,
a plaintiff had to identify the source of Congress' power to remedy the par-
ticular deprivation alleged.'2 The Court did not, however, address what
"classes" might qualify for protection under the statute nor what constitutional
sources would support federal protection from a private conspiracy.
The Court later attempted to fill in some of the gaps left open by the
Griffin decision. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott" in-
volved a group of construction workers who refused to join a union and con-
sequently became the victims of harassment and intimidation by local residents
and union members." The workers invoked § 1985(3) alleging a violation of
their First Amendment right of association. The Court first addressed whether
a § 1985(3) action would lie if the defendants' discriminatory intent involved
something other than racial bias. While the Court did not explicitly state that
only racial groups were protected by the statute, it did preclude extension of
the statute to conspiracies based only on "economic" animus." The Court
then addressed the state action requirement. It ruled that a § 1985(3) action
based on deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights necessarily required
proof of state involvement.' Deprivation of Thirteenth Amendment rights,
36. Id. at 658.
37. Id. at 658. This decision is troubling in view of legislative debate indicating that
Congress intended § 1985(3) to cover violations of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. See Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 1361.
38. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
39. hI. at 90-91.
40. Id. at 97, 105.
41. Id. at 102.
42. Id. at 104, 106.
43. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
44. Id. at 827-28.
45. I. at 837.
46. Id. at 830-31.
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however, by a private actor, as was the case in Griffin, could be maintained as
the Thirteenth Amendment arguably protects only blacks. Implicit in the hold-
ing of Scott, therefore, is a racial animus requirement. These decisions ignore
the fact that § 1985(3) was designed to protect white as well as black victims
of violence and intimidation at the hands of the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan's
targets included their political opposition, the Republican Party, and other
supporters of Reconstruction policies who were undoubtedly white.47
By issuing inconsistent opinions regarding a state action requirement and
by failing to specify the classes of persons protected by § 1985(3), the Su-
preme Court left a great deal of interpretation to lower courts. In addition, the
Court never sufficiently explained its hesitancy to apply the Act as broadly as
that intended by the legislators. Thus, several district courts and circuit courts
of appeal extended application of the statute to a wide variety of discriminato-
ry contexts.48 When the Supreme Court revisited § 1985(3) in Bray v. Alex-
andria Women's Health Clinic, there were well-reasoned rationales to justify
applying the statute to the terrorist activities of antiabortion protesters. The
Court in Bray, however, found those rationales unpersuasive.
B. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic
1. Facts and Procedural History
In January of 1993,' the United States Supreme Court denied application
of § 1985(3) to clinic blockaders in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clin-
ic.4 9 The plaintiffs in Bray included nine clinics in the Washington D.C. met-
ropolitan area and five pro-choice organizations, including the National Orga-
nization for Women (NOW). As state law enforcement had repeatedly been
overwhelmed by Operation Rescue's protest efforts,50 and state law remedies
had proven ineffective, plaintiffs sought relief in federal court. The complaint
alleged that Operation Rescue had violated § 1985(3) by disrupting and block-
ading clinics, thereby denying women equal protection of the laws. The plain-
tiffs argued that Operation Rescue's activity created a class-based conspiracy
designed to prevent women from exercising their constitutional right to inter-
state travel and their right to privacy in seeking abortion services.
The Federal District court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the
plaintiffs' request under § 1985(3) for a permanent injunction in National
Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue.5 Because many women trav-
eled interstate to obtain abortion services in the Washington metropolitan area,
47. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 32, at 1366-67.
48. See, e.g., Lisa J. Banks, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme
Court's License for Domestic Terrorism, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 449, 457 n.74 (1994).
49. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
50. Bray. 113 S. Ct. at 781 (Stevens. J., dissenting) ("Because of the large-scale, highly.
organized nature of petitioners' activities, the local authorities are unable to protect the vic-
tims of petitioners' conspiracy."); see also Crane, supra note 22, at 181.
51. 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989), affl'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in
part and vacated in part sub non. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993).
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the court upheld NOW's claim that Operation Rescue had engaged in a con-
spiracy for the purpose of depriving women seeking abortions the right to
travel interstate.52 Such gender-based discrimination, according to the court,
was sufficient to satisfy the class-based discriminatory element of §
1985(3)." The district court declined, however, to address NOW's claim that
defendants, by conspiring to prevent access to abortion facilities, had also
deprived women of their Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, finding no abuse of discretion, affirmed the opinion
and the permanent injunction issued by the district court.54 It also refused to
consider whether the right to abortion as a fundamental right of privacy was
within the scope of § 1985(3).s
2. The Supreme Court's Plurality Opinion
On February 25, 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. 6 The Court addressed several questions
on review. The first involved whether the protestors' actions resulted from a
"class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." This involved deciding
whether women seeking abortions constituted a "class" and then whether such
a gender-based class qualified for protection under § 1985(3). The second
question analyzed whether respondents had been deprived of constitutional
rights enforceable by Congress. This entailed deciding whether the right of
interstate travel and the right to abortion were entitled to protection under §
1985(3).
Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia first rejected the contention that
women seeking abortions were a "class" entitled to protection under §
1985(3). Such a finding, he explained, would create a potential cause of action
for every tort victim.57 Justice Scalia also did not believe that defendants'
actions were targeted towards women in general. 8 He argued that opposition
to abortion does not translate into an "invidiously discriminatory animus"
against women." Because the plurality concluded that women as a class were
not the target of civil rights violations in Bray, it declined to address whether
a gender-based conspiracy would be upheld under § 1985(3).'
52. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1489.
53. h. at 1492.
54. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582. 585 (1990), rev'd in
part and vacated in part sub nor. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct.
753 (1993).
55. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at 586.
56. 498 U.S. 1119 (1991).
57. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
58. Id. at 759-60.
59. Justice Scalia, after citing the definition of "invidious" from Webster's Dictionary:
"Itlending to excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; esp. unjustly and irritat-
ingly discriminating," asserted "Iwlhether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of preventing
abortion, that goal in itself . . . does not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and
for such derogatory association with racism." Id. at 761-62.
60. Id. at 759.
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The Court next evaluated whether respondents had alleged a right guaran-
teed by the Constitution against private encroachment as required by Carpen-
ters." While recognizing that the right to interstate travel had been protected
by the Court from private interference in Griffin, Justice Scalia nevertheless
denied such protection in Bray because he believed that interstate travel was
not sufficiently implicated.6 2 The fact that some women had traveled inter-
state to obtain abortion services in the Washington metropolitan area, Justice
Scalia argued, was not enough to show that protestors intended to impede
interstate travel." He went on to explain that antiabortion demonstrations on-
ly physically obstructed access to a particular clinic and therefore did not in
any way affect interstate travel. Justice Scalia equally denied that the right
to abortion was protected from private interference.6" He explained that the
Court in Roe had characterized abortion in terms of a "more general right of
privacy"' under the Constitution and, therefore, was barely afforded protect-
ed from state action. Maintaining the extremely narrow reach of § 1985(3),
Justice Scalia pointed out that only the Thirteenth Amendment had thus far
been accorded protection from both state and private conspiracies.67 The plu-
rality, therefore, was extremely disinclined to protect abortion."
3. The Hindrance Clause
After concluding that the respondents failed to make out a claim under the
deprivation clause of § 1985(3), Justice Scalia took aim at the existence of a
claim under the latter part of § 1985(3). The so-called "hindrance" clause
prohibits conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing or hindering the consti-
tuted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all per-
sons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws."" Be-
cause a claim under the hindrance clause was neither expressly pled nor raised
on certiorari, Justice Scalia vehemently claimed it was not an issue the Court
should address. Justices Souter, Stevens, Blackmun, and O'Connor, however,
agreed in their respective dissenting opinions that a claim under the hindrance
clause should be considered by the Court.
Justice Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, acknowledged
that the deprivation clause was restrained by Griffin, which required a racial or
class-based animus, and by Carpenters, which required proof of a right se-




64. Id. at 763.




69. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). The hindrance clause prohibits acts that interfere with
law enforcement efforts to protect the rights of the plaintiff, whereas the deprivation clause
prohibits acts that directly deprive the plaintiff's rights.
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cured against private action.7" Justice Souter disagreed, however, that the hin-
drance clause was similarly restrained. He undertook a lengthy re-examination
of both Griffin and Carpenters, noting that in both cases the Court construed
only the deprivation clause.7 In his opinion, the two conditions that arose out
of the two cases were in direct conflict with the intentions of the Forty-second
Congress.7 While the principle of stare decisis required that the conditions be
applied to the deprivation clause," Justice Souter opined that the current
Court should be free to construe the meaning of the hindrance clause separate-
ly, since its meaning had not been considered by the Courts in either Griffin or
Carpenters.74 Because he believed both restrictions were inconsistent with the
intended scope of § 19 8 5 (3 )," Souter concluded that the hindrance clause
should be interpreted without them.76 In his view, the hindrance clause would
apply even if the conspirators did not act with a racial or otherwise class-
based animus" and even when the object of their conspiracy was interference
with a constitutional guarantee only against state action."8 Ultimately, howev-
er, Justice Souter found that while the findings of the District Court could
support a hindrance clause violation, it should be remanded for a more express
determination."
The dissenting opinions, penned by Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor,
and joined by Justice Blackmun, focused primarily on their opposition to the
plurality's holding under the deprivation clause. Both opinions, however,
agreed with Justice Souter that the conditions imposed by Griffin and Carpen-
ters limited only the deprivation clause and were inapplicable to the hindrance
c!ause. 0 Justice Stevens pointed to Kush v. Rutledges", an earlier case, in
which the Court refused to apply the class-based animus requirement to anoth-
er section of the Ku Klux Klan Act now codified at § 1985(2)."2 In addition,
he determined that a conspiracy to interfere with the duties of law enforcement
implicated sufficient involvement by the State to trigger the federally protected
right to choose an abortion." As such, it was unnecessary to demonstrate a
right protected from private interference, as required by Carpenters, to make
out a claim under the second clause of § 1985(3)." Justices Stevens and
O'Connor went one step further, finding that a claim under the hindrance
clause was clearly established by the facts. They relied on evidence within the
70. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 770.
71. Id. at 772-76.
72. Id. at 772.
73. Id. at 770.
74. h. at 769-70, 775.
75. I. at 771.
76. Id. at 775.
77. hi. at 775-76.
78. hi. at 776-77.
79. i. at 779.
80. Brav, 113 S. Ct. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81. 460 U.S. 719 (1983).





record that protestors had often overwhelmed local law enforcement and pre-
vented their efforts to maintain clinic access. 5 Such evidence, in the opinions
of both Justices, demonstrated a conspiracy that mirrored the activities of the
Ku Klux Klan and merited redress under § 1983(5).
Justice Scalia, in the plurality opinion, steadfastly responded that his col-
leagues were mistaken in their views regarding the hindrance clause. He ex-
plained that the restrictions formulated in Griffin and Carpenters applied to the
"equal protection of the laws" language found in both clauses under
§1985(3)." The restrictions, therefore, applied unquestionably to the hin-
drance clause, preventing it from being stretched more broadly than the depri-
vation clause." A different interpretation, in his view, would create an imper-
missible inconsistency.88 Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that the mean-
ing of the hindrance clause was not an issue properly before the Court. 9 His
analysis of the issue, therefore, was not dispositive.
Importantly, four of the Justices believed the hindrance clause was proper-
ly implicated in this case. The extent to which they addressed the issue may
be of some precedential value in future cases. The issue has been left open for
future discussion, as the meaning of the hindrance clause remains undecided.
In contrast, the plurality slammed the door on the deprivation clause under §
1985(3). By refusing to extend its application to abortion protestors, the Court
narrowed the scope of § 1985(3) further than ever intended by the drafters.
This inexplicable restriction becomes even more mystifying considering that
the Court later extended an organized crime statute to the very same fact pat-
tern.
C. Racketeer hifluenced and Corrupt Organizations
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, signed by President Nixon on
October 15, 1970, was heralded as a powerful weapon in the "war against
organized crime.""' Title IX of the Act, entitled "Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations" (RICO)," requires proof that a defendant, through a
pattern of racketeering, directly or indirectly invested in, maintained an interest
in, or participated in an enterprise, the activities of which affected interstate
commerce.92 Plaintiffs invoking civil RICO must also allege and prove that
an injury to their business or property occurred as a result of such activity.9"
An "enterprise" includes any "association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."94
85. I. at 781 (Stevens. J., dissenting), 800 (O'Connor. J., dissenting).
86. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 765.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 766.
89. i. at 767.
90. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS. THE LAW OF CIVIL RICO 1-2 (1991).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988).
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"Racketeering activity" covers a wide range of crimes including "any act or
threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery [and]
extortion." 5 To establish a "pattern," a plaintiff must prove at least two pred-
icate acts.9"
At its inception, RICO was directed at the "infiltration of organized crime
and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate com-
merce." 7 Its civil remedy," however, has been applied in a variety of situa-
tions against a wide range of defendants, moving far beyond the originally
targeted mobster activity." The inclusion of a liberal construction clause"°°
lends support to RICO's wide application and broad interpretation.
With RICO's increased extension outside the context of organized crime,
courts and defendants sought ways to limit its use. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has consistently discouraged such attempts. In its first civil RICO case,
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inrex Co.,"' the Court refused to require a prior crimi-
nal conviction or an allegation of a special racketeering type injury. °2 The
Court recognized that "RICO is evolving into something quite different from
the original conception of its enactors,""' and approved the statute's broad
reach."
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Predicate acts are defined as individual criminal acts
that, when viewed together with evidence of other singular criminal acts, may constitute a
"pattern."
97. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1969); see also the Congressional State-
ment of Findings and Purpose prefacing RICO, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 tit. 9,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23 (1970), quoted in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576, 588-89 (1981) (holding that the purpose of the Act is "to seek the eradication of orga-
nized crime in the United States").
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides: "Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
99. Defendants have included "individuals, American and foreign corporations, partner-
ships, labor unions, receivers, churches, colleges and universities, municipal officials, munici-
pal corporations, estates, and political party organizations." ABRAMS, supra note 90, at 177-
79 (citations omitted); see also Arthur P. Breshnahan et al., Racketeer hIfluenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847 (1993) (citations omitted) (stating that RICO
claims have included "corporate takeovers, securities regulations, banking, and insurance");
Geri J. Yonover, Fighting Fire With Fire: Civil RICO and Anti-Abortion Activists, 12
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153 (1990) (citations omitted) (stating that RICO has been applied to
"copyright and licensing agreements, closely-held corporations, tax shelters, churning (securi-
ties fraud), tortious interference with a business, breach of contract, sexual harassment, family
disputes, and religious disputes").
100. Section 904 of title 9 of Pub. L. No. 91-452 provides in relevant part: "The pro-
visions of this title . . . shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), tit. 9, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988)).
101. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
102. Sedimna, 433 U.S. at 500; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593
(1981) (holding that RICO applies both to legitimate and illegitimate enterprises).
103. Sedinia, 473 U.S. at 500.
104. Id. at 499; see also HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248
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The notion that a RICO claim must include proof that a defendant's ac-
tions were motivated by financial gain first emerged in the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Anderson. 5 The court's primary goal was to keep separate
the "pattern" and "enterprise" elements."' In order to prevent two or more
predicate acts from automatically establishing evidence of an enterprise, the
court required that an enterprise be "directed towards an economic goal."' 7
Anderson was decided before the Supreme Court declaration of RICO's
breadth in Sedima. Even after Sedina, however, the Eighth Circuit adhered to
a restrictive reading of RICO in United States v. Flynn,' denying a convic-
tion absent an economic motive. In United States v. Ivic,"° the plaintiffs in-
voked RICO to address the terrorist activities of Croatian nationalists. In their
complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had committed two attempted
bombings and one attempted murder against advocates of Croatian indepen-
dence." ' The Second Circuit panel itself raised the question of economic
motivation at oral argument. The court was concerned about whether RICO
extended to such politically motivated acts in light of the statute's intended
purpose."' After the parties submitted additional briefs on the issue, the pan-
el concluded that the RICO enterprise or the predicate acts must have a finan-
cial purpose."2 Relying primarily on RICO's legislative history and Justice
Department Guidelines that narrowly targeted the "ill-gotten gains" of orga-
nized crime, the court found the defendants' acts were necessarily beyond the
scope of RICO."'
Ivic's narrow holding was undermined but not extinguished two and a half
months later by a different panel of the Second Circuit in United States v.
Bagaric."' Faced once again with the application of RICO to Croatian ter-
rorists, the panel rejected the contention that the prosecution must prove an
"ultimate and overriding economic motive." '' " While it was clear that the de-
fendants were motivated solely by their political beliefs, the court found predi-
cate acts involving the financial crime of extortion enough to show an "eco-
nomic dimension."
' 6
Five years later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Northeast Women's
(1989) (commenting that "Itihe occasion for Congress' action was the perceived need to
combat organized crime. But Congress for cogent reasons chose to enact a more general
statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its focus, was not limited in applica-
tion to organized crime").
105. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
106. Anderson, 626 F.2d at 1365-1369, 1372.
107. Id. at 1362.
108. 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
109. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
110. ltic, 700 F.2d at 53-55.
Ill. Id. at 59-61.
112. Id. at 65.
113. id. at 64.
114. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840 (1983).
115. Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 53.
116. Id. at 57.
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Center v. McMonagle,"7 affirmed the district court's finding that twenty-
seven antiabortion protestors were liable for monetary damages under RICO.
The evidence at trial revealed that protestors had unlawfully entered the clinic
on four occasions, knocked down and injured several employees, and de-
stroyed medical equipment. This caused some employees to resign and the
Center to lose its lease."' In its complaint, the Center alleged extortion in
violation of the Hobbs Act"' involving threats of force, fear, and violence
designed to drive the Center out of business. 20 Proof of Hobbs Act vio-
lations serve as predicate acts required under RICO.'' Predicate acts, evi-
dence that the defendant has committed some crime, may ultimately be used in
combination with other evidence to show a large-scale operation. Because the
absence of economic motive is not a defense to Hobbs Act crimes, the court
reasoned by analogy that it was not necessary to prove an economic motive to
maintain a valid RICO claim. -'2 2 Two months later, the District Court for the
Western District of Washington, in Feminist Women's Health Center v. Rob-
erts, 21 followed McMonagle and expressly rejected the defendants' conten-
tion that RICO was inapplicable to the political acts of abortion protestors.
24
By injecting an economic motive requirement into RICO, the Eighth and
Second Circuit courts prescribed a narrow construction of RICO that was not
supported by any Supreme Court decision. The inconsistent justifications by
the two circuit courts for such a restricted reading and their inability to clarify
the scope of the requirement warranted further review. Establishing reliable
precedent with regard to the issue was crucial when it appeared that success or
failure of a civil RICO claim rested upon the question of economic motivation.
D. National Organization for Women v. Scheidler
1. Facts and Procedural History
In 1989, the National Organization for Women ("NOW")'25 along with
two women's health organizations, 21 sought stiff penalties under civil RICO
117. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
118. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-46.
119. The Hobbs Act defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or
under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
120. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-47.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(B) (1988).
122. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350.
123. Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Roberts, No. C86-161Z, 1989 WL 56017 (W.D.
Wash. May 5, 1989).
124. Id. at *11.
125. NOW is an organization "which has a vital interest in women's rights to privacy
and reproductive freedom." It brought the action on behalf of itself, its members, and other
people who use or may use the services of women's health centers that provide abortions.
Brief for Petitioners at 5, National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994) (No.
92-780).




to strike at the heart of nationally organized and violent abortion protests.
Defendants included Joseph Scheidler, founder of the Pro-Life Action League
("PLAL"), and Randall A. Terry, founder of Operation Rescue who, along
with other abortion opposers, comprised the Pro-Life Action Network
("PLAN").127 NOW claimed the defendants had violated § 1962 of RICO by
participating in a nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through
a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically extortion under the Hobbs
Act. 12 The extortionate acts alleged included direct threats of personal harm
to clinic personnel and patients, arson and fire, burglary, criminal damage to
clinic property and equipment, and threats against the clinics' lessors, medical
laboratories, and suppliers.'29
The district court dismissed NOW's claims under § 1962 in part because
it concluded that donations from supporters could not be considered "income"
obtained by the defendants through a pattern of racketeering activity and in
part because it required proof of an economic motive." The court acknowl-
edged that the circuit courts were divided on the issue but followed the Sev-
enth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Neapolitan' which had adopted
the Eighth Circuit's definition in Anderson of an "enterprise" directed at an
economic goal.
12
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling. 3 ' It agreed that the contributions defendants received from pro-life
supporters were not derived from a pattern of extortionate activity, despite
NOW's insistence that defendants' income increased in direct relation to the
frequency and notoriety of their efforts." 4 The court conceded that its deci-
sion in Neapolitan only indirectly imposed an economic motive
requirement."' s It also agreed with the finding in McMonagle that Hobbs Act
defendants need not profit economically from their extortionate acts." 6 Nev-
ertheless, the court examined Ivic, which it considered to be the leading case
on the issue, and adopted Ivic's narrow interpretation of the statute. It agreed
that according to its legislative history, RICO was intended to apply only in
the case of a financially motivated enterprise or series of predicate acts.'
RICO could not extend, therefore, to politically motivated entities or acts.
127. PLAN has organized an overall national strategy of "direct action" against clinics,
clinic staff, and patients. PLAN's activities include multi-city "blitzes." PLAN designated
1985-1986 as "the year of pain and fear" for anyone giving or receiving an abortion. Id. at
7.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1988).
129. Petitioners' Brief at 4, Scheidler (No. 92-780).
130. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 941-43 (N.D. Ill. 1991),
aft'd, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
131. 791 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 500.
133. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612. 630-31 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
134. I. at 623.
135. I. at 627.
136, hI. at 629-30.
137 Id. at 627.
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2. The Supreme Court's Unanimous Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Scheidler to resolve the disparity
among the circuit courts on the issue of economic motive.'38 It unanimously
concluded that neither the enterprise nor the predicate acts of RICO require
proof that the defendants were driven by financial gain.'39 In reversing the
Seventh Circuit Court's ruling, the Court first examined the statutory language.
It pointed out that an economic motive requirement is neither explicitly con-
tained in the language of § 1962 outlining prohibited conduct nor is it men-
tioned in any of the definitions in § 1961."4' While § 1962(c) imposes liabili-
ty when an enterprise engages in or affects interstate commerce, the Court
acknowledged that an enterprise could "affect" interstate commerce "without
having its own profit-seeking motives." 141
Dissecting the language of the statute even further, the Court demonstrat-
ed that the Seventh Circuit was wrong to graft an economic motive require-
ment onto § 1962(c) based on use of the term "enterprise" in §§ 1962 (a) and
(b) because the term plays a different role in each subsection. 42 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that "enterprise" in subsections
(a) and (b) correspond respectively to income derived from illegal activity or
money invested in illegal activity.'43 Subsection (c), however, is merely a
"vehicle" through which illegal activity is conducted."4 An enterprise, there-
fore, need only be an association which does in fact affect interstate commerce
through a pattern of racketeering. 4 ' Justice Rehnquist emphasized that re-
quiring predicate acts to have an economic motive ignores the possibility that
an enterprise, through its illegal conduct, may cause financial harm to a busi-
ness without creating any financial gain for itself.'46
The Court reaffirmed its decisions in both Sedina and H.J. Inc. v. North-
western Bell Telephone Co.,'47 advocating a broad reading of RICO in light
of the language chosen by Congress. Specifically, the Court reiterated a point
from United States v. Turkette18 that if Congress had intended RICO to be
more limited in scope, it could have done so by inserting a single word. In
response to the argument that the statement of congressional findings in the
note following § 1961 justified a restricted reading of RICO, the Court stated
that it is "a rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement ... neither
expressed nor, we think, fairly implied in the operative sections of the
138. National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 800 (1994).
139. hI. at 806.






146. IdL at 805.
147. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).




Act."' 45 While it did not specifically address the weight given to administra-
tive law principles, the Court mentioned that the Department of Justice guide-
lines stating that a RICO enterprise must have an economic purpose had since
been amended to include "other identifiable goal[s]. ' ' °
The Court restated its holding in Sedina that the language of RICO,
which invites application beyond the context of organized crime, illustrates its
broad nature and does not call for clarification. 5' The Court consequently
found no need to analyze the bits of legislative history that the lower courts
found so persuasive in support of an economic element.12 For the same rea-
son, the Court declined to apply the rule of lenity, that is invoked only when
the language of a statute is ambiguous.'
The Court expressed no view, however, as to whether all the required
elements of RICO were met in the instant case. 54 It concluded only that an
economic motive was not necessary to maintain a valid claim. On remand to
the district court, NOW must still prove that the defendants participated in an
enterprise that affected interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering.
3. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Souter, who wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy
joined, emphasized that the majority opinion addressed a narrow legal question
and should not be interpreted to bar a First Amendment challenge to the appli-
cation of RICO in the context of political protest.' He indicated that impos-
ing an economic motive requirement might over-protect or under-protect free-
speech and was, therefore, not the proper avenue through which such concerns
should be pursued. 5 ' A better tactic, he suggested, would be to raise a First
Amendment challenge in defense of an individual RICO claim.' Finally,
Justice Souter delivered a warning to the courts to be cautious in applying
RICO where free speech may be an issue.'58
149. hI. at 805.
150. hI. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE. 9 U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 110.360 (1984)).
151. hi. at 806 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (quot-
ing Harco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.. 747 F.2d 384, 398 (2d Cir. I11.))).
152. hI.
153. Id. The lenity rule provides that where there is ambiguity in the language of a
statute concerning multiple punishment, it should be resolved in favor of lenity in sentencing.
BLACKS LAW Dt-rIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990).
154. Id.
155. hI. at 806 (Souter, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 807. Justice Souter explained that an economic motive requirement might
"keep RICO from reaching ideological entities whose members commit acts of violence we
need not fear chilling . . . but fully protected expression might fail the proposed economic-
motive test (for even protest movements need money)." Id.
157. hI. at 807. For a discussion of the potential conflict between RICO liability and the
First Amendment rights of abortion protestors, see Steven E. Soule & Karen R. Weinstein,
Racketeering, A,,ti-Abortion Protestors, and the First Amendotet, 4 UCLA WOMEN's L.J.
365 (1994).
158. Scheidler. 114 S. Ct. at 807.
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E. Reconciling Bray and Scheidler
On one level, the decision in Scheidler is not particularly remarkable. The
Supreme Court has consistently given RICO a wide reign. Scheidler is in line
with numerous cases that reject attempts to narrow application of the statute.
However, the Court's tacit approval of the extension of RICO to abortion
protestors, in light of its refusal to extend § 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act,
is somewhat anomalous.
1. The Harm Remedied
It is clear that the Supreme Court in Bray did not believe the KKK Act
was the proper federal remedy to address the violent efforts of antiabortion
protestors." 9 Protecting a woman's constitutional right to an abortion, how-
ever, is a logical application of a statute whose goal is to uphold equal protec-
tion of the laws. In contrast, the goal of RICO is to prevent organized entities
from using illegal means to harm a business. " ) The element in Scheidler that
allows RICO to encompass the acts of abortion protestors is the allegation of
an injury to plaintiffs business or property. This injury, however, was merely
incidental to the real harm caused by the protestors-preventing women's
access to abortion services. While the decision in Scheidler is certainly not an
unwelcome one for abortion rights proponents, questions remain on both sides
as to why the Court was so willing to extend liability under RICO in Scheidler
but not under the Ku Klux Klan Act in Bray.
2. The Group Targeted
The respective statutes were originally aimed at two very different types
of organized conspiracies. Section 1985(3) targeted the Ku Klux Klan, a group
motivated by race and politics. After suffering defeat in the war between the
states, the South gave birth to the KKK, a group comprised of former Con-
federate soldiers and former slave owners. 6' By whatever means necessary,
members of the Klan sought to reclaim their accustomed way of life. Their
efforts were aimed not only at blacks but at northern profit seekers and south-
ern sympathizers. 6 2 This fact alone repudiates the idea that § 1985(3) was
159. Bray was a 5-4 decision. Justice Scalia revealed the sharp division of the Court in
his venomous opinion, which took issue with every point made by the dissenting Justices
Stevens, Blackmun. and O'Connor. Had it not been for Justice Scalia's belief that abortion is
not a constitutionally protected right, the Court might have reached a different conclusion in
Bray'. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). Justice Scalia
explicitly stated his belief that Roe v. Wade should be overturned in Webster v. Reproduc-
live Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2873 (1992), he also expressed his view that the Constitution does not require states
to permit abortion.
160. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
161. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 22 at 1364.
162. The term "carpetbaggers" was used to describe those people who descended from
the North seeking to rebuild the war-torn South. "'Scalawags" were native southerners who
sympathized with the new federal policies. Both were targeted by the Klan's campaign
against change in the South. Id.
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intended solely to remedy racial bias.' It also demonstrates that the Forty-
Second Congress intended to fashion a more general remedy that would pro-
tect the rights of all citizens against their political opposers."
RICO, by contrast, was originally aimed at mobsters, a group motivated
solely by economic gain. In 1967, the Task Force on Organized Crime estab-
lished by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, reported that twenty-four crime families operated across the na-
tion. "' These intricate associations maneuvered outside the law to achieve
financial and political dominance. They gained profits through illegal gam-
bling, loan sharking, and the sale of narcotics." 6 They obtained power
through monopolization and extortion of legitimate businesses and bribery of
government officials."5 7 These criminals sought to put competitors out of
business solely to put more money in their own pockets, not because they
opposed a particular kind of business, its members, or its politics."'
In terms of intense political, moral, and social opposition, abortion protest
organizations align most closely with the Ku Klux Klan. Groups like Opera-
tion Rescue, the Pro-Life Action League, and Rescue America are motivated
primarily by their moral and political views. They oppose any constitutional
protection for a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, just as the Klan
opposed constitutional protection for a slave's right to be free. Like the Klan,
opposers of choice seek, through whatever means necessary,"' to undo what
the Court did in Roe v. Wade.
When organized crime pressures a particular business owner in an attempt
to shut down his or her business, it is a purely profit motivated activity. Not
so for protestors whose ultimate goal is to shut down abortion clinics and
deprive women of their constitutional rights. Anti-choice activists seek to put
abortion providers out of business, but not for financial gain. Thus, it does not
make sense to stretch the provisions of RICO to cover acts based on political
163. While the Supreme Court has not directly limited § 1985(3) to racially motivated
conspiracies, it has implied such a limitation. Griffin, a case involving racial discrimination,
is the only instance where the Court has allowed application of the statute. See Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In addition, the Court in Carpenters placed the statute in
an historical context, making it less applicable to modern-day conspiracies when it charac-
terized the purpose of § 1985(3) narrowly "to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes
and their supporters." United Bhd. of Carpenters. Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825. 836
(1983).
164. See supra note 31.
165. TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 7
(1967).
166. /i. at 1.
167. Id. at 2.
168. "What organized crime wants is money and power." hi. at I.
169. Randall Terry, founder of Operation Rescue, is stepping tip efforts to bring about
his brand of change. He is building his own training center to raise tip "a cadre of people
who are militant, who are fierce, who are unmerciful." In addition, he plans to run for New
York State office in 1996. his goal being to "recapturlel the power bases from their current
tyrannical captors." Kio Stark. Call it Pro-Deth: Operation Rescne. TIHE NATION. Aug. 22.
1994. at 183.
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and social beliefs. Section 1985(3), however, was specifically designed to
remedy civil rights infringements of the very kind found in the antiabortion
context.
3. The Plain Meaning Approach and Stare Decisis
Justice Scalia emphasized a plain meaning approach when writing the
plurality opinion in Bray. This meant looking only to the "ordinary under-
standing of the words and structure of statutory text.' 170 Justice Scalia con-
sulted Webster's Dictionary for the plain meaning of "invidious," and conclud-
ed that such a word does not describe the mental state of abortion protestors
towards women in general. 7 In reaching his conclusion, Justice Scalia ef-
fectively precluded application of § 1985(31. The actual words of the statute,
however, do not contain any such language. The statute plainly states that it
prohibits a conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving" any person or class of
persons the equal protection of the laws.'72 In Bray, Justice Scalia was inter-
preting the language drafted by the Court in Griffin. 7 ' The Griffin Court,
however, added this limiting language in blatant disregard of the words al-
ready in place.
Additionally, § 1985(3) states quite clearly that the intended beneficiaries
of the statute include "any person or class of persons."'7 The word "any"
indicates that the statute should protect women seeking abortions as well as
blacks seeking employment. The Court in Griffin, however, limited protection
to those deprived of their rights based on race or "class."" ' The Supreme
Court has yet to determine what classes qualify for class-based discrimination
under this statute.
In Bray, Justice Scalia skirted this issue by finding that protestors' opposi-
tion to abortion did not translate into opposition to women in general. He
concluded that the protestors could not be liable under § 1985(3) since their
conspiracy was not aimed at any particular class. Such reasoning, however,
neglects that the conduct complained of interferes with every woman's right to
obtain abortion services.
Further, the people whose rights were being infringed upon in Bray in-
cluded not only women seeking abortions, but also the men and women who
provide the medical service. A plain meaning interpretation of the statute
would seem to protect anyone who was denied equal protection of the laws
based on political opposition. The Supreme Court, however, preferred to rely
170. Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict
Statiuto., Constrictmio,, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 401 (1994).
171. He quoted the definition from Webster's as "It]ending to excite odium, ill will, or
envy; likely to give offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating," Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 762 (1993) (quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1306 (2d ed. 1954)).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
173. A plaintiff must prove the conspirators acted with a "racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
175. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 103.
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upon its precedents and their distortion of the Act. Thus, in order to apply §
1985(3) in Bray, the Court was compelled to find a discriminatory animus
because of Griffin. It also had to find that the rights violated were protected
from private interference pursuant to Carpenters.
But was the Court truly bound by Griffin and Carpenters? The Court
claims to be committed to the doctrine of stare decisis.T "' But that commit-
ment is not absolute. The majority in Planned Parenthood v. Casey", fash-
ioned a test that allows the Court to overrule a prior decision if: I) it proves
unworkable in practice; 2) causes inequities in effect; 3) damages social sta-
bility; 4) is abandoned by society; and 5) relies on key fact assumptions which
have changed. Griffin itself did not adhere to the principle of stare decisis
when it eliminated the state action requirement, overruling Collins v.
Hardyrnan." ' Similarly, Carpenters mutated the statute and prior precedent
even further. If the purpose of stare decisis is to give the Court institutional
legitimacy through consistency, that purpose was not accomplished in this line
of cases.
The Court could have applied the test in Casey and concluded easily that
the requirements from Griffin and Carpenters rendered § 1985(3) unworkable
or inequitable in effect. The Court's narrow interpretation of § 1985(3) in
Bra)' may have complied with the elements laid out in Griffin and Carpenters,
but it is a far cry from the plain meaning of the statute or the intent of its
drafters. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the majority in Bra) acted with
its own, or other, concerns in mind and failed to see the inequities created by
denying application of § 1985(3).
The Court also employed the plain meaning approach when it interpreted
the RICO statute in NOW v. Scheidler.'79 Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
unanimous court, quickly came to the conclusion that an economic motive
requirement was neither contained in the words nor could it be implied in the
structure of the statute.' 81' Aiding the Court in its decision were multudinous
prior decisions which had already broadened the reach of RICO. Perhaps that
is why it was so much easier for the Court to extend a remedy to the victims
of violent protest in Scheidler, whereas in Bray prior case law severely nar-
rowed the statute in question.
The Court may also have found the issue in Scheidler simpler to resolve
because it was not dispositive. The plaintiffs must still prove all elements of a
RICO conspiracy at the trial level. The initial decision on the merits and the
accompanying criticism would be shouldered by the trial court. Further, per-
haps, the Supreme Court saw Scheidler as a concession for its poor judgment
176. Stare decisis was the primary justification for the Court's holding in Casev. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992); see also Ronald Kahn. The
Supreme Court As a (Counter) Majoritarian histitution: Misperceptions of the Warren, Bur-
ger, and Relinquist Courts, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 1.
177. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
178. 341 U.S. 651 (1951), overruled by Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
179. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
180. I. at 803-05.
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in Bray. After its decision in Bray, the Court was severely criticized,' clinic
violence continued to escalate, and there was a heightened demand for practi-
cal solutions. Scheidler, therefore, may be viewed as not merely the reaction
of a conservative court, but as a compromising gesture and an attempt to quell
the suspicion that Justices allow their individual opinions on the abortion issue
to enter into the decision-making process.
II. BALANCING CLINIC PROTECTION AND FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH
A. The Standard Applied in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,"8 2 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a permanent injunction issued by a Florida state
court to restrain antiabortion demonstrations. In 1991, a Florida clinic sought
protection for its patients, personnel, and property when demonstrations aimed
at shutting down the clinic became too disruptive."5 3 The Florida state court
issued a permanent injunction in September of 1992 which prohibited the pro-
testors from "blocking or interfering with public access to the clinic, and from
physically abusing persons entering or leaving the clinic."' "& This general re-
striction served only to escalate protest activity.' In response, the clinic
sought another injunction to address specific protest activities. The Florida
district court issued a broader and more explicit injunction on April 8, 1993.
Antiabortion activists Judy Madsen and Shirley Hobbs challenged five
provisions of the amended injunction which restricted their protest activities.
The challenged provisions included: 1) 36-foot clinic buffer zone - prohibiting
protestors from demonstrating within 36 feet of clinic property; 2) noise -
prohibiting, during hours of operation, "singing, chanting, whistling, shouting,
yelling, us[ing] bullhorns, auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other
181. See Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, Operation Rescue Versus A Woman's Right to
Choose: A Conflict Without A Federal Reniedv?, 32 DuQ. L. REV. 709 (1994); Banks supra,
note 48; Todd C. Coleman, Casenote, Hindering The Applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to
Abortion Protests: Bray v. Alexandria Women'a Health Clinic, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 525
(1994); Toni Driver, Casenote, Federal Law -Civil Rights-Individuals Obstructing Ingress
aiid Egress to Abortion Facilities Do Not Violate A Woman's Federal Rights Within 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 753 (1994); J. Paige Lambdin, Note, Civil
Rights-Abortion Protests-42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) Does Not Provide A Federal Cause of Ac-
tion Against Protestors Who Obstruct Access to Abortion Clinics-Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2096 (1993).
182. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
183. See Respondent's Brief at I, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 114 S. Ct.
2516 (1994) (No. 93-880).
184. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
185. "In the months following the September 1992 injunction, the Clinic suffered a De-
cember 1992 butyric acid attack; the Clinic doors were disabled with super glue; the doctor
serving the Clinic received threats including a mock shooting . . . and focused residential
picketing against the Clinic staff continued." Respondent's Brief at 3, Madsen (No. 93-880).
In addition, the Melbourne police testified to the increase in protest activity, its overflow into
the street, and protestors' disregard for police warnings. Id. at 7.
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sounds .. within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic."; 3) observable
images - prohibiting the use of signs which could be seen inside the clinic; 87
4) no approach zone - prohibiting protestors from "physically approaching any
person seeking the services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire
to communicate.";' and 5) 300-foot residential buffer zone - prohibiting
protestors from demonstrating within 300 feet of the residences of "employees,
staff, owners or agents."' 89 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the injunc-
tion "' while the Eleventh Circuit, in a concurrent challenge, struck it down
as an unconstitutional infringement on protestors' First Amendment right of
free speech.' 9' The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the dis-
pute.192
In its opinion, the Court first explained why the injunction was not con-
tent or viewpoint based and therefore did not warrant a strict scrutiny analysis
as urged by the petitioners.9 3 The Court stated that an injunction, by its very
nature, targets a specific group of people based on that group's past behav-
ior.'' Whether an injunction is content or viewpoint based, however, de-
pends upon the purpose of the court in issuing the order. The Florida state
court adopted the restriction in response to the protestors' violation of the
original order, not because of their antiabortion message. 9 The injunction
was, therefore, content-neutral.
The Court next distinguished a content-neutral injunction from a content-
neutral statute, the former being a remedy "imposed for violations (or threat-
ened violations) of a legislative or judicial decree,"'" and the latter a "legis-
lative choice regarding the promotion of particular societal interests.""' 9 The
constitutionality of a content-neutral statute, which restricts free speech in a
public forum, normally requires a court to apply the intermediate scrutiny
standard from Ward v. Rock Against Racism.9 ' Under this standard, a court
evaluates whether the restriction on speech is "justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, [is] narrowly tailored to serve a significant
186. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522.
187. The protestors were known to prop ladders against the Clinic's 8-foot privacy fence
and hold up signs within view of patients inside the clinic. Respondent's Brief at 4, Madsen
(No. 93-880).
188. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522.
189. I.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2523.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2523 (referring to Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37. 45 (1983)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2523-24. "Our principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference to the content of the
regulated speech."' Id. at 2523 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
196. Id. at 2524.
197. id.
198. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
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government interest, and ... leave[s] open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.'"
The Court in Madsen, however, was concerned that a content-neutral
injunction has a greater potential to discriminate. Therefore, the Court sought
to apply First Amendment principles more strictly than those embodied in the
intermediate scrutiny standard. It announced a new standard whereby the con-
stitutionality of a content-neutral injunction requires a finding that its restric-
tions "bUrden[ed] no more speech than necessary to serve a significant govern-
mental interest.""' The Court agreed with the Florida Supreme Court that
the injunction in Madsen was intended to serve three significant governmental
interests: 1) to protect "a woman's freedom to seek lawful medical or counsel-
ing services in connection with her pregnancy;" 2 2) to ensure "public safety
and order, in promoting the free flow of traffic on public streets and side-
walks, and in protecting the property rights of all its citizens; '2112 and 3) to
protect residential privacy.-" These interests were then weighed against that
of the protestors in exercising their right to freedom of expression guaranteed
by the First Amendment.
The Court applied this balancing test to each challenged provision of the
injunction. First, it upheld the 36-foot buffer zone around clinic entrances. The
Court found the denial of potentially peaceful protest in that area was out-
weighed by the need to protect ingress to and egress from the clinic and pro-
tect the free flow of traffic on the street in front of the clinic.2"4 The Court
relied on facts in the record indicating that large numbers of protestors could
significantly block the entrances to the clinic even though their actions were
peaceful.' 5 In addition, the Court reasoned that the first, less restrictive in-
junction, failed to maintain adequate access to the facility. According to the
Court, however, the buffer zone could not permissibly include private property
on the back and side of the clinic.2 ' The record indicated that protest activi-
ties in those areas neither interfered with access to the clinic nor interrupted
traffic on the adjoining street.2 7 Thus, a restriction including those areas bur-
dened more speech than necessary to serve the interest of maintaining access
to the facility.
2'8 s
The Court also upheld the noise restriction, finding that the health center,
like any medical facility, requires a comfortable and quiet atmosphere for its
patients. Similar noise restrictions had previously been upheld as reasonable by
the Court, based on the nature of the area in question. ° In Madsen, the
199. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citations omitted).
200. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
201. Id. at 2526.
202. hI.
203. Id.
204. hI. at 2527.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2528.
207. 1i.
208. I.
209. Id. "ITIhe nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds
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Court reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment does not demand that patients at a
medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of politi-
cal protests. 2 " ' The noise restriction, therefore, was a necessary burden on
protestors' speech. With regard to observable images, however, the Court
found "it is much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to
stop up her ears." ' t' As such, a restriction on images observable from clinic
windows was an unnecessary burden on the protestors' speech.
Next, the Court invalidated both the provision prohibiting protestors from
engaging in uninvited communication with persons entering the clinic and the
provision prohibiting demonstrations within 300 feet of the personal residences
of clinic staff. Both restrictions were found to restrict peaceful protest beyond
that necessary to maintain clinic access and residential privacy. The Court
explained that when a topic is a subject of heated public debate, people "must
tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment." 2 2 While
the Court indicated it might have upheld a smaller buffer zone around staff
residences, a 300 foot zone was too broad and not justified by the facts in the
record.2"
Madsen is important because it recognizes injunctions as a means of ad-
dressing violence at abortion clinics. It demonstrates that even those on the
Court who oppose abortion are unwilling to permit unlawful protest. Despite
the Court's ruling in NOW v. Scheidler,2 " RICO has proved to be an illusory
solution to the problem of day-to-day protest activities. Madsen, however,
offers definitive and immediate protection for abortion clinics, patients, and
personnel. In addition, the majority demonstrated a respect for the rights of
both parties. The decision indicated that neither a woman seeking an abortion
nor protestors seeking to express their viewpoint may exercise their right to
the exclusion of the other. Many saw Madsen as a sound compromise.2
Others, however, believed the Supreme Court had gone too far in restricting
the free speech of protestors.2 6
of regulations . . . that are reasonable." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972). For an analysis of Supreme Court opinions addressing noise restrictions, see Richard
E. Guida, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amnedn'nt Freedom of Speech-Statute Prohibit-
ing "oud and Unseenl'" Noises is a Content-Neutral Regulation of Protected Speech, 20
U. BALT. L. REV. 507 (1991) (pointing out that the Supreme Court generally upholds regula-
tion of amplified speech if necessary to protect the public from noise).
210. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528.
211. id. at 2529.
212. Id. at 2529 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)).
213. Id. at 2530.
214. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
215. See. e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court Allows Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones Scalia Sees
Threat to Free Speech Rights, WASH. POST. Jul. I, 1994, at Al; Aaron Epstein, Court Backs
Restrictions on Protestors It Upheld, 6-3, A Florida Judge's Rling Against Anti-Abortion
Demonstrators. Scalia Decried the Decision as "A Ponerfli Loaded Weapon", PHILA. IN-
QUIRER. Jul. I. 1994. at A3.
216. See Epstein, supra note 215.
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B. The First Amendment Inplications of Madsen
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas, attacked the standard developed in Madsen and accused the majority
of making yet another exception in the context of abortion.21 '7 The entire de-
cision, in Justice Scalia's view, was "profoundly at odds with [the Court's]
First Amendment precedents and traditions . 2 8 He advocated strict
scrutiny of any injunction mainly because be believed such a restriction on
speech is as likely to intentionally discriminate against a particular viewpoint
as is a content-based statute. In Justice Scalia's opinion, the Court should have
evaluated whether the injunction's restriction on speech was "necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve that
end." ' 211 Justice Scalia primarily contended that the 36-foot buffer zone,
which included a public sidewalk area, was an impermissible restriction on the
protestors' right of free expression. Because he believed the record did not
reflect sufficient violence or attempts to prevent patient entry into the clin-
ic, 22' Justice Scalia did not understand the majority's willingness to curtail
the protestors' activities in any way. He likened the demonstrations in Madsen
to civil rights protests22 ' and implied that the Court's decision could support
future restrictions on social protest with little or no findings of fact.
222
Justice Scalia's disagreement with the majority in Madsen is illustrative of
a current debate among First Amendment scholars. There are those who would
leave speech mostly deregulated and others who Professor Kathleen M.
Sullivan terms the "new speech regulators.12 2 1 Professor Sullivan argues that
the new speech regulators blur distinctions created by modern free speech doc-
trine. 24 For example, where the modern free speech consensus draws a line
between pure speech and speech as conduct, allowing regulation only of the
latter, the new speech regulators would equate some pure speech with physical
assault. 2-  By upholding the noise restriction, the Madsen Court demonstrat-
ed some accord with the view of the new speech regulators. The Clinic argued
that antiabortion speech outside the clinic caused patients to display physical
symptoms of anxiety, requiring increased doses of sedation.22 '6 The Court re-
jected this equation of speech with physical harm in its refusal to restrict pro-
testors from shouting their message or approaching patients entering the clinic.
The Court did, however, find that once inside the clinic, restriction of a bull-
217. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2535 (J. Scalia dissenting).
218. hi.
219. Id. at 2537 (quoting Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
220. Id.
221. /d. at 2542.
222. /i. at 2550.
223. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Lecture. Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 206
(1994).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 209; e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (arguing that
pornography sexualizes male dominance and is a harm in itself).
226. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
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horned message is necessary "to ensure the health and well-being of the pa-
tients." 2' 7 This demonstrates a nod towards the view that pure speech may be
regulated in some instances when it is thought to create physical harm.
In addition, the new speech regulators would have the courts focus more
upon the "effect" of a restriction on speech than on the "purpose" of the re-
striction. Currently, the Supreme Court will generally uphold a content-neutral
restriction on speech and strike down a content-based restriction. Professor
Cass Sunstein points out, however, that some restrictions on a particular view-
point may not be as damaging as a blanket ban on speech. -28 Professor
Sunstein cites a public university prohibition on a narrow category of racial
hate speech as an example of an acceptable content-based restriction.2" In
contrast, a restriction on all speech in airports, train stations, and bus terminals
would be an impermissible restriction of the fora in which speech can take
place.2"" Professor Sunstein argues for a less mechanical application of First
Amendment principles.
The majority in Madsen seemed to follow this line of thinking. Whereas
Justice Scalia would have the Court routinely characterize an injunction as a
content-based restriction, the majority in Madsen undertook a more thoughtful
approach. It refused to automatically classify all injunctions as content-based
just because they enjoin the activities of a single group. On the other hand, the
majority acknoovledged that because injunctions always target a particular
group, they could potentially be used to stifle a particular viewpoint. The
majority, therefore, fashioned a stricter content-neutral standard and then eval-
uated each section of the injunction individually to assess its effect on the
parties. With each provision, the Court asked, what will happen to protestors if
this restriction is included and what will happen to clinic personnel and pa-
tients if it is not? Adoption of the limited 36-foot buffer zone reflects such an
analysis. The Court upheld a 36-foot restriction in order to maintain access to
the clinic, but struck down portions around the clinic where protest activity did
not obstruct an entrance to the clinic. Such a fact-driven decision-making
process has the potential to create a more just outcome. It does not, however,
produce meaningful guidelines for those similarly situated.
The majority in Madsen may disagree with some of the opinions advanced
by the new speech regulators. It is interesting, however, to see how a recent
Supreme Court decision incorporates elements of their philosophy. First
Amendment law, in Justice Scalia's view, has been forever marred by the
decision in Madsen. This decision may, however, mark a necessary change in
the way we view freedom of speech. The availability of a post-injury remedy
for patients and clinic personnel may not be enough in the context of abortion
protest where peaceful picketing has given rise to clinic invasions, personal
assault, and even murder. The Court cannot choose freedom of speech over
227. I. at 2528.
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freedom of choice or vice versa. Placing some restriction on protestors'
speech, while refusing to shield recipients from their message, however, en-
courages respect for differing viewpoints. Achievement of such a compromise
could end violence in the on-going debate over abortion.
C. Post-Madsen Decisions
As mentioned above, the Court in Madsen paid particular attention to the
facts of the case. It evaluated the specific instances of conduct in relation to
the restriction sought. While the Court's analysis may have produced a sound
result in Madsen, it provides only a vague guideline for district judges in
crafting permissible injunctions and for courts of appeal in evaluating them.
1. Demonstrations On and Around Clinic Property
On October 31, 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated a California Su-
preme Court's judgment regarding an injunction aimed at abortion protestors,
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Madsen. In
Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, t the California Su-
preme Court upheld2'2 a portion of an injunction restricting "all picketing,
demonstrating or counseling to the public sidewalk across the street from the
clinic building."2- Only that particular provision of the injunction was re-
viewed by the California Court and considered by the U.S. Supreme
Court.2  The California Supreme Court determined, as had the U.S. Supreme
Court in Madsen, that the injunction is a content-neutral restriction.23 The
California Court, however, applied the intermediate scrutiny standard estab-
lished for content-neutral statutes 216 that the U.S. Supreme Court enumerated
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.2" In upholding the sidewalk restriction, it
identified the "health and safety of the clinic's patients" as a significant gov-
ernmental interest.2 "8 This is in accord with the governmental interests identi-
fied in Madsen.
On remand, however, the Shasta-Diablo court is required to re-evaluate
the restriction under the stricter Madsen standard, to determine whether the
restriction burdens more speech than necessary to serve the identified signifi-
231. 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 413 (1994). In granting cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the California Supreme Court
opinion for further consideration in light of Madsen.
232. Id. at 1226.
233. Id. at 1227-28.
234. Id. at 1228.
235. Id. at 1229.
236. Id.
237. The standard allows "reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of pro-
tected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."'
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal cites omitted).
238. Shasta-Diablo, 873 P.2d at 1230.
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cant government interest. Because the sidewalk restriction in Shasta-Diablo is
very similar to the 36-foot buffer zone upheld in Madsen, the California Court
is likely to uphold the sidewalk restriction with only slight modification.
Madsen upheld a 36-foot buffer zone, but only around the entrances and drive-
ways where, as shown by evidence in the record, protest activity had often
prevented access to the clinic. In addition, the Court in Madsen refused to
uphold portions of the buffer zone that extended into private property where
protest activity had not proven to be disruptive. Similarly, the California Court
in Shasta-Diablo may uphold the sidewalk restriction only in areas where evi-
dence shows that protest activity prevents access to the clinic or disrupts the
free flow of traffic.
In the U.S. Courts of Appeal, both the D.C. and Second Circuits have
followed Madsen in deciding the constitutionality of injunctions that restrict
the speech of abortion protestors. In Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck,2- the
Second Circuit struck down a bubble-zone provision that prohibited all demon-
strations within fifteen feet of clinic entrances and driveways and within fif-
teen feet of all persons and vehicles seeking access to the facility. The provi-
sion did allow two demonstrators at a time to enter the bubble zone for the
purpose of sidewalk "counseling." '4 The court found the fifteen foot radius
was well within the bounds of Madsen24' and the exception for two sidewalk
counselors was an acceptable way to prevent a complete ban on expres-
sion.24 2 The provision would, however, prohibit standing on the sidewalk
with a sign, when it did not obstruct or impede access to the clinic. 41 In ad-
dition, the record failed to reflect significant disregard of a prior court or-
der 2-44 as was the case in Madsen. The bubble zone in Schenck, therefore,
was too broad a restriction on constitutionally protected expression.241
The court in Schenck also invalidated a provision that required protestors
to "cease and desist" counseling people who approach the clinic, reject the
counseling, and turn to walk away. 246 The court found that while this provi-
sion was less restrictive than its "no approach" counterpart in Madsen because
it allowed a counselor to approach a potential listener, the provision neverthe-
less allowed the potential listener "to control the prospective counselor's op-
portunity to engage in protected expression." 42 It therefore violated the idea
239. 1994 WL 480642 (2nd Cir. Sep. 6. 1994). The opinion was initially reported at 34
F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 1994) but was withdrawn from the bound volume pending an en banc
poll.
240. The term "sidewalk counselor" is somewhat misleading. Anti-abortion "counselors"
approach women entering abortion facilities with the goal of persuading them not to have an
abortion. See, e.g., Alan F. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting
Free Speech Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property of Private Medical Clinics
Providing Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073 n.] (1991).
241. Pro-Choice Network v. Schenck, 1994 WL 480642 at *9.
242. hI.
243. Id.
244. hi. at *9-10.
245. I. at *10.
246. Id.
247. Id. at *11.
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established in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwe1 248 that we must sometimes
tolerate outrageous speech in order to maintain First Amendment freedom.
In National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue,249 the D.C.
Circuit upheld the first portion of an injunction that prohibited protestors from
"trespassing on, blockading, impeding or obstructing access to or egress from
any facility at which abortions, family planning, or gynecological services are
performed in the District of Columbia." 2'0 It remanded for modification the
second portion of the injunction that prohibited "inducing, encouraging, direct-
ing, aiding, or abetting others" to violate the first provision.25' The court
found the injunction to be content-neutral, identified virtually the same signifi-
cant governmental interests as in Madsen, and then applied the "burden no
more speech than necessary" standard. 22
The court upheld the first provision because trespassing and blocking
access to private property have been established by the Supreme Court as
illegal conduct not protected by the First Amendment.2" This provision is
particularly noteworthy for two reasons. First, it accomplishes essentially the
same goal as the thirty-six foot buffer zone in Madsen by maintaining access
to the medical facility. The provision does not, however, restrict the expression
of a protestor holding a sign outside the clinic who is not blocking access to
an entrance or driveway. Presumably, though, if this injunction does not suc-
ceed in deterring clinic blockades, the district court could create a buffer zone
similar to that in Madsen. Second, unlike the injunction in Madsen, which
involved a particular abortion clinic, the injunction in NOW v'. Operation Res-
cue covers the entire District of Columbia. Such a distinction was not dis-
cussed in Madsen but could be important for other cities drafting similar in-
junctions or ordinances. Other courts might rule that such a regional restriction
on speech is not narrowly tailored and therefore unconstitutional.
In reviewing the second provision, the D.C. Circuit Court ultimately relied
on Madsen. Operation Rescue's primary concern was that the terms "inducing"
and "encouraging" are broad enough to include the ordinary fundraising and
organizing activities which facilitate permissible demonstrations but might also
ultimately involve prohibited activity.2' The record of the district court,
however, indicated that it meant to prohibit protestors from "inciting" unlawful
acts.2"5 The D.C. Circuit Court agreed that "inducing" and "encouraging"
were impermissibly vague but that use of the term "inciting" would make the
248. 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
249. 37 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
250. I/. at 649.
251. M.
252. Id. at 655.
253. hL; see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568 (1971) (holding there is no First
Amendment right to trespass on private property); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555
(1965) (holding there is no right to block physically access to private property as a means
of protest).
254. National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d at 656.
255. 1i. at 657.
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prohibition clear .2 " As the injunction's vague terms created an unnecessary
burden on protestors' speech, the court remanded that portion of the order to
the district court with instructions to remove the vague terms and insert the
word "inciting," which more clearly expressed the district court's inten-
tions.-11
2. Residential Picketing
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed residential picketing by abortion
protestors in Frisby v. Schultz.258 After much controversy over antiabortion
demonstrations outside the home of an abortion doctor, the town of
Brookfield, Wisconsin adopted an ordinance that completely banned picketing
"before or about" any residence.259 The Supreme Court recognized that the
government has a significant interest in protecting residential privacy, as
"[pireserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and wom-
en can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely
an important value."' The Court, however, upheld a limited interpretation
of the restriction, finding that to "fall within the scope of the ordinance the
picketing must be directed at a single residence. '26' This meant protestors
could continue to terrorize a particular resident. They merely had to picket up
and down the entire block rather than in the area directly in front of the
resident's home. Their activities would then cease being "focused" and be-
come a "more generally directed means of communication" which, according
to Frisby, may not be completely banned in residential areas. Such a narrow
holding restrained the spatial reach of the ordinance and cast doubt on the
future ability of municipalities to remedy the harms associated with residential
picketing.2'62
In Madsen, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a restriction on
picketing in residential neighborhoods. The injunction at issue in Madsen
placed a blanket ban on picketing within 300 feet of the residences of clinic
staff. While recognizing the need to maintain privacy of the home, the Court
found a 300 foot buffer zone to be much broader than necessary to achieve
that goal.263 In addition, the prohibited zone was much larger than the "fo-
cused picketing" ban in Frisby.2' The Court advised, however, that a smaller
zone and less restrictive ban on the time of picketing, the duration of pickets,
and the number of picketers might be upheld if supported by sufficient evi-
256. I. at 656.
257. i. at 658.
258. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
259. Id. at 476.
260. hI. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
261. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483.
262. See The Supreme Court 1987 Tern,-Residential Picketing, 102 HARV. L. REV. 261
(1988) (concluding that the Court failed to enunciate an ascertainable test for lower courts to
follow).
263. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
264. hi. at 2529-30.
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dence.2" Unfortunately, the Court did not specify what kind and how much
evidence would be necessary to support a particular restriction.2'  The Su-
preme Court subsequently granted certiorari on a New Jersey Supreme Court
decision that upheld a 300 foot residential picketing ban.
In Murray v. Lawson,26 7 the Court vacated and remanded the decision of
the New Jersey Supreme Court 68 for further consideration in light of
Madsen. After Dr. Elrick Murray, an abortion doctor, became the target of
antiabortion protest at his home, a court in the New Jersey Chancery Division
issued a permanent injunction banning protestors from "picketing in any form
including parking, parading or demonstrating in any manner, within 300 feet
of the Murray residence." 9 Both the New Jersey Appellate Division and the
New Jersey Supreme Court initially upheld the 300 foot restriction. On
remand, after reviewing Madsen, the New Jersey Supreme Court amended the
original injunction to allow picketing up to 100 feet of the Murray's property
line, in a group of no more than ten persons, for one hour every two weeks,
with twenty-four hour notice to the local police department.:1
The New Jersey Supreme Court first rejected the protestors' argument that
the entire injunction was a "'prior restraint' on speech and thus presumptively
unconstitutional.2 72 The court explained that a prior restraint generally in-
volved "administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications
when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to oc-
cur." The U.S. Supreme Court had summarily disposed of this issue in
Madsen, by pointing out that every injunction that incidentally affects speech
is not necessarily a prior restraint.2 7 Because a buffer zone only partially
restrained the protestors' message, as they were free to voice it in a variety of
265. I. at 2530.
266. The Court added to this confusion when it denied certiorari in Winfield v. Kaplan,
114 S. Ct. 2783 (1994), on the same day it issued its opinion in Madsen. Winfield involved
an identical 300 foot ban on residential picketing. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, Justice Scalia explained that the Court deferred disposition on Winfield
until a final decision was reached in Madsen. Incredulously, the majority of the Court de-
cided not to vacate and remand the case for further consideration in light of the judgment in
Madsen, but rather to deny certiorari. Justice Scalia surmised that because the injunction in
Winfield was only temporary, the Court majority must have presumed the North Carolina
court would follow Madsen in issuing the permanent order. This still left a question, Justice
Scalia argued, as to why the Court did not deny certiorari initially. hi. at 2783.
267. 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994).
268. Murray v. Lawson, 642 A.2d 338 (N.J. 1993), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 44 (1994).
269. Murray v. Lawson. 649 A.2d 1253, 1257 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, No. 94-1450.
1995 WL 94168 (May 30, 1995).
270. Id. at 1255.
271. Id. at 1268.
272. hI. at 1261. The protestors based their argument on a footnote in Madsen. That
footnote indicated that the injunction in Madsen was issued because of unlawful conduct, not
because of the content of the expression. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2.
273. Murray, 649 A.2d at 1261 (quoting Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766,
2771 (1993)).
274. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2524 n.2.
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other ways, the restriction was not an impermissible prior restraint.-7 The
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted this reasoning from Madsen and pointed
out that the protestors were not prohibited from leafletting, canvassing, and
picketing outside the buffer zone in the Murrays' neighborhood. 7 ' In addi-
tion, the court denied that the injunction was aimed at the content of the
protestors' message, as picketing in front of the Murray residence for any pur-
pose would violate the Murrays' privacy.277
After making these initial findings, the New Jersey Supreme Court pro-
ceeded to apply the Madsen test to the 300 foot restriction. The court first
looked at the evidence offered in Madsen to support the 300 foot zone. Rea-
soning that more evidence than in Madsen was necessary to justify such a re-
striction, the New Jersey Supreme Court compared its record to that of
Madsen. '7 Here, the record reflected that the trial judge engaged in a rigor-
ous inquiry. He viewed a videotape, looked at pictures of the protests, and
heard live testimony in evaluating the request for injunctive relief.279 In addi-
tion, he personally examined the Murrays' neighborhood and consulted the
town tax map in determining how to design the injunction.
280 The court concluded that the record developed by the trial judge
clearly supported some sort of buffer.28 It chose to shorten the distance from
300 to 100 feet because at that distance, the protestors would still be visible a
lot-and-a-half away, but inside their home the Murrays would no longer feel
imprisoned. 8 " Limiting the number of picketers to ten prevented the Murrays
from feeling besieged and assured the protestors that their picketing would be
taken seriously.' Allowing picketing once every two weeks for one hour
gave protestors the opportunity to communicate their message without subject-
ing the Murrays to a constant barrage."' The New Jersey Supreme Court
ultimately concluded that the modified injunction allowed the protestors to
communicate their message effectively while still affording protection to the
Murrays.
11
Murray is a reasonable interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision
regarding residential picketing in Madsen. The opinion in Madsen, however,
gave little guidance beyond its finding that a 300 foot buffer was too broad
and that sufficient evidence was necessary to justify any restriction. Neverthe-
less, the New Jersey Supreme Court aptly applied the enumerated standard and
revised the restriction to effect a better balance of first amendment freedoms
with the residential right of privacy. Murray may be instructive for future
275. Id.
276. Murray, 649 A.2d at 1262.
277. /i. at 1263.
278. Id. at 1264.
279. Id. at 1266.
280. Id. at 1265-66.
281. Id. at 1268.
282. Id. at 1268.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. hI. at 1268.
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cases, but decisions in this area will likely remain subjective as they are heavi-
ly fact-driven. The New Jersey decision is nevertheless important because it
gives more definition to Frisby's concept of focused picketing and maintains
injunctive relief as a way to prevent social protest from invading the privacy
of the home.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has subsequently
reviewed a city ordinance identical to that in Frisby. The majority decision in
Vittitow v. City of Upper Arlington,286 issued January 12, 1995, calls the dic-
tates of both Frisby and Madsen into question. Plaintiffs were abortion pro-
testors who sought an injunction to prevent the City of Arlington from enforc-
ing a city ordinance that prohibited picketing "before or about the residence or
dwelling of any individual ...."2"7 The district court issued an injunction
enjoining the city from enforcing the ordinance as written, but provided for
conditional enforcement which, in effect, imposed a counter-injunction on
protestors' activities. The injunction prohibited picketers from stopping or
gathering "in front of or around any residence" '288 and from giving "undue
emphasis to directing their activities to one residence." 289 After further re-
view, however, the district court modified the order sua sponte to prevent
protestors from "picketing in front of: (a) the doctor's home, and (b) the two
homes on either side of the doctor's home," as well as "the home of anyone
[the city has] probable cause to believe is the target, focus or subject of the
picketing, as well as ... the two homes on either side of the home just de-
scribed. , ' - "
The Sixth Circuit Court reviewed this ordinance and injunction in light of
its understanding of Frisby and Madsen. The court interpreted Madsen to
clearly make suspect if not prohibit, "any linear extension beyond the area
'solely in front of a particular residence."' 2'9 While the city of Arlington
used language identical to that upheld in Frisby, the Sixth Circuit admonished
the city for doing so, as only a narrow interpretation of the Frisby ordinance
was ultimately upheld.2 '92 The court pointed out that the local police would
find a violation when it thought one residence was being targeted. This would
be incorrect, according to the Sixth Circuit, because every picket will have a
target and "only focused picketing taking place solely in front of a particular
residence is prohibited."29 The court distinguished this case and those such
as Murray, where the victim of residential picketing seeks the injunction. In
the latter case, the court conceded, "the trial judge rightfully undertakes to
define the rights of the parties in an appropriately worded injunction, if an
injunction is called for."2" Here, however, the court, feeling restrained by
286. 43 F.3d I100 (6th Cir. 1995).
287. Id. at 1101.
288. Id. at 1102.
289. Id. at 1102-03.
290. Id.
291. id. at 1105.
292. Id. at 1106.
293. Id. at 1107 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988)).
294. Vittitow, 43 F.3d at 1107.
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federalism concerns, refused to rewrite the city ordinance. Since the court
found the ordinance's complete ban on residential picketing was in conflict
with Madsen, it therefore reversed and remanded with instructions for the
district court to issue a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the
ordinance. 2-
Judge Boyce F. Martin, in his dissenting opinion, applied a much broader
reading of Frisby and would have remanded the injunction to the district court
for revision consistent with Madsen. According to Judge Martin, Frisby's
rationale for balancing the constitutional rights involved would permit a re-
striction on other forms of picketing, not just those taking place in front of one
residence. 21 In his view, "the targeted homeowner is as much a captive au-
dience when picketers repeatedly march in front of a home as when they are
standing still."297 Judge Martin interpreted Frisbv to create a "zone" of prohi-
bition and Madsen to somewhat define that zone. He concluded that the three-
house zone created by the district court injunction burdened no more speech
than necessary to protect residential privacy, 2" but suggested that the Su-
preme Court should consider modifying the public forum doctrine in this con-
text. Judge Martin proposed that residential streets and sidewalks be reclassi-
fied in light of the privacy interests involved.2
The Supreme Court may be forced to clarify its position on residential
picketing as abortion clinic personnel increasingly become the target of protest
activities in their own neighborhoods. In addition, the neighbors of abortion
doctors and clinic personnel have become fearful that protests in their neigh-
borhoods will become violent."' Activity aimed at intimidating individual
doctors and clinic workers is likely to increase as protestors consider it the
most effective way to cause those employees to quit their positions.0 Joseph
Scheidler, executive director of the Chicago-based Pro-Life Action League has
remarked that "campaigns against doctors are more effective than clinic block-
ades, which require a steady supply of protestors willing to risk arrest."' 2 If
the risk of arrest in residential neighborhoods increases, however, perhaps
some of the tactics waged against abortion providers and their employees will
cease.
295. Id.
296. Id. at I110 (Martin, J., dissenting).
297. id. at IIII.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1112.
300. See Leef Smith. Doctor's Neighbors Fear Violence as Abortion Pickets Hit Home,
WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1995, at Metro 1.
301. See 1993 Clinic Violence Survey Report supra note 21, at 5; see also Ana Puga,
Pressed More Providers Halting Their Practices, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. I, 1994, at I; Abor-
tion Rights Leaders Plan to Leave Pensacola, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 30, 1994, at 6B.
302. Sandra G. Boodman, Abortion Foes Strike at Doctors' Home Lives Illegal. litimnida-
tion or Protected Protest?, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1993, at Al.
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Ill. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT
On May 26, 1994, President Clinton signed the "Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act" (FACE).""1 The law amends Chapter XIII of Title 18
of the U.S. Code and prohibits blocking access to clinics, damaging clinic
property, and injuring or intimidating patients and staff." It provides crim-
inal penalties and civil remedies including injunctive relief and compensatory
and punitive damages. 5 At the signing, both President Clinton and U.S. At-
torney General Janet Reno expressed their commitment to ending the nation-
wide campaigns of violence that prompted the need for more adequate federal
legislation."
On June 4, 1994, six protestors in Milwaukee were the first charged with
violating FACE when they blocked the entrance to a Milwaukee abortion
clinic by chaining and cementing themselves to vehicles in front of the clin-
ic."" The six protestors were each convicted of a misdemeanor for a first-
time, nonviolent offense."' In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice filed
the first civil lawsuit under FACE seeking damages against the Milwaukee
protestors on December 20, 1994."' 9 Recently, two protestors in Fargo, North
Dakota who attached themselves with bicycle locks to cars placed in front of
the entrance to North Dakota's only abortion clinic, were charged with a civil
FACE violation.10
The highly publicized trial of former minister Paul Hill marked the first
time a FACE violation was sought for murder.. Hill was charged and found
guilty under FACE for murdering Dr. John Britton and his volunteer escort
James H. Barrett on July 29, 1994 outside the Ladies Center in Pensacola,
Florida.3"' As a result of the jury verdict on the FACE charge, Hill received
two life sentences in federal prison. Florida Circuit Judge Frank Bell sentenced
Hill to death on state murder charges.
-12
303. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1994); see also Ruth Marcus, President Signs Clinic Access
Law, Foes File Lawsuit, WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at AI0.
304. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (1994).
305. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(b)-(c) (1994).
306. Marcus, supra note 303; see also As Congress Adjourns, FACE Bill Wins Passage
in House and Senate, WASH. MEMO (The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 23,
1993, at 1.
307. Stephen Labaton, Law on Abortion Protestors Gets First Test, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1994, at AI4.
308. 6 Convicted of Blocking Milwaukee Clinic, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1994, at 13.
309. U.S. Sues Protestors Who Blocked Milwaukee Clinic, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1994, at
3.
310. Feds Seek Restraining Order, Civil Damages in Abortion Protests, STAR TRIB., Jan.
20, 1995, at 2B; 2 Who Blocked Abortion Clinic Entry in Fargo MOy Face Federal Charg-
es, STAR TRIB., Nov. 23, 1994, at 4B.
311. Trial in Abortion Doctor's Slaying will Test Clinic Protection Law, S. F. CHRON.,
Oct. 3, 1994, at A4; Mike Clary, Hill Found Guilty in Abortion Shootings Violence: The
Former Minister is the First Person Convicted of Violating the Nation's New Clinic Access
Law, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al; Ronald Smothers, Man Accused in Clinic Slayings Is
Convicted on Federal Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al.
312. William Booth, Abortion Clinic Slaver is Sentenced to Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 7,
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John Salvi IlI, the suspect in the more recent murders of abortion clinic
personnel in Brookline, Massachusetts, may also face penalties under the fed-
eral clinic access law. 3 The Brookline murders have spurred a new wave of
federal action aimed at protecting abortion clinics and their personnel. U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno asked the Department of Justice to evaluate
whether additional legislation may be needed to "stem the violence" at abor-
tion facilities."4 In addition, U.S. Marshalls issued a list of security tips and
delivered them by hand to every abortion clinic in the nation. The eight-page
document suggested surveillance cameras, buzzers, metal detectors, intercoms,
bullet-proof vests, police detail, security guards, escorts for patients, bullet-
proof glass, and automatic door locks as means to increase safety." 5 Also,
the Justice Department filed the first of several civil lawsuits that implicate
protestors who have threatened doctors, against a protestor in Cleveland ac-
cused of threatening to kill an abortion doctor and attempting to run him off
the road."' This new protection effort may assuage the fears of those who
believed FACE and its goals would be undermined by the new Republican
majority that entered Congress following the November 1994 elections." 7
Prior to the election, however, there was widespread concern about
FACE's effectiveness in deterring violence. On September 22, 1994, the
House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice
held an oversight hearing to evaluate the enforcement of FACE." ' The Sub-
committee listened to the statements of Jo Ann Harris from the Justice Depart-
ment; James Brown from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF); Linda Taggart from the Ladies Center in Pensacola, Florida; Dr.
George Klopfer from the Fort Wayne Women's Health Organization, Sergeant
William Walsh from the Fort Wayne Police Department; Susan Finn on behalf
of the Pro-Life Movement and others.3 The Justice Department reported
1994, at Al.
313. Eric L. Wee, Clinic Slaving Suspect Caught Shooting ait Norfolk Abortion Center
Tied to Massachusetts Attacks, WASH. POST. Jan. I, 1995, at AI.
314. ABORTION REPORT, Spotlight Ston FACE: Pro-Lifers Say it Limits Speech; Reno
calls for Review, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 118, Jan. 13, 1995, available in WL APN-AB
Database. List & Date Query.
315. Marshalls Advise Clinics-Sniff Mail, Then Open Tips to Protect Abortion Providers,
S. F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1995, at Al l.
316. Id.
317. See generally Carol Jouzaitis, Abortion Foes' Strength in Congress Could Impede
Medical Research, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 20, 1994, at I; Fawn Vrazo, Conservative Ascendatcy
Propels Abortion to the Crossroads in '92, Anti-Abortion Forces Felt Doomed. No,, Since
Tuesday 'v's Vote, They' v Sudden*y Can Count on Powerful Sympathizers ii the Majority At
Many Levels, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 13, 1994, at A15; Nirmala Bhat, Abortion Factions
Draw New Battle Lines ii Anticipation of GOP-Controlled House, STAR TRIB., Nov. 16,
1994, at AI0. However, on Nov. 16, 1994, in a telephone interview with the author, Wil-
liam R. Yeomans, Legislative Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights at
the U.S. Department of Justice, stated there was "no reason to believe [FACEI will go by
the wayside," and that the Justice Department will continue to enforce FACE "as the facts
and terms of the statute dictate."
318. Robert Pear, Abortion Clinic Workers Say Law is Being Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1994, at A16.
319. Witness List, House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
19951
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
that it had, along with the ATF, FBI, and Marshalls' service, undertaken a task
force investigation into the criminal activities of protestors to assess the exis-
tence of a nationwide conspiracy. 20 Despite this and other federal efforts,
Linda Taggart testified that local police and the F.B.I. refused to enforce
FACE when she contacted them in June 1994.2- Susan Hill, president of the
National Women's Health Organization, also testified that she had difficulty
finding someone to enforce the new law. '2 This lead subcommittee chair-
man, Rep. Charles E. Schumer, to conclude that, "[tihe Justice Department
must do better. There is not adequate enforcement of this law. 323 While the
Senate voted 99-0 at the end of January 1995 to approve a non-binding resolu-
tion asking the attorney general to fully enforce FACE, Senator Barbara Box-
er, who introduced the resolution, felt protection for clinics is not high on the
new Republican majority's agenda.324
FACE has also been attacked in numerous lawsuits filed in federal district
courts by protestors challenging the law's constitutionality. Five of the six
cases have affirmed that FACE does not violate the First Amendment rights of
protestors and is a permissible use of congressional law-making power under
the Commerce Clause.32 On June 17, 1994, Judge Leonie Brinkema for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued the first FACE
ruling in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno.2- Judge Brinkema found the
law reasonable and appropriate because it only prohibited the conduct of pro-
testors who threaten violence, commit violence, or physically block a clinic
on Crime and Criminal Justice, available in 1994 WL 51762, Sept. 22, 1994. For full text
of the prepared statements of the witnesses at the Sept. 22, 1994 hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, see WL "USTEST1MONY" database.
320. See Testimony of Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, before the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice,
Sept. 22, 1994, available in 1994 WL 517647, at *4; see also Jury Seeks Link Anong Abor-
tion Clinic Attacks, Justice Department Task Force Subpoenas Witnesses, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
15, 1994, at 24.
321. Pear. supra note 318.
322. "Federal officials tell us to go to local authorities and the local authorities," she
said, "tell us that they have no jurisdiction, that we have to get the Feds to do it." Id. In a
telephone interview with the author, William R. Yeomans, Legislative Counsel with the Jus-
tice Department, explained that local law enforcement are initially responsible for making
arrests and then, one of ninety-six U.S. attorneys across the country, in conjunction with the
Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department, would make the decision whether or not to
press FACE charges. He also remarked that clinics had been advised they can call the Civil
Rights Division directly regarding possible FACE violations. See supra note 317.
323. Pear, supra note 318.
324. Fox Butterfield, Abortion Clinics Forti, Defenses; U.S. Faulted on Protecting Sites,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1995, at At.
325. See United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Wis. 1994); Riely v. Reno.
860 F. Supp. 693 (D. Ariz. 1994); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1994);
Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994); American Life
League, Inc. v. Reno, 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994). But see United States v. Wilson,
No. 94-CR-140, 1995 WL 114802 (Mar. 16, 1995 E.D. Wis.).
326. 855 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1994); see AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK Spotlight
Stor , FACE First Ruling Says its Constitutional, 5 ABORTION REPORT No. 225, Jun. 17,
1994, available in WL APN-AB Database, List & Date Query.
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door. 7 Subsequent cases followed Judge Brinkema's reasoning in holding
that FACE does not abridge the First Amendment freedoms of abortion protes-
tors. Additionally, in Council for Life Coalition v. Reno,2 Judge Gonzalez
pointed to ample congressional findings to uphold the legitimacy of congres-
sional power to regulate in this area.329
The U.S. Supreme Court may soon have the opportunity to make its own
determination with regard to FACE.3 Considering the overwhelming ap-
proval of FACE thusfar in the courts, it seems unlikely that the Court would
strike down the law as unconstitutional. Some scholars, however, would
disagree.' For now, anyway, FACE remains an important tool in the effort
to protect abortion providers, their staff, and patients. FACE was designed and
approved by a Congress and an Administration that could no longer let violent
protest go unnoticed. While Congress may now house fewer supporters of a
woman's right to choose abortion, almost all agree that violent social protest
cannot hide behind the First Amendment. Future administrations as well will
likely support FACE and other efforts to stop domestic terrorism perpetrated
by opponents of abortion.
IV. THE RESULTING FRAMEWORK
Solutions to the problem of abortion clinic violence are gradually acquir-
ing some cohesiveness. After much trial and error, advocates for choice are
discovering what works in the courtroom and what does not. Abortion clinic
personnel and patients must tolerate the peaceful dissemination of antiabortion
views. They should not, however, be made to fear for their lives and the lives
of their families on a daily basis. Over the past few years, lengthy legal battles
have provided some guidance about what is appropriate behavior for both
sides. In addition, recent legislation and other efforts have given abortion
providers the tools for protection against day-to-day harassment.
A. The Short-term Solutions
Arrest by local law enforcement is the first step in stopping illegal protest.
Law enforcement personnel have become more aware of the increased risk of
violence associated with antiabortion activity and may be more likely to re-
spond than in the past. While many protestors are not deterred by arrest, fines,
or even jail time, state and local authorities must continue their efforts to
uphold applicable laws and enforce standing court orders. A local arrest is also
the first step in bringing FACE charges. After a suspected violator has been
327. American Life League, 855 F. Supp at 142.
328. 856 F. Supp. 1422 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
329. Council for Life Colation v. Reno, 856 F. Supp at 1431.
330. Assessing the constitutionality of FACE was listed among issues that may be in the
offing for the Supreme Court's 1994-95 term. See Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court Justices
Get On-The-Bench Training, BALT. MORNING SUN, Oct. 2, 1994, at IA.
331. See, e.g., Michael S. Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful Constitution-
ality of the Clinic Access Bill, I VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 261 (1994).
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arrested, local police and clinic administrators should contact the closest U.S.
attorney or the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. Provided
there is enough evidence, the U.S. attorney may then proceed with a FACE
prosecution.-
Obtaining a state court injunction may be the best way to prevent clinic
blockades. As is clear in Madsen, a picket-free zone to maintain clinic access
is an acceptable restriction on the protestors' First Amendment freedoms. On
the federal level, under § 248(3)(c)(A) of FACE, a "person involved in provid-
ing or seeking to provide, or obtaining or seeking to obtain services in a fa-
cility that provides reproductive health services" '  may seek a preliminary
or permanent injunction in federal court. FACE provides injunctive relief not
only for the protection of clinics and patients, but may also be used to estab-
lish a picket-free zone around the residences of clinic staff. In order to comply
with Madsen, however, such a zone must be less than 300 feet and must be
supported by sufficient evidence."
In general, FACE provides a quicker remedy than is available under §
1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act or § 1962(c) of RICO. For a RICO case in
particular, evidence may take years to compile. An attorney general may im-
mediately seek an injunction,"' compensatory damages, or civil penalties un-
der FACE. A prosecution under FACE, however, may only be sought against
those who directly participate in a specific incident, while RICO provides a
means to impose liability on antiabortion leaders who coordinate nationwide
demonstrations. Nevertheless, FACE is an extraordinary tool for those who
seek to protect women's access to reproductive health care.
B. Long-term Solutions
While collecting large monetary judgments from abortion protestors may
be difficult, imposing liability under § 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act and §
1962(c) of RICO is a viable means to curb lawless behavior in the long run.
Interpretation of the hindrance clause under § 1985(3) remains unclear after
Bray."6 The Ninth Circuit, in two opinions following Bray, has read the hin-
drance clause to require only proof of a conspiracy to prevent or hinder state
332. See generaly Stop the Terrorism: Understanding Your Rights Under the Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Wash., D.C.)
(1994).
333. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(3)(c)(A) (1994).
334. See Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. 1993)
(modifying a restriction on residential picketing after Madsen), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2783
(1994).
335. For example, U.S. Attorney Steve Hill successfully obtained an injunction under
FACE against Rescue Radio producer Regina Dinwiddie to prevent her from coming within
500 feet of all abortion clinics in western Missouri and from threatening staff and clients
outside the Planned Parenthood of Greater Kansas City clinic. See AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK, State Reports Missouri: Pro-Lifer Gets Ist Restraining Order under FACE, 6
ABORTION REPORT No. 114, Jan. 9, 1995, available in WL APN-AB Database, List & Date
Query.
336. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
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law enforcement from securing for women the constitutional right to an abor-
tion. In both National Abortion Federation v. Operation Rescue33 and Port-
land Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Live, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that proof of a class-based animus and a
constitutional right protected from private interference are necessary to make
out a claim under the second clause of § 1985(3).11 9 Until the Supreme Court
clarifies application of the hindrance clause, such a remedy may be available
in the lower courts.
On remand from the Supreme Court, NOW v. Scheidler 34 is still await-
ing trial in the district court to determine whether plaintiffs' evidence demon-
strates a RICO conspiracy. Since then, the U.S. Supreme Court has denied,
without comment, two requests for review of other cases involving RICO
liability in the context of abortion protest."' Most notably, the U.S. District
Court for the District of South Carolina issued a final order October 11, 1994,
in Palmetto State Medical Center, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,342 which includ-
ed a jury award of $25,000 in actual damages on a RICO claim against abor-
tion protestors. An appeal is pending in the Fourth Circuit.1
43
As mentioned above, RICO provides a means to impose liability on the
leaders of antiabortion organizations. These leaders may be able to escape
prosecution under FACE by never participating directly in the protest efforts
they orchestrate. If they can be linked to various nationwide demonstrations,
however, they are susceptible to liability under RICO. The current federal task
force investigation into the sources of clinic violence may unearth enough
evidence to support a federal RICO prosecution. The time-consuming and
costly nature of such a lawsuit makes it an unlikely option for clinics and their
advocates who have limited resources. In addition, organizers hide their assets
and claim insolvency, making it less worthwhile for civil plaintiffs.' Proof
of an "enterprise" may also become tougher as the organizers of antiabortion
events scramble to conceal evidence of their alliance." 5 Nevertheless, RICO
337. 8 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1993).
338. 34 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 1994).
339. But cf. Women's Health Care Services, P.A. v. Operation Rescue, National, 24 F.3d
107, 109 (10th Cir. 1994) (adhering to Justice Scalia's dicta claiming the hindrance clause
and deprivation clause are similarly restricted); Upper Hudson Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.
Doe, 836 F. Supp. 939, 949 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (predicting that the Supreme Court would, in
all liklihood, impose the extratextual requirements on the hindrance clause as well).
340. 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
341. See Supreme Court Rejects Another Anti-choice Appeal in Racketeering Suit,
REPROD. FREEDOM NEWS (Center for Reprod. L. and Pol'y, N.Y.C.) Dec. 16, 1994, at 2.
342. Information regarding this final order can be obtained from the court. The case
docket number is CA-89-2548-3-6.
343. A prior appeal was dismissed upon the Fourth Circuit's finding that the district
court order was not yet final. Palmetto State Medical Center, Inc. v. Operation Rescue; Op-
eration Lifeline, No. 90-2688, 1994 WL 468123 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) (unpublished opin-
ion).
344. See Paul M. Barrett, New, Legal Weapon in Abortion Fight Is Hard to Use and
Hard to Enforce, WALL ST. J., Jan, 28, 1994, at BI, B3; Ana Puga, Battle Against Illegal
Protests Follows the Money Trail, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 1.
345. Interview with Katie Reinisch, Director of Public Affairs, Planned Parenthood of the
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is a valid remedy to combat the source of organized violent protest.
Another long-term solution may come in the form of state and local legis-
lation. Many states are preparing to draft their own clinic protection legislation
in the hopes of stemming the violence. 4 ' States or municipalities may also
draft legislation to create bubble zones around clinics and residences in com-
pliance with the limitations set out in Frisby and Madsen. Additionally, intro-
duction of the new abortion pill, RU-486, into the U.S. is seen by some as a
possible end to abortion clinic violence.3"7 RU-486, however, will not elimi-
nate the need for some surgical abortions."4 It may also cause protestors to
single out patients taking the drug for increased harassment."
CONCLUSION
Whatever form it may take, protection for abortion clinics, their personnel,
and patients is imperative so long as the violent tactics of abortion protestors
continue. Social protest is a legitimate form of expression protected by the
First Amendment to the Constitution. A woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy is also protected by the Constitution. Thus, there exists a conflict be-
tween two equally justified constitutional guarantees. One should not necessar-
ily be elevated over the other. The only solution seems to be a compromise.
Women walking into an abortion clinic must tolerate voices and signs that
oppose abortion. Protestors must allow women to exercise their right of re-
productive choice. Only when those who oppose abortion respect others' right
to choose will the violence cease.
There is much room in the public forum for speech-even outrageous
speech that many would find offensive. Only in a truly "open" public forum
will opposing viewpoints lead to enlightenment and change. There is no room
within that discussion, however, for violence and hate. It is the duty of the
courts to draw the line at violence masquerading as protected free speech.
Neither side in the abortion debate is likely to convince the other that their
Rocky Mountains, in Denver, Colo. (June 8, 1994).
346. See Rebecca Blumenstein, Assembly Votes to Protect Clinics, NEWSDAY, Jan. 24,
1995, at A14; AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK, State Reports Virginia: Legislature Ma' See
Clinic-Access, Notification, 6 ABORTION REPORT No. 115, Jan. 10, 1995, available in WL
APN-AB Database, List & Date Query; Maine Meeting Will Discuss Abortion Access, BOS-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1994. at Metro 22.
347. See RU-486 and the Abortion War, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Jan. 10, 1995, at A14
(arguing that RU-486 could diffuse the abortion war); The Brookline Clinic Murders, WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 1995, at A14, (arguing that RU-486 provides a long-run defense to abortion
clinic violence). But see Anita Manning, Abortion Pill: An Answer or A New Problem?,
USA TODAY, Jan. 24, 1995. at Al (reporting on the protest efforts aimed at clinics and
patients participating in the clinical trials of RU-486).
348. For an in-depth report on RU-486, see Carol Jouzaitis, RU-486: Europe's Use
Shows Problems of Pill Abortions Still Are Not Easy to Obtain or to Experience, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 2, 1994, at I, and Carol Jouzaitis, Abortion Pill's Next Hurdle: U.S. Testing to Begin
RU-486 Fate Here Uncertain Despite Success in Europe, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1994, at I.
349. In November 1994, the Portland Life Ministries group launched its "No Place to
Hide" campaign outside the homes of participants in the clinical trials of RU-486. See
Across the USA: News From Ever), State, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 1994, at 9A.
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viewpoint is right. Individuals will be forever entrenched on both sides of the
abortion issue. Let the battle, however, be fought with pens and on podiums,




HELLER V. DOE: INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT UNDER A
REASONABLE DOUBT
"[T]he mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to
be treated equally by the law.'
INTRODUCTION
Differences in treatment between the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill have "long existed in Anglo-American law."2 Nevertheless, criticism of this
distinction has grown in recent years.3 In Heller v. Doe,' the United States
Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit this approach and abolish the
disparity. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the distinction and upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Kentucky statute that sanctioned differential treatment of the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill with regard to involuntary commitment
proceedings.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that the statute did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by designating a lower burden of
proof for the commitment of the mentally retarded than for the mentally ill.'
The Court also held (6-3) that the statute did not violate equal protection or
due process by permitting close family members and guardians to participate
as parties in the commitment proceedings for the mentally retarded but not the
mentally ill.6 The Court in effect bent-over-backwards to uphold the statute."
I. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985).
2. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2646 (1993).
3. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 37 (3d
ed. 1985).
4. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
5. kI. at 2640.
6. hI. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The due process issue in Heller
is beyond the scope of this comment and will not be addressed.
7. Leon Friedman, Retroactivity, Equal Protection and Standing, 10 TOURO L. REV.
503, 513 (1994). Professor Friedman asserts that the importance of the Heller decision lies in
"the extraordinary deference the Supreme Court gives to the rational relationship test." Id. at
511-12. Friedman describes the Court's review of the Kentucky statute as "the most extraor-
dinary deference I have ever seen," referring to the standard the Court applied as "the lean-
over-backwards test." Id. at 513.
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The Majority reasoned that the law's historical treatment of the mentally re-
tarded and the mentally ill as distinct classes suggests a "commonsense dis-
tinction" exists between them.' This circular logic, used to justify maintaining
the status quo, exemplifies the weakness of the Majority's arguments in
overturning the two lower court decisions at issue.
.This Comment analyzes the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the
Majority's decision in Heller by comparing it to the Court's prior decisions
and to the legally and factually based arguments of Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion. Part I provides a historical backdrop to the class distinction and a
description of the Kentucky statute at issue. This section also includes a brief
synopsis of the equal protection, followed by an examination of recent Su-
preme Court decisions addressing the constitutional rights of the mentally ill
and mentally retarded. Part II describes the factual and procedural background
of Heller v. Doe and explains the majority and dissenting opinions. Part III
scrutinizes the Court's reasoning in light of its previous opinions and argues
that the statute fails the "rational basis" test. This section also criticizes the
Court's refusal to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the statute's constitutional-
ity. Ultimately, this Comment endorses the elimination of unequal treatment
between the mentally retarded and the mentally ill with respect to the adjudi-
catory process required to deny a person's constitutional right to liberty.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Overview of Class Distinction
English common law applied to the mentally ill ("lunatics") and the men-
tally retarded ("idiots") in different manners.9 The King had a duty to provide
both classes with "necessaries" and preserve their estates, but was only re-
quired to take on retarded individuals as wards." While the King was prohib-
ited from profiting from his care of the mentally ill, the law permitted him to
profit from his wardship of the mentally retarded." Depriving a person of his
property and profits was apparently the principal purpose of an "idiocy" adju-
dication. 2
The legal distinction between the two groups continues in some respects
today. Forty-five United States jurisdictions have separate involuntary commit-
ment statutes, and some have separate agencies for addressing the needs of
8. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646.
9. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646 (citing 1 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 481 (2d ed. 1909)).
10. Id. (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES '302-04).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2656 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing STANLEY S. HERR, RIGHTS AND AD-
VOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 10 (1983)). "Lunatics" were viewed as "demonically pos-
sessed or the products of parental sin" and were generally "punished or left to perish." Id.
(citing HERR, supra at 9). Individuals perceived as mentally ill or mentally retarded were
often lumped together, however, in the "lunacy" category. HERR, supra at 9. Although the
distinction between "idiocy" and "lunacy" existed before the nineteenth century, "the two
conditions were often confused." Id.
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each group. 3 Consistent with the modem trend toward legal homogenization,
the judicial commitment procedures for both classes show, however, an in-
creasing uniformity among the states.1
4
B. Kentucky's Statutory Scheme Governing Involuntary Commitment
Kentucky law provides a mentally ill or mentally retarded individual with
a judicial hearing prior to involuntary commitment. 5 To warrant confinement
in an institution, the state must establish that the person 1) suffers from the
alleged defect (mental illness or retardation), 2) presents a threat of danger to
self, family or others, 3) can reasonably benefit from the available treatment,
and 4) is one for whom the institution is the least restrictive mode of treatment
presently available. 6 While the state must establish these requirements "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" for the involuntary commitment of an allegedly
mentally ill individual, it must only meet a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard for the involuntary commitment of an allegedly mentally retarded
individual. 7 Except for this distinction, the rules of procedure and evidence
for these commitment hearings are the same as those for any criminal proceed-
ing.'" In addition, family members or guardians of the mentally retarded may
participate in the proceedings as a party, which gives them power to cross
examine witnesses and standing to appeal the final decision. 9 The statute
does not provide these rights to the family members or guardians of the men-
tally ill.2"
C. Equal Protection Analysis Summary
The Kentucky statute facially discriminates against the mentally retarded,
raising equal protection concerns. According to the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws."'" Al-
13. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646-47 n.2. Six states, however, do not distinguish be-
tween the two groups in their involuntary commitment laws. Id.
14. BRAKEL, supra note 3, at 56. While the trend during the 1970s and 1980s was
toward developing separate legislation for the judicial commitment of the mentally ill and
retarded, id. at 37, today only marginal differences exist between these laws. Id. at 56. A
trend toward abolishing the involuntary commitment of retarded people altogether has also
evolved recently. Id. at 37.
15. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.051(9) (mental illness); 202B.100(8) (mental retarda-
tion) (Michie 1990). "[If the court at the preliminary hearing] finds there is probable cause
to believe the respondent should be involuntarily admitted, the court shall order a final hear-
ing to determine if the respondent should be involuntarily admitted." §202A.051(9).
Respondents' right to the preliminary hearing is waivable, but their right to the final hearing
is not waivable. § 202A.076(i)-(2) (mental illness); § 202B.160(i)-(2) (mental retardation).
16. § 202A.026 (mental illness); § 202B.040 (mental retardation).
17. § 202A.076(2) (mental illness); § 202B.160(2) (mental retardation).
18. § 202A.076(2) (mental illness); § 202B.160(2) (mental retardation).
19. § 202B.160(3).
20. See § 202A.076.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
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though the Supreme Court interprets this language as mandating similar treat-
ment of all persons "similarly situated," states are allowed wide latitude under
the Equal Protection Clause out of respect for their individual sovereign pow-
ers.22 To survive judicial review under this clause, a state need only show
that its statutory classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est."23 Legislation that is subjected to the "rational basis" standard is pre-
sumed constitutional and the burden is on the challenger "to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a foun-
dation in the record. 24
Courts apply strict scrutiny, however, when examining the constitution-
ality of government actions that impinge on fundamental rights25 or that are
"drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alien-
age."'26 To qualify as "suspect," a class must satisfy three criteria: 1) society
historically has subjected the group to purposeful discriminatory treatment, 2)
the characteristic(s) responsible for the group's suffering are immutable, and
3) society historically has restricted the group's access to the political pro-
cess." When examining this last requirement, courts look to whether the
class lacks the ability to attract lawmakers' attention, not whether the class is
merely "powerless to assert direct control over the legislature."2 This height-
ened standard of review requires that the statutory classification be "suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."'  This test presumes the
legislation's invalidity and places the burden on the state to prove it satisfies
the standard.'
Finally, courts apply a middle standard of heightened judicial scrutiny to
classifications that satisfy some, but not all, of the "suspect" requirements.
These "quasi-suspect" classifications, like suspect classifications, are based on
immutable characteristics unrelated to an individual's ability to contribute to
society." Courts apply "intermediate" scrutiny to classifications based on ille-
gitimacy or gender,32 but refuse this application when evaluating the constitu-
22. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 431 (1979) (stating that "Itihe essence of federalism is that states must be free to de-
velop a variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold").
23. City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
24. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993) (citation omitted).
25. Examples of fundamental rights include the right to vote, Burson v. Freeman, 112
S. Ct. 1846, 1847 (1992); the right to interstate travel, Attomey General v. Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. 898, 924 (1986); and the right to marital privacy, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
26. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
27. Leslie H. Powers, Note, Less Equal Than Others: Persons with Mental Retardation,
Equal Protection and Deinstitutionalization, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINE-
MENT 81, 89 (1989); see also United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
28. Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. Cal.
1993) (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445).
29. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
30. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
31. Id.
32. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1988); Pow-
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tionality of differential legislative treatment based on age,33 wealth, 4 or ho-
mosexuality. 5 Under intermediate scrutiny, legislative discriminatory treat-
ment violates the Equal Protection Clause unless the classification is "substan-
tially related" to an important governmental interest.36
D. Supreme Court Decisions Affecting the Mentally Ill and Mentally
Retarded
1. Basis of the Heller Decision
Prior cases supporting the Heller decision addressed such issues as the
standard of proof for commitment and suspect classifications. In Addington v.
Texas, 37 the Court addressed the appropriate standard of proof required by the
Fourteenth Amendment for the involuntary civil commitment of an individual
to a state mental hospital." The trial judge instructed the jury that the pro-
posed patient must be found by "clear ... and convincing evidence" to be 1)
mentally ill and 2) in need of hospitalization for either his own welfare and
protection or the protection of others.39 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals
held that due process required the higher "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard of proof used in criminal prosecutions.' The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed and held that a "preponderance of the evidence," the lower standard
used in civil litigation, was appropriate.4
The United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld the original "clear and
convincing" standard.42 The Court reasoned that the "function of a standard
of proof" is "to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate
the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision."43 Asserting that
"the function of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous deci-
sions,"" the Court recognized that any civil commitment constitutes a
"significant deprivation of liberty" requiring due process protection." With
ers, supra note 28, at 90-91.
33. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
34. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
35. See Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D.
Cal. 1993). But see Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 440 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (concluding that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals qualify for "quasi-suspect" class
status). The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue.
36. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. For criticism of this complicated multi-level
analysis, see id. (Stevens, J., concurring), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
38. Id. at 419.
39. Id. at 421.
40. Id. at 422.
41. Id. The court relied on its previous decision in State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563
(Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 929 (1978). Turner held that the preponderance of evi-
dence standard of proof satisfied due process in civil commitment proceedings. Id. at 566.
42. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.
43. Id. at 423.
44. Id. at 425.
45. Id.
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such an interest at stake, the Court held that the middle level "clear and con-
vincing" burden of proof was appropriate because it "strikes a fair balance
between the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of the
state." The Court also made clear that states are free to apply the stricter
"beyond a reasonable doubt" criminal standard, but may not utilize any stan-
dard more lenient than the "clear and convincing" constitutional minimum.47
Importantly, the Addington decision did not identify the appropriate standard
of proof for the involuntary commitment of the mentally retarded.4"
Although presented with the issue in Schweiker v. Wilson,49 the Supreme
Court never expressly determined whether the mentally ill qualify as a "sus-
pect class."' " Schweiker addressed the constitutionality of two Federal Social
Security Act provisions." The provisions in question reduced the amount of
benefits received by otherwise eligible individuals who resided in public men-
tal institutions and were not in receipt of Medicaid funds for their care.52 The
Court held that the legislative distinction satisfied the rational-basis test and
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause." The Court reasoned that a statu-
tory classification merely requires a "reasonable basis" and does not offend the
Constitution simply because it is "imperfect" due to its inequitable results.'
Plaintiffs asserted that the class satisfied "suspect class" criteria and warranted
a heightened standard of review. The Court avoided this issue by concluding
that the statute did not directly classify on the basis of mental health." Ac-
cording to the Court, the statute distinguished between residents in public
institutions receiving Medicaid funds and residents in such institutions not
receiving Medicaid." Since the Act did not distinguish between the mentally
ill and nonmentally ill, the "suspect class" question was left unanswered."
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cr., Inc.," the Court found that
the mentally retarded did not qualify as a "suspect class." The Court did hold,
nevertheless, that a Texas city's zoning ordinance requiring a special permit
for the operation of a mentally retarded group home violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because it failed the rational-basis test." The Court concluded
that the special permit requirement was not reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental interest, but appeared to be based on an "irrational prejudice"
46. Id. at 431.
47. Id. at 433.
48. Id. at 433 (stating that the determination of the precise burden is a matter of state
law).
49. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
50. Id. at 230-31.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(l)(A),(B) (1988).
52. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 222.
53. Id. at 237.
54. Id. at 234 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
55. Id. at 231.
56. Id. at 232-33.
57. Id.
58. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). For an in-depth analysis of the, effects of the City of
Cleburne decision, see generally Powers, supra note 27.
59. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
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against the mentally retarded.' Although the Court seemed to alter the ratio-
nal-basis standard by shifting the burden of proof to the city,6 it refused to
apply a heightened standard of review. The Court provided four rationales for
holding that the mentally retarded did not qualify as a "quasi-suspect" class."
First, the Court reasoned that although mental retardation is an immutable
characteristic, there is a wide range among individuals' level of disability.
63
This diversity suggests a preference for professionally-influenced legislative
decisions regarding the legal treatment of this class over the, perhaps ill-in-
formed, opinions of the judiciary.' Second, the Court found that the federal
government's action in outlawing discrimination against the mentally retarded
in federally funded programs negated any claim of invidious discrimination.65
Congress bestowed on this class the right to appropriate habilitation, services,
and treatment in a setting that least restricts their personal liberty.'
Third, the aforementioned legislative response mutes any claim that the
mentally retarded are politically powerless due to their inability to attract
lawmakers' attention.6 Moreover, since any minority can be said to be pow-
erless to assert direct control over the legislature, many laws would be deemed
suspect if that were a requirement for heightened judicial scrutiny.'
Finally, the Court feared difficulty in finding a principled method of dif-
ferentiating the mentally retarded from various other groups with arguably
immutable disabilities who also lack power to mandate favorable legislation
and can legitimately claim to be victimized by public discrimination.' The
Court cited the mentally ill, the aging, the infirm, and the physically disabled
as examples.7" In addition, the Court noted that classifications based on other
related immutable characteristics, such as intelligence and physical disability,
are typically accepted as valid because they are often relevant to legitimate
governmental purposes.7
City of Cleburne did not involve involuntary commitment or any type of
incarceration that would restrict an individual's constitutional right to freedom.
Therefore the Court was not required to decide how the issue of "fundamental
rights" would affect the standard of review applied to laws discriminating on
the basis of mental retardation.
60. Id. at 450.
61. The Court supported the court of appeals in noting that the city never justified "its
apparent view that other people can live under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally
retarded persons cannot." Id. (quoting City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc., 726
F.2d 191, 202 (5th Cir. 1984)).
62. Id. at 442-45.
63. See id. at 442.
64. Id. at 443.
65. See id.
66. Id. (citing Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6010()-(2) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6009(l)-(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
67. Id. at 445.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 445-46.
71. Id. at 433 n.10.
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Five years after the City of Cleburne decision, Congress passed the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 2 The ADA indicated that men-
tally disabled persons are a "discrete and insular minority. '73 This language
suggests that Congress intended to overrule City of Cleburne's holding that the
mentally retarded are not a "suspect class." By virtue of this language in the
ADA, Congress appears to be sanctioning strict judicial scrutiny of any law
that discriminates against the mentally disabled. It is doubtful, however, that
the judiciary is bound by this congressional assertion.74
2. Other Significant Cases
In advocating the statute's failure of the "rational basis" test, the challeng-
ing class in Heller relied on one significant case, Baxstrom v. Herold.75 In
Baxstrom, the Court held that a New York statute violated equal protection by
permitting a person to be civilly committed when his criminal sentence ex-
pired without providing him the jury review available to all others being civil-
ly committed in that state.7 ' Although equal protection does not require that
all persons be dealt with identically, it does require that differential treatment
be somewhat relevant to the purpose for which the classification was creat-
72. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V
1993).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(7), 12102(2). Congress found:
[llndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and result-
ing from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society ....
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Mentally retarded people are included in this class. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2). One purpose of the ADA is "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, in-
cluding the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment ... in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b)(4).
74. Lower courts are split on this issue, but most hold that the congressional finding
does not overrule City of Cleburne, and thus has no effect on judicial equal protection anal-
ysis. See Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993);
More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d. 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 74 (1993);
Thornton v. City of Allegan, 863 F. Supp. 504, 508 (W.D. Mich. 1993); see also Trautz v.
Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that while the "discrete and
insular minority" classification is relevant to § 1985(c) claims, it does not sanction height-
ened scrutiny in an equal protection analysis). But see Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp.
1175, 1209 (S.D. Ohio 1993) ("Congress is far better equipped than the courts accurately to
make such findings. The Court cannot ignore Congress' [sic] finding.") While Congress's
findings "do not overrule the U.S. Supreme Court on an issue of law ... [here] Congress
has made purely factual findings." id. Congress's finding is purely factual "even though ...
[it] is purposely couched in terms used by the U.S. Supreme Court in equal protection cas-
es." Id. at 1209 n.28. Based on Congress's finding in the ADA, the court held in Martin
that a minimum of intermediate scrutiny was applicable. Id. at 1210.
75. 383 U.S. 107 (1966); see Brief for Respondent at 14, Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct.
2637 (1993) (No. 92-351) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
76. Baxtrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
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ed." The Court found that while the classification of a mentally ill person as
either insane or dangerously insane can be a reasonable distinction when made
in the context of determining the type of care to be given, it is not relevant to
the purpose of showing whether a person is mentally ill in the first place.78
Therefore, the Court concluded there was no conceivable basis for the statuto-
ry distinction.79 The Baxtrom decision suggests that a distinction between two
groups, for example the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, can be relevant
when determining the appropriateness of care and treatment. The decision also
asserts, however, that such a distinction may not be rationally related to the
purpose of showing whether an individual initially qualifies for one of the
groups.
Prior to the Court's decision in Heller, several cases addressed the free-
dom rights, or liberty interests, of the mentally ill and mentally retarded.
These cases will be discussed chronologically. The first three decisions fo-
cused on the rights of the mentally ill.
First, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,"° the Court held that, under the Consti-
tution, a state may not confine a non-dangerous mentally ill individual who is
capable of living safely in freedom.8' The Court reasoned that public intoler-
ance or animosity did not provide sufficient justification for depriving a person
of his or her physical liberty.82 Because involuntary confinement based solely
on a diagnosis of mental illness violates the constitutional right to freedom, a
valid determination of the individual's dangerousness, either to himself or
others, is also required to justify confinement.83 The O'Connor ruling, decid-
ed four years before Addington, gave no intimation as to the proper standard
for proving an individual dangerous.
Next, in Parham v. J.R.,s' the Court held that a Georgia statute permit-
ting parents or guardians to commit minor children to a state mental hospital
on a voluntary basis was not unconstitutional per se.8" The Court recognized,
however, that a child has constitutionally protectible interests in not being
erroneously labeled as mentally ill and in being free of unnecessary bodily
restraints.86 As a result, the Court ruled that the statute required revisions in
order to protect children's liberty rights.87 Due to the significant risk of error
involved in allowing a parental decision to institutionalize a child, the Court
required inquiry by a neutral factfinder to determine whether statutory admis-
sion requirements had been met.88 The Court also required that the neutral
77. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 111-12.
80. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
81. Id. at 576.
82. Id. at 575.
83. See id. at 576.
84. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
85. Id. at 616-17.
86. Id. at 601.
87. See id. at 601, 606-07.
88. Id. at 606.
1995]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
party be given the authority to refuse admittance of a child who fails to satisfy
the requisite medical standards.8 9 As a final prerequisite to the statute's ap-
proval, the Court required a similarly independent periodic review of each
child's need for continuing commitment.' °
The following year, in Vitek v. Jones,9 the Court struck down as
unconsitutional a Nebraska statute that allowed the involuntary transfer of
criminally convicted prisoners to a state mental hospital for the treatment of
mental illness.92 The statute violated the prisoners' due process rights because
it failed to provide them with notice, a hearing, an opportunity to present a
defense, an independent decision maker, a written statement justifying a deci-
sion to transfer, and legal counsel.93 While the Court recognized that commit-
ment to a mental hospital results in "a massive curtailment of liberty" for the
ordinary citizen,94 it found that a valid criminal conviction and the resulting
prison sentence extinguish a convict's right to freedom from confinement.95
Ultimately, however, the Court reasoned that the loss of liberty that involun-
tary commitment produces is greater than the loss of freedom from confine-
ment because of the stigmatizing consequences and mandatory behavior modi-
fication treatment that accompany commitment to a mental hospital.'
Youngberg v. Romeo97 directly addressed the liberty interests of the men-
tally retarded.98 In Youngberg, the Court held that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, mentally retarded individuals have a con-
stitutionally protected right to reasonably nonrestrictive confinement condi-
tions, as well as the right to safe conditions of care and adequate training
required to protect those interests.' The Court noted that freedom from bodi-
ly restraint has always been considered to be at the core of liberty protected
from arbitrary governmental action." ° The Court reasoned that because the
right to that particular type of freedom continues to survive even in the crimi-
nal system of incarceration, it must also survive with respect to involuntary
commitment.'
Because the confined individual in Youngberg did not challenge his com-
89. Id. at 607.
90. Id.
91. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
92. Id. at 491. But see People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1981) (automatic com-
mitment of an insanity aquittee does not violate due process).
93. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494-95.
94. Id. (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
95. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Cor-
rectional Complex, 442 U.S. I, 7 (1979)).
96. See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494.
97. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For an analysis of the effects of the Youngberg decision, see
Diane M. Weidert, Comment, Constitutional Rights of the Involuntarily Committed Mentally
Retarded After Youngberg v. Romeo, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1113 (1983).
98. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314-15.
99. Id. at 324.




mitment,0 2 the Court had no occasion to designate the proper burden of
proof necessary to commit a retarded individual involuntarily. 3 In determin-
ing whether a committed individual should be denied his right to be free of
restraint, however, the Court did not refer to the Addington standard of "clear
and convincing evidence" of dangerousness.'" Instead, the Court invoked the
lower standard of "professional judgment"'0 " that allowed the individual staff
member in charge to decide whether restraints were appropriate.
Finally, in Foucha v. Louisiana," a person acquitted by reason of
insanity who was cured of his mental illness challenged the constitutionality of
a state statute that failed to provide him with the same procedural safeguards
against unwarranted confinement that were guaranteed to those facing civil
commitment."' Faced with an equal protection issue, the Court relied on
Youngberg to determine that freedom from physical confinement was a "fun-
damental right" triggering strict scrutiny." Because the Court found no
compelling reason for the discrimination, they concluded that the statute vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause and was therefore unconstitutional."' 9 Al-
though Foucha involved mental illness, the basis for the decision rested on the
fundamental right to be free from physical confinement identified in
Youngberg.
The timing of the Foucha decision was significant because it occurred
several months before Heller v. Doe was brought before the Supreme Court,
but after the Sixth Circuit decided Heller on equal protection grounds. One
could logically assume that the Court would apply either the
Foucha/Youngberg rule establishing an individual's fundamental right to free-
dom or the Baxtrom decision regarding initial classification. The Court de-
clined to take either approach.
II. HELLER v. DOE
A. Facts and Procedural History
Heller began as a civil rights class action attempting to stop the institu-
102. Id. at 315.
103. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 37-48.
105. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
106. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
107. Id. at 1782.
108. Id. at 1788. The statute in Foucha was struck down on substantive due process
grounds. Id. at 1781. The equal protection decision was decided by a plurality, with four
justices joining the "fundamental rights" ruling. Justice O'Connor did not address the "funda-
mental rights" question because she joined the decision with respect to due process consider-
ations only, finding it unnecessary to examine equal protection issues. Id. at 1790-91.
109. Id. at 1788-89. In Foucha, the Court reaffirmed its decision in Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding that due process requires that "the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted"). Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators
in Kansas: A Modem Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 899 (1994).
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tionalization of mentally retarded adults under unconstitutional circumstanc-
es.' 0 Plaintiff, Samuel Doe, represented a class of citizens similarly situated
as involuntarily committed mentally retarded adults in the state of Ken-
tucky."' The Kentucky Cabinet of Human Resources ("CHR") had no
knowledge of the whereabouts of plaintiff at the time of the decision because
a fictitious name had been used to identify him since the beginning of the
suit.'"2
The specific issues raised by the litigation changed with each of the four
decisions leading up to Heller. The original suit challenged the constitutional-
ity of a Kentucky statute that considered a mentally retarded adult's commit-
ment by a parent or guardian to be "voluntary" and therefore required no
judicial hearing on the matter." 3 The district court determined that these
commitments were "involuntary" because they occurred without the
individual's consent."4 The district court also held that the statute, by requir-
ing a judicial hearing for the mentally ill but not for the mentally retarded
prior to involuntary commitment, violated the Equal Protection Clause." 5 Af-
ter acknowledging -that significant differences exist between the two
groups," 6 the court concluded that no rational basis existed for the class
distinction with respect to initial involuntary commitment."7 The district
court ordered the state to provide a judicial hearing to any allegedly mentally
retarded adult facing involuntary commitment."8  The Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's equal protection decision."9 The court of appeals held
unanimously that while due process does not require a judicial hearing under
the circumstances, equal protection does require a hearing because the state
lacks a rational basis for providing a hearing to the mentally ill but not the
mentally retarded. 2 ° The court found the distinction between the classes rele-
vant only with regard to the frequency of judicial review regulating continued
confinement.' 2' The Supreme Court denied CHR's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari later that year.
2
In response to Sixth Circuit's decision, the Kentucky General Assembly
quickly revised the statute before the district court could enact an agreed-upon
compliance plan designed to implement the previous decisions of both
courts.23 The plan would have required the state to provide the mentally re-
tarded with the same rights and procedures as the mentally ill when facing in-
110. Brief for Respondent at 1.
111. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, 110 (6th Cir. 1992).
112. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Heller v. Doe 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (No. 92-351).
113. Doe v. Austin, 668 F. Supp. 597, 600 (W.D. Ky. 1986).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 601.
116. Id. at 600.
117. Id. at 601.
118. Id. at 602.
119. Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).
120. Id. at 1395.
121. Id. at 1396.
122. Cowherd v. Doe, 488 U.S. 967 (1988).
123. Brief for Respondent at 6-7.
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voluntary commitment." Instead, the statutory revisions resulted in two sig-
nificant new differences in treatment. First, the standard of proof for institu-
tionalizing the allegedly mentally retarded was lowered to "clear and convinc-
ing evidence." Second, family members and guardians of an allegedly retarded
person were granted party status in the commitment process, giving them the
right to an appeal."
The next round of litigation challenged the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive revisions.'26 The district court responded by holding that both new pro-
visions violated the Equal Protection Clause. 2' CHR defended the lower bur-
den of proof under Addington v. Texas, which permitted the "clear and con-
vincing" standard for involuntary commitment of the mentally ill. 28 In de-
ciding the case, the court relied, however, on a previous Sixth Circuit decision
and cited City of Cleburne29 as the appropriate precedent in holding that leg-
islation sanctioning differential treatment of the mentally retarded from the
mentally ill in commitment proceedings failed the rational basis test." In
addition, the court reasoned that Kentucky law provides that "when a proceed-
ing may lead to the loss of personal liberty, the defendant in that proceeding
should be afforded the same constitutional protection as is given to the ac-
cused in a criminal prosecution."'' This constitutional protection includes
judgement under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
The court then ruled that the threat to personal liberty is identical for both
the mentally retarded and the mentally ill. Because the statute failed the
rational basis test, the court did not find it necessary to address the "strict
scrutiny" issue. The district court then enjoined Kentucky from applying or
enforcing either provision."'
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed the district court's decision
regarding the equal protection challenge."3 CHR asserted that the many dif-
ferences between the mentally ill and mentally retarded provided a reasonable
basis for the different standards of proof.'35 The Sixth Circuit found that
simply identifying differences between classes is not sufficient to satisfy equal
protection demands-the distinctions must be relevant to the classification's
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(2)-(3) (Michie 1991).
126. See Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
127. Id. at 358.
128. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32); see supra text accompanying
notes 38-49.
129. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1988).
130. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 358; see supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
131. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. at 358 (quoting Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681,
682 (Ky. 1964)).
132. Id. at 358.
133. Id. at 359.
134. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1992).
135. See id. at 112. CHR contended that mental retardation I) is a permanent, incurable
condition while mental illness is treatable, 2) is not treated, but requires "habilitation" on a
continuing basis, 3) requires less intrusive services than mental illness, and 4) is less stigma-
tized than mental illness. Id.
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purpose.'36 The court found no evidentiary support in the trial record for the
differences CHR claimed were relevant.'
37
The court also reasoned that allowing third parties to participate in the
proceedings as parties with the right to appeal would impose a greater burden
than is imposed on similarly situated mentally ill adults, especially when their
"interests may be adverse to the person facing commitment."'38 The court
noted its holding in a previous case that the decision to commit is not within
the discretion of a mentally retarded adult's parent or guardian.'39 The circuit
court found no rational basis for distinguishing between the mentally ill and
retarded in this regard."
CHR again petitioned the Supreme Court in a final attempt to defend the
Kentucky statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
Kentucky's statutory class distinction between the mentally retarded and the
mentally ill violated the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Majority Opinion
In determining what level of judicial scrutiny to apply to Kentucky's
statutory class distinction, the Court conceded that although heightened scruti-
ny may have applied, the issue was not properly presented because all four of
the cases below had been litigated and decided under the rational basis theo-
ry. '4 The lower standard of review did not require the state to make the
extensive evidentiary showing necessary for the statute to survive heightened
scrutiny. The Court, therefore, ruled that it would be unfair and imprudent to
inject a more stringent standard at such a late stage in the litigation.'42 The
Court applied minimum rationality, requiring the state to show that its differ-
ential statutory treatment of allegedly mentally retarded persons facing invol-
untary commitment was reasonably related to some legitimate governmental
purpose.'43 Additionally, the majority denied that anything other than the tra-
ditional rational-basis standard had been applied in City of Cleburne.'"
In its equal protection analysis, the Court adhered to the principle that a
classification should be upheld if any reasonably conceivable state of facts
could provide a rational basis for the distinction."' The Court ruled that a
state must merely present a plausible argument to justify legislative discrimi-
136. Id. (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, Ill (1966)).
137. Id. at 112.
138. Id. at 113.
139, Id. (citing Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
967 (1988)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2642.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2643; see City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).




nation, placing the burden on the challenging party to "negative every conceiv-
able basis" that could support the classification." CHR asserted that differ-
ences between the groups justified the disparity in treatment.47 The Supreme
Court agreed with CHR and viewed the distinctions as rational. 4
The Court concluded that three differences were relevant to the purposes
served by the lower standard of proof. First, it found that mental retardation is
easier to diagnose than mental illness because it is a developmental disability
that becomes apparent during childhood.'49 In contrast, mental illness can
have sudden manifestations after adulthood is reached."5 In the Court's
view, the relative ease of diagnosing mental retardation justified the lower
burden of proof.' Second, because mental retardation is a permanent, rela-
tively static condition when compared to mental illness, a more accurate deter-
mination of dangerousness may be based on any instances of violent behavior
in the mentally retarded individual's past. 5 2 In comparison, with mental ill-
ness past behavior may not be an adequate predictor of future actions.'53
Finally, the Court found that treatment methods for mental retardation
were much less invasive than those for mental illness.'" Whereas mentally
ill persons may be subjected to personally intrusive medical and psychiatric
treatment, including psychotropic drug treatment, the mentally retarded are
provided "habilitation" consisting of education and training intended to im-
prove their self-sufficiency skills.' The Court conceded that the loss of
freedom both groups experience following commitment may be similar, and
that some committed mentally retarded adults may be subjected to more intru-
sive treatments during confinement.'56 The Court reasoned, however, that the
Kentucky legislature could have plausibly believed that most committed men-
146. Id. at 2643 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364
(1973)). Several lower courts have since cited Heller confirming that the burden of proof
remains on the challenger when applying the rational basis standard. See, e.g., Contractors
Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1011 (3d Cir. 1993); Dahl v. Secretary of the
United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319, 1326 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
147. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643.
148. See id. at 2647.
149. Id. at 2643.
150. Id. at 2644. The Court found CHR's premise that mental retardation is easier to
diagnose than mental illness had a sufficient factual basis. Id. (citing James W. Ellis & Ruth
A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 438-39
(1985)).
151. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2644. The Sixth Circuit did not address this argument in its
Cowherd decision. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). The district court, however, found that the relative ease of
diagnosing mental retardation was only relevant to the frequency of reviewing an individual's
need for continued confinement. Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354, 358 (W.D. Ky. 1991),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
152. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2644.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2645.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2645-46.
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tally retarded persons receive different, less invasive treatment than the men-
tally ill. 57 It concluded that a legislature is permitted to use this sort of gen-
eralization under minimum rationality review because the issue was at least
debatable.5 ' The Court noted that each of the three arguments alone were
sufficient to satisfy a rational basis test.'59
The Court also upheld the statutory distinction allowing family members
and guardians to participate as parties in the commitment proceedings of the
allegedly mentally retarded, but not in those of the allegedly mentally ill."6
The Court found that two of the contended differences were rationally related
to the state's purpose for distinguishing between the two groups.'6 ' The
Court found that sudden onset during adulthood could preclude family mem-
bers from knowing of a mentally ill person's condition because they are no
longer regularly caring for the individual.'62 In comparison, the onset of
mental retardation during a person's developmental years would give the fami-
ly members opportunity to make observations which are important to the de-
termination of the proper treatment for that individual.'63 In addition, the
Court found that the mentally ill have a greater need for privacy than the
mentally retarded."6 This rationale justified keeping the number of third par-
ties attending the commitment proceedings for the mentally ill to a mini-
mum. 65 The Court speculated that the Kentucky legislature could have al-
lowed the relatives and guardians of a mentally retarded person to participate
in the hearing without granting them party status."'6 The Court ruled, howev-
er, that even if a less restrictive alternative method exists, such an alternative
must be disregarded if the state advances a reasonable and identifiable govern-
mental purpose for the statutory distinction.'67 Under the rational basis test, a




Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's refusal to address the ques-
tion of heightened scrutiny." She also agreed that permitting the relatives
and guardians of mentally retarded persons to participate as parties in commit-
157. Id. at 2646.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2647.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2647-48.
162. Id. at 2647.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Majority provided no support for this conclusion.
165. Id. at 2647-48.
166. Id. at 2648.
167. Id. (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981)).
168. Heller. 113 S. Ct. at 2648 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. I, 51 (1973)).
169. Id. at 2650 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ment proceedings did not violate equal protection or procedural due pro-
cess. O'Connor, however, disagreed with the majority's upholding of the
differential standard of proof because she believed this aspect of the class
distinction was irrational. 7'
2. Justice Souter
Justice Souter's dissent initially questioned the majority's justification for
refusing to address the issue of heightened scrutiny.'72 He acknowledged
respondents' arguments that under Foucha v. Louisiana' a fundamental
right was at issue and that the mentally ill were designated a "suspect class"
by Congress with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."' Souter
concluded, however, that the issue need not be addressed because the class
distinctions created in Kentucky's statutory scheme failed even the rational-
basis test. 7 Souter also questioned the majority's failure to either apply or
overrule the City of Cleburne decision." 6 The Court in City of Cleburne
ruled that legislation discriminating against the mentally retarded was ground-
ed in "irrational prejudice" and therefore lacked a rational basis.'77 Souter
stated that he would have followed the City of Cleburne decision because it
had not been expressly overruled.'78 He argued that, in accordance with City
of Cleburne, the Court should have concluded that the differential treatment
sanctioned by the Kentucky statute also lacked any reasonable association to a
legitimate state interest.1
Souter then disputed each argument presented by the majority to justify
Kentucky's statutory class distinctions under rational-basis review. First, he
concluded that the differences between the mentally retarded and the mentally
ill did not rationally justify different standards of proof for involuntarily
committment to state institutions." Regarding the ease of diagnosis and de-
termination of dangerousness arguments, Souter declared that the majority
"misunderstands the principle object in setting burdens" when it bases a bur-
170. Id.
171. Id. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Souter's dissent only with respect to that one
issue. Justice Blackmun joined Souter's dissent in its entirety, as did Justice Stevens.
Blackmun only wrote separately to emphasize his belief that laws that infringe upon funda-
mental rights or discriminate against mentally retarded persons should be subjected to height-
ened judicial scrutiny. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
172. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
174. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 nn.1-2; see also Brief for Respondent at 27-32 (arguing
that Congress has indicated in the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993), that disabled persons are a "discrete and insular minority"
sanctioning strict judicial scrutiny of laws which discriminate against them).
175. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
178. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2652-53, 2656.
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den of proof on the difficulty of avoiding error.' Instead, he argued that the
burden of proof should be based on the importance of avoiding error viewed
from the perspective of the parties affected by the allocation.'82 Souter rea-
soned that no difference exists between the two groups with respect to their
rights to be free from bodily restraint and to avoid stigmatization. 3 He con-
cluded that there is "not a shred of rational support [for Kentucky's] decision
to discriminate against the mentally retarded in allocating the risk of erroneous
curtailment of liberty" because a mentally retarded person has as much to lose
from civil commitment as one who is mentally ill-including losses of free-
dom and privacy.'
Souter noted that Kentucky failed to explain how the permanency of men-
tal retardation could rationally justify the increased risk of erroneous curtail-
ment of liberty." 5 He pointed out that the decreased likelihood that perma-
nently mentally retarded persons would ever regain their freedom actually
supports the application of a higher standard of proof-not a lower
one-because there is so much at stake."s Souter also noted that the state
did not even attempt to justify the lower burden of proof in connection with
the last two statutory requirements: that the commitment be beneficial and that
it be the least restrictive alternative method of treatment. 87
Souter next responded to the argument that the mentally retarded receive
less invasive treatments than mentally ill. He disputed the majority's finding
that the Kentucky legislature could have plausibly believed that the mentally
retarded are subjected to less invasive medical or psychological treatments.'88
Citing numerous professional articles and studies, Souter stressed that psycho-
tropic drugs and behavior modification are no less commonly used, or mis-
used, in treating the mentally retarded than the mentally ill."s In fact, inva-
sive behavior therapy and drug therapy are often used together in treating the
mentally retarded."9 He concluded that no differences in therapeutic regimes
exist that could conceivably explain the less rigorous commitment standards
for the allegedly mentally retarded. 9'
Souter also objected to the disparity regarding the party-status of relatives
and guardians at commitment proceedings. He first reasoned that the distinc-
tions between the two groups the majority found relevant did not apply to the
guardian.'92 Guardians of both classes have equal legal obligations to protect
181. Id. at 2653.
182. Id.
183. See id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)).
184. Id. at 2653-54.
185. Id. at 2656 n.7.
186. Id. at 2656. The commitment of a mentally retarded person usually constitutes a
"life sentence." Id. at 2656 n.7.
187. Id. at 2653 n.4.
188. Id. at 2654.
189. Id.
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their wards.'93 Souter next reasoned that these distinctions were completely
unrelated to the objectionable aspects of the statute."9 He argued that grant-
ing party-status to relatives or guardians, and thus giving them the right to ap-
peal any decision not resulting in institutionalization, in effect presents the
mentally retarded individual with a second prosecutor. 95 He emphasized that
neither the alleged differential in needs for privacy nor the alleged more regu-
lar connection between the relatives and guardians of the mentally retarded
versus those those of the mentally ill, explained any purpose the additional
burden would serve."' Souter concluded there was no rational justification
for imposing the burden of a "second prosecutor" on the allegedly mentally re-
tarded but not the allegedly mentally ill.'97
1II. ANALYSIS
A. Rational Basis Review
To invalidate a facially discriminatory statute under rational basis review,
the challenging party must prove either that there is no legitimate governmen-
tal interest behind the statute or, alternatively, that the classifications at issue
lack any reasonable relationship to that interest."' Under its parens patriae
powers, a state has a legitimate interest in providing care to its citizens with
mental disorders who are unable to care for themselves.'" A state also pos-
sesses authority under its police powers to protect the community from a men-
tally ill or retarded individual with dangerous tendencies.2" A state has a
countervailing interest, however, in protecting the constitutional rights of those
with mental disorders."° In upholding Kentucky's involuntary commitment
scheme as constitutional, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory class
distinctions were rationally related to the state's interest in confining and car-
ing for dangerous mentally retarded persons. 2 The Court ruled that any
plausible argument that conceivably could have been grounds for the
legislature's differential treatment would suffice to justify the discrimina-
tion."0 3
193. Id.
194. Id. at 2656-57.
195. Id. at 2657.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
199. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). The parens patriae doctrine has
fallen into disfavor with the courts when used to uphold involuntary commitment statutes.
Brief for Respondent at 2 n.1 (citing Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 417 (W.D. Ky.
1975)). To justify confinement under current jurisprudence, a judicial determination is re-
quired to show that an individual is dangerous as well as mentally ill or retarded. See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.026, 202B.040 (Michie 1994); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 576 (1975).
200. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
201. Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 145-59.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
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The Court's application of the plausible argument principle further diluted
the effect of the already deferential rational basis standard. The application of
such a diluted test appears inconsistent with the application of the seemingly
more stringent test applied to the ordinance in City of Cleburne.2' Most im-
portantly, the Court failed to consider that a person is only "allegedly" mental-
ly retarded at the commencement of the judicial commitment proceedings."°
The law affords all alleged criminals the benefit of being considered "innocent
until proven guilty."2' Alleged offenders are not given different procedural
protections depending on what crime they are accused of committing. In Ken-
tucky, however, the differential treatment is based on a diagnosis that has not
yet been judicially established. During commitment proceedings in Kentucky,
a person is in effect considered mentally retarded until proven normal.
Until there has been a judicial determination that an individual is both
mentally retarded and dangerous, that individual should be afforded the same
benefit as any other citizen facing confinement. As Justice Souter argued,
differences between the mentally ill and mentally retarded cease to exist when
it comes to their rights to be free from bodily restraint and to avoid
stigmatization.207 According to the Court's ruling in Baxstrom v. Herold,2'
differences between the groups in diagnostic, accuracy or treatment methods
are irrelevant to the purpose of judicially categorizing a person into either
group.2" Had the Court followed its Baxtrom rule in Heller, it would have
concluded that none of the purported differences between the groups could
plausibly be related to the burden of proof required for determination of
whether an individual qualifies for either group. Under the proper analysis, the
justifications for the burden of proof differential have no reasonable relation to
Kentucky's purpose for judicially determining an individual is mentally retard-
ed in the first place.
With respect to the party-status disparity, the state could have a legitimate
interest in protecting the rights of the parents and guardians. Many parents and
guardians can no longer financially, emotionally, or physically care for their
mentally retarded children after they have grown to adulthood, especially if
there has been an increase in violent behavior. In comparison, the parents or
guardians of a mentally ill adult are often not responsible for the care of that
person at the time they become ill and dangerous.2t ° While the parens patri-
204. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); see supra note
7.
205. See Brief for Respondent at 18-22 (arguing it is prejudicial to base a proceeding on
an issue that the hearing itself is designed to adjudicate). While Justice Souter did not cite
specifially to Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), in his dissenting opinion, he did
emphasize that the issue in Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993), was "the application of
the provision to adults who have not been shown to be mentally retarded, but who are sim-
ply alleged to be." Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
206. People also generally retain the right to be presumed competent even after hospi-
talization for mental illness. BRAKEL, ET AL. supra note 3, at 258.
207. See supra note 183-84.
208. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
210. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2647 (1993).
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ae doctrine applies in both of these situations, the parents of a mentally retard-
ed adult possess a greater interest in having influence at the commitment pro-
ceedings than the parents of a mentally ill adult. The rights at issue in a com-
mitment proceeding, however, are those of the individuals facing confinement,
not those of their parents or guardians. The mentally retarded have no less of
a right not to be faced with a "second prosecutor" than the mentally ill.
Financial or emotional inability to care for a retarded adult child is not a
sufficient basis for committing that child. If the court determines, however,
that the adult child satisfies the statutory criteria for commitment, then the
state realistically may be in a position to provide better care than the parents
or guardians. As the majority pointed out, the parents and guardians of a men-
tally retarded person also have more information concerning the individual's
condition and behavior that may be helpful in determining the best course of
treatment for the individual.2 ' Thus, this distinction could conceivably be
related to Kentucky's interest in ensuring that mentally retarded persons are
given proper care. Nonetheless, as Baxtrom pointed out, while the difference
in parental knowledge may be relevant to post-adjudicatory decisions regarding
care and treatment, it is entirely irrelevant to determining whether the adult
child is mentally ill or retarded in the first place. The Baxtrom argument,
therefore, overrides the Court's rationale supporting the party-status distinction
because that treatment differential is also employed before adjudication.
Finally, the majority's finding that mentally ill people have a greater need
for privacy at their commitment proceedings lacks evidentiary support. The
Court provided no factual basis for the premise that, in the eyes of the general
public, a sudden infliction of mental illness is more stigmatizing than mental
retardation. Similarly, no factual basis exists for the Majority's premise that
the mentally ill are entitled to more privacy. As in City of Cleburne, this al-
leged distinction seems to be based on an "irrational prejudice"2 2 and is ir-
relevant to any state interest in allowing parents and guardians access to the
commitment proceedings. The absence of rational basis found in City of
Cleburne need not be followed blindly as Justice Souter suggests, however,
since the facts of that case are so dissimilar to Heller.
211. Id.
212. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); see supra
text accompanying note 60. The majority hinted at its own "irrational prejudice" with respect
to this subject matter in its discussion of historical English common law references to the
mentally retarded and mentally ill as "idiots" and "lunatics," respectively. See Heller, 113 S.
Ct. at 2646. The majority used historical distinctions in legal treatment to attempt to justify
the present-day differentials between the two groups. See id. The Court previously exhibited
this type of prejudice when it upheld a statute allowing state institutions to sterilize retarded
persons. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Buck has not been overruled officially,
though the Court later held that procreation was a fundamental right. See Skinner v. Oklaho-
ma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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B. Application of Heightened Scrutiny
For strict scrutiny to apply, a legislative classification must either deny
fundamental rights or discriminate against a "suspect class. ' 2" The Majority
in Heller refused to address the strict scrutiny question for procedural rea-
sons.2 '" The following discussion addresses arguments for the application of
strict scrutiny that nevertheless existed.
I. Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Classification
Though the mentally retarded as a class fail to qualify for heightened
judicial review, they arguably do satisfy some of the Carolene Products crite-
211ria. Mental retardation is unquestionably immutable and the mentally re-
tarded as a class have historically been subjected to purposeful discriminatory
treatment."6 City of Cleburne held, however, that the mentally retarded
lacked sufficient political powerlessness to qualify as a suspect or quasi-sus-
pect class.1 7 While the ADA declared that disabled persons were a "discrete
and insular minority,"2 s this congressional attention most likely supports
rather than contradicts the City of Cleburne rationale.2 9 The congressional
finding also has a questionable effect on the judiciary's equal protection analy-
sis. 2  Thus, in light of City of Cleburne, a claim filed directly under the
ADA might have been a more successful avenue for respondents than a claim
that the mentally retarded constitute a suspect class.
Legislation that discriminates on the basis of gender or illegitimacy, the
two "quasi-suspect" classifications, warrants an intermediate standard of scruti-
ny because, inter alia, those characteristics do not affect a person's ability to
perform or contribute to society.2 Mental retardation undoubtedly affects
213. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
216. See supra text accompanying note 27.
217. See supra text accompanying note 67-68.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74. If courts were bound by the ADA con-
gressional finding, then Congress could designate any group a "discrete and insular minority"
and the courts would have to apply strict scrutiny to any statute treating any such group
differently.
219. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5, Heller v. Doe, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (1993) (No. 92-
351) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioner]. But see BRAKEL, ET AL., supra note 3, at 617
(commenting that "Itlhose born with or afflicted with any mental disorder are a weak con-
stituency for asserting rights and obtaining services for themselves and future generations of
mentally disabled persons"). In response to respondents' ADA argument, the state argued that
applying a higher standard of review to legislation distinguishing the mentally retarded might
actually deprive them of benefits. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 6. Kentucky also argued that
"[n]o part of the legislative history of the ADA . . . establishes any Congressional intent to
overrule City of Clebume's analysis of the issue." Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5. Even if
Congress had intended to overrule Cir, of Cleburne, it could not "find" that the mentally re-
tarded are a "suspect class" because that would be a legal, not a factual, finding. See supra
note 74.
220. See styr note 74 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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one's performance and contribution abilities. Therefore, even though mental
retardation satisfies at least two of the Carolene Products requirements, not all
quasi-suspect class criteria are satisfied. Even if the mentally retarded do not
qualify as a suspect or "quasi-suspect" class, they are still entitled, however, to
protection of their fundamental rights.
2. Fundamental Rights
The Court held that the strict scrutiny question had not been "properly
presented" in the lower courts.22 2 Respondents may have erred by not argu-
ing for strict scrutiny in the beginning stage of the litigation. The Court, how-
ever, failed to acknowledge that the Foucha decision came down six weeks af-
ter the Sixth Circuit heard arguments in Cowherd.223 The respondents intro-
duced their "fundamental rights" issue for the first time in their answer brief
for Heller.224 Respondents had no occasion to introduce the Foucha funda-
mental rights argument sooner because CHR, as petitioner, was responsible for
filing the writ of certiorari and the initial brief delineating the issues in Heller.
Respondents were merely correcting the inaccuracy of petitioners presentation
of the issues, in accordance with Supreme Court rules, 25 and updating their
arguments in light of Foucha. Respondents continued to assert that the Ken-
tucky statute violated equal protection-they did not dispute the accuracy of
the main issue. Respondents simply attempted to strengthen their position by
applying the Supreme Court's Foucha ruling. Therefore, the Court could have
addressed the argument and applied strict scrutiny to Kentucky's class distinc-
tion if it had so chosen. Admittedly, respondents should have based their strict
scrutiny argument on the Youngberg due process decision from the onset.226
Had the statute been invalidated under strict scrutiny instead of rational basis,
CHR may have been less willing to appeal.
In Heller, the majority stated in its minimum rationality reasoning that "a
classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along sus-
pect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity." '227 The Court's deni-
al that a fundamental right was at issue seems to contradict its rulings in
Youngberg and Foucha that freedom from bodily restraint is a fundamental
right warranting strict scrutiny of any law threatening to deny that right to a
designated class.228 Surely the Court did not intend to insinuate that freedom
222. See supra text accompanying note 141. It is questionable whether the Court would
have used this rationale to refuse the application of strict scrutiny to a statute with a racial
classification or a statute denying a group the right to vote.
223. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992), was argued on March 30, 1992
and Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992), was decided on May 18, 1992.
224. Brief for Respondent at 23-24. Since the strict scrutiny issue had been presented in
Respondents' brief, the Majority would not have been addressing it sua sponte.
225. SuP. CT. R. 24.2.
226. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), was decided four years before Doe v.
Austin, 668 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Ky. 1986), the first adjudication in the Heller litigation. See
supra text accompanying notes 97-105.
227. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637. 2642 (1993).
228. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1992).
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from bodily restraint is not a fundamental right of the mentally retarded.
The Court's decision not to address the issue of strict scrutiny was the
most questionable ruling in Heller. Very few cases of impaired fundamental
rights are upheld when strictly scrutinized.229 Had the Court applied their
Youngberg/Foucha ruling to Heller, it likely would have held that both statuto-
ry distinctions violated the Equal Protection Clause.
C. Reasonable Doubt Standard for All Facing Confinement
A standard of proof reflects the value society places on individual liber-
ty.2" The mentally ill and the mentally retarded have equal liberty inter-
ests."' Thus, the burden of proof required to involuntarily commit both
classes should be identical. Allowing the lower "clear and convincing" stan-
dard in commitment proceedings suggests that our society values the liberty
rights of the allegedly mentally deficient less than those of alleged criminals.
This proposition is inconsistent with the Court's ruling in Vitek that the loss of
liberty produced by involuntary commitment is greater than the loss of free-
dom from criminal confinement.232 If proving "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that a person committed a crime is not an excessive requirement for the state,
then proving "beyond a reasonable doubt" that a person is mentally ill or re-
tarded, and dangerous, should not be excessively burdensome either. This is
especially true for the mentally retarded, who are actually easier to diagnose
and less likely to ever be released from confinement.233 Since commitment
for the mentally retarded is usually equivalent to a "life sentence," members of
that group are entitled to the "reasonable doubt" standard as much or more
than the mentally ill or criminally accused.
The mentally retarded, the mentally ill, and the criminally accused are all
"similarly situated" groups when facing involuntary confinement. Therefore,
that confinement should be allowed only when the state can prove "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that restriction of liberty is justified. In Addington, the
Court explicitly sanctioned the states' freedom to apply the reasonable doubt
standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings." The flexibility afford-
ed by the Addington decision should be employed with respect to both the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill.
229. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1452 (2d ed.
1988). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
230. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
231. See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
232. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 149 and 186.




In Heller, the Supreme Court failed to capitalize on an opportunity to
establish that the mentally retarded and the mentally ill have equal rights un-
der the Constitution. By declining to apply strict scrutiny, the Court "leaned
over backwards" in order to sustain Kentucky's statutory distinction by lending
"extraordinary deference" to the rational basis test. 35 Even under minimum
rationality review, however, the court should have recognized that the mentally
ill and the mentally retarded have equal liberty interests before adjudication.
The majority's refusal to address the fundamental rights issue in Heller has
merely delayed that decision to a later date. In the interim, the Court's avoid-
ance tactics could result in individuals being involuntarily committed while
there is still a "reasonable doubt" whether they are mentally retarded and
dangerous.
Mari-Rae Sopper
235. See supra note 7 and text accompanying note 204.
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